

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

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The American Political Science Review

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NO. 2

A CRITIQUE OF THE ELITIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

JACK L. WALKER

The University of Michigan

During the last thirty years, there have been numerous attempts to revise or reconstitute the "classical" theory of democracy: the familiar doctrine of popular rule, patterned after the New England town meeting, which asserts that public policy should result from extensive, informed discussion and debate.¹ By extending general participation in decision-making the classical theorists hoped to increase the citizen's awareness of his moral and social responsibilities, reduce the danger of tyranny, and improve the quality of government. Public officials, acting as agents of the public at large, would then carry out the broad policies decided upon by majority vote in popular assemblies.

Although it is seldom made clear just which of the classical democratic theorists is being referred to, contemporary criticism has focused primarily on the descriptive elements of the theory, on its basic conceptions of citizenship, representation and decision-making.² The con-

cept of an active, informed, democratic citizenry, the most distinctive feature of the traditional theory, is the principal object of attack. On empirical grounds it is argued that very few such people can be found in Western societies. Public policy is not the expression of the common good as conceived of by the citizenry after widespread discussion and compromise. This description of policy making is held to be dangerously naive because it overlooks the role of demagogic leadership, mass psychology, group coercion, and the influence of those who control concentrated economic power. In short, classical democratic theory is held to be unrealistic; first because it employs conceptions of the nature of man and the operation of society which are utopian, and second because it does not provide adequate, operational definitions of its key concepts.

Since contemporary scholars have found the classical theory of democracy inadequate, a "revisionist" movement has developed, much as it has among contemporary Marxists, seeking to reconstitute the theory and bring it into closer correspondence with the latest findings of empirical research. One major restatement, called the "elitist theory of democracy"

¹ For discussions of the meaning of the classical theory of democracy see: George Sabine, "The Two Democratic Traditions," *The Philosophical Review*, 61 (1952), 451-474; and his *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1958), especially chs. 31 and 32. Also see J. Roland Pennock, *Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects* (New York, 1950); and Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston, 1960), especially chs. 9 and 10.

² Criticism of the descriptive accuracy of the classical theory has been widespread in recent years. The best statement of the basic objections usually made is Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1942), Part IV. See also Bernard Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), chapter 14; articles by Louis Hartz and Samuel Beer in W. N. Chambers and R. H. Salisbury (eds.), *Democracy in the Mid-20th*

Century (St. Louis, 1960); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960); Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), and *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961), especially pp. 223-325; V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), especially Part VI; Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago, 1965), especially Chapter VI; and for a general summary of the position: Henry Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory*. (New York, 1960).

by Seymour Martin Lipset,³ is now employed in many contemporary books and articles on American politics and political behavior and is fast becoming part of the conventional wisdom of political science.

The adequacy of the elitist theory of democracy, both as a set of political norms and as a guide to empirical research, is open to serious question. It has two major shortcomings: first, in their quest for realism, the revisionists have fundamentally changed the normative significance of democracy, rendering it a more conservative doctrine in the process; second, the general acceptance of the elitist theory by contemporary political scientists has led them to neglect almost completely some profoundly important developments in American society.

I. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELITIST THEORY

At the heart of the elitist theory is a clear presumption of the average citizen's inadequacies. As a consequence, democratic systems must rely on the wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the population at large. The political system is divided into two groups: the *elite*, or the "political entrepreneurs,"⁴ who possess ideological commitments and manipulative skills; and the *citizens at large*, the masses, or the "apolitical clay"⁵ of the system, a much larger class of passive, inert followers who have little knowledge of public affairs and even less interest. The factor that distinguishes democratic and authoritarian systems, according to this view, is the provision for limited, peaceful competition among members of the elite for the formal positions of leadership within the system. As Joseph Schumpeter summarized the theory; "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."⁶

Democracy is thus conceived primarily in procedural terms; it is seen as a method of making decisions which insures efficiency in administration and policy making and yet requires some measure of responsiveness to popular opinion on the part of the ruling elites. The average citizen still has some measure of effective political power under this system, even

though he does not initiate policy, because of his right to vote (if he chooses) in regularly scheduled elections. The political leaders, in an effort to gain support at the polls, will shape public policy to fit the citizens' desires. By anticipating public reaction the elite grants the citizenry a form of indirect access to public policy making, without the creation of any kind of formal institutions and even in the absence of any direct communication. "A few citizens who are non-voters, and who for some reason have no influential contact with voters, have no indirect influence. Most citizens, however, possess a moderate degree of indirect influence, for elected officials keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents constantly in mind in deciding what policies to adopt or reject."⁷ An ambiguity is created here because obviously leaders sometimes create opinions as well as respond to them, but since the leaders are constantly being challenged by rivals seeking to gain the allegiance of the masses it is assumed that the individual citizen will receive information from several conflicting sources, making it extremely difficult for any one group to "engineer consent" by manipulating public opinion. As Lipset puts it: "Representation is neither simply a means of political adjustment to social pressures nor an instrument of manipulation. It involves both functions, since the purpose of representation is to locate the combinations of relationships between parties and social bases which make possible the operation of efficient government."⁸

There has been extensive research and speculation about the prerequisites for a democratic system of this kind. There is general agreement that a well developed social pluralism and an extensive system of voluntary groups or associations is needed, along with a prevailing sense of psychological security, widespread education and limited disparities of wealth. There must be no arbitrary barriers to political participation, and "enough people must participate in the governmental process so that political leaders compete for the support of a large and more or less representative cross section of the population."⁹

Elitist theory departs markedly from the classical tradition at this point. Traditionally it was assumed that the most important prerequisite for a stable democracy was general agreement among the politically active (those who vote) on certain fundamental policies and basic

³ Introduction by Lipset to the Collier Books paperback edition of Robert Michels's, *Political Parties* (New York, 1962), p. 33.

⁴ The phrase is Dahl's in *Who Governs?*, p. 227.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁶ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

⁷ Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 164.

⁸ Lipset, Introduction to Michels, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁹ Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York, 1953), p. 309.

values, and widespread acceptance of democratic procedures and restraints on political activity. Political leaders would not violate the basic consensus, or "democratic mold," if they wished to be successful in gaining their objectives, because once these fundamental restraints were broken the otherwise passive public would become aroused and would organize against the offending leaders. Elitist theorists argue instead that agreement on democratic values among the "intervening structure of elites," the very elements which had been seen earlier as potential threats to democracy, is the main bulwark against a breakdown in constitutionalism. Writing in 1959 David Truman discards his notion of "potential groups," a variation of the traditional doctrine of consensus, and calls instead for a "consensus of elites," a determination on the part of the leaders of political parties, labor unions, trade associations and other voluntary associations to defend the fundamental procedures of democracy in order to protect their own positions and the basic structure of society itself from the threat of an irresponsible demagogue.¹⁰ V.O. Key, in his *Public Opinion and the American Democracy*, concludes that "the critical element for the health of a democratic order consists in the beliefs, standards, and competence of those who constitute the influentials, the opinion-leaders, the political activists in the order."¹¹ Similarly, Robert Dahl concludes in his study of New Haven that the skillful, active political leaders in the system are the true democratic "legitimists."¹² Since democratic procedures regulate their conflicts and protect their privileged positions in the system the leaders can be counted on to defend the democratic creed even if a majority of the voters might prefer some other set of procedures.¹³

¹⁰ David Truman, "The American System in Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly*, (December, 1959), pp. 481-497. See also a perceptive critique of Truman's change of attitude in Peter Bachrach, "Elite Consensus and Democracy," *The Journal of Politics*, 24 (1962), 439-452.

¹¹ Key, *op. cit.*, p. 558. See also Key's "Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 37 (1961), 481-494.

¹² Dahl's position on this issue seems to have undergone a transformation somewhat similar to Truman's. Compare Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.*, Chapter 11 with Dahl, *Who Governs?*, Books IV, V, VI.

¹³ Dahl, *Who Governs?*, pp. 311-325. It is important to note that these conclusions about the crucial function of an elite consensus in democracy were based on little empirical evidence.

It has also been suggested by several elitist theorists that democracies have good reason to fear increased political participation. They argue that a successful (that is, stable) democratic system depends on widespread apathy and general political incompetence.¹⁴ The ideal of democratic participation is thus transformed into a "noble lie" designed chiefly to insure a sense of responsibility among political leaders. As Lester Milbrath puts it:

... it is important to continue moral admonishment for citizens to become active in politics, not because we want or expect great masses of them to become active, but rather because the admonishment helps keep the system open and sustains a belief in the right of all to participate, which is an important norm governing the behavior of political elites.¹⁵

If the uninformed masses participate in large numbers, democratic self-restraint will break down and peaceful competition among the elites, the central element in the elitist theory, will become impossible.

The principal aim of the critics whose views

Truman, Key and Dahl seem to rely most heavily on Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955), a study based on national opinion surveys which was concerned with only one issue (McCarthyism) and did not investigate the relationship between the expressed opinions of its subjects and their behavior under stress; and James Prothro and Charles Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276-294, a study of attitudes in two small cities. More recently, however, Herbert McClosky has produced more convincing data in his "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 361-382. On page 377 McClosky concludes that widespread agreement on procedural norms is not a prerequisite to the success of a democratic system: "Consensus may strengthen democratic viability, but its absence in an otherwise stable society need not be fatal, or even particularly damaging." McClosky's conclusions are called into question by data presented by Samuel Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 183-219; and Edmond Constantini, "Intraparty Attitude Conflict: Democratic Party Leadership in California," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (1963), 956-972.

¹⁴ See Bernard Berelson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 14; Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-16; W. H. Morris-Jones, "In Defense of Apathy," *Political Studies*, II (1954), 25-37.

¹⁵ Milbrath, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

we are examining has been to make the theory of democracy more realistic, to bring it into closer correspondence with empirical reality. They are convinced that the classical theory does not account for "much of the real machinery"¹⁶ by which the system operates, and they have expressed concern about the possible spread among Americans of either unwarranted anxiety or cynical disillusionment over the condition of democracy. But it is difficult to transform a utopian theory into a realistic account of political behavior without changing the theory's normative foundations. By revising the theory to bring it into closer correspondence with reality, the elitist theorists have transformed democracy from a radical into a conservative political doctrine, stripping away its distinctive emphasis on popular political activity so that it no longer serves as a set of ideals toward which society ought to be striving.¹⁷

The most distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis on individual participation in the development of public policy. By taking part in the affairs of his society the citizen would gain in knowledge and under-

¹⁶ Louis Hartz, "Democracy: Image and Reality," in Chambers and Salisbury (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁷ Several articles have recently appeared which attack the elitist theory on normative grounds. The best and most insightful is Lane Davis, "The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (1964), 37-46. Also see: Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes, "The New Democracy," *Political Studies*, 11 (1963), 156-177; Steven W. Rousseas and James Farganis, "American Politics and the End of Ideology," *British Journal of Sociology*, 14 (1963) 347-360; and Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 39-51. The subject is also treated in: Henry Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford, 1961), Chapters 9 and 11; T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (London, 1964), 108-110; Robert Presthus, *Men at the Top* (New York, 1964), 3-47; and Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York) (1964), 93-99, 524-532. For an insightful critique of the work of Dahl and Mills, conceived of as opposing ideological positions see: William E. Connolly, *Responsible Political Ideology: Implications of the Sociology of Knowledge for Political Inquiry*, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1965), pp. 18-39. This section of this article depends heavily on Lane Davis' analysis.

standing, develop a deeper sense of social responsibility, and broaden his perspective beyond the narrow confines of his private life. Although the classical theorists accepted the basic framework of Lockean democracy, with its emphasis on limited government, they were *not* primarily concerned with the *policies* which might be produced in a democracy; above all else they were concerned with *human development*, the opportunities which existed in political activity to realize the untapped potentials of men and to create the foundations of a genuine human community. In the words of John Stuart Mill:

... the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, ... moral, intellectual, and active.¹⁸

In the elitist version of the theory, however, emphasis has shifted to the needs and functions of the system as a whole; there is no longer a direct concern with human development. The central question is not how to design a political system which stimulates greater individual participation and enhances the moral development of its citizens, but how "to combine a substantial degree of popular participation with a system of power capable of governing *effectively and coherently*?"¹⁹

The elitist theory allows the citizen only a passive role as an object of political activity; he exerts influence on policy making only by rendering judgements after the fact in national elections. The safety of contemporary democracy lies in the high-minded sense of responsibility of its leaders, the only elements of society who are actively striving to discover and implement the common good. The citizens are left to "judge a world they never made, and thus to become a genteel counter-part of the mobs which sporadically unseated aristocratic governments in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe."²⁰

The contemporary version of democratic theory has, it seems, lost much of the vital force, the radical thrust of the classical theory. The elitist theorists, in trying to develop a

¹⁸ John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York, 1862), pp. 39-40.

¹⁹ Samuel Beer, "New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America," in Chambers and Salisbury (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²⁰ Davis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 45.

theory which takes account of the way the political system actually operates, have changed the principal orienting values of democracy. The heart of the classical theory was its justification of broad participation in the public affairs of the community; the aim was the production of citizens who were capable enough and responsible enough to play this role. The classical theory was not meant to describe any existing system of government; it was an outline, a set of prescriptions for the ideal polity which men should strive to create. The elitist theorists, in their quest for realism, have changed this distinctive prescriptive element in democratic theory; they have substituted stability and efficiency as the prime goals of democracy. If these revisions are accepted, the danger arises that in striving to develop more reliable explanations of political behavior, political scientists will also become sophisticated apologists for the existing political order. Robert Lane, in concluding his study of the political ideologies of fifteen "common men" in an Eastern city, observes that they lack a utopian vision, a well-defined sense of social justice that would allow them to stand in judgement on their society and its institutions.²¹ To some degree, the "men of Eastport" share this disability with much of the American academic elite.

II. THE ELITIST THEORY AS A GUIDE FOR RESEARCH

The shortcomings of the elitist theory are not confined to its normative implications. Serious questions also arise concerning its descriptive accuracy and its utility as a guide to empirical research. The most unsatisfactory element in the theory is its concept of the passive, apolitical, common man who pays allegiance to his governors and to the sideshow of politics while remaining primarily concerned with his private life, evenings of television with his family, or the demands of his job. Occasionally, when the average citizen finds his primary goals threatened by the actions or inactions of government, he may strive vigorously to influence the course of public policy, but "*Homo Civicus*" as Dahl calls him, "is not, by nature, a political animal."²²

²¹ Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962), p. 475. See also Donald Stokes' comments on the same topic in "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold Lasswell (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness* (Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their relation to the Democratic Way of Life, 1962), p. 72.

²² Dahl, *Who Governs?*, pp. 225.

It was the acceptance of this concept that led the elitist theorists to reject the traditional notion of consensus. It became implausible to argue that the citizenry is watchful and jealous of the great democratic values while at the same time suggesting that they are uninvolved, uninformed and apathetic. Widespread apathy also is said to contribute to democratic stability by insuring that the disagreements that arise during campaigns and elections will not involve large numbers of people or plunge the society into violent disorders or civil war.

No one can deny that there is widespread political apathy among many sectors of the American public. But it is important to ask why this is so and not simply to explain how this phenomenon contributes to the smooth functioning of the system. Of course, the citizens' passivity might stem from their satisfaction with the operation of the political system, and thus they would naturally become aroused only if they perceived a threat to the system. Dahl, for one, argues that the political system operates largely through "inertia," tradition or habitual responses. It remains stable because only a few "key" issues are the objects of controversy at any one time, the rest of public policy having been settled and established in past controversies which are now all but forgotten. Similarly, Nelson Polsby argues that it is fallacious to assume that the quiescent citizens in a community, especially those in the lower income groups, have grievances unless they actually express them. To do so is to arbitrarily assign "upper- and middle-class values to all actors in the community."²³

But it is hard to believe, in these days of protest demonstrations, of Black Muslims and the Deacons of Defense and Justice, that the mood of cynical apathy toward politics which affects so many American Negroes is an indication of their satisfaction with the political system, and with the weak, essentially meaningless alternatives it usually presents to them. To assume that apathy is a sign of satisfaction in this case is to overlook the tragic history of the Negroes in America and the system of violent repression long used to deny them any entrance into the regular channels of democratic decision-making.

Students of race relations have concluded that hostile attitudes toward a racial group do not necessarily lead to hostile actions, and amicable feelings do not ensure amicable actions. Instead, "it is the social demands of the situation, particularly when supported by accepted

²³ Nelson Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven, 1963), p. 117.

authority figures, which are the effective determinants of individual action. . . ."²⁴ This insight might apply to other areas besides race relations. It suggests that a society's political culture, the general perceptions about the nature of authority and the prevailing expectations of significant reference groups, might be a major influence on the political behavior of the average citizen regardless of his own feelings of satisfaction or hostility. There have been sizable shifts in rates of political participation throughout American history which suggests that these rates are not rigidly determined. A recent analysis indicates that rates of voter participation are now *lower* than they were in the Nineteenth Century even though the population is now much better educated and the facilities for communication much better developed.²⁵ Other studies indicate that there are marked differences in the political milieu of towns and cities which lead citizens of one area to exhibit much more cynicism and distrust of the political system than others.²⁶ Although the studies showed no corresponding changes in feelings of political competence, cynical attitudes might inhibit many forms of participation and thus induce apathy.

Political apathy obviously has many sources. It may stem from feelings of personal inadequacy, from a fear of endangering important personal relationships, or from a lack of interest in the issues; but it may also have its roots in the society's institutional structure, in the weakness or absence of group stimulation or support, in the positive opposition of elements within the political system to wider participation; in the absence, in other words, of appropriate spurs to action, or the presence of tangi-

ble deterrents.²⁷ Before the causes of apathy can be established with confidence much more attention must be directed to the role of the mass media. How are the perceptions of individual citizens affected by the version of reality they receive, either directly or indirectly, from television, the national wire services, and the public schools²⁸—and how do these perceptions affect their motivations? Political scientists have also largely neglected to study the use of both legitimate and illegitimate sanctions and private intimidation to gain political ends. How do the activities of the police,²⁹ social workers, or elements of organized crime affect the desires and the opportunities available for individual political participation?

Certainly the apparent calm of American politics is not matched by our general social life, which is marked by high crime rates, numerous fads and crazes, and much inter-group tension.³⁰ One recent study showed that during the civil rights protests in Atlanta, Georgia, and Cambridge, Maryland, crime rates in the Negro communities dropped substantially.³¹ A finding of this kind suggests that there is some connection between these two realms of social conflict and that both may serve as outlets for individual distress and frustration. High crime (or suicide) rates and low rates of voting may very well be related;

²⁴ Herbert Blumer, "Recent research [on race relations in the] United States of America," *International Social Science Bulletin* (UNESCO), 10 (1958), p. 432. Similar arguments concerning the relationship of beliefs and action can be found in J. D. Lohman and D. C. Reitzes, "Deliberately Organized Groups and Racial Behavior," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954), 342-344; and in Earl Raab (ed.), *American Race Relations Today* (Garden City, 1962).

²⁵ Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this *REVIEW*, 59 (1965), 7-28.

²⁶ Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *The Journal of Politics* 23 (1961), 477-506; and Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *The Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963) 312-323.

²⁷ For a brief survey of findings on this subject, see Milbrath, *op. cit.*; and for a clear, brief summary, see: Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (1954-55), 349-366. Also see David Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, 1964), especially chapters by Converse and Wolfinger, *et al.*

²⁸ A major study of the influence of secondary schools on political attitudes is underway at the University of Michigan under the direction of M. Kent Jennings.

²⁹ An extensive investigation of the role of the police and the courts in city politics is being conducted at Harvard University by James Q. Wilson.

³⁰ It is very difficult to compare crime rates or other indications of social disorganization in the United States with those in other countries. For a discussion of some of the difficulties see: UNESCO 1963 *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1963).

³¹ Fredric Solomon, Walter L. Walker, Garrett O'Connor and Jacob Fishman, "Civil Rights Activity and Reduction of Crime Among Negroes," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 12 (March, 1965), 227-236.

the former may represent "leakage" from the political system.³²

Once we admit that the society is not based on a widespread consensus, we must look at our loosely organized, decentralized political parties in a different light. It may be that the parties have developed in this way precisely because no broad consensus exists. In a fragmented society which contains numerous geographic, religious and racial conflicts, the successful politician has been the man adept at negotiation and bargaining, the man best able to play these numerous animosities off against each other, and thereby build *ad hoc* coalitions of support for specific programs. Success at this delicate business of coalition building depends on achieving some basis for communication among the leaders of otherwise antagonistic groups and finding a formula for compromise. To create these circumstances sharp conflicts must be avoided; highly controversial, potentially explosive issues shunned. Controversy is shifted to other issues or the public authorities simply refuse to deal with the question, claiming that they have no legitimate jurisdiction in the case or burying it quietly in some committee room or bureaucratic pigeonhole.³³

In other words, one of the chief characteristics of our political system has been its success in suppressing and controlling internal conflict. But the avoidance of conflict, the suppression of strife, is *not* necessarily the creation of satisfaction or consensus. The citizens may remain quiescent, the political system might retain its stability, but significant differences of opinion remain, numerous conflicts are unresolved and many desires go unfulfilled. The frustrations resulting from such deprivations can create conflict in other, non-political realms. Fads, religious revivals, or wild, anomic riots such as

those which occurred in the Negro ghettos of several large American cities during the summers of 1964 and 1965, phenomena not directly related to the achievement of any clearly conceived political goals, may be touched off by unresolved tensions left untended by the society's political leaders.

The American political system is highly complex, with conflicting jurisdictions and numerous checks and balances. A large commitment in time and energy must be made, even by a well-educated citizen, to keep informed of the issues and personalities in all levels of government. Most citizens are not able or willing to pay this kind of cost to gain the information necessary for effective political participation. This may be especially true in a political system in which weak or unclear alternatives are usually presented to the electorate. For most citizens the world of politics is remote, bewildering, and meaningless, having no direct relation to daily concerns about jobs or family life. Many citizens have desires or frustrations with which public agencies might be expected to deal, but they usually remain unaware of possible solutions to their problems in the public sphere. This group within our political system are citizens only from the legal point of view. If a high degree of social solidarity and sense of community are necessary for true democratic participation, then these marginal men are not really citizens of the state. The polity has not been extended to include them.³⁴

For the elitist theorist widespread apathy is merely a fact of political life, something to be anticipated, a prerequisite for democratic stability. But for the classical democrat political apathy is an object of intense concern because the overriding moral purpose of the classical theory is to expand the boundaries of the political community and build the foundations for human understanding through participation by the citizens in the affairs of their government.

III. LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

While most elitist theorists are agreed in conceiving of the average citizen as politically passive and uncreative, there seems to be a difference of opinion (or at least of emphasis) over the likelihood of some irrational, anti-democratic outburst from the society's common men. Dahl does not dwell on this possibility. He seemingly conceives of *homo civicus*, the aver-

³² For an excellent study of the Black Muslims which portrays the movement as a non-political outlet for the frustration and bitterness felt by many American Negroes see the study by an African scholar: E. V. Essien-Udom, *Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America* (Chicago, 1962).

³³ Herbert Agar makes a similar analysis and argues for the retention of the system in *The Price of Union*, (Boston, 1950). On page 689 he states:

The lesson which Americans learned [from the Civil War] was useful: in a large federal nation, when a problem is passionately felt, and is discussed in terms of morals, each party may divide within itself, against itself. And if the parties divide, the nation may divide; for the parties, with their enjoyable pursuit of power, are a unifying influence. Wise men, therefore, may seek to dodge such problems as long as possible. And the easiest way to dodge them is for both parties to take both sides.

³⁴ For a study of several important factors affecting the degree of participation in American politics see: E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), especially chs. 5 and 6.

age citizen, as a man who consciously chooses to avoid politics and to devote himself to the pleasures and problems of his job and family:

Typically, as a source of direct gratifications political activity will appear to *homo civicus* as less attractive than a host of other activities; and, as a strategy to achieve his gratifications indirectly political action will seem considerably less efficient than working at his job, earning more money, taking out insurance, joining a club, planning a vacation, moving to another neighborhood or city, or coping with an uncertain future in manifold other ways.³⁵

Lipset, on the other hand, seems much more concerned with the danger that the common man might suddenly enter the political system, smashing democratic institutions in the process, as part of an irrational, authoritarian political force. He sees "profoundly anti-democratic tendencies in lower class groups,"³⁶ and he has been frequently concerned in his work with Hitler, McCarthy and other demagogic leaders who have led anti-democratic mass movements.

Although there are obviously some important differences of opinion and emphasis concerning the political capacities of average citizens and the relative security of democratic institutions, the elitist theorists agree on the crucial importance of leadership in insuring both the safety and viability of representative government. This set of basic assumptions serves as a foundation for their explanation of change and innovation in American politics, a process in which they feel creative leadership plays the central role.

Running throughout the work of these writers is a vision of the "professional" politician as hero, much as he is pictured in Max Weber's essay, "Politics as a Vocation." Dahl's Mayor Lee, Edward Banfield's Mayor Daley, Richard Neustadt's ideal occupant of the White House all possess great skill and drive, and are engaged in the delicate art of persuasion and coalition building. They are actively moving the society forward toward their own goals, according to their own special vision. All of them possess the pre-eminent qualities of Weber's ideal-type politician: "passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion."³⁷ As in Schumpeter's analysis of capitalism, the primary source of change and innovation in the political system is the "political

entrepreneur"; only such a leader can break through the inherent conservatism of organizations and shake the masses from their habitual passivity.

It is obvious that political leaders (especially chief executives) have played a very important role in American politics, but it is also clear that the American system's large degree of internal bargaining, the lack of many strong hierarchical controls and its numerous checks and balances, both constitutional and political, place powerful constraints on the behavior of political executives. American presidents, governors and mayors usually find themselves caught in a web of cross pressures which prevent them from making bold departures in policy or firmly attaching themselves to either side of a controversy. The agenda of controversy, the list of questions which are recognized by the active participants in politics as legitimate subjects of attention and concern, is very hard to change.

Just as it can be argued that the common citizens have a form of indirect influence, so it can also be argued that the top leaders of other institutions in the society, such as the business community, possess indirect influence as well. As Banfield suggests in his study of Chicago, the top business leaders have great potential power: "if the twenty or thirty wealthiest men in Chicago acted as one and put all their wealth into the fight, they could easily destroy or capture the machine."³⁸ The skillful politician, following Carl Friedrich's "rule of anticipated reactions,"³⁹ is unlikely to make proposals which would unite the business community against him. The aspiring politician learns early in his career, by absorbing the folklore which circulates among the politically active, which issues can and cannot be exploited successfully. It is this constellation of influences and anticipated reactions, "the peculiar mobilization of bias" in the community, fortified by a general consensus of elites, that determines the agenda of controversy.⁴⁰ The American political system, above all

³⁵ Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, 1961), p. 290.

³⁶ Carl Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Politics* (New York, 1939), pp. 17-18.

⁴⁰ This point is made persuasively by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 947-952. Also see their "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 632-642; and Thomas J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism and Local Politics," *Administrative Quarterly*, 7 (1963), 425-457.

³⁵ Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 224.

³⁶ Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

³⁷ Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), p. 115.

others, seems to be especially designed to frustrate the creative leader.

But as rigid and inflexible as it is, the political system does produce new policies; new programs and schemes are approved; even basic procedural changes are made from time to time. Of course, each major shift in public policy has a great many causes. The elitist theory of democracy looks for the principal source of innovation in the competition among rival leaders and the clever maneuvering of political entrepreneurs, which is, in its view, the most distinctive aspect of a democratic system. Because so many political scientists have worn the theoretical blinders of the elitist theory, however, we have overlooked the importance of broadly based social movements, arising from the public at large, as powerful agents of innovation and change.

The primary concerns of the elitist theorists have been the maintenance of democratic stability, the preservation of democratic procedures, and the creation of machinery which would produce efficient administration and coherent public policies. With these goals in mind, social movements (if they have been studied at all) have usually been pictured as threats to democracy, as manifestations of "political extremism." Lipset asserts that such movements typically appeal to the "disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authoritarian persons at every level of the society."⁴¹ Movements of this kind throw the political system out of gear and disrupt the mechanisms designed to maintain due process; if the elites were overwhelmed by such forces, democracy would be destroyed. This narrow, antagonistic view of social movements stems from the elitist theorists' suspicion of the political capacities of the common citizens,⁴² their

fear of instability and their failure to recognize the elements of rigidity and constraint existing in the political system. But if one holds that view and at the same time recognizes the tendency of the prevailing political system to frustrate strong leaders, it becomes difficult to explain how significant innovations in public policy, such as the social security system, the Wagner Act, the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, or the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, ever came about.

During the last century American society has spawned numerous social movements, some of which have made extensive demands on the political system, while others have been highly esoteric, mystical, and apolitical. These movements arise because some form of social dislocation or widespread sense of frustration exists within the society. But dissatisfaction alone is not a sufficient cause; it must be coupled with the necessary resources and the existence of potential leadership which can motivate a group to take action designed to change the offending circumstances.⁴³ Often such movements erupt along the margins of the political system, and they sometimes serve the purpose of encouraging political and social mobilization, of widening the boundaries of the polity.⁴⁴

in First Student Sit-in Demonstration." *Journal of Social Issues*, 20 (1964), 36-45; and "Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, 27 (1964) 91-99. Also see the October, 1964 issue of *The Journal of Social Issues*, entitled "Youth and Social Action," edited by Fredric Solomon and Jacob Fishman; and Jack L. Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leaders in Atlanta, Georgia," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1963), 99-124.

⁴³ Sociologists usually study social movements under the rubric of collective behavior. For general treatments see: Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior" in J. B. Gittler (ed.), *Review of Sociology* (New York, 1957); Rudolph Heberle, *Social Movements*, (New York, 1951); Lewis Killian, "Social Movements" in Robert Faris (ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago, 1964); Charles King, *Social Movements in the United States* (New York, 1956); Karl Lang and Gladys Lang, *Collective Dynamics* (New York, 1961); Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York, 1963); Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957). For a brief historical sketch of some American social movements see: Thomas Greer, *American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1946).

⁴⁴ For a book which investigates social move-

⁴¹ Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁴² Ruth Searles and J. Allen Williams, in a study of Negro students who took part in the sit-in demonstrations, found no evidence that they were authoritarian or posed threats to democracy. "Far from being alienated, the students appear to be committed to the society and its middle class leaders": "Negro College Students' Participation in Sit-ins," *Social Forces*, 40 (1962), p. 219. For other studies of this particular social movement see: Robert Coles, "Social Struggle and Weariness," *Psychiatry*, 27 (1964), 305-315; and three articles by Fredric Solomon and Jacob Fishman; "Perspectives on Student Sit-in Movement," *American Journal of Ortho-psychiatry*, 33 (1963), 872-882; "Action and Identity Formation

Through movements such as the Negroes' drive for civil rights, or the Midwestern farmers' crusade for fair prices in the 1890's, the Ku Klux Klan, or the "radical right" movements of the 1960's, "pre-political people who have not yet found, or only begun to find, a specific language in which to express their aspirations about the world"⁴⁶ are given new orientation, confidence, knowledge, sources of information and leadership.

Social movements also serve, in Rudolf Heberle's words, as the "creators and carriers of public opinion."⁴⁶ By confronting the political authorities, or by locking themselves in peaceful—or violent⁴⁷—conflict with some other element of the society, social movements provoke trials of strength between contending forces or ideas. Those trials of economic, political or moral strength take place in the court of public opinion and sometimes place enormous strain on democratic institutions and even the social fabric itself. But through such trials, as tumultuous as they may sometimes be, the agenda of controversy, the list of acceptable, "key" issues may be changed. In an effort to conciliate and mediate, the political leaders fashion new legislation, create unique regulatory bodies and strive to establish channels of communication and accommodation among the combatants.

Of course, members of the political elite may

ments which have served this function among Italian peasants see: E. J. Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels* (Manchester, 1959). See also: Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed* (New York, 1963) for a study of the relationship of Messianic Cults and revolutionary movements on five continents; and George Rude, *The Crowd in History* (New York, 1964) for a study of popular uprisings in England and France from 1730–1848.

⁴⁵ Hobsbawn, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Heberle, *op. cit.*, pp. 417–418.

⁴⁷ American political scientists have not been sufficiently concerned with the role of violence in the governmental process. Among all the articles published in *The American Political Science Review* between 1906 and 1963, there was only one whose title contained the word "violence," only one with the word "coercive" (it concerned India), and none with the word "force." During the same period there were forty-nine articles on governmental reorganization and twenty-four on civil service reform. See Kenneth Janda (ed.), *Cumulative Index to The American Political Science Review* (Evanston, 1964). Efforts to retrieve this situation have begun in: Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* (New York, 1964).

respond to the movement by resisting it, driving it underground or destroying it; they may try to co-opt the movement's leaders by granting them privileges or by accepting parts of its program, or even by making the leaders part of the established elite; they may surrender to the movement, losing control of their offices in the political system in the process. The nature of the political leader's response is probably a prime determinant of the tactics the movement will adopt, the kind of leadership that arises within it, and the ideological appeals it develops. Other factors might determine the response of the leadership, such as the existence of competing social movements with conflicting demands, the resources available to the political leaders to satisfy the demands of the movement, the social status of the participants in the movement, the presence of competing sets of leaders claiming to represent the same movement, and many other elements peculiar to each particular situation. In this process social movements may be highly disruptive and some institutions may be completely destroyed; the story does not always have a happy ending. But one major consequence (function, if you will) of social movements is to break society's log jams, to prevent ossification in the political system, to prompt and justify major innovations in social policy and economic organization.⁴⁸

This relationship of challenge and response between the established political system and social movements has gone without much systematic study by political scientists. Sociologists have been concerned with social movements, but they have directed most of their attention to the causes of the movements, their "natural history," and the relationship between leaders and followers within them.⁴⁹ Historians have produced many case studies of social movements but little in the way of systematic

⁴⁸ Lewis Coser has discussed the role of conflict in provoking social change in his *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe: 1956); and in his "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change" *British Journal of Sociology*, 9 (1957) 197–207. See also Irving Louis Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory," *Social Forces*, 41 (1962), 177–188.

⁴⁹ For an insightful and stimulating example, see Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade* (Urbana, 1963), which makes an excellent analysis of the causes of the Temperance movement and changes in its leadership but makes only brief mention of the movement's impact on the government and the responses of political leaders to its efforts.

explanation.⁵⁰ This would seem to be a fruitful area for investigation by political scientists. But this research is not likely to appear unless we revise our concept of the masses as politically inert, apathetic and bound by habitual responses. We must also shift our emphasis from theories which conceive of the "social structure in terms of a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by certain patterned and recurrent processes," to theories which place greater emphasis on the role of coercion and constraint in the political system and which concentrate on the influences within society which produce "the forces that maintain it in an unending process of change."⁵¹ The greatest contribution of Marx to the understanding of society was his realization that internal conflict is a major source of change and innovation. One need not accept his metaphysical assumptions to appreciate this important insight.

IV. CONCLUSION

In a society undergoing massive social change, fresh theoretical perspectives are essential. Political theorists are charged with the responsibility of constantly reformulating the dogmas of the past so that democratic theory remains relevant to the stormy realities of Twentieth Century American society with its sprawling urban centers, its innumerable social conflicts, and its enormous bureaucratic hierarchies.

In restating the classical theory, however, contemporary political scientists have stripped

democracy of much of its radical *elan* and have diluted its utopian vision, thus rendering it inadequate as a guide to the future. The elitist theorists generally accept the prevailing distribution of status in the society (with exceptions usually made for the American Negro), and find it "not only compatible with political freedom but even . . . a condition of it."⁵² They place great emphasis on the limitations of the average citizen and are suspicious of schemes which might encourage greater participation in public affairs. Accordingly, they put their trust in the wisdom and energy of an active, responsible elite.

Besides these normative shortcomings the elitist theory has served as an inadequate guide to empirical research, providing an unconvincing explanation of widespread political apathy in American society and leading political scientists to ignore manifestations of discontent not directly related to the political system. Few studies have been conducted of the use of force, or informal, illegitimate coercion in the American political system, and little attention has been directed to the great social movements which have marked American society in the last one hundred years.

If political science is to be relevant to society's pressing needs and urgent problems, professional students of politics must broaden their perspectives and become aware of new problems which are in need of scientific investigation. They must examine the norms that guide their efforts and guard against the danger of uncritically accepting the values of the going system in the name of scientific objectivity. Political scientists must strive for heightened awareness and self-knowledge; they must avoid rigid presumptions which diminish their vision, destroy their capacities for criticism, and blind them to some of the most significant social and political developments of our time.

⁵⁰ John Higham is somewhat of an exception of this generalization. See his *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925* (New York, 1963). Also see his: "Another Look at Nativism," *Catholic Historical Review*, 44 (1958), 147-158; and his "The Cult of the 'American Consensus': Homogenizing Our History." *Commentary* (February, 1959), p. 159.

⁵¹ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, 1959), p. 159.

⁵² Sabine, "The Two Democratic Traditions," *op. cit.*, p. 459.

FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON "THE ELITIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY"

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I

An interest in the roles, functions, contributions, and dangers of leadership in popular regimes is not, of course, new among observers of political life. This has, in fact, been an ancient and enduring interest of political theorists. It is possible, however, to distinguish—at least in a rough way—two different streams of thought: one consisting of writers sympathetic to popular rule, the other consisting of anti-democratic writers.

It has always been obvious to practical and theoretical observers alike that even where leaders are chosen by the people, they might convert a democracy into an oligarchy or a despotism. From ancient times, as everyone knows, anti-democratic writers have contended that popular governments were unlikely to provide leaders with wisdom and virtue, and insisted on the natural affinity between the people and the despot. These ancient challenges by anti-democratic writers were, I think, made more formidable in the course of the last hundred years by critics—sometimes ex-democrats turned authoritarian when their Utopian hopes encountered the ugly realities of political life—who, like Pareto, Michels, and Mosca, contended that popular rule is not only undesirable but also, as they tried to show, *impossible*. The failure of popular regimes to emerge, or, if they did emerge to survive, in Russia, Italy, Germany, and Spain could not be met merely by frequent assertions of democratic rhetoric.

Fortunately, alongside this stream of anti-democratic thought and experience there has always been the other. Aware both of their critics and of the real life problems of popular rule, writers sympathetic to democracy have emphasized the need for wisdom, virtue, and self-restraint not only among the general body of citizens but among leaders as well. Thus Aristotle gave his attention to the problems of leadership in popular orders at a number of points in the *Politics*.¹ Machiavelli, a tough-

minded republican who knew from direct observation of Renaissance Europe the despotic propensities of political leaders, was fully aware of the dangers to popular rule generated by the need for and existence of leadership, but his solutions were not always enormously helpful—e.g., that every well ordered republic should elect a succession of virtuous rulers (*principi*).² Although in the *Discourses* he did not elaborate on the problem of leadership in republics, his scattered observations show that he regarded the problem as significant and serious.³

Nor did Rousseau neglect the problem. In fact, it was the impossibility of arriving at all the conditions necessary for direct democracy, including the impossibility of keeping the people constantly assembled in order to decide public affairs, that led Rousseau to conclude that "democracy," in his sense, had never existed and never would. "If there were a people of gods, they would govern themselves democratically. A government so perfect is not suited to men."⁴ Rousseau, no less than Plato,

racies changes are chiefly due to the wanton license of demagogues." *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans. with an introduction, notes, and appendixes by Ernest Barker (Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 168, 215.

² In the *Discourses*, after noting that two "principi virtuosi" in succession were sufficient to conquer the world—Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great—Machiavelli goes on to say: "Il che tanto più debba fare una repubblica, avendo per il modo dello eleggere non solamente due successioni ma infiniti principi virtuosissimi che sono l'uno dell'altro successori: la quale virtuosa successione fia sempre in ogni repubblica bene ordinata." *Libro Primo Dei Discorsi Sopra La Prima Deca di Tito Livio*, XX, in *Tutte Le Opere Storiche E Letterarie di Niccolò Machiavelli*, Mazzoni and Casella (eds), (Florence, B. Barbéra, 1929) p. 90.

³ He lamented, for example, that men of true merit (virtù) are sought for in difficult times but in easy times it is not virtuous men who are most favored but those with riches and the proper relations; in peaceful times, other citizens who are jealous of the reputation of the virtuous want not merely to be their equals but their superiors. Book 3, XVI, *Ibid.*, p. 224. See also *ibid.* XXVIII, 239ff.

⁴ *Du Contrat Social*, Cho. IV. "De la démocratie," pp. 280–81. Note his comment: "Il est

¹ See, for example, his comment: "It is popular leaders who, by referring all issues to the decision of the people, are responsible for substituting the sovereignty of decrees for that of laws." See also his comments on "the particular causes of revolution and change" in democracies, e.g. "In democ-

asserted that the best and most natural order is one in which the wisest govern the multitude, provided that the wisest govern for the benefit of the many and not for their own profit.⁵

Although John Stuart Mill emphasized the benefits to personal growth derived from political participation, as an admirer of Mill's like Professor Walker is surely aware, Mill did not advocate *equal power*: "... Though every one ought to have a voice—that every one should have an equal voice is a totally different proposition . . . If, with equal virtue, one [person] is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence—or if, with equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue—the opinion, the judgment, of the higher moral or intellectual being is worth more than that of the inferior: and if the institutions of the country virtually assert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing which is not."⁶

One could go on citing other writers generally sympathetic to democracy or representative government, but I hope there is no need. The point is not that I or Professor Walker must agree with their analysis, their solutions, or their descriptions. The point is that writers from the earliest times have understood that popular regimes, like other regimes, would inevitably have leaders—that is to say, men of more authority, and very likely more power and influence, than ordinary citizens. What kinds of leaders will—or should—the people elect? No doubt they should choose men of virtue and wisdom. But will they? How is this to be insured? What will happen if, as may be the case from time to time, they fail? These and similar concerns are ancient; the writers Professor Walker cites as "elitists" did not discover these questions: they sought to answer them in the light of modern experience.

I imagine that the heterogeneous collection of writers whose attention to the problems of leadership in popular orders stirs Professor Walker to regard them as "elitists" were all familiar with these two streams of thought and experience, the democratic and the anti-democratic. But they were also responding to the state of the debate as it seemed to stand around the middle of this century: for both recent history and recent theory had posed an extraordinarily sharp challenge to the validity of

widely prevailing assumptions about popular government.

And unfortunately, despite several thousand years of attention given to the problems of leadership by theorists sympathetic with popular rule, the analysis of leadership in popular orders was unsystematic, incomplete, and based almost entirely on pre-modern experience. Although not all the readers of this REVIEW will agree, and Professor Walker himself may not, it does not seem to me, nor I think to many other political scientists, that the questions raised in this century about leadership in democracies can be met satisfactorily by citing Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Mill, or indeed any other theorist deprived of the opportunity to analyze the unfolding experience during the past half century or so with popular government in large, industrial, urbanized nation-states.

II

A number of writers committed to the success of popular regimes have therefore tried to examine the ancient problem of leadership, citizenship, and democracy by directly confronting recent experience. Had Professor Walker been content to make this point, no one, I am sure, would have found much to dispute in his essay—nor, for that matter, much of interest. What he has done, however, is something else: he has tried to reduce a variety of these recent efforts to a single body of doctrine.

Now any attempt to compress the views of many different writers to a simple statement is, I suppose, almost bound to distort their views, perhaps in quite important ways. In outlining what he has chosen to call "the elitist theory of democracy," Professor Walker has constructed

⁷ May I register a dissent seemingly so minor that I fear it will appear to be nitpicking: the appropriateness of the label? I realize that Professor Walker has taken the expression "the elitist theory of democracy" from Lipset; but even if Lipset may have had his reasons while writing a preface to the major work of Michels for applying this phrase to Weber, Schumpeter, Parsons, and James Burnham, that is not a good reason for stretching it, as Professor Walker does, to cover others. I, for one, object to being labelled "elitist" not only because—as I hope to show—it would be inaccurate in implication even if it were a neutral term, but even more so because in our language and in our society it is unavoidably, I think, a pejorative, even a polemical epithet.

To substitute epithet for argument was, I am sure, not Professor Walker's intention. Nonetheless, to stick the label "elitist" on someone is to

contre l'ordre naturel que le grand nombre gouverne et que let petit soit gouverné," p. 280 (Paris, Éditions Garnier Frères, 1962.)

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁶ *On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government*, ed. by R. B. McCallum (New York, Macmillan, 1947), pp. 215-216.

a paradigm that his intended victims will all, I feel sure, regard as a caricature. Like every good caricature, it combines verisimilitude with exaggeration and distortion.

(1) It is an ancient academic game to create a "school" by asserting that it exists. But it is misleading to speak of "the" elitist theory of democracy as if such an entity existed. At various places the following writers in addition to myself seem to be construed as advocates of "the elitist theory": Beer, Berelson, Hartz, Lipset, Key, Mayo, Milbrath, McClosky, Morris-Jones, Polsby, Schumpeter, Truman, and somewhat strangely, since he is cited in the first footnote as an authority on the classical meaning of democracy, Sabine. I am puzzled as to what doctrine these writers are supposed to share—other than a belief in the desirability of representative government. I have tested the list against several criteria, each of which leads to absurdities. Is the common doctrine of these writers an emphasis on the empirical proposition that leaders do, as a matter of fact, have

discredit half his argument without saying another word. Moreover, precisely because the term "elite" carries many of the connotations that Professor Walker and most others are inclined to read into it—no matter how much an author may try to sterilize the term by definition—I have generally avoided the term in writing about American politics. Like David Truman and V. O. Key, I have used terms rather more descriptive and discriminating, so it seems to me, such as political leadership, political strata, and the like. It is revealing, incidentally, that in the index to V. O. Key's *Public Opinion and American Democracy* the only reference to "elite" reads as follows: "elite: see political activists." I suggest that this difference in the choice of words is more than a mere matter of taste or distaste for certain labels. It also reflects a conviction on the part of Key, Truman, myself and others that "elitist" interpretations of American political life are inadequate both empirically and normatively. The extent to which Professor Walker has misunderstood the orientation of the late V. O. Key, Jr., is best indicated by the work that Key was writing at the time of his death, and that Professor Walker could not have read, of course, when he wrote his article. "The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book," Key wrote, "is that voters are not fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of information available to it." *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7.

great weight in large, modern representative systems? If so, are there any students of modern politics who deny the proposition?⁸ I would offer as further candidates for the list of proponents of "the elitist theory of democracy": Jefferson, Lincoln, Marx, Lenin, Mosca, Pareto, Michels, C. Wright Mills, and Professor Walker himself, since he has stressed as forcefully as most of his "elitist" writers the weight of leadership in "democracies." Isn't this too mixed a bag to be useful?

Is, then, the school of thought Professor Walker wishes to identify those writers who emphasize that in representative systems on the scale of the nation-state it is desirable to have leaders committed to democratic norms? If so, then the criterion is as vacuous as the preceding one. Does *anyone*, including Professor Walker, deny the proposition I have just set forth? Alternatively, is the distinguishing criterion a belief in one or both of the following propositions: that *only* leaders ought to be committed to democratic norms, and that "widespread apathy and general political incompetence" are *desirable* features of representative democratic republics? If so, this criterion very seriously misrepresents, I believe, most of the writers he cites, and probably all of them.

(2) One central difficulty with Professor Walker's paradigm is, I think, that he insists upon interpreting as if they were normative or deontological certain writings that were mainly if not wholly intended to set out descriptive, empirical theories. Most (though perhaps not all) of the works cited by Professor Walker are not attempts to prescribe how democracy *ought* to work but to *describe* how some of the political systems widely called by that name do in fact operate and to *explain* why they operate this way. Professor Walker may deplore the neglect of normative questions, as many other political scientists and political philosophers do; but he ought not to confuse attempts at empirical description and explanation with efforts at prescribing how these systems ought to operate in order to attain desirable or ideal ends. I would not argue that every writer cited by Professor Walker has always tried to maintain this distinction or, if he did, has always succeeded; but I do think it is a serious misunderstanding to interpret these writers as essentially normative theorists.

⁸ Why, by the way, not also: Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes, Downs, Sartori, Almond, Verba, Kornhauser, Lasswell, Lane, Tingsen . . . ? In short: among writers who have examined questions of leadership and participation, who is *not* eligible for Professor Walker's list?

At the empirical level, experience with and systematic study of political life in cities and countries with democratic governments has turned up evidence that, if valid, raises interesting and important empirical questions. To take the most obvious example, there is the enormous mass of evidence, much of it furnished by Professor Walker's colleagues in the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, on rates of participation in political life. This evidence seems to demonstrate, rather conclusively I think, that rates of participation vary widely, that a rather large fraction of adults participate in political life barely at all, and that a small proportion of adults participate a very great deal. Confronted by this evidence, political scientists have had either to reject it as factually false, which it is increasingly difficult to do; or to accept it provisionally as factually correct. If it is approximately correct, what do we make of it? As I see it, evidence of this kind confronts us with problems for both empirical and normative theory. Strictly at the level of empirical analysis and explanation we face such questions as: How do we account for these variations in rates of participation? How do these variations affect the outcome of elections, government policy-making, etc.? Even after we have arrived at necessarily tentative and provisional answers to these empirical questions, important normative questions, which I shall not try to formulate here, would still remain unanswered. The point seems too obvious to be worth stressing, but attempts to *explain* should not be confounded with attempts to *prescribe*.

One more example: There is substantial evidence on the distribution of American attitudes toward civil liberties and certain other norms associated with (though perhaps not inextricably bound up with) democratic behavior. As Professor Walker rightly says in a footnote, the evidence is not conclusive. Further research may prove it wrong; I, for one, hope that the present evidence for the existence of considerably less than a widespread and confident commitment to democratic and libertarian norms will be found wrong. Meanwhile, it is the best evidence we have, it cannot be brushed aside, and it cannot be re-written to fit our hopes. If we accept the evidence, even provisionally, it suggests important problems both for empirical analysis and explanation and for normative analysis and prescription. Strictly at the empirical level, the evidence suggests a paradox: In a "democratic" country like the United States, where elections take place regularly, why aren't anti-libertarian and even anti-democratic norms transmuted into national policy more often than they are? How does it

happen that on matters of free speech, for example, some norms that seem to be weakly held or even opposed by a majority of citizens are nonetheless applied vigorously by the Supreme Court, enforced by the executive branch, and at least tolerated by the Congress? The question, you will note, is formulated as an empirical one. Obviously the answer has a bearing on normative theory as well. But Professor Walker, so it appears to me, persists in interpreting an empirical enterprise ("I must try to understand and *explain* this curious phenomenon") as if it were explicitly or implicitly a normative enterprise of mounting a defense of the status quo ("I must try to *justify* this curious phenomenon.").

I may, however, do Professor Walker an injustice, since I confess that his presentation leaves me uncertain as to exactly where he stands: that is, whether (a) he rejects the survey evidence on such matters as participation and the distribution of democratic norms; or (b) he accepts the evidence (contingently, which is all anyone can properly do with empirical data) but rejects the *explanations* of Key, Truman, and others; or (c) he accepts both the evidence and the explanation but denies that they describe (or prescribe) a desirable state of affairs in a democracy. If it is the first, which I doubt, we must await his own evidence. If it is the second—I so interpret his argument about apathy—we must await the development of his own theory and his testing of it; I return to this point later on. If it is the third, I heartily concur. I imagine that most of the other people he treats as "elitists" would also concur.

(3) Professor Walker's confounding of empirical explanation with prescription tempts him, I fear, to play the part of Procrustes and force his theorists to fit the bed he has prepared for them. The cut may be small—a half-inch slice off the top of a writer's head may seem important to no one but that author; or it may be rather large—from the ears up, say.

Exquisitely painful as they are to the victims, examples of the first sort are, it seems, so tedious in the telling that the suffering of the persistent reader finally surpasses that of the victims. I shall therefore spare the reader this unpleasantness. But may I offer one or two examples of surgery on a more ambitious scale?

Professor Walker describes the views of the "elitists" as follows: "The elitist theory allows the citizen only a passive role as an object of political activity; he exerts influence on policy making only by rendering judgments after-the-fact in national elections." It is unclear whether Professor Walker regards this as (1) an incorrect empirical statement; (2) a correct—or roughly

correct—empirical statement; or (3) a description of what the authors he cites regard as a desirable state of affairs. I confess that I find it far too simple to be acceptable. And clearly an author who subscribed to this as a roughly accurate empirical statement—indeed, I have the impression that Professor Walker himself believes it to be correct—need not regard this state of affairs as the least bit desirable: unless, perhaps, in the weak sense that even worse states are possible. With the next sentence, Professor Walker renders his elitists more frankly normative: “The safety of contemporary democracy lies in the high-minded sense of responsibility of its leaders, the *only* elements of society who are *actively striving to discover and implement the common good*” (my italics). Strangely, at this point Professor Walker cites no writer who made such a statement; personally, I find the sentence equally preposterous as an empirical statement or as a prescription for a desirable state of affairs.

Finally, Professor Walker concludes his paragraph by hammering his point home with a quotation that, like many other readers, I read initially as a devastating confirmation of his interpretation of the “elitists.” The sentence reads as follows: “The citizens are left to ‘judge a world they never made, and thus to become a genteel counterpart of the mobs which sporadically unseated aristocratic governments in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe.’” In heaven’s name, I thought to myself, which of his “elitists” ever made such an astounding statement! The footnote led me to an article not by any of the writers he is attacking but by Lane Davis, who, like Professor Walker, evidently is also a critic of the so-called “elitist theory.” Thus we enter into the world of the closed circle of mutually reinforcing scholarship, where one critic of X cites a fellow critic of X in order to establish the validity of his own interpretation of X. Soon it will be quite unnecessary to examine what X said or seek to interpret X in the light of what can be understood about X’s intentions. Walker will simply cite what Davis says X means, then Davis can cite Walker’s article citing Davis’ article interpreting X, then, . . . Poor X!

May I offer one more example of Professor Walker’s somewhat uninhibited selection and interpretation? He writes: “It has also been suggested by several elitist theorists that democracies have good reason to fear increased political participation. They argue that a successful (that is, stable) democratic system depends on widespread apathy and general political incompetence.”

Who are the “several elitist theorists” who have made statements equivalent to those two

sentences and particularly the second? We are directed to the whole of Chapter 14 in Berelson *et al.* I find it curious that Professor Walker was unable to cite anything more precise than the whole chapter. As readers of that chapter will recall, a central aspect of it is to contrast a hypothetical normative democratic theory prescribing certain kinds and levels of behavior with the findings on actual behavior in Elmira. The authors then seek to explain how, despite the gap, the system does function. Sometimes they also make normative comments. But I think the reader of this REVIEW will find that even their normative comments do not justify Professor Walker’s statement.⁹

We are also directed to Lipset, but probably as a result of differing printings the pages cited take me to the Table of Contents of my own edition of *Political Man*—or else to two blank pages of the edition of Michels’ *Political Parties* that Lipset edited. However, if Professor Walker had looked through Lipset’s writings for a full and fair interpretation, as I am sure he did, he must surely have noticed some statements that do not support the cynical view of civic participation suggested by the sentence that Professor Walker has written.¹⁰

⁹ Here are some of them, with italics added to emphasize the difference between what they say and what Professor Walker says they say: “The democratic citizen is expected to be well informed about political affairs. . . . By such standards the voter falls short. Even when he has the motivation, he finds it difficult to make decisions on the basis of full information when the subject is relatively simple and proximate; how can he do so when it is complex and remote? . . .” *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 308. “How could a mass democracy work if *all* the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by *some* people is not without its benefits, too. . . . Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and *might* culminate in rigid fanaticism that *could* destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community. . . . *Some* people are and should be highly interested in politics, but not *everyone* is or needs to be. Only the doctrinaire would depreciate the *moderate* indifference that facilitates compromise.”: *ibid.*, pp. 314–315; “*The classical political philosophers were right in the direction of their assessment of the virtues of the citizen. But they demanded those virtues in too extreme or doctrinal a form. The voter does have some principles, he does have information and rationality, he does have interest—but he does not have them in the extreme, elaborate, comprehensive, or detailed form in which they were uniformly recommended by political philosophers*”: *ibid.*, p. 322.

In sum, I have serious reservations as to the validity of Professor Walker's citations on this matter.¹¹ I fear, too, that he is led by his fixed ideas of "elitist theorists" into substituting, albeit unconsciously, extreme interpretations of his authors for their own much more balanced, qualified, and complex formulations. In terms of what I take to be his own aspirations for theory, this is a pity. Cutting down straw men is not going to answer the very hard questions nor overcome the very real deficiencies of democratic theory.

(4) The passage I have just been criticizing illustrates another aspect of Professor Walker's critique that I find particularly painful. Even if we were to assume that he correctly interprets "several" of the writers he calls "elitist," what of the others who hold very different views? If the writers happen to disagree among themselves, by what criterion does Professor Walker determine who is, and who is not, an elitist? Are we to take every item from someone's writings that lends itself to an "elitist" interpretation, and neglect every item that does not?

Speaking for myself, I disagree strongly with the notion that high rates of political participation in democratic orders necessarily lead to, or must inevitably be associated with, "instability." I disagree even more strongly with the view that the rates of political participation that have been characteristic of the American citizen body—or, for that matter, the citizen body of any large national polyarchal system—are desirable. On the contrary, I happen to believe that they are deplorably low. I should like to see much higher rates of political activity, particularly among some segments of the population whose participation has been lowest. But there are worlds of difference among different factors that might lead to higher participation; and worlds of difference in the quality and value of acts of participation. The rapid rise in electoral participation in the late years of the Weimar Republic did not make it a "better"

democracy, nor did it enable that Republic to solve its problems. Instead, it was associated with factors that transformed that experiment in democracy into a monstrous system with very high rates of "participation" of a kind, and where apathy was encouraged only in the concentration camps.¹²

This not a recent point of view on my part, nor, I imagine, is it one with which many of the writers cited by Professor Walker would disagree. I would not expect Professor Walker to have read everything I have written, but I am flattered to think that he has read the books he cites. I should therefore like to remind him of some passages in these books.¹³ One of the curi-

¹² Incidentally, while we may have recently emphasized the conditions of democratic "stability" too much, and the conditions of democratic change too little, I doubt whether anyone who remembers the failure of "stable" democracies to emerge in the USSR, Italy, Germany, and Spain will ever find it in himself to scoff at writers who focus on the conditions of democratic stability. What such writers are likely to have in mind when they think of democratic "instability" is not cabinet changes nor even piddling differences in regime but the possibility of democratic failures eventuating in brutal dictatorships in comparison with which even the worst polyarchy will seem like the promised land.

¹³ In *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, Lindblom and I wrote: "Polyarchy also requires a relatively high degree of political activity. That is, enough people must participate in the governmental process so that political leaders compete for the support of a large and more or less representative cross section of the population. . . .

"Admittedly this is a rather imprecise formulation; in what follows we shall attempt to refine it a little. But one cannot be very precise. . . . In practice, moreover, even in one country the extent of political activity varies enormously from one policy-making situation to another, from complete apathy to widespread activity. Then, too, political "activity" is itself a difficult kind of behavior to measure. The number of variables is large, including the number of people involved, the intensity with which they pursue their goals, the type of activity they indulge in, the political position and location of those who are active, their status, degree of control over others, and so on. . . .

"... In a very large number of important governmental decisions only a small minority of the electorate expresses or apparently even possesses any definite preferences at all among the alternatives in dispute. And it is equally safe to say that very little specific national policy is ever a product of an expressed preference for a

¹⁰ Like many other writers on politics, including Rousseau, Lipset's writings contain statements which, quoted out of context, might seem to offer faint confirmation for the interpretation offered by Professor Walker. But I do not see how, for example, Lipset's Chapter on "Elections: Who Votes and Who Doesn't?" in *Political Man* could be regarded by anyone who reads the whole chapter as yielding the sentence in Professor Walker's essay: see especially pp. 181, 186.

¹¹ The third citation is to an article by Morris-Jones, which I do not have at hand as I write. If it turns out that he has correctly interpreted Morris-Jones, would that justify his interpretation of Berelson *et al* and of Lipset?

ous ironies of his method of selection is that while he interprets empirical theory as if it were normative or prescriptive, he seems to have overlooked some efforts to formulate normative criteria for the performance of democracies or polyarchies.¹⁴ Thus in *A Preface to*

specific alternative by an overwhelming majority of the electorate. . . .

"... In practice, then, the democratic goal that governmental decisions should accord with the preferences of the greater number of adults in the society is extraordinarily difficult to approximate, and rarely, if ever, is it closely approximated. . . .

"... This discrepancy between polyarchy and democracy arouses anxieties among those who wish to approximate democracy more closely, and rightly so. Keeping this fact in mind, let us suggest some general lines of approach to the question of the level of political activity required as a precondition for polyarchy.

"A considerable measure of political inactivity is not *by itself* a sign that the democratic goal is not being roughly approximated by a polyarchy. . . .

"... The question, then, is not so much whether citizens are active but whether they have the opportunity to exert control through activity when they wish to do so. . . .

"... Therefore the problem is not so much one of insuring that every citizen is politically active on every issue as it is one of insuring that all citizens have approximately equal opportunity to act, using 'opportunity' in a realistic rather than legalistic sense. . . .

"... Equal opportunity to act is not, however, a product merely of legal rights. It is a product of a variety of factors that make for differences in understanding the key points in the political process, access to them, methods of exploiting this access, optimism and buoyancy about the prospect of success, and willingness to act. Some of these factors probably cannot be rationally influenced given the present state of knowledge and techniques. Three that to some extent can are income, wealth, and education. A fourth that may become important as knowledge increases is personality. . . .

"... Nevertheless, many policy decisions cannot actually reflect any specific preferences of the greater number. About the most that can be said for polyarchy is that, if the opportunities for political action are kept open to a representative section of the adult population, specific policies will rarely violate highly ranked, intense, stable, and relatively broad preferences of the greater number for a longer period than about the interval between elections. . . ." (pp. 309-314.)

¹⁴ Thus in *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, Lindblom and I offered "Seven Basic Ends for

Democratic Theory, working out some ideas Lindblom and I had already advanced in *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, I tried to develop a set of standards against which it would (in theory) be possible to measure the performance of a political system in order to determine the degree to which that system "maximized democracy." The eight standards I laid down were, I thought, extremely severe. In fact, I wrote: "I think it may be laid down dogmatically that no human organization—certainly none with more than a handful of people—has ever met or is ever likely to meet these eight conditions."¹⁵ I defined "poly-

Social Action": freedom, rationality, democracy, subjective equality, security, progress, and appropriate inclusion. Of democracy we wrote as follows:

"The democratic goal is twofold. It consists of a condition to be attained and a principle guiding the procedure for attaining it. The condition is political equality, which we define as follows: *Control over governmental decisions is shared so that the preferences of no one citizen are weighted more heavily than the preferences of any other one citizen.* The principle is majority rule, which we define as follows: *Governmental decisions should be controlled by the greater number expressing their preferences in the 'last say.'*

"Democracy is a goal, not an achievement. The main sociopolitical process for approximating (although not achieving) democracy we shall call polyarchy. The characteristics of polyarchy, its prerequisites, and its significance as a device for rational social action on economic matters are discussed in a later chapter. If democracy is one of our goals and if polyarchy is a process for approximating that goal, it follows that we must also value polyarchy as a means. But here we are concerned with the democratic goal itself." (p. 41)

¹⁵ (p. 71.) Though I have always tried to write lucidly, I am increasingly appalled by incontrovertible evidence of my inability to do so. If Professor Walker interprets as normative theory what I (and, as I believe, others) wholly or primarily intended to be empirical theory, others have reversed the process by interpreting my ventures in normative theorizing as if I were describing the American political system. Despite the clear warning contained in the sentence just cited, the fact that my model of "polyarchy" and my description of "The American Hybrid" are in the same book, though in separate chapters, is evidently enough to lead to their being confounded. Cf. Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (Wiley, New York, 1964), pp. 93 ff. Incidentally, my guess, supported by some data, is that if a number of "democracies" were measured by the standards

archies," however, as political systems in which the eight conditions "exist to a relatively high degree" (p. 84). I advanced the proposition that "polyarchy is a function of the political activity of the members" (p. 81), but also conjectured that "if an increase in political activity brings the authoritarian-minded into the political arena, consensus on the basic norms among the politically active certainly must be declining. To the extent that consensus declines, we would expect . . . that, after some lag, polyarchy would also decline" (p. 89).

Professor Walker may not agree with any of this. But I do not understand why he ignores it in order to construct his paradigm of "elitist theory."

In short, I do not share Professor Walker's confidence that he knows the implicit or explicit normative assumptions of the writers he has tried to summarize. Whether they would agree, in the main, on their empirical descriptions is one thing; whether they would agree, in the main, on their normative standards and conclusions is quite another. My guess is that although they would not agree with Professor Walker's description of them in either case, their actual normative disagreements would prove more profound than their empirical disagreements. But I do not pretend to know.

III

One possible justification for building a man of straw in order to attack it is the methodological (and psychological?) assistance even a straw man may give in designing one's own alternative theory. I cannot help feeling that Professor Walker's caricature is intended for this purpose: it provides him with at least a hypothetical view to react against. Perhaps we should take it in that spirit.

In any case, when Professor Walker turns his attention from his *bêtes noires* in order to speculate about apathy and social movements, he says much with which it is difficult to disagree. Thus when he speaks of "widespread political apathy . . . among many sectors of the American public," who will contest his statement that "it is important to ask why this is so and not simply to explain how this phenomenon contributes to the smooth functioning of the system"?

In fact, it seems to me that in the last two decades there has been more attention paid to

the extent, types, characteristics, and possible causes of varying rates of political participation than in the preceding 25 centuries. Perhaps the best evidence on this point is supplied by Professor Walker himself. Not only does he rely heavily in his own theoretical suggestions on the work of social scientists who, by the standards of the first part of his essay, would surely be classified as "elitists"; but his hypotheses, as I read them, do not go much beyond what is already in the mainstream of the social sciences.¹⁶

Nonetheless, Professor Walker is surely right that we do not know nearly as much as we ought to, that political apathy, alienation, indifference, lack of confidence, and feelings of inefficacy are widespread in the United States among the poor, Negroes, and even many individuals and segments in other strata, and that these feelings create obstacles to effective participation in political life. I assume that Professor Walker and I are at one in wanting these obstacles to be eliminated and in thinking that political scientists may have something to contribute to this task.

If much of what Professor Walker has to say about apathy and participation is, as I believe, pretty much taken for granted by most students of the subject, he has nonetheless contributed some interesting additional hypotheses that have not, so far as I know, been studied. I have in mind, for example, his intriguing speculation that "high crime (or suicide) rates and low rates of voting may very well be related." It is a pity that Professor Walker did not go beyond speculation in order to furnish us with some tests of his hypothesis. To be sure, the problem has formidable aspects, but even a brief survey of the evidence would have been helpful.¹⁷

¹⁶ Many of the factors Professor Walker advances as possible explanations for varying degrees of political involvement-apaty, or political participation-nonparticipation, will be found in the pioneering article, published in 1954, by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. II, pp. 1124-1175. A decade later, Angus Campbell presented a compact, succinct, and (to me) potentially powerful explanatory theory that takes into account much of the work in the interval: "The Passive Citizen" in Stein Rokkan, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation* (Bergen, The Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1962).

¹⁷ Although reported crime rates are, for a variety of reasons, notoriously unreliable indices of actual crime, investigation conceivably might turn up some connections. However, as to the relation between suicide rates and voting rates, an

of polyarchal performance described in the model, the United States would be found to rank well down the list. A highly innovative attempt to undertake such a ranking is Deane Neubauer's *On the Theory of Polyarchy: An Empirical Study of Democracy in Ten Countries* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1965.)

Professor Walker's references to the possible effects of the American political system on participation and apathy call attention to a methodological matter that until recently has generally been ignored: the need to examine the problem in a comparative framework and not exclusively in the American setting. The evidence of a few comparative studies suggests a paradox.¹⁸ Although turnout in elections is rel-

atively low in the United States, political involvement, interest, and participation in politics in ways other than voting is relatively high: quite possible higher than in any other large country. Apathy, alienation, and non-participation are not peculiar to the United States; indeed, a good case could be made out that these phenomena are present to a lesser degree in the United States than in most other democracies. It would be premature to fix on this conclusion. My point is that to understand the problems Professor Walker is concerned with we need more analysis across nations as well as within the United States itself.

IV

examination made at my request by Edward R. Tufte of readily available evidence shows that in the United States the relationship, if any, runs counter to Professor Walker's conjecture. Taking each state as a unit, there is a positive and not a negative relationship between suicides and voting turnout. The correlations are 0.24 with turnout in presidential elections and 0.34 with turnout in off-year elections for governor and Senators. Mississippi has the lowest turnout and the second lowest suicide rate. Rhode Island, which has the lowest suicide rate, has a high voting turnout, while Wyoming, which has about the same turnout as Rhode Island, has the second highest suicide rate. California and New York had almost exactly the same turnout in the 1960 Presidential election, but the suicide rate in California is 16 per 100,000, putting it in the highest group, while New York at 9.7 per 100,000 is among the lowest. Professor Walker's hypothesis would imply that the suicide rate among Negroes is higher than among whites; in fact, for the United States the rate among whites (11.4) is more than twice that among Negroes (4.5). In fact the rate among non-whites is lower than among whites in all states except six with few non-whites. In eleven Southern states the correlation between suicide rates and voting in Presidential elections (which according to the conjecture should of course be negative) is positive and moderately high: 0.47; with off-term elections for governor and Senators, it is lower but still positive: 0.36. The correlation of suicide rates with voting in off-term elections for governor and Senators is practically identical in North and South; with voting in Presidential elections, the correlation in the North is almost non-existent but negative: 0.17. The data are from Louis I. Dublin, *Suicide* (New York, Ronald Press, 1963), pp. 218-219, and Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), pp. 40, 46. My strong impression is that if the hypothesis were checked against comparative data, it would run into similar difficulties. For example, the Scandinavian countries have similar voting rates; yet while the suicide rate is high in Sweden and Denmark, it is low in Norway. Italy, which has astonishingly high turnout, has a low suicide rate, etc.

¹⁸ I have in mind particularly Gabriel Almond

Professor Walker's suggestions for further study of "social movements" is timely. If we adopt Professor Heberle's definition of a social movement as "a stirring among the people, an unrest, a collective attempt to reach a visualized goal, especially a change in certain social institutions,"¹⁹ surely it is true that parties, pressure groups, interest groups, voting behavior and many other closely related topics have been far more popular than social movements as subjects of investigation by American political scientists. But I wonder if the reasons for this relative neglect are really where Professor Walker locates them. Well defined social movements—the anti-slavery movement of the pre-Civil War period or the agrarian discontent of the 1880's and 1890's—are comparatively rare in the United States. It is no accident that it is mainly historians who have written about American social movements: for the examples are chiefly historical. Social movements are often short-lived, as in the case of the Know-nothings before the Civil War. If they endure, they inevitably become institutionalized; when they do become institutionalized, as in the case of the Prohibition movement, the labor movement, or the Socialist Party, they are more likely to be studied by political scientists, under more familiar rubrics, e.g., pressure groups, interest groups, or political parties.²⁰

and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Spring, 1962), 11-13; and Rokkan (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation*, op. cit.

¹⁹ Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), p. 6.

²⁰ Professor Walker may have been somewhat misled because he has looked for studies of "social movements" under the wrong headings. Standard texts on political parties and pressure

To the extent that social movements have been amorphous and fugitive they have left little permanent evidence to study. Moreover, an older bias in favor of research in the library rather than in the field would probably handicap political scientists. My impression is that today, when political scientists get out into the field more rapidly than once might have been the case, they are more likely to observe social movements in the earlier stages. Thus the Radical Right, whose adherents are not always easy to examine, has nonetheless been the subject of a good deal of recent inquiry.²¹

It is too early to tell whether the civil rights movement, the recent peace and anti-Vietnam-war movements, the New Left and student discontent will receive much professional attention from political scientists. I venture to guess that the amount of attention paid to them by political scientists will depend in very large measure on how long they last.

In any case, Professor Walker is surely right in suggesting that movements like these are important to study. I would only add two cautionary notes. First, as with political participation, the subject cries out for treatment in a comparative and historical framework.²² Sec-

groups have for decades contained descriptions of farmers' organizations, the labor movement, the NAACP, etc., under such headings as "pressure groups" or "interest groups." They have also treated third parties, sometimes extensively. E.g., the third edition of V. O. Key's *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), which had chapters in Part I, Pressure Groups, on "Agrarianism" that included a section on "Cycles of Agrarian Discontent: The Nature of Political Movements"; "Workers," "Business," and "Other Interest Groups," including "Racial and Nationalist Minorities." See also, Chapter 7, "The Party Battle, 1896-1952" and Ch. 11, "The Role of Minor Parties."

²¹ The best known work is, of course, *The New American Right*, ed. by Daniel Bell (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), and the "expanded and updated" version *The Radical Right* (New York: Doubleday, 1963). In 1963, *The Journal of Social Issues* devoted an entire issue to "American Political Extremism in the 1960's" (Vol. 19, April, 1963). And see the results of a direct attempt to interview people at a San Francisco Regional School of Anti-Communism by R. E. Wolfinger, B. K. Wolfinger, K. Prewitt and S. Rosenhack, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in *Ideology and Discontent*, David Apter (ed.) (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

²² Comparable, for example, to Otto Kirchheimer's "Confining Conditions and Revolu-

ond, considering the variety of phenomena that might be called social movements and the great variety in the "relationship of challenge and response between the established political system and social movements," to use Professor Walker's phrase, the subject would be unmanageable, I fear, with a framework no more specific than Professor Walker provides us in his essay. Some typologies, some specific hypotheses would, I imagine, go a long way toward making the subject more manageable. Efforts in this direction might be a good deal more productive than a general exhortation to go out and study social movements.

V

There is a danger that the main thrust of Professor Walker's essay will seem to have been lost in all these details. In so far as his essay is an appeal for better normative democratic theory than now seems to be at hand, I most enthusiastically concur.

Even if there is a renaissance of normative theory, as Professor Walker and I hope there will be, I doubt very much whether there will ever be an entity that we can call the normative theory of democracy. Despite the frequency and confidence with which the "classic theory of democracy" is often described, there has never been such a theory. Between Aristotle and Paine, as between Rousseau and Mill, there are universes of difference. Along with other people, theorists who believe in popular government have never agreed wholly on the goals or values to be maximized. Equally important, they have never agreed on the kinds and degrees of constraints that have to be treated as fixed by the conditions of man and society, whether for all time or within a given period. Disagreement with respect to these basic assumptions is not going to disappear. We should therefore expect that in the future as in the past there will be not one but a number of differing normative theories of democracy. But I agree with Professor Walker: It is time to get on with the job.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For further comments by Professor Walker see Communications to the Editor, pp. 391-392.)

tionary Breakthroughs," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 964-974; or Val R. Lorwin's "Labor Organizations and Politics in Belgium and France," in *National Labor Movements in the Postwar World*, E. M. Kassalow (ed.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 142-168; and his "Reflections on the History of the French and American Labor Movements," *Journal of Economic History* (March, 1957), 24-244.

POLITICAL ETHOS AND THE STRUCTURE OF CITY GOVERNMENT*

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For years specialists in local politics have deplored the anecdotal quality of literature in the field and have called for theoretically-based comparative research. One of the most stimulating and ambitious attempts in this direction is Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson's theory of "public-regardingness" and "private-regardingness," which states that much of what Americans think about the political world can be subsumed under one or the other of these conflicting orientations and that the prevalence of one ethos over the other influences the style, structure, and outcome of local politics.¹ Banfield and Wilson attribute these two ethics to different elements in the population and hypothesize that a number of political forms and policies are manifestations of each ethos. We intend to examine the associations between these hypothesized consequences and the demographic characteristics that are said to be the bases of the two ethics.

I. THE THEORY OF THE TWO ETHICS

Banfield and Wilson take their cue from a famous passage in Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform* contrasting native and immigrant political values in the early twentieth century:

Out of the clash between the needs of the immigrants and the sentiments of the natives there emerged two thoroughly different systems of political ethics. . . . One, founded upon the in-

digenous Yankee-Protestant political traditions, and upon middle-class life, assumed and demanded the constant, disinterested activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued that political life ought to be run . . . in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs . . . The other system, founded upon the European backgrounds of the immigrants, upon their unfamiliarity with independent political action, their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and upon the urgent needs that so often grew out of their migration, took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs, interpreted political and civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligations, and placed strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of law or morals. It was chiefly upon this system of values that the political life of the immigrant, the boss, and the urban machine was based.²

Many specialists in local politics have referred to this passage in one context or another, but it remained for Banfield and Wilson to develop from it a comprehensive and persuasive theory to explain many aspects of American municipal politics. They introduce their argument as follows:

There is a tendency for [urban cleavages] to coalesce into two opposite patterns. These patterns reflect two conceptions of the public interest that are widely held. The first, which derives from the middle class ethos, favors what the municipal reform movement has always defined as "good government"—namely efficiency, impartiality, honesty, planning, strong executives, no favoritism, model legal codes . . . The other conception of the public interest (one never explicitly formulated as such, but one all the same) derives from the "immigrant ethos." This is the conception of those people who identify with the ward or neighborhood rather than the city "as a whole," who look to politicians for "help" and "favors," . . . and who are far less interested in the efficiency, impartiality, and honesty of local government than in its readiness to confer material benefits of one sort or another upon them.³

At first reading there are troublesome points

² (New York: Knopf, 1955), pp. 8-9.

³ Banfield and Wilson, p. 46.

* We are grateful to Kuan Lee for writing programs and supervising computer runs for the data analysis, to Richard A. Brody, Jay Kadane, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. for advice on statistical matters, to James D. Barber, Martha Derthick, Heinz Eulau, Genevieve Knapfer, Sheilah R. Koeppen, Nelson W. Polsby, Alan Rosenthal, Gilbert Y. Steiner, Aaron B. Wildavsky, James Q. Wilson, and Barbara Kaye Wolfinger for their advice and comments at various stages of our research, and to the Graduate Division of Stanford University and the Stanford Computation Center for financial assistance.

¹ This is one of the major themes of their *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and the M.I.T. Press, 1963); see also James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this *Review*, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.

in this passage, as in Hofstadter's. Is a strong executive part of the old American political ideal? Are these "public-regarding" old settlers the same people who are usually considered devotees of Adam Smith's very private-regarding doctrine that the individual should pursue his own interests and that the public good would be achieved from the sum of individual interests? Did the peasants who came here from the monarchies of 19th century Europe introduce graft and the spoils system to America, or did they learn their bad habits from the Yankees? Did the Yankees withdraw from local politics because they could not stomach the newcomers' sordid political customs or because, outnumbered by the immigrants whom they had rebuffed and exploited, they wanted to avoid the consequences of the resulting hostility? Have Yankees led fights for municipal reform because they are more upstanding or because they find corruption a handy club with which to beat their opponents?⁴

It is well known, however, that many cities with large foreign-stock populations tend to have political orders in which good government is subordinated to favoritism and machine politics. Tammany Hall, the formidable Democratic organization in Chicago, and the confused, crooked Boston scene come immediately to mind. Furthermore, reform campaigns in these cities tend to be led by upper-middle-class Yankees and Jews whose life styles and political perspectives are a world apart from the outlook of ward heelers and clubhouse politicians.

But then one can easily think of an equal number of cases on the other side of the argument. Until its recent reformation, was Kansas City (11 per cent foreign stock) any less tainted than Boston (46 per cent)?⁵ The South and the border states have notoriously corrupt politics and are just as notoriously Anglo-Saxon. Farther north, in Indiana, only 8 per cent of the residents are of foreign stock, but state employ-

ees are "maced" 2 per cent of their pay for the benefit of the ruling political party. In Pennsylvania, dominated until a dozen years ago by a Republican party based on small-town, native-born Americans, at least 40,000 state jobs are at the disposal of the party that wins control of the state government.⁶

The most obvious fact that emerges from this recital is that such comparisons are idle. Attempts to verify the existence of the two ethics and analyze their political consequences will have to proceed beyond discussion of simple honesty and dishonesty. Fortunately Banfield and Wilson have elaborated their basic hypothesis by drawing from the general theory of conflicting ethics a number of propositions about specific manifestations of one ethos or the other. "The logic of the middle class ideal implies also certain institutional arrangements" conducive to government by experts in the interests of the city as a whole: the city manager plan, nonpartisan ballots, election of the city council at large, or, if wards are used, from large districts.⁷ On the other hand, the private-regarding ethos favors mayors, partisan ballots, and election of councilmen from wards, preferably small ones. The differences between the two ethics are said to be reflected as well in various municipal policies. The public-regarding ethos favors complete civil service coverage of city employees in order to maximize the professional and impartial conduct of public business. On the other hand, the private-regarding ethos emphasizes favoritism and patronage and therefore opposes civil service. Because the public-regarding ethos is concerned with the city as a whole and with long-range attempts to manage and improve the local environment, it favors city planning and urban renewal. The private-regarding ethos opposes such policies because they interrupt neighborhood patterns and impose unwelcome restraints on the city's residents.

Other writers have seen much of this conflict as a clash between middle-class admiration of efficiency and the working-class' desires for representation of their interests.⁸ Some critics of

⁴ Here, with Banfield and Wilson, we refer not to the stylish young liberal club members of California and Manhattan, but to the more conservative "good government" forces in many cities.

⁵ Throughout this article the "percent foreign stock" or "percent ethnic" refers to the proportion of a city's 1960 population that is foreign born or native born with at least one parent born abroad. Nineteen per cent of the total U. S. population is of foreign stock. Data on nativity and parentage are from U. S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1962* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

⁶ Perhaps because so much of the best scholarly research on local politics has been conducted close to the great universities of the Northeast and perhaps also because most serious nonacademic writers live in a few northeastern cities, political organizations in these cities have been described at great length, while very little is known about existing machines in other parts of the country.

⁷ Banfield and Wilson, p. 330; see also *ibid.*, pp. 92, 95, 154, 170.

⁸ See, e.g., Leo F. Schnore and Robert F. Al-

Banfield and Wilson say that the labels for the two ethics are much too value-laden and that preferences described as selfish or unselfish could more properly be interpreted in terms of the different interests of different social classes.⁹ For example, the fact that poor people protest urban renewal projects may be due not so much to private-regardingness as to the fact that the houses demolished in such projects usually are the homes of the poor.

These caveats are not germane to this study. We are not concerned for the moment with either the morality or the consequences of any particular governmental form or policy, nor are we concerned with how and where particular legal forms can be subverted by local political styles. We are examining the relationship between various forms and policies and the social properties of the relevant cities. It is sufficient for this purpose only to assume that the differences between the alternative forms are worth talking about.

A more important question remains: is the independent variable ethnicity or occupational status? Some parts of the country have scarcely any foreign-stock population, while the distribution of social classes is, of course, fairly even not only from one region to another, but also among most cities. Moreover, cities with large ethnic populations do not necessarily have small middle classes. The correlation coefficient between per cent ethnic and per cent in white collar occupations for all New England cities of over 50,000 population is $-.04$; it is faintly positive for other regions with appreciable ethnic populations: $.29$ in the Middle Atlantic states, $.20$ in the Midwest, and $.24$ in the West.¹⁰

Banfield and Wilson seem to consider the two dimensions interchangeable. Sometimes they attribute the two ethnics to ethnicity, sometimes to social class, and sometimes they mingle both explanations. The weight of evidence suggests that ethnicity is meant to be the con-

trolling independent variable. The theme of the two ethnics is introduced in a discussion of cleavages between old settlers and immigrants.¹¹ In a more recent work they remark, "We do not think that income *per se* has this effect [making people private- or public-regarding]; rather it is the ethnic attributes, or culture, empirically associated with it."¹² But this interpretation is confounded by statements like this: "The assimilation of lower-class people into the middle class has, of course, entailed their assimilation to the political ethos of the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant elite . . ."¹³

Is a combination of ethnicity and working-class status the origin of the private-regarding ethos? If so, why would upward mobility produce a change? It might be argued that private-regardingness is a consequence of ethnic consciousness, which disappears when middle-class status is attained. But the available data indicate that social mobility often has little effect on ethnic consciousness.¹⁴ Nor is it plausible that upward-mobile ethnics will readily abandon their political perspectives in favor of views more characteristic of the middle class.¹⁵

Some of these difficulties may be resolved if "middle class" is interpreted, for present purposes, as "upper middle class." Indeed, in some passages Banfield and Wilson indicate that the important line of demarcation is between professional and business people on the one hand and lower status groups on the other. But the bulk of their treatment of the two ethnics contradicts this. In particular, their discussion of the likelihood that "the middle class will in the very long run assimilate the lower class entirely"¹⁶ suggests that they include everyone in a white collar occupation in the "middle class" as far as the two ethnics are concerned.

Banfield and Wilson do not explain why immigrants should be private-regarding. Their silence on this point is a source of numerous complications. Did the immigrants bring the private-regarding ethos with them from their former countries or was it a product of inter-

ford, "Forms of Government and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17.

⁹ See especially Herbert Kaufman's review of *City Politics* in this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 422-423. Kaufman asks, "are those measures designated 'public-regarding' by Banfield and Wilson really manifestations of selfless fellow feeling or are they the self-serving policies of a particular group in society that is trying to hold on to what it has?" (p. 423).

¹⁰ In these computations the Midwest includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.

¹¹ Banfield and Wilson, pp. 38-46.

¹² Wilson and Banfield, p. 885.

¹³ Banfield and Wilson, p. 123; see also *ibid.*, p. 329.

¹⁴ Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 896-908.

¹⁵ In other areas of political behavior the upward mobile tend to have characteristics midway between their old and new classes; see James A. Barber, Jr., *Social Mobility and Political Behavior* (Chicago: Rand McNally, forthcoming).

¹⁶ Banfield and Wilson, p. 123.

action between their predispositions and the conditions of life they found in the United States? Hofstadter seems to favor the latter interpretation, but Banfield and Wilson speak of the ethos that "the new immigrants brought with them."¹⁷ If the immigrants came with the private-regarding ethos, one would expect to find it distributed around the country in proportion to the number of persons of foreign stock. (This assumes, of course, that immigrants from different countries have similar inclinations to private-regardingness. Banfield and Wilson do not consider this point, except to single out Polish-Americans as particularly likely to be private-regarding, for reasons that are not explained.)¹⁸

On the other hand, if the ethos is a response to American life, one would expect that its distribution would be related not only to the proportion of immigrants in the population, but also to the character of their experience in America. Typical immigrant experiences differed considerably from one region to another. This was notably true of the West, where non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants arrived with or on the heels of the earliest settlers. All shared the rigors of pioneering and the profits and instabilities of boom economies.¹⁹ Compared to those in the settled Eastern cities, immigrants to the West were better off and better educated; labor was scarcer, wages were higher, and class distinctions were weaker and more unstable.²⁰ Status and income were neither so fixed nor so strongly stratified. If private-regardingness is an acquired characteristic, it seems likely that different regional immigrant histories might produce different levels of attachment to the ethos or perhaps different manifestations of it.

These observations do not invalidate the ethos theory, but they do suggest some necessary modifications. In particular, since the quality of the immigrant experience differed from region to region, it appears that a given level of foreign-stock population in, say, California and New York might produce very different levels of private-regardingness in the two places.²¹ Our findings support this inference.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Louis Berg, "Peddlers in Eldorado," *Commentary*, July, 1965, pp. 64-66.

²⁰ Earl Pomeroy, *The Pacific Slope* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

²¹ Similarly, an analysis of local voting returns in the 1960 presidential election showed considerable regional variation in the responses of

Several pieces of published research bear on the ethos theory. John H. Kessel found that the mayor form was more common in cities with large ethnic populations.²² Schnore and Alford report the same finding in their study of 300 suburbs, but the difference here is slight: 9.3 per cent foreign-born population in mayor cities compared to 8 per cent in manager cities.²³ Both studies also found that manager cities had larger proportions of residents in white-collar occupations.²⁴ Phillips Cutright suggests that partisan elections are more likely to be found where "community cleavages" are intense, because such divisions provide "political parties with the social basis necessary for effective organization and sufficient activity necessary for survival as a community force."²⁵ He used two measures of "high cleavage": more than 50 per cent of the population employed in manufacturing indicates economic cleavage; while more than 20 per cent Catholics indicates religious cleavage. By either measure, high-cleavage cities were more likely to use the partisan ballot.²⁶

similar Protestant voting groups to President Kennedy's candidacy; see Lucy S. Davidowicz and Leon J. Goldstein, *Politics in a Pluralist Democracy* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1963).

²² John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," this *REVIEW*, 56 (September, 1962), 615-620.

²³ Schnore and Alford, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁴ Edgar L. Sherbenou found that Chicago suburbs with higher priced homes are very likely to use the manager form, while more modest towns all have mayors; see his "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," *Public Administration Review*, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135.

²⁵ Phillips Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems in American Cities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (January, 1963), p. 218.

²⁶ One proposition of the ethos theory states that public-regardingness is manifested in support for expansion of many government services that do not benefit the individual, but that will increase his tax payments. In their own work Banfield and Wilson have found that, among homeowners subject to property taxes, support for such measures to be financed by property taxation rises with the median income and home value of the voting unit. They also found that voting units with large foreign-stock populations were less likely to support such measures. They believe that the controlling element in these rela-

These studies have severe limitations as sources of evidence for the ethos theory. They are concerned with only two of its dependent variables. More important, they do not include controls for third variables, particularly region. Since some parts of the country are almost devoid of foreign-stock residents (and Catholics), it is reasonable to try to separate the influence of region from that of local population characteristics. Furthermore, western and southwestern cities, whatever their economic bases, tend to have larger white-collar populations than cities in the Northeast and Midwest. Because of the historical development of land-use patterns, these cities usually have more extensive residential neighborhoods with suburban characteristics, and thus have suffered less from the postwar flight to the suburbs that has reduced middle class populations in core cities elsewhere.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

The ethos theory states that the city manager form of government, the nonpartisan ballot, at-large election of city legislators, big wards, civil service coverage of municipal employees, city planning, and urban renewal are favored by the public-regarding ethos, which is a prominent aspect of the political perspectives of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The opposing private-regarding ethos, rooted in the immigrant experience, favors the mayor form, the partisan ballot, ward election of city legislators, and small wards; it is opposed to civil service, city planning, and urban renewal.²⁷ We have treated all these features as dependent variables and examined their relationship to the key independent variable, the proportion of a city's population that is of foreign stock. Other independent variables include social class (measured by the percentage of the labor force employed in white collar occupations), median family income, and educational level (measured by the median school years completed by residents aged 25 or over). We examined the relationship between each independent and dependent variable within each major region of the United States. We also measured the degree of association between

tionships is ethnicity, and attribute the findings to the prevalence of the private-regarding ethos among ethnic group members; see Banfield and Wilson, pp. 237-240; and Wilson and Banfield.

²⁷ A number of other political forms, styles, and policies are said to be favored by one or the other of the two ethics. Data permitting intercity comparisons are not available on these other variables.

ethnicity and each dependent variable while controlling for social class, income, and education. The dependent variables and their hypothesized relationships to the two ethics are summarized in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Private-Regarding	Public-Regarding
Form of Government	Mayor	Manager
Type of Ballot	Partisan	Nonpartisan
Method of Electing Councilmen	Wards	At Large
Size of Council Districts	Small	Large
Civil Service Coverage	Less	More
City Planning Expenditures	Low	High
Urban Renewal	Low	High

This study includes all 309 incorporated cities with 1960 populations in excess of 50,000 persons, excluding Washington, D. C. Data on all dependent variables except urban renewal were taken from *The Municipal Year Book 1963*.²⁸ The magnitude of urban renewal programs was measured by capital grants per capita for each city. Raw data on capital grants were obtained from the *Urban Renewal Directory* for December 31, 1963.²⁹ A variety of demographic data for each city was obtained from the *County and City Data Book, 1962*.

Cities are not always free to make their own decisions on what governmental forms they will adopt and what policies they will follow. State constitutions and legislatures often interfere with home rule by requiring cities to conform to particular forms or preventing them from adopting others. We have investigated this problem at some length and consulted scholars and officials of several professional organizations in the field of municipal government.³⁰ Whenever state law imposes con-

²⁸ Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (eds.), *The Municipal Year Book 1963* (Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1963).

²⁹ Urban Renewal Administration, *Urban Renewal Directory, December 31, 1963* (Washington: Urban Renewal Administration, 1964).

³⁰ For information on state restrictions on home rule we are grateful to, among others, David S. Arnold of the International City Managers' Association, William N. Cassella, Jr. of the

straints on cities' free choice with respect to any dependent variable we have omitted such cities from the relevant analyses.

It might be argued that our index of ethnicity is both too exclusive and too inclusive. Foreign-stock population percentages exclude Negroes, who might be considered inclined to the private-regarding ethos.³¹ But 1960 levels of Negro population in northern cities reflect recent migration. In most such cities Negroes were scarce and politically unimportant until the postwar years; as with all newcomers, they still have not mobilized themselves so as to exert political strength commensurate with their numbers. In the South, of course, Negroes have been disfranchised until recently. Most southern cities have now gone a long way toward removing impediments to Negro voting, but the recency and unevenness of this development makes it difficult to use numbers as an index of Negro political influence.

The criterion might be considered too inclusive in that most Jews are first- or second-generation Americans, and Banfield and Wilson say that at least upper-middle-class Jews are public regarding.³² Jews amount to three or four per cent of the total American population. Almost all of them live in northern cities; more than a quarter live in New York City, where they comprise almost 30 per cent of the population. Aside from New York and a few other places, Jews have not been sizable parts of most cities' populations. Since only some Jews are exempted from the charge of private-regardingness and since we exclude the very large cities where most of them live from many of our computations, this problem is not so great.

In recent years many Jews have moved to

National Municipal League, Eugene C. Lee of the Institute of Governmental Studies of the University of California (Berkeley), and Keith Ocheltree of the Public Personnel Association.

³¹ Banfield and Wilson do not include Negroes in those groups they consider disposed to private-regardingness, although some political goals they attribute to Negroes, such as desires for representation and "recognition," might be thought to incline them in that direction (Banfield and Wilson, pp. 158-159, 293-294, 307-308). On the other hand, Negroes are described as disproportionately public-regarding in their voting on bond issues (*ibid.*, pp. 237-239).

³² See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 42, 123, 330. While upper-middle-class Jews are often classified with Yankees as adherents of the public-regarding ethos, Banfield and Wilson do not say if they are any more likely to be public-regarding than Catholics of similar social status.

the cities of southern Florida, some of which now have foreign-stock populations as large as any northern community. (In fact, Miami Beach, 53 per cent of whose population is ethnic, leads the nation in this category.) Since most Jewish Floridians have lived in the state only a few years, they are unlikely to have political influence in proportion to their numbers, and so one would not expect that the political practices of Florida cities would fully reflect their preferences. These cities are the exceptions to the general rule that 1960 levels of ethnic populations are a fairly reliable index of each city's relative ethnicity over the past fifty years.

The ethos theory does not refer to the actual incidence of its various dependent variables, but to attitudes toward the variables.³³ Therefore, propositions specifying relationships between cities' population characteristics and their political forms and policies are inferences from the ethos theory, not parts of the theory itself. These inferences are based on the assumptions that the strength of the public- and private-regarding ethics is related to the magnitude of the population groupings that supposedly give rise to one ethos or the other, and that the two ethics are important causal factors in city politics. Banfield and Wilson seem to have made the same assumption: "Obviously the social and ecological structure of a city largely determines which view as to the proper role of government will prevail in it."³⁴

How valid are these inferences? Obviously it would be unwise to assert that there is a simple causal relationship between public attitudes

³³ We think it unlikely that most individuals' political knowledge has developed to the point of having opinions about, say, the relative merits of ward and at-large elections. Thus the ethics may exist at two levels: as general value systems for most people and as a set of specific political preferences for their leaders.

³⁴ Banfield and Wilson, p. 55. Our interpretation of this statement is based on its context, Banfield and Wilson's citation of the Sherbenou and Schnore-Alford correlational studies in support of their proposition about public-regardingness and the city manager plan (*ibid.*, p. 169n), and passages like this:

"Many council-manager cities are upper-class or middle-class in character; few if any are predominantly lower-class. In the Chicago area, for example, . . . eighteen of the twenty cities with the highest home values had the [manager] plan, whereas none of the thirty-one cities with the lowest home values had it. Its popularity with people of the upper and middle classes explains its popularity in small communities, which are more likely to consist predominantly of those classes than are large ones" (*ibid.*, p. 169).

toward a particular governmental feature and the likelihood that that feature will be adopted. Many other considerations affect the nature of local political institutions. Some of these other factors, such as state law, can be identified. Others, such as the interrelationship of other demographic variables, can be controlled by statistical manipulation. The effect of city size and region can also be controlled. Other factors, such as different national origins of immigrants, can be partially and indirectly isolated by analyzing the data by region.

When all these other variables have been taken into account, we do not think it untenable to assume that if the two ethics: a) exist, b) have the properties attributed to them, and c) are associated with the ethnic composition of urban populations, then this will be reflected in statistical associations between a specific hypothesized dependent variable and levels of ethnicity, when such associations are examined in large groups of cities. This assumption does not deny the existence of other independent variables, but it does require that the ethos be of sufficient importance so that, *in the aggregate*, its influence will be discernible. If the hypothesized relationship between ethnicity and a given political form is not found, three conclusions can be considered: a) a preference for that form is not part of the ethos; b) the ethos is not related to ethnicity; c) the two ethics are not translated into political reality.

We will explore three general questions in the following sections. First, to what extent do the structural dependent variables—form of government, type of ballot, and method of electing councilmen—go together? For example, do cities with mayors also use the partisan ballot and elect their councilmen from wards? Second, how do cities differ by size and region with respect both to ethnicity and to the structural dependent variables? Third, and most important, what are the relationships between ethnicity and the dependent variables?

III. THE CONSISTENCY OF POLITICAL FORMS

All the structural manifestations of public-regardingness were elements in the municipal reform movement that began with the 20th century. Civil service, nonpartisanship, at-large elections, and big districts were principal features of the National Municipal League's "municipal program," issued in 1900. Together with the manager plan and city planning, these measures were incorporated in the League's "Model City Charter," promulgated in 1916 and reissued several times subsequently.³⁵ Since

these various features have all been part of a package, jointly promoted and presumably reflecting the same spirit, one might expect that they would be found together in practice.³⁶ This conclusion follows both from the logic of Banfield and Wilson's argument and from their statement that "people who are decidedly public-regarding or decidedly private-regarding on one matter tend to be so on all matters."³⁷

Of the 309 cities, 146 use the manager form, 126 have elected mayors, and 37 have commission government. We will omit the commission cities from consideration because this form does not figure in the ethos theory. Of the cities with mayors or managers, 85 use the partisan and 186 use the nonpartisan ballot (information on one city is missing); 153 cities elect their councilmen at large, 67 elect them from wards, and 49 cities use a combination of the two methods (data on two cities are missing).³⁸ How do these features go together? If a city follows one ethos in one structural feature, will it be consistent with the same ethos in the other two features? It is clear that there will be less than a perfect fit in this respect, since the number of cities with a particular private-regarding feature ranges from 126 (with mayors) to 67 (electing councilmen from wards).

Manager cities are fairly consistent in their adoption of the other two structural variables: 85 per cent of them use the nonpartisan ballot, 81 per cent elect their councilmen at large, and 70 per cent use both the nonpartisan ballot and at-large elections. Mayor cities are much less consistent: half of them have partisan elections, 41 per cent elect their councilmen from wards, and only 23 per cent follow both of these private-regarding practices. As Table 1 shows, cities with mayors seem to be very eclectic in their choice of governmental institutions. Less

agers' Association considers nonpartisanship and at-large election "main features" of the manager system (*ibid.*, p. 172).

³⁶ Cf. Banfield and Wilson, "The connection between the partisan and district systems, as between the nonpartisan and at-large systems, is of considerable significance, for, as we shall see later, the connected elements tend in both cases to produce the same style of politics and to reinforce one another" (p. 90).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

³⁸ Cities that elect at least three-quarters of their municipal legislators from wards are classified as using the ward system; the same criterion is used with the at-large system. Cities that elect more even proportions by the two methods are classified as "combination" cities. Since all cities using the commission form elect the commission at large, they are omitted from these tabulations.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 141. The International City Man-

TABLE 1. TYPE OF BALLOT AND METHOD OF ELECTING COUNCILMEN
IN MANAGER AND MAYOR CITIES

Form of Government and Type of Ballot	Method of Electing Councilmen			
	Ward	At-Large	Combination	Totals
Manager:				
Partisan	3% (4)	11% (16)	1% (2)	15% (22)
Nonpartisan	9 (13)	70 (101)	6 (9)	85 (123)
	12% (17)	81% (117)	7% (11)	100% (145) ^a
Mayor:				
Partisan	23% (28)	11% (14)	17% (21)	51% (63)
Nonpartisan	18 (22)	18 (22)	14 (17)	49 (61)
	41% (50)	29% (36)	31% (38)	100% (124) ^b

^a Data on method of electing councilmen missing for one city.

^b Data on method of electing councilmen or type of ballot missing for two cities.

than a quarter of them are "pure" private-regarding types and almost as many cities have each of the five other possible combinations of type of ballot and method of electing councilmen.

Three out of four cities with partisan local elections have mayors, but less than half of these partisan mayor cities also elect councilmen from wards. Partisan manager cities overwhelmingly prefer at-large elections. Where local elections are nonpartisan, two out of three communities are on the manager plan; and most of these cities also elect their councilmen at large. These data are presented in Table 2.

Cities electing councilmen from wards are

very likely to have mayors, as are cities with a combination of ward and at-large elections. Both of these groups of cities are rather evenly split between partisan and nonpartisan ballots. By a similar three-to-one ratio, at-large cities have managers, and most of these communities also have nonpartisan elections.

In short, there is a recognizable "public-regarding" structural syndrome in American cities. Most of the manager cities have followed the advice of the National Municipal League and adopted nonpartisan ballots and at-large elections. But the opposite is not true; there is no "private-regarding" syndrome. Instead, cities with mayors have, in fairly equal propor-

TABLE 2. FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND METHOD OF ELECTING COUNCILMEN IN CITIES
USING THE PARTISAN AND NONPARTISAN BALLOT^a

Type of Ballot and Form of Government	Method of Electing Councilmen			
	Ward	At-Large	Combination	Totals
Partisan:				
Mayor	33% (28)	16% (14)	25% (21)	74% (63)
Manager	5 (4)	19 (16)	2 (2)	26 (22)
	38% (32)	35% (30)	27% (23)	100% (85)
Nonpartisan:				
Mayor	12% (22)	12% (22)	9% (17)	33% (61)
Manager	7 (13)	55 (101)	5 (9)	67 (123)
	19% (35)	67% (123)	14% (26)	100% (184) ^b

^a Cities with the commission form of government have been excluded from this table.

^b Data on method of electing councilmen are not reported for two cities.

TABLE 3. TYPE OF BALLOT AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN CITIES ELECTING COUNCILMEN FROM WARDS, AT LARGE, AND BY A COMBINATION OF METHODS^a

Method of Election and Type of Ballot	Form of Government		
	Mayor	Manager	Totals
By Wards:			
Partisan	42% (28)	6% (4)	48% (32)
Nonpartisan	33 (22)	19 (13)	52 (35)
	75% (50)	25% (17)	100% (67)
At Large:			
Partisan	9% (14)	10% (16)	20% ^b (30)
Nonpartisan	14 (22)	66 (101)	80 (123)
	23% (36)	76% (117)	100% (153)
By a Combination:			
Partisan	43% (21)	4% (2)	47% (23)
Nonpartisan	35 (17)	18 (9)	53 (26)
	78% (38)	22% (11)	100% (49)

^a Cities with the commission form of government have been excluded from this table.

^b Does not sum to 19% because of rounding.

tions, every conceivable combination of the other two structural variables. Forty-eight per cent of all cities with mayors or managers are "pure types"; the others are hybrids of one sort or another.

Civil service coverage of municipal employees is another element in the "good government" package and in the public-regarding ethos. *The Municipal Year Book* reports civil service coverage of various classes of municipal employees. These data refer only to the formal regulations. Undoubtedly the prevailing political style in many cities subverts the personnel laws. In Chicago, for example, all municipal workers except those in public utilities are "covered" by civil service. In fact, of course, a great many jobs in the Chicago government can be used for patronage purposes with little difficulty. Nevertheless we assume that in the aggregate the extent of official civil service coverage gives some indication of the reality of public personnel policies.³⁹ We have used *The Municipal Year Book* reports to develop four

³⁹ "However important may be the evasions of the civil service system in particular cases, it is clear that in general the effect of the system everywhere has been to make it increasingly difficult for the parties to maintain effective discipline over their workers by giving and withholding jobs" (*ibid.*, p. 209).

levels of civil service coverage that apply to almost all cities:

Level 1. All employees covered; 106 cities.

Level 2. All employees except manual workers covered; 13 cities.

Level 3. Only firemen and policemen covered; 57 cities.

Level 4. No civil service coverage; 33 cities.

Iowa, New York, and Ohio require their cities to use merit systems; in Massachusetts all local employees come under the jurisdiction of the state civil service commission. Since cities in these four states are not free to make their own personnel policies, we have excluded them from all tabulations involving civil service coverage.

We have compared the civil service coverage of municipal employees in mayor and manager cities.⁴⁰ Table 4 shows the proportion of each type of city that has each of the four levels of

⁴⁰ State law in Anglo-Saxon Indiana makes it almost impossible for cities there to deviate from the mayor form of government. Since form of municipal government is not subject to local choice, we have excluded the nine Indiana cities from the tabulation presented in Table 4. Several other states interfere with home rule in this respect, but their cities all use the commission form and on this ground are excluded from our tabulations.

TABLE 4. FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND LEVEL OF CIVIL SERVICE COVERAGE*

Level of Civil Service Coverage	Mayor	Manager
1. All employees covered	49%	56%
2. All but manual workers covered	10	2
3. Only policemen and firemen covered	25	25
4. No civil service coverage	16	17
Total	100%	100%
N	(61)	(110)

* Excludes cities in Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York and Ohio.

coverage. A slightly larger share of manager cities has complete coverage and somewhat more mayor cities are at level 2. These differences are small, however, and equal proportions of both groups are at levels 3 and 4. There is little more than a random chance that the two alleged manifestations of the public-regarding ethos, city manager government and civil service protection, will be found together.

The various hypothesized manifestations of the two ethics are often found in "inconsistent" combinations. This suggests that the two ethics may be somewhat less differentiated from each other than Banfield and Wilson say. The forces influencing a city's choice of any one of these

variables probably differ considerably in strength and composition from the factors influencing choices of other variables. These data indicate the unevenness of the wave of structural reform that swept over American cities in the twentieth century. They also suggest that the pressures for and against different items in the catalogue of reform were not as similar as has been assumed.

IV. CITY SIZE AND REGION AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The second general question is how cities of different size and in different regions vary in their formal governmental characteristics and in the ethnic level of their populations.

Size turns out to make surprisingly little difference with respect either to ethnicity or structural characteristics. Cities with more than half a million residents are much more likely to have mayors, but below this point there is only a slight trend toward use of the manager form as size declines further.⁴¹ (Mayors become more popular again in cities below 50,000 population.) Only cities with more than a million in-

⁴¹ Cf. Banfield and Wilson, "The larger the city, generally speaking, the more is at stake politically, and consequently the greater the effort that professional politicians will put forth to avoid being displaced. This is certainly a factor that generally tends to prevent adoption of the [city manager] plan in a large city" (pp. 182-183).

TABLE 5. GOVERNMENTAL FORMS AND CITY SIZE

Size	Form of Government ^a		Type of Ballot ^b	Method of Election ^c		Number in Each Size Category
	Mayor	Manager	Partisan	Ward	At-Large	
Over 1 million	100%	—	40%	60%	20	5
500,000 to 1 million	73%	27	33%	27%	53	15
250,000 to 500,000	43%	40	23%	17%	73	30
100,000 to 250,000	39%	48	40%	20%	67	79
50,000 to 100,000	37%	51	29%	22%	60	180
Mean for all cities over 50,000	41%	47	32%	22%	62	
N	(126)	(146)	(98)	(67)	(190)	(309)

* Cities with the commission form of government have been excluded from these columns but not from the base on which the percentages were computed.

^b All other cities use the nonpartisan ballot, except for one city for which data on type of ballot are missing.

^c Cities using a combination of the ward and at-large method have been excluded from these columns but not from the base on which the percentages were computed. Data on the method used in three cities are missing.

TABLE 6. FOREIGN-STOCK POPULATION
AND CITY SIZE

Proportion of Population of Foreign Stock	Population Size		
	Over 250,000	100,000 to 250,000	50,000 to 100,000
0% to 9.9%	30%	32%	26%
10% to 19.9%	16	15	21
20% to 29.9%	18	28	21
30% to 39.9%	28	10	14
40% to 49.9%	6	14	13
50% and over	2	1	6
	100%	100%	101% ^a
Per cent of cities with 20% or more foreign stock	54%	53%	53%

^a Sums to more than 100% because of rounding.

habitants are much more likely to elect their council members from wards; below this level the trend is slightly and irregularly toward the at-large system. The pattern is more uneven with respect to type of ballot. Cities with populations of more than a million and those in the 100,000 to 250,000 category are most likely to have partisan elections (although the nonpartisan ballot is still preferred by 60 per cent of the cities in each category), and cities in the quarter to half million group are least likely to hold partisan elections. But these differences are not, by and large, very great, and there is no consistent relationship between size and use of one ballot or the other. These data are presented in Table 5.

Similar findings hold with respect to the relationship between size and ethnicity. As Table 6 shows, small and medium-sized cities are just

TABLE 8. METHOD OF ELECTING COUNCILMEN BY
REGION, EXCLUDING COMMISSION CITIES

Region	Ward	At- Large	Combina- tion	Total	
				%	N
Northeast	31%	38	31	100	61
Midwest	33%	46	21	100	76
West	18%	75	7	100	57
South	13%	73	13	99 ^a	60
Border	33%	53	13	99 ^a	15
(All cities)					
over 50,000				100%	
N	(67)	(153)	(49)		(269)

^a Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

as likely as the country's biggest cities to have large foreign stock populations. Whatever its importance in other areas, a city's size is an unimportant variable either for ethnicity or (with the exceptions noted) governmental structure.

The major operational conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that size need not be controlled in examining relationships between ethnicity and the structural dependent variables, except to exclude cities of over half a million population when form of government is a variable, and cities of over a million when analyzing the method of electing councilmen. Controlling for size turned out to be unnecessary for another reason: when we did it, there was no change in the results that are presented later in this paper.

Tables 7 and 8 show the distribution of alternative forms of government, types of ballot, and methods of electing councilmen in different parts of the country. These tables demonstrate the striking regional variations in each of these characteristics. The mayor form is the predominant one in the Northeast, is somewhat favored in the Midwest, unpopular in the South,

TABLE 7. FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND TYPE OF BALLOT—BY REGION

Region	Form of Government			Type of Ballot		Number of Cities in Region
	Mayor	Manager	Commission	Partisan	Nonpartisan	
Northeast	65%	18	17	61%	39	76
Midwest	55%	37	8	33%	67	84
West	15%	81	3	5%	95	59
South	22%	59	19	19%	81	74
Border	38%	56	6	44%	56	16
All cities over 50,000	41%	47%	12%	32%	68%	
N	(126)	(146)	(37)	(98)	(210)	(309)

and even less popular in the West.⁴² The distribution is similar for the type of ballot; partisan elections are preferred only in the Northeast. There are, however, two quite different patterns in the two sub-regions of the Northeast. Mid-Atlantic cities (in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) use the partisan ballot by a ratio of more than four to one, while almost two-thirds of the New England cities have nonpartisan local elections. Elsewhere in the country the nonpartisan system is heavily favored; in the West only three cities have partisan elections.⁴³ Regional variations in methods of electing councilmen are much milder, as Table 8 shows. Midwestern and northeastern cities are most addicted to the "private-regarding" alternative; almost one third of each group elect legislators from wards. Three quarters of the cities in the West and South use the at-large system.

Just as regional variations in structure are immense, so are they in levels of ethnicity. As Table 9 demonstrates, the Northeast is the most ethnic part of the country, with 94 per cent of its cities having more than the national average (19 per cent) of first- and second-generation Americans, and more than half being over 40 per cent foreign stock. The New England sub-region has the heaviest concentration of immigrants and their children; 27 of the 33 New England cities in our sample are at least 40 per cent ethnic. The distribution is somewhat less skewed in the Midwest. Just under half of the cities there are less than 20 per cent ethnic, with almost all the rest in the 20 to 40 per cent range. The western cities show a different

⁴² The western cities are those in the conventionally defined eleven western states, plus Honolulu. The Northeast includes the six New England states plus New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Midwest includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. The South includes the eleven ex-Confederate states.

⁴³ Most western cities examined here are in California, where all cities use the nonpartisan ballot. California law does *not* require nonpartisan local elections, however. In 1913 the legislature required "general-law" cities (those without charters) to use the nonpartisan ballot. This did not apply to charter cities, of which there were 70 in 1960, including the communities in our sample. Any California municipality of more than 3500 persons may adopt its own charter. See Eugene C. Lee, *The Politics of Non-partisanship* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 13-15, 23.

TABLE 9. FOREIGN-STOCK POPULATION OF CITIES—BY REGION

Proportion of Population of Foreign Stock	North-east	Mid-west	West	South	Border
0% to 9.9%	3%	16%	2%	80%	69%
10% to 19.9%	4	31	31	11	19
20% to 29.9%	17	24	53	4	6
30% to 39.9%	24	24	12	3	6
40% to 49.9%	40	6	3	—	—
50% and over	13	—	—	3 ^a	—
Totals	101% ^b	101% ^b	101% ^b	101% ^b	100%
Per cent of cities with 20% or more foreign stock	94%	54%	68%	10%	12%

^a Miami Beach and Laredo.

^b Does not sum to 100 because of rounding.

pattern; 84 per cent of them fall between 10 and 30 per cent foreign stock. Almost all the southern and border cities are homogeneously native, except for a few towns on the Mexican border and in the Florida resort belt. The foreign-stock residents in the former cases are, of course, largely Mexicans who have not participated heavily in local politics.⁴⁴ In the latter case the ethnics are mostly Jews who have moved to Florida in recent years.

V. ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES

We come now to the central question, the relationship between cities' ethnic populations and political forms. It might be assumed that the preceding section has already answered the question with a resounding affirmation of the ethos theory, for those regions with the largest foreign stock populations have the highest proportion of cities with elements of the private-regarding ethic. There are some exceptions to this, notably in the popularity of nonpartisanship in New England and in the consistent deviation of the West, but by and large the pattern is as predicted by the ethos theory.

More precise measures produce the same result. Excluding cities with a commission form of government and comparing the mean foreign stock populations of cities with mayors and with managers, we find that mayor cities have a much higher mean ethnic population. All mayor cities have a mean foreign-stock population of 29 per cent; those with a manager form

⁴⁴ For a description of Mexican-American political apathy in one Texas border city see Edward C. Banfield, *Big City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 76-78.

are 18 per cent foreign stock. This difference is significant at the .001 level of confidence.⁴⁵

But since both ethnicity and types of governmental structure vary markedly from one part of the country to another, it is necessary to control for region when examining the relationships between these variables. The South, for example, has few foreign-stock residents and few institutional manifestations of the private-regarding ethos. Indeed, the relationship in the South is so strong that it probably accounts in large part for the nationwide findings described in the preceding paragraph. But it would be rash to attribute southern political patterns to the scarcity of immigrants there. (Southern and border cities are excluded from the following intra-region comparisons because there is so little variation in the level of their foreign-stock populations.)

When the relationship between ethnicity and form of government is examined *within* regions, this control eliminates most of the apparent relationship. (We have also controlled for size by eliminating all cities of more than 500,000 population.) Northeastern cities with mayors have a mean ethnic population of 39 per cent; those with managers are 40 per cent foreign stock. The predicted relationship is found in the Midwest,⁴⁶ where cities with mayors average 6 per

⁴⁵ The significance of differences between means was measured with a two-tailed t test.

⁴⁶ In this and all other analyses of relationships between form of government and socioeconomic variables, the nine Indiana cities have been omitted.

cent more ethnic than cities with managers. This difference is significant at the .05 level. There is a similar finding in the West, although its importance is diminished by the fact that only six western cities have mayors.⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that the northeastern manager cities are much more ethnic than cities in other parts of the country that use the mayor form.⁴⁸ This suggests that there is no nationally relevant level of ethnicity above which one form of government is likely to predominate, i.e., there is no threshold level of ethnicity. These data are summarized in Table 10.

The only discernible variable distinguishing mayor and manager cities in the Northeast is the proportion of their populations in white-collar occupations, and even here the difference is neither large nor statistically significant. The residents of northeastern mayor cities average

⁴⁷ Controlling for social class by means of analysis of covariance did not produce greater differences in ethnicity between the two types of city. Whenever relationships between a dependent variable and a demographic independent variable are described in this paper, we have also controlled for the possible influence of other demographic variables by analysis of covariance. Except where noted, this procedure did not increase or diminish the explanatory power of the independent variable being examined.

⁴⁸ The same is true for the other structural dependent variables; the "public-regarding" northeastern cities are more ethnic than "private-regarding" cities in other parts of the country (see Tables 11 and 12).

TABLE 10. FORM OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES UNDER 500,000 POPULATION—BY REGION

Population Characteristic	Northeast			Midwest			West		
	Mayor	Manager	Sig. ^a	Mayor	Manager	Sig.	Mayor	Manager	Sig.
% foreign stock	39%	40%	n.s.	26%	20%	.05	26%	22%	n.s.
% white collar	42%	46%	n.s.	45%	49%	n.s.	51%	50%	n.s.
Median family income in 1959	\$6200	\$6395	n.s.	\$6755	\$6883	n.s.	\$6481	\$6975	n.s.
Median school years ^b	10.3	11.0	.05	11.2	11.4	n.s.	12.1	12.0	n.s.
Number of cities	(44)	(14)		(32)	(30)		(6)	(47)	

^a The difference between mayor and manager cities for the relevant demographic variable, in a given region, is measured with a two-tailed t test.

^b For adults 25 and older.

TABLE 11. TYPE OF BALLOT AND SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS—BY REGION

Population Characteristic	Northeast			Midwest			West		
	Par-tisan	Nonpar-tisan	Sig. ^a	Par-tisan	Nonpar-tisan	Sig. ^a	Par-tisan	Nonpar-tisan	Sig. ^a
% foreign stock	34%	43%	.001	23%	22%	n.s.	28%	23%	n.s.
% white collar	42%	41%	n.s.	45%	46%	n.s.	49%	50%	n.s.
Median family income in 1959	\$6099	\$6058	n.s.	\$6689	\$6607	n.s.	\$6330	\$6917	n.s.
Median school years ^b	10.3	10.4	n.s.	11.0	11.2	n.s.	12.1	12.0	n.s.
Number of cities	(46)	(29)		(28)	(56)		(3)	(56)	

^a A two-tailed t test was used to measure the significance of the difference between partisan and nonpartisan cities with respect to the relevant demographic variable in a given region.

^b For adults 25 years of age and older.

42 per cent in white-collar jobs, compared to 46 per cent in manager cities. The same difference is true in the Midwest. No such relationship is found in western cities. The levels of median income in manager cities are somewhat higher in all three regions. The differences range from \$128 in the Midwest to \$494 in the West. In the West this probably reflects nothing more than variations in the cost of labor, since there is no difference in the mean size of the working-class populations of the two types of cities there. Northeastern manager cities tend to have somewhat higher levels of education: 11.0 median school years completed as opposed to 10.3 in the mayor cities. There are no such differences in the Midwest and West.

The nationwide pattern of distribution of partisan and nonpartisan ballots is quite similar to that of form of government. All cities using the partisan ballot have a mean ethnic population of 25 per cent; those using nonpartisan ballots have a mean ethnic population of 21 per cent. While this difference is considerably smaller than that for forms of government, it is still significant at the .01 level.

This faint relationship breaks down or even reverses when examined within regions. As Table 11 shows, northeastern cities using a nonpartisan ballot have considerably larger ethnic populations than those which use the partisan ballot: 43 per cent v. 34 per cent; this difference is significant at the .001 level. This striking negative finding is due largely to New England, which is the most ethnic part of the country and where 64 per cent of the cities use the non-

partisan ballot. There is no difference between those midwestern cities using the nonpartisan ballot and those that do not. There is a difference among western cities in the predicted direction. It is not statistically significant, perhaps because only three western cities have partisan elections.

Examination of other demographic indices reveals no consistent patterns. Neither class, income, nor education is related to use of one type of ballot or the other. Controlling for third variables such as occupation and income did not produce greater relationships between any demographic variable and the presence of party labels in municipal elections.

The method of electing city councilmen is also unrelated to the level of foreign-stock population. As Table 12 indicates, there are no differences in foreign-stock population between northeastern cities electing their legislators from wards and at large, nor are there differences with respect to any other demographic measure.⁴⁹ In the Midwest at-large cities are 4 per cent less ethnic and also have slightly more middle class residents (2 per cent) and a higher median income (\$115). While all these differences are in the predicted direction, none is statistically significant, much less of any substantive consequence. Western cities electing councilmen from wards have fewer ethnic resi-

⁴⁹ The five cities with populations of more than a million persons have been excluded from these tabulations involving methods of electing councilmen.

TABLE 12. METHOD OF ELECTING CITY COUNCILMEN AND SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES WITH LESS THAN ONE MILLION POPULATION—BY REGION

Population Characteristic	Northeast			Midwest			West		
	Ward	At-Large	Sig. ^a	Ward	At-Large	Sig.	Ward	At-Large	Sig.
% foreign stock	38%	38%	n.s.	25%	21%	n.s.	21%	23%	n.s.
% white collar	43%	43%	n.s.	45%	47%	n.s.	52%	50%	n.s.
Median family income in 1959	\$6211	\$6157	n.s.	\$6643	\$6758	n.s.	\$6713	\$6926	n.s.
Median school years ^b	10.4	10.5	n.s.	10.9	11.2	n.s.	12.3	12.0	n.s.
Number of cities	(18)	(25)		(24)	(35)		(9)	(43)	

^a Significance measured with a two-tailed t test.

^b For adults 25 and older.

dents and slightly larger middle-class populations, but these differences are even smaller than those in the Midwest.

The salient conclusion to be drawn from these data is that one can do a much better job of predicting a city's political forms by knowing what part of the country it is in than by knowing anything about the composition of its population. The reasons for this may lie in certain regional historical experiences related to the influx of immigrants and the responses to their needs reflected in municipal political systems. We will discuss the importance of regional differences in the concluding section of this

paper. For the present, it is sufficient to note that only in the Midwest can we detect relationships in the direction predicted by the ethos theory with respect to two of the three dependent variables we have examined.

In addition to analyzing each of these dependent variables singly, we have combined them. There are eight possible combinations of form of government (we limit ourselves to mayor and manager), type of ballot, and method of electing councilmen (here limited to ward or at-large, omitting combinations), as shown in Table 13. Within each region we have computed the mean foreign stock populations of those

TABLE 13. MEAN FOREIGN STOCK POPULATION OF CITIES WITH EACH COMBINATION OF FORM OF GOVERNMENT, TYPE OF BALLOT, AND METHOD OF ELECTING COUNCILMEN—BY REGION^a

Governmental Combination	Northeast		Midwest		West	
	per cent ethnic	N	per cent ethnic	N	per cent ethnic	N
Mayor-Partisan-Ward	40	16	26	7	23	1
Mayor-Partisan-At-Large	33	9	33	2	—	0
Mayor-Nonpartisan-Ward	37	2	27	12	25	5
Manager-Partisan-Ward	26	1	19	2	—	0
Manager-Nonpartisan-Ward	—	0	27	4	19	4
Manager-Partisan-At-Large	40	4	25	5	22	1
Mayor-Nonpartisan-At-Large	44	3	24	9	37	2
Manager-Nonpartisan-At-Large	43	7	18	18	22	40

^a Cities using the commission form or a combination of ward and at-large election have been excluded from this table.

cities with each combination of characteristics. Conceivably the "pure type" cities would be more likely to display the ethnic characteristics said to be related to one ethos or the other. We can also evaluate Banfield and Wilson's suggestion that:

Among the modifications that might make the [city manager] plan more acceptable and more workable in cities (whether large or small) having a politically significant lower class are the following: partisan rather than nonpartisan elections, election of some councilmen on a ward rather than an at-large basis. . . .⁵⁰

As Table 13 shows, there is no consequential difference in the ethnic populations of any of the groups of cities, in any region, except for "pure" public-regarding cities in the Midwest; these 18 cities have, on the average, fewer ethnic residents than do cities with any of the other seven combinations. In the Northeast the "pure" public-regarding cities have, in the aggregate, slightly larger foreign-stock populations than the "pure" private-regarding cities. Combining the manager form with partisan voting and ward-elected councilmen does not seem to have had the appeal suggested by Banfield and Wilson.

The difference between the two ethics is also said to be reflected in the size of the districts represented by members of the municipal legislature where wards, in fact, exist. Small districts are thought to be a consequence of the dominance of the private-regarding ethos, while large districts, which force each councilman to respond to a more heterogeneous constituency, reflect the public-regarding ethic. This proposition can be tested by examining relationships between the size of cities' ethnic populations and the number of persons represented by their ward-elected councilmen. If the proposition were valid, one would find negative correlations—that is, the larger the districts, the fewer the ethnic residents in the city.

As usual, the proposition is confirmed on a nationwide basis. For all cities with at least some ward-elected councilmen, the correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) between the foreign-stock population and the number of persons represented by each ward-elected councilman is $-.23$. This is significant at the .05 level.⁵¹ The coefficient remains at about the same level when a partial correlation is computed to control for social class; similar results are found when other variables are controlled.

⁵⁰ Banfield and Wilson, pp. 183–184.

⁵¹ Significance of correlations is measured by the F value.

The relationship persists when size is controlled. For cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000 the coefficient is $-.30$; it falls only to $-.26$ when social class is partialled. Both of these values fall just short of the .05 level of confidence. In the smaller cities the coefficient is $-.28$ whether or not other variables are controlled; this is significant at the .05 level.

Once again, however, examining the data on a regional basis alters the picture drastically. In the Northeast the coefficient for all cities is .02; this vanishes entirely when class is controlled. In the Midwest the relationship is slightly in the predicted direction ($-.16$), and persists when other variables are controlled, but falls short of statistical significance. In the West the 14 cities with some ward-elected councilmen present a strikingly different pattern; the relationship is opposite to that predicted by the ethos theory. The simple correlation coefficient is .30, which falls to .24 when class is controlled. Neither of these values is significant at the .05 level. It appears that the confirmation of the proposition obtained by examining cities on a nationwide basis is primarily an artifact of regional differences.

VI. ETHNICITY AND PUBLIC POLICY

The ethos theory states that the private-regarding ethic is hostile to civil service, city planning, and urban renewal. In this section we will test this proposition by examining the relationships between ethnicity and indices of these policies.

There is a strong relationship between a city's size and the likelihood that its municipal employees will be under civil service. As Table 14 shows, cities with more than 250,000 residents are very likely to have complete coverage; only one of the 28 cities in this group for which we

TABLE 14. CIVIL SERVICE COVERAGE AND SIZE OF CITY^a

Level of Civil Service Coverage	Over 250,000	100,000 to 250,000	50,000 to 100,000
1. All employees covered	75%	51%	45%
2. All but manual workers covered	14	6	5
3. Only policemen and firemen covered	7	25	32
4. No civil service coverage	4	18	18
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	(28)	(51)	(130)

^a Cities in Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio are excluded from all tables concerning civil service coverage.

TABLE 15. CIVIL SERVICE COVERAGE AND FOREIGN-STOCK POPULATION—BY SIZE

Level of Civil Service Coverage	Mean per cent foreign-stock in population:		
	Over 250,000	100,000 to 250,000	50,000 to 100,000
1. All employees covered	21%	23%	24%
2. All but manual workers covered	24	15	16
3. Only policemen and firemen covered	6	10	18
4. No civil service coverage	4	16	14

have data does not have any coverage at all. A bare majority of cities with populations from 100,000 to 250,000 have total coverage, while more than 40 per cent either have none or protect only firemen and policemen. The trend continues for smaller cities.

Table 15 shows the foreign-stock populations of cities with different levels of civil service coverage, with size controlled. The data seem to contradict the ethos theory powerfully. Those cities with complete coverage have the highest foreign-stock populations in every size category except the largest, and even there the cities with minimal coverage are by far the least ethnic.

As with all our other nationwide findings, these striking relationships are an artifact of regional differences. Controlling for region makes it clear that the very low ethnic population of the cities with scanty coverage is due to the contribution of southern and border cities, which characteristically have neither extensive civil service coverage nor large foreign-stock populations. Unfortunately for the ethos theory, however, data for the rest of the country do not support the hypothesis. The ethnic populations of western and midwestern cities do not differ appreciably from one level of coverage to the next. There are considerable differences among northeastern cities, but their impact is, if anything, contradictory to the

TABLE 17. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PER CENT FOREIGN-STOCK AND CITY PLANNING EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA—BY SIZE AND REGION^a

Size of City	North-east	Mid-west	West
Over 250,000	-.11 (8) ^b	.22 (15)	-.10 (10)
100,000 to 250,000	-.22 (21)	-.25 (19)	.21 (14)
50,000 to 100,000	-.04 (47)	.23 (50)	.09 (35)

^a The value in each cell is the Pearsonian r of the relationship between per cent ethnic population and city planning expenditures per capita, for the given group of cities. A negative correlation is in the direction predicted by the ethos theory.

^b Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases in each cell.

theory. The eleven northeastern cities in which only policemen and firemen are protected have the fewest ethnic residents. The two cities with the least coverage have the highest mean ethnic populations, but this exceeds the mean for the 18 cities with complete coverage by only 5 per cent. In short, ethnicity does not make any difference in any region so far as civil service coverage is concerned. Relationships with other demographic variables are no more evident.

City planning supposedly comes close to being anathema to the private-regarding ethos. We have correlated per capita city planning expenditures with foreign-stock percentages for cities of different sizes and in different regions. These data are summarized in Table 17. If the ethos theory were correct in this respect, we would find negative correlations, presumably at some level of statistical significance. No such pattern can be discerned in Table 17. Five of the nine cells show negative correlations, rang-

TABLE 16. CIVIL SERVICE COVERAGE AND FOREIGN-STOCK POPULATION—BY REGION

Level of Civil Service Coverage	Mean per cent foreign-stock in population:							
	Northeast		Midwest		West		South	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
1. All employees covered	40	18	23	25	23	38	13	20
2. All but manual workers covered	38	3	22	3	—	—	7	6
3. Only policemen and firemen covered	23	11	23	16	21	4	7	23
4. No civil service coverage	45	2	21	6	21	8	4	13

ing from $-.04$ to $-.25$. Positive correlation coefficients range from $.09$ to $.23$. It is difficult regard these results as due to anything but chance. These relationships do not change when partial correlations are computed to control for social class.

For somewhat the same reasons that they are believed to oppose city planning members of ethnic groups are said to be hostile to urban renewal. The amount of the federal capital grants reserved for a city is an accurate index of the extent of its commitment to urban renewal. We have used capital grants per capita as a comparative measure.⁵²

While probably every city with more than 50,000 residents "needs" at least some urban renewal, it would be unsafe to assume that the need is equally important or recognized everywhere. The compact, aging cities of the industrial East and Midwest are losing residents and businesses to the suburbs, while most southern and western cities are growing more prosperous and populous. Quasi-ideological opposition to urban renewal is stronger in the latter areas.⁵³

Renewal activity is also a function of a city's size. While 86 per cent of cities with populations over 250,000 have at least one renewal project in the action phase, this is true of 71 per cent of cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000, and only 47 per cent of cities in the 50,000 to 100,000 category.

For these reasons we have controlled for size and region when correlating ethnicity and urban renewal grants per capita. The findings, summarized in Table 18, resemble those for city planning. There is no consistent relationship, either in one region or in the country as a whole. Partial correlations to control for social class do not materially change this picture.⁵⁴

⁵² We counted all projects classified in the execution stage, or where a loan and grant contract was approved but not yet formally executed, in the December 31, 1963 directory. A renewal project in the execution stage at the end of 1963 is the product of prior decisions extending at least two or three years into the past.

⁵³ Several western and southern states were very slow to pass enabling legislation to permit their cities to undertake urban renewal projects; one or two states still impose severe restraints in this regard. We excluded southern states from our analysis; the western states that followed this policy do not, with one exception, contain cities with populations over 50,000.

⁵⁴ Amos H. Hawley has found an inverse relationship between the proportion of businessmen and professionals in a city's population and the likelihood that it has begun to carry out a re-

TABLE 18. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENT FOREIGN-STOCK AND URBAN RENEWAL CAPITAL GRANTS PER CAPITA—BY SIZE AND REGION^a

Size of City	North-east	Mid-west	West
Over 250,000	$-.54$ (8)	$.12$ (15)	$.72^b$ (10)
100,000 to 250,000	$.05$ (21)	$-.16$ (19)	$.34$ (14)
50,000 to 100,000	$-.10$ (47)	$.02$ (50)	$.17$ (35)

^a The value in each cell is the Pearsonian r of the relationship between per cent ethnic population and urban renewal capital grants per capita for all federally-aided urban renewal projects in the execution stage. A negative correlation is in the direction predicted by the ethos theory.

^b Significant at the .05 level. This is the only value to attain this level of confidence.

The conventional wisdom holds that city governments headed by mayors are more responsive to the political preferences of ethnic groups. If this were the case and if ethnics were opposed to city planning and urban renewal, we would expect to find that while there was no relationship between ethnicity and the extent of these policies in all cities, such a relationship might appear in mayor cities. That is, in political systems where members of ethnic groups supposedly have more influence, this influence might be manifested in lower expenditures on city planning and urban renewal.⁵⁵ We can test this proposition by further subdividing the classes of cities in Tables 17 and 18 into mayor cities and manager cities (discarding those with the commission form). These tabulations are summarized in Tables 19 and 20.

This manipulation of the data does not

newal project. See his "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January, 1963), 422-431. Hawley's study does not take account of the magnitude of a city's program. It has been criticized on other grounds by Bruce C. Straits, "Community Action and Implementation of Urban Renewal," *ibid.*, 71 (July, 1965), 77-82. See also Hawley's rejoinder, *ibid.*, pp. 82-84.

⁵⁵ An earlier study found no relationship between form of local government and magnitude of urban renewal. See George S. Duggar, "The Relation of Local Government Structure to Urban Renewal," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 26 (1961), 49-69.

TABLE 19. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENT FOREIGN-STOCK AND CITY PLANNING EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA IN MAYOR AND MANAGER CITIES—BY SIZE AND REGION^a

Size of City	Northeast		Midwest		West	
Over 250,000	mayor ^b	-.11	mayor manager	.21 -.44	mayor manager	.75 -.16
100,000 to 250,000	mayor manager	-.39 .08	mayor manager	-.37 -.65	^c manager	 .23
50,000 to 100,000	mayor manager	.11 -.12	mayor manager	.23 .12	mayor manager	.32 .13

^a The value in each cell is the product moment correlation coefficient of the relationship between per cent ethnic population and city planning expenditures per capita, for those cities with the indicated form of government and size and region. A negative correlation is in the direction predicted by the ethos theory, which also predicts larger negative correlations for the mayor cities.

^b One manager city in group.

^c No mayor cities in group.

yield any greater relationships between ethnicity and city planning, as Table 19 demonstrates. There are no consistent tendencies in any part of the country for the correlation coefficients in mayor cities to be in the negative direction. Table 20, on urban renewal, provides one ray of hope for the ethos theory in the cell for small midwestern cities. Those cities with mayors have a correlation coefficient of $-.43$ between foreign-stock population and urban renewal capital grants per capita. This value is just short of significance at the .05 level. The coefficient for small western cities is almost as high, but there are only four cities in this group

with mayors. Interpretation of Table 20 is, by and large, a matter of temperament. This one weak finding, in a mass of negative evidence, does not impress us as very important.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing findings: (1) Contrary to specific propositions in the ethos theory, some of the political forms and policies are not manifestations of either ethos. (2) The two ethics are not as ethnically differentiated as has been suggested. (3) The ethics, as described, do not exist. (4) The propositions about manifesta-

TABLE 20. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENT FOREIGN-STOCK AND URBAN RENEWAL CAPITAL GRANTS PER CAPITA IN MAYOR AND MANAGER CITIES—BY SIZE AND REGION^a

Size of City	Northeast		Midwest		West	
Over 250,000 population	mayor ^b	-.55	mayor manager	.15 -.08	mayor manager	.60 .90
100,000 to 250,000	mayor manager	.06 .24	mayor manager	.21 .41	^c manager	 .34
50,000 to 100,000	mayor manager	-.05 -.14	mayor manager	-.43 ^d -.14	mayor manager	-.41 ^e .21

^a The value in each cell is the product moment correlation coefficient of the relationship between per cent ethnic population and urban renewal capital grants per capita, for those cities with the indicated form of government and size and region. The ethos theory predicts negative correlations, greater in mayor cities than in manager ones.

^b One manager city in group.

^c No mayor cities in group.

^d Almost significant at the .05 level; the only value in either Table 19 or 20 that comes this close.

^e Four cities in this sub-group.

tions of the ethics and their ethnic roots are all correct, but there are so many other factors bearing on political outcomes that the prevailing ethos in a city is not very important. The data at hand do not permit us to evaluate these conclusions, but we can be fairly confident of one other assertion: the propositions of the ethos theory need to be modified to account for special circumstances that limit their validity. Regional variations are the most obvious examples of such circumstances; they are a good starting point for this discussion.

The ethos theory is irrelevant to the South, where most municipal institutions seem to be corollaries of the region's traditional preoccupation with excluding Negroes from political power. A one-party system removes temptations to appeal to Negro voters, as does the city manager plan. With only one party, the partisan ballot is not meaningful. At-large elections minimize Negro voting strength. In view of these considerations, the scarcity of immigrants in the South appears to be a superfluous explanation for its local governmental practices.⁵⁶

For other special reasons the theory is also inapplicable to the West, where cities do have a considerable range of foreign-stock populations. We suggested one cause earlier: the immigrant experience in the West was different, hence the conditions that allegedly produce private-regardingness did not develop there. This different history also probably accounts for the relatively low levels of ethnic consciousness in the West. Inhabitants of the West have never been as fascinated as Easterners with national origins (except where Orientals and Mexicans are concerned), and therefore the region has not

displayed the ethnic politics characteristic of the East.⁵⁷ Some manifestations of the private-regarding ethos are conducive to ethnic politics. The election of councilmen from wards, for instance, makes it much easier to bestow "recognition" on nationality groups. In the absence of civil service regulations it is easier to give every ethnic group its "fair share" of public jobs without having to worry about qualifications. Where politics is viewed as conflict among nationality groups for jobs, nominations, and spoils, institutional forms consistent with these aspirations are likely to flourish, *quite apart from any other prevailing view of the political world*. Obviously, ethnic salience is a prerequisite of ethnic politics. A strategy of "recognizing" nationality groups is meaningless if most group members do not see politics in ethnic perspectives. To the extent that ethnic salience contributes to the strength of private-regardingness, one would expect that the ethos would be less evident in those places where ethnicity is not as prominent a feature of political life as it is in the Northeast.

Yet the theory also fares badly in the Northeast. It might be argued that this reflects a different kind of historical circumstance. Perhaps the Yankees there, anticipating their submergence in the rising tide of immigrants, took steps to minimize this trend by changing the political structure accordingly. This might, for instance, explain why northeastern cities that use the nonpartisan ballot are so much more ethnic than the region's cities that adhere to the partisan ballot. But this explanation presents several difficulties. Even those cities with, say, partisan elections, are highly ethnic. A generation ago ethnics must have been even more numerous in them. Why, then, did the Yankees in those cities not take steps to protect their interests? Why were the Yankees apparently most successful in those cities where the ethnics were most numerous? Why did the ethnics not change the system back when they took over?

When Yankees are as outnumbered as they are in the Northeast, they may prefer a system that gives them some minority representation. Perhaps any self-conscious minority prefers institutions that guarantee it representation and a chance to maximize its political resources, and there is no doubt that Yankees are a self-conscious minority in urban New England. When Boston city councilmen were elected from wards some Yankees and Jews won seats. But when Boston adopted the public-regarding

⁵⁶ This southern concern with unity may also explain why Mexican-Americans in Texas have been so apolitical, in contrast to the political involvement of immigrants in the North. Perhaps the political participation of newly arrived minority groups is enhanced when the political environment is competitive. European immigrants to northern cities typically arrived in political arenas where partisan competition motivated both sets of contenders to appeal for their votes. As the immigrants acquired political skill, their prices rose until they had attained political influence at least somewhat in proportion to their numbers. But if immigrants come to a political system where the elites shun conflict with each other, they are likely to find that the interest of those elites is to exclude them from politics rather than appeal for their support. The impact of immigrant political values obviously would be far greater in the former case.

⁵⁷ Regional differences in ethnic politics and salience are discussed at greater length in Wolfinger, *op. cit.*, p. 898.

at-large system only Italians and Irishmen could get elected.⁵⁸

Possibly the politics of the Northeast, with its virulent ethnic tensions, produces in the Yankees the same orientations that the ethnics are said to have. They develop the same interests in recognition, representation of their parochial interests, favors from city hall, and so on. When the choice is between doing business with a private-regarding regime and political isolation, perhaps all but the stiffest Brahmins adapt to the private-regarding style. This would explain why ethnicity appears to be worthless as an independent variable in the Northeast: everyone there except possibly the cosmopolitan upper-middle-class has succumbed to private-regardingness.⁵⁹ The triumph of the immigrants is complete. The outnumbered, affronted, overpowered Yankees go along with the immigrant political style both because they have to and because its values have replaced their own in the community.

The Midwest provides the best evidence for the ethos theory, but even there the differences between "public-regarding" and "private-regarding" cities are small and uneven.

Whatever the utility of these assorted spec-

⁵⁸ Banfield and Wilson, p. 95.

⁵⁹ As we noted earlier, the scanty scholarly knowledge of nonmetropolitan political machines may be due to the fact that most of the best research on local politics has been done at schools like Harvard, Columbia, and Chicago. These universities are located in cities where politics is conducted almost entirely by members of ethnic groups. From the vantage point of Hyde Park or Harvard Square, almost everyone not connected with the university is an ethnic. Political practices in such cities typically are "private-regarding." Much of the opposition to these practices comes from people connected with or attracted to universities, that is, mostly from Jews and Protestants. College faculties and their social satellites are scarcely typical of the Protestant middle class. Banfield and Wilson may be overgenerous to the bulk of the Anglo-Saxon population. While professors and account executives are not particularly interested in patronage, ticket fixing, and the like, these and other elements of the private-regarding style may be quite congenial to people who have little in common with college faculties but nonmembership in the Catholic Church.

ulations about the ethos theory, we still have not explained our striking positive finding, the great variations in each of the structural variables from one region to the next. Outside the South regional variations may reflect to some extent interaction between cities' natural histories and prevailing political enthusiasms at crucial periods in those histories. Most eastern and midwestern cities were important communities in the 19th century, before the National Municipal League's various structural reforms were seriously proposed. Their political institutions were well established and had seen hard service in the first generation of industrialization. Politicians generally had vested interests in maintaining the existing forms and most political actors had at least developed means of dealing with those forms. These attachments and accommodations were weaker and less developed in newer cities or cities undergoing tremendous growth. They were even more irrelevant when it came to deciding on governmental institutions for brand new communities. In such cases there was no presumption in favor of the status quo, and the writers of municipal constitutions were responsive to contemporary political fashions.

Most southwestern and western cities were villages, at best, until the early twentieth century, when the new municipal governmental forms were all the rage. We think that regional differences in the age of cities may explain a good deal of the striking regional variations in form of government, type of ballot, and method of electing councilmen.

While sudden growth is the most common occasion on which constitutions are written *de novo*, other conditions may present similar opportunities. This seems most likely to happen after a major political upheaval. For example, California's wholesale conversion to local nonpartisanship was a result of the Progressives' great victory over the Southern Pacific Railroad in the election of 1910. Anxious to capitalize on their triumph, the Progressives were extraordinarily receptive to the prevailing nostrums of reform. Twenty years before, these measures were not yet plausible alternatives. Twenty years later, sophisticated reformers would have placed far less faith in such changes.

In short, the ethos theory clearly needs a good deal of modification. Whether a revised version will have much explanatory power remains to be seen.

DISCOVERING VOTING GROUPS IN THE UNITED NATIONS*

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I. AN INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO VOTING PATTERNS

The discussion of voting groups or blocs within the United Nations General Assembly has long been a popular pastime. It is, of course, merely a special case of a wider concern with groups and coalitions in all aspects of international politics. With the apparent loosening of the early postwar bipolarity it is increasingly important to discern the number, composition, and relative strength of whatever coalitions of nations may emerge from the present seemingly transitional period.

Voting groups in the General Assembly provide a relevant datum, though hardly the only one, for an effort to identify these groups. The United Nations gives no perfect image of broader international politics; due to the one-nation one-vote principle and to the fact that it is not a world government with authority to enforce its decisions, power relationships within the Assembly are not the same as in other arenas, such as functional or geographic ones. It might well be argued that because of the majority-rule principle the smaller and poorer states have an incentive to band together in the UN that they do not have elsewhere. Thus the discovery of a "bloc" of underdeveloped countries in the UN proves nothing about the cohesion of that "bloc" in other contexts. Yet votes in the General Assembly do provide a unique set of data where many national governments commit themselves simultaneously and publicly on a wide variety of major issues. The range of issues includes almost everything of major worldwide concern; even policy positions on parochial or regional questions (the intra-bloc relations of Communist states, for instance) can often be inferred from the nations' votes on other issues. However warped or distorted an image of general world politics the General Assembly may convey, it remains one of our best sources of replicable information policy positions for its 100-plus members.

An interest in voting groups may have a number of payoffs. From a frankly manipulative point of view, it may give information which can assist American policy-makers to increase their gains in the UN political process. Of more scientific interest, it can tell us about blocs and coalitions in ways that can be related to broader theories about parliamentary be-

havior. And finally it can indeed give some, admittedly imperfect, information about the nature—such as bipolar or multipolar, etc.—of the emerging international system.

The last concern must proceed from an inductive approach to the identification of voting groups, and so, for most purposes, should the second. That is, if one is asking how many such groups there are, the advance specification of certain aggregates, such as caucusing groups (Commonwealth, Communist, Afro-Asian) is a very roundabout way to get the answer. True, there is a tendency for caucusing groups to be more cohesive than any set of states picked purely at random, but the association between caucusing group membership and voting identity is very rough, as Thomas Hovet has so compellingly demonstrated.¹ Furthermore, by dealing only with pre-selected groups one could easily conclude, for example, that disagreement and conflict within the Afro-Asian group is extremely high, but not even notice some subgroups, including some which do not formally caucus together, that nevertheless show very high agreement. Or one might ignore the cohesion of an aggregate of states (such as those of the North Atlantic area) which includes both one or more caucusing groups and a number of countries that are not in any caucusing group.

Most of the published studies to date have been directed to measuring the cohesion of caucusing, geographic, or other pre-selected groups.² One major exception is Leroy Rieselbach's article, which introduces an inductive method

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¹ *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

² *Ibid.*, and Thomas Hovet, *Africa in the United Nations* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963). See also M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," *International Organization*, 5 (1951), 3-31; Robert E. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1958); and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), ch. 12.

of bloc analysis.³ He constructs a table showing the percentage of votes on which each of a large number of pairs of countries agree, and arranges the table in such a way as to indicate cohesion, with lines drawn around any group of countries achieving a given level of agreement. In the article he illustrates this method for selected countries, those in Latin America, but it becomes extremely awkward for a body as large as the entire Assembly in recent years (over 110 members). In such a large table (each of 110 countries' scores with every other nation) it is very difficult to be sure one has found all the "blocs" that meet one's criterion.⁴ Rieselbach also illustrates an approach using Guttman scaling, but it can only find groups who vote together on a particular set of issues (cold war, colonial self-determination, etc.). We shall discuss this aspect below. In many ways it is a major improvement over studies which attempt to find groups when lumping all issues together, for coalitions on cold war issues are *not* identical with those on self-determination. Yet the inability to employ it simultaneously, when one wishes, to more than one issue is a limitation.

Arend Lijphart has with great force pointed out the overwhelming concentration of interest in the previous literature on analyzing pre-selected groups, and to counter it offers an ingenious inductive method which he illustrates for states in the 11th through 13th Sessions.⁵ It again depends upon a version of an index of the percentage of times two states' voting positions agree, modified to account for the abstentions which are rather common in the General Assembly. He employs a graphic method of presentation (vaguely reminiscent of spider webs) that is superior to the tabular one but nevertheless becomes quite difficult to interpret for a body the size of the current Assembly. Furthermore, it can only identify those pairs or groups of states which achieve or exceed a particular level of agreement (in his illustration, 87.5 per cent), and is not an economical method for showing the degrees of agreement which may exist among all states.

Thus no fully satisfactory method for the

identification of voting groups has yet appeared in the international organization literature. What is required is a technique which is *inductive*, given to a means of presentation which is readily *interpretable*, which shows *gradations* in agreement among nations (not just whether or not they exceed a particular level of agreement), which reliably *identifies all the groupings*, and which can be applied either to a *selected* set of issues or to *all* roll-call votes of a Session.

I believe that factor analysis, and more specifically a particular application of factor analysis, the so-called "Q-technique," is such a method. Originally developed by psychologists, during the past several years factor analysis has been employed sufficiently widely by political scientists that it probably requires no detailed introduction or justification to most readers, though its application to the United Nations has so far been limited.⁶ In the most common employment of factor analysis every variable is correlated with every other variable, using the product-moment correlation coefficient. Factor analysis is then a data-reduction technique, as those variables which show high correlations among themselves and very low correlation with other variables are interpreted as pointing to a single underlying dimension, or *factor*. The factors themselves are uncorrelated with each other. Thus in Alker's initial application of the technique to UN voting patterns it was found that certain roll-calls (e.g. in 1961 on South Africa, Angola, Rhodesia, Ruanda-Urundi, trade, and economic aid) had similar voting alignments that pointed to an underlying "self-determination" issue. These voting alignments were unrelated to those on such issues as Cuba, Hungary, Tibet, and disarmament, which were like each other and pointed to a different underlying issue (the cold war).⁷ In this application each roll-call vote was a variable, with each "actor" (country) serving as an item or observation.

The versatility of factor analysis, however, suggests an alternative use. It can just as readily be used to find similar *actors* (test takers, legislators, nations) as similar *variables* (questions on a psychological test, roll-call votes). If,

³ "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," *International Organization*, 14 (1960), 291-306.

⁴ Even in Rieselbach's Table 2 of Latin American countries there would seem to be one other group (Uruguay, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Honduras, Peru) that meets his criteria (five countries, 80 per cent agreement) for a bloc.

⁵ "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," this *REVIEW*, 57 (1963), 902-917.

⁶ Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," this *REVIEW*, 58 (1964), 642-657 and Alker and Russett, *op. cit.* A much more detailed discussion of how factor analysis is employed can be found in chapter 2 of the latter. As yet unpublished analyses of UN votes have been performed by George Chacko, Rudolph Rummel, Raymond Tanter, Charles Wrigley, and others.

⁷ Alker, *op cit.*

for example, one began with a table (matrix) where each country was a row and each column a roll-call, one could simply turn the table 90 degrees so that, in effect, the countries became variables and the roll-calls became observations. When the matrix is then factor-analyzed in this fashion the correlations identify *countries* with similar voting patterns and the factors point to voting groups or blocs. This procedure is usually designated "Q-analysis" to distinguish it from the somewhat more common technique mentioned first (R-analysis).⁸ To repeat, the procedure is inductive in that it involves no prior specification of the groups to be looked for, nor is even the number of such groups specified in advance.

II. COHESIVE VOTING GROUPS:

A Q-ANALYSIS OF THE 18TH SESSION

We shall illustrate the technique with an analysis of roll-call votes in the 18th Session, beginning in the autumn of 1963, and in the process be able to make some useful substantive points about the nature of politics in the Assembly. Because of the United States vs. Russia and France controversy over dues there was only a single recorded vote in the 19th (1964) Session, so these are the most recent data available or likely to become so until the *Official Records* of the 20th (1965) Session are published sometime in 1967.

Our data consist of all 66 roll-call votes, both plenary and committee, except those which are virtually unanimous (defined here as more than 90 per cent of those voting taking one side—usually in favor).⁹ This restriction is necessary

⁸ Although it has been used rather frequently in other disciplines, to my knowledge the only application in comparative or international politics is a paper by Arthur S. Banks and Phillip Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems: Q-Factor Analysis of A Cross-Polity Survey," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 9, 3 (November, 1965), 3-6. An application to the Kansas state legislature can be found in John Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1963), 336-356. It is worth noting that in his pioneer study of voting blocs in the United States Congress David Truman discusses the difficulty of finding blocs in a large matrix and suggests factor analysis as a method possibly superior to his own; *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 329.

⁹ Committee votes often preview later plenary ones, but more frequently there is no plenary roll-call vote repeating one in committee. Even when the same paragraph or resolution does come up

because the product-moment correlation coefficient is seriously distorted by a distribution more lopsided than 90-10. The omission might result in the hiding of any very small group that was consistently in the minority, but is not likely to be important because typically such very lopsided votes account for less than 10 per cent of all those in a session. In practice the only real possibility of a group whose cohesion and isolation might be understated is the handful of states (Portugal, Spain, South Africa, France, Belgium, sometimes the United Kingdom) which are so out of step with the Assembly majority on African colonial issues. As we shall see below Portugal and Spain do actually cluster together anyway, and South Africa is not even included in the analysis because of high absenteeism. This example, however, constitutes a warning against processing the data too mechanically without a careful inspection of the *Records*.

On every vote each state was coded either 2 (affirmative) 1 (abstain) or 0 (negative). Absenteeism is rather frequent in the Assembly, however, and posed something of a problem. In a few cases a country, though absent, later officially recorded its position. I listed it as if it had so voted. Also, in some cases an absence is clearly intended to demonstrate opposition to the resolution, or a conviction that the Assembly is overstepping the bounds of its authority in considering the issue. The United Kingdom found itself in such a position over several votes on Southern Rhodesia in the 18th Session. In those cases I recorded the absence as a negative vote. Both of these procedures are in conformity with the practice of earlier researches.¹⁰

The remaining absences are in general concentrated on a few countries, often those with small delegations. While it would sometimes be possible to estimate an absent nation's voting position from the votes of other states in its geographical area or caucusing group, in our inductive search for voting groups such a procedure would prejudice the results and would not be admissible. Instead I chose to equate an absence with abstention. In many instances an absence does in fact mean abstention, but by no means always, and when it does not the result is to incorporate a degree of imprecision in the analysis. The average absenteeism for the Assembly is about 12 per cent, and for the vast majority of states less than 25 per cent. Since the equation of absence with abstention actually

again the alignments usually shift somewhat; there are no duplicates in the following analysis.

¹⁰ Lijphart, *op. cit.*, and Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*

assigns a state to a middle position on our three-point scale, and since it is sometimes the correct interpretation anyway, this treatment of absences will not seriously distort the voting position of all countries with 25 per cent for fewer absences—their scores on the factors below are not affected by more than about 8 per cent. For those countries (11 in the 18th Session) with greater absenteeism the distortion is potentially more serious, and they are marked with a † symbol to indicate that their positions should be treated with some caution. Four other states (Dominican Republic, Honduras, Luxembourg, and South Africa) were absent more than 40 per cent of the time and so were excluded entirely from the analysis. Kenya and Zanzibar, admitted well after the Session was under way, were also omitted.

Table 1 presents the factor "loadings" of every country on each of the six meaningful factors which emerge from the analysis. Each factor identifies a group of countries whose voting patterns are very similar, and the loadings are product-moment correlation coefficients of a country's voting pattern with the underlying factor. The highest loadings or correlations identify those countries with the "purest" pattern, those whose voting is most fully described by the factor. Labelling the factors is always somewhat arbitrary, but in most cases the descriptive label should be appropriate. The percentages at the head of each column indicate the percentage of the total variation (variance) among all 107 countries that is explained (accounted for) by the factor. All loadings of .50 or greater have been underlined for emphasis, as loadings in the .40's are underscored with dashed lines. Squaring the correlation coefficient provides a means of discovering the amount of the country's total variance which is accounted for by the underlying factor. Thus it is reasonable largely to ignore correlations below .40 since the factor in question accounts for less than a sixth of the variance. The countries are listed in descending order of their loadings on the factor which best "explains" their voting pattern. Countries with no loading above .49 (and thus for whom no one factor "explains" as much as one-fourth of their voting variance) seemed best left "unclassifiable." In factor analytic terms the table presents the orthogonal solution, which means that the factors are uncorrelated with each other.¹¹

¹¹ In Tables 1 and 2 I present the factors as rotated according to the varimax technique. Unities were inserted in the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix. "Rotating" the original

I have labelled the first factor "Western Community" in an attempt to indicate the predominance of European and European-settled states among those with high loadings. "Western Community" in this context must be interpreted as a cultural and not just a geographical phenomenon, including the white Commonwealth. This relationship is indicated by the fact that of 35 UN members either physically located in Europe or whose population is predominantly of European origin (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, New Zealand, Uruguay, and United States), 22 have loadings of .50 or greater on the second factor. This works out to a fairly low correlation coefficient of .35. Each of the top 15 loadings, however, is held by such a country.

Note also the high loadings of Japan and (nationalist) China on this factor. Japan's basic foreign policy has become quite well integrated with those of her North Atlantic associates in recent years, and is so perceived by Afro-Asian observers.¹² Nationalist China is of course heavily dependent upon United States military and diplomatic support. This leads to another observation about the factor: among those with .50 or higher loadings are 33 of the 38 UN members who have a formal military alliance with the United States (including the United States itself and counting Iran). Such a close association produces a correlation of .79. France is by far the lowest of all NATO allies on this factor, with also a strong *negative* leading on the Afro-Asian factor (number three).

The second factor is named "Brazzaville Africans," though the name is far from perfect and a number of non-African states also correlate with it. The six highest loadings, and 14 above .50 in all, are possessed by countries which were members of the former Brazzaville caucusing group, of whom all but the Congo (Leopoldville) were ex-French colonies. Both the Brazzaville and Casablanca groupings had been formally dissolved by the 18th (1963)

factors to "simple structure" maximizes the number of both very high and very low loadings, thus making interpretation easier. Each factor has an "eigen value" which expresses the amount of variance in the entire table that it accounts for. The eigen value, when divided by the total number of variables (countries), gives the *percentage* of variance accounted for by the factor. All 15 factors with eigen values greater than one were rotated. Nine factors which had no more than one loading as high as .50 are omitted from the table.

¹² Cf. Saburo Okita, "Japan and the Developing Nations," *Contemporary Japan*, 28, 2 (1965), 1-14.

TABLE 1. UNITED NATIONS GROUPINGS IN 1963

Nation	Factor 1 "Western Community" 23%	Factor 2 "Brazzaville Africans" 17%	Factor 3 "Afro- Asians" 16%	Factor 4 "Communist Bloc" 11%	Factor 5 "Conserva- tive Arabs" 4%	Factor 6 "Iberia" 2%
		"Western Community"				
Denmark	<u>.90</u>	.12	-.02	-.27	-.01	-.17
Norway	<u>.89</u>	.10	-.03	-.23	-.11	-.04
Sweden	<u>.89</u>	.09	-.03	-.25	-.12	-.09
Finland	<u>.88</u>	.06	.03	-.22	-.04	-.10
Austria	<u>.87</u>	.20	.00	-.17	-.10	-.01
Ireland	<u>.86</u>	.15	-.08	-.25	.16	-.03
Turkey	<u>.83</u>	.18	-.10	-.33	-.04	.23
Australia	<u>.82</u>	.10	-.15	-.38	.01	.10
Belgium	<u>.82</u>	.13	-.15	<u>-.44</u>	-.07	.15
New Zealand	<u>.82</u>	.17	-.14	-.27	.07	.05
Iceland	<u>.82</u>	.14	-.05	-.22	.14	-.20
United States	<u>.81</u>	.07	.23	-.27	.09	.23
Italy	<u>.81</u>	.12	-.12	-.37	.14	.11
Canada	<u>.80</u>	.09	-.15	<u>-.44</u>	-.02	.17
Netherlands	<u>.80</u>	.05	-.11	<u>-.46</u>	.03	.09
Japan	<u>.76</u>	.23	-.11	-.33	.31	.06
China	<u>.75</u>	<u>.40</u>	-.01	-.11	.07	.09
United Kingdom	<u>.72</u>	-.16	-.22	<u>-.46</u>	.07	.09
Greece	<u>.71</u>	.23	-.21	-.29	-.03	.15
*Venezuela	<u>.70</u>	<u>.52</u>	-.01	-.07	.13	-.02
*Argentina	<u>.70</u>	<u>.49</u>	-.04	-.10	.12	.09
*Guatemala	<u>.65</u>	<u>.52</u>	.07	-.17	.09	-.05
*Panama	<u>.63</u>	<u>.51</u>	.05	.08	.09	.05
*Colombia	<u>.62</u>	<u>.52</u>	.15	.08	.16	.09
*Ecuador	<u>.62</u>	<u>.50</u>	-.05	-.06	.32	.05
Iran	<u>.61</u>	.38	-.01	-.04	.33	-.04
*Costa Rica	<u>.61</u>	<u>.61</u>	.09	.11	.11	.05
*Mexico	<u>.61</u>	<u>.52</u>	.11	.01	.39	-.07
*Thailand	<u>.60</u>	<u>.52</u>	.05	-.02	.15	.14
*Jamaica	<u>.59</u>	<u>.51</u>	.03	.06	.32	-.19
†El Salvador	<u>.59</u>	.36	.00	-.29	.29	.34

* Moderately high loadings on Factors 1 and 2.

† More than 25% absenteeism (but less than 40%); absent equated with abstain.

TABLE 1.—(Continued)

Nation	Factor 1 "Western Community" 23%	Factor 2 "Brazzaville Africans" 17%	Factor 3 "Afro- Asians" 16%	Factor 4 "Communist Bloc" 11%	Factor 5 "Conserva- tive Arabs" 4%	Factor 6 "Iberia" 2%
France	<u>.59</u>	.01	— <u>.48</u>	— .02	— .23	.27
*Chile	<u>.58</u>	<u>.52</u>	.28	— .08	.18	.05
*Brazil	<u>.56</u>	<u>.43</u>	.01	— .04	.10	.05
*Peru	<u>.56</u>	<u>.49</u>	.03	.02	.17	.34
*Malaysia	<u>.55</u>	<u>.55</u>	.21	.06	.43	.03
†Nicaragua	<u>.55</u>	.38	.09	— .32	.02	.17
*Paraguay	<u>.53</u>	<u>.47</u>	.00	— .20	.19	.18
		"Brazzaville Africans"				
Chad	.12	<u>.87</u>	.17	.01	— .03	.06
Cameroun	.20	<u>.79</u>	.29	— .08	— .08	— .06
†Gabon	.20	<u>.79</u>	.23	.08	.06	.04
Central African Rep.	.17	<u>.78</u>	.03	.01	— .09	.10
Niger	.02	<u>.78</u>	.34	— .03	.04	.14
Congo (B)	.07	<u>.77</u>	.28	.08	— .09	— .00
Rwanda	.23	<u>.76</u>	.16	— .09	.05	— .20
†Haiti	.16	<u>.74</u>	— .06	.00	.01	.10
Ivory Coast	.08	<u>.73</u>	.35	— .04	.27	— .04
Upper Volta	— .09	<u>.73</u>	.37	.05	— .12	— .06
Congo (L)	.22	<u>.72</u>	.22	.01	.01	— .17
*Cyprus	<u>.52</u>	<u>.71</u>	.04	— .06	.08	.01
Dahomey	.07	<u>.70</u>	.32	— .03	.05	— .11
†Bolivia	.37	<u>.68</u>	.10	— .15	.14	.01
Senegal	.12	<u>.68</u>	.26	.19	.19	.15
Uruguay	.35	<u>.68</u>	.11	.08	.23	.04
*Philippines	<u>.49</u>	<u>.63</u>	.09	— .05	.26	.03
Madagascar	.39	<u>.62</u>	.05	— .14	.32	— .09
Sierra Leone	.05	<u>.62</u>	<u>.41</u>	— .01	— .02	— .09
Liberia	<u>.41</u>	<u>.62</u>	.09	— .14	.32	— .17
Togo	.09	<u>.62</u>	<u>.49</u>	— .02	.23	— .01
*Israel	<u>.43</u>	<u>.53</u>	— .04	— .18	.04	— .31
Mauretania	.08	<u>.53</u>	.38	.18	<u>.49</u>	.00
*Pakistan	<u>.50</u>	<u>.51</u>	.21	.01	.09	— .09
		"Afro-Asians"				
Ghana	— .09	.14	<u>.88</u>	.17	— .11	— .04

TABLE 1.—(Continued)

Nation	Factor 1 "Western Community" 23%	Factor 2 "Brazzaville Africans" 17%	Factor 3 "Afro- Asians" 16%	Factor 4 "Communist Bloc" 11%	Factor 5 "Conserva- tive Arabs" 4%	Factor 6 "Iberia" 2%
Afghanistan	-.15	.15	<u>.84</u>	.23	-.00	.06
Indonesia	-.17	.08	<u>.82</u>	.13	-.19	.12
Egypt	-.09	.07	<u>.82</u>	.30	.06	.06
Syria	-.05	.09	<u>.82</u>	.30	.04	.07
Ethiopia	-.02	.11	<u>.82</u>	.18	.00	-.14
Yugoslavia	-.18	.15	<u>.80</u>	.29	-.03	.02
India	.12	.19	<u>.75</u>	.02	.31	-.07
Algeria	-.22	.16	<u>.74</u>	<u>.40</u>	.09	.02
Nigeria	.01	.26	<u>.74</u>	-.13	.04	.25
Iraq	-.24	.15	<u>.73</u>	.30	.25	-.04
Tunisia	-.02	.25	<u>.73</u>	.13	-.01	-.07
†Burma	.05	.13	<u>.72</u>	.24	-.06	.08
Cambodia	-.13	.13	<u>.72</u>	.31	.03	-.03
Tanganyika	-.18	.33	<u>.67</u>	.22	.10	-.16
Guinea	-.13	.29	<u>.67</u>	.32	.09	.05
Mali	-.25	.09	<u>.65</u>	<u>.42</u>	.27	-.11
Ceylon	.02	.19	<u>.65</u>	.21	.05	-.02
Sudan	.00	.24	<u>.60</u>	.24	.05	-.09
Kuwait	.14	.29	<u>.58</u>	.24	<u>.47</u>	-.06
Morocco	-.15	.13	<u>.58</u>	.35	<u>.40</u>	-.06
†Somalia	-.04	.22	<u>.55</u>	.11	.08	-.27
†Uganda	-.02	.32	<u>.55</u>	.27	.06	.03
†Yemen	-.02	.24	<u>.53</u>	.32	.04	-.13
"Communist Bloc"						
Czechoslovakia	-.42	-.04	.28	<u>.85</u>	-.02	-.02
U.S.S.R.	-.42	-.04	.28	<u>.85</u>	-.02	-.02
Bulgaria	-.41	-.05	.29	<u>.85</u>	-.03	-.02
Byelorussia	-.42	-.05	.29	<u>.85</u>	.07	-.06
Poland	-.42	-.05	.29	<u>.85</u>	.07	-.06
Cuba	-.36	.00	.28	<u>.85</u>	-.07	-.02
Romania	-.39	-.05	.32	<u>.84</u>	-.02	.02
Ukraine	-.45	-.02	.28	<u>.83</u>	-.04	-.03
Hungary	-.40	-.07	.27	<u>.83</u>	.16	-.08
Mongolia	-.42	-.06	.29	<u>.82</u>	.16	-.10

TABLE 1.—(Continued)

Nation	Factor 1 "Western Community" 23%	Factor 2 "Brazzaville Africans" 17%	Factor 3 "Afro- Asians" 16%	Factor 4 "Communist Bloc" 11%	Factor 5 "Conserva- tive Arabs" 4%	Factor 6 "Iberia" 2%
Albania	-.27	.01	<u>.49</u>	<u>.59</u>	-.05	-.07
Lebanon	.09	"Conservative Arabs"		.08	<u>.66</u>	.10
Jordan	.17	.34	<u>.46</u>	.25	<u>.58</u>	-.03
Libya	.21	<u>.44</u>	<u>.45</u>	.01	<u>.54</u>	-.05
Portugal	.23	-.25	"Iberia"		-.08	<u>.68</u>
Spain	<u>.52</u>	.13	-.11	-.26	.09	<u>.66</u>
Burundi	.14	Unclassifiable		.19	-.09	-.17
†Laos	.26	.19	<u>.40</u>	.07	.27	.04
Nepal	.14	.36	<u>.47</u>	-.06	.04	-.01
†Saudi Arabia	.22	.14	.39	.32	.18	.15
Trinidad & Tobago	<u>.42</u>	<u>.41</u>	.18	.06	.07	-.03

Session, ostensibly in the interest of promoting African unity, but the essential differences in voting patterns seem still to persist. Note also the high loadings of Haiti (Negro, very under-developed) and of several Asian and Latin American states. Previous studies have noted that the Brazzaville states tend to be less anti-Western on cold war issues than the Afro-Asian "neutralists," but more so, and especially on colonial questions, than the typical Latin American state. This second factor then picks out, in addition to the Brazzaville Africans, both several of the more pro-Western Asians (Philippines and Pakistan, plus Israel) and a number of Latin Americans who are rather to the "east" of their caucusing group (Uruguay and Bolivia, for example). The first two factors together account for 40 per cent of the total roll-call variance, and indicate most of the states which can generally be expected to take the Western position on most cold war issues.

The third factor quite clearly picks out those Asians and Africans sometimes identified by the term Afro-Asian neutralists. More often than not they vote with the Soviet Union on both cold war and colonial questions. They include such long-time leaders of this group as Egypt, India, and Indonesia, most of the Arab countries, Yugoslavia, and a number of African states, especially (but not only) those with rather leftist governments which belonged to

the former "Casablanca" caucusing group. And while these are (except for Yugoslavia) non-Communist governments, of 24 UN members outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc known to have received economic and/or military aid from China, the U.S.S.R., or Eastern Europe by mid-1962, 19 have loadings of at least .50 with this third factor. Using all 96 non-Soviet bloc governments in this table, and simple receipt or non-receipt of Sino-Soviet aid as the variable, this produces a correlation (r) of .72. All of the top nine countries on this factor received such aid.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet bloc accounts for the other major factor. Only Communist states load heavily on this factor—though Yugoslavia emphatically does not and belongs with Factor 3. Cuba and Mongolia are virtually indistinguishable from the European members of the bloc. But one important evidence of the crack in what had in previous years been a solid voting alignment is the behavior of Albania. Since the defection of Yugoslavia in 1948 this is the first time that any study of the United Nations has shown a noticeable deviation by a Communist nation. Albania's loading on the factor is a mere .59, and if we return to the original votes from which the factor analysis is derived, Albania's voting pattern correlates but .75 with those of other Soviet "bloc" states. That is, voting by the U.S.S.R. "accounts for" little

more than half the variance in Albania's behavior in the Assembly.

Finally, there are two minor factors, each accounting for but four and two per cent of the total variance. Factor five has three countries loading highly on it: Lebanon, Jordan, and Libya. The name "Conservative Arabs" seems appropriate, for all are non-revolutionary regimes, in cold-war politics these states vote relatively often with the Western powers, and each has received substantial foreign aid from the United States. Factor six picks out Portugal and Spain only; the label "Iberia" is obvious.

Most commonly in a factor analysis of this sort the factors can with relative ease be used to identify "groups" of variables (in this case nations). This is true for four of our six factors,

but not for two other. Many of the countries loading either on Factors 1 or 2 (called "Western Community" and "Brazzaville Africans") actually show fairly high loadings on *both* factors, so that they cannot unequivocally be identified with either. The majority of states with loadings between .50 and .70 on either factor share this property. In such circumstances it is often useful to make a scattergram and plot the positions of the countries in question on the two competing factors. Figure 1 is a graph where the vertical axis represents the percentage of variance (simply 100 times the factor loading squared) accounted for by Factor 2, and the horizontal axis the percentage explained by Factor 1. All countries with loadings of .40 or higher on *both* factors are represented,




FIG. 1. "Latin American" grouping as identified by moderate loadings on Factors 1 and 2.

as well as a couple of others for reference.

In some instances one factor accounts for three or more times as much of a country's variance as does the other, and when this happens there is little question as to where the nation should be grouped. This applies, for example, to Uruguay and Bolivia, for whom Factor 2 accounts for almost 50 per cent of the variance and Factor 1 less than 15 per cent. Any country which occupies a position either between the vertical axis and the sloping solid line to its right, or between the horizontal axis and the sloping solid line above it, has this variance ratio of more than three to one. The sloping dashed lines to the right and above the solid ones respectively mark the gray area where the variance ratio is over two to one. Although the countries occupying this space are distinctly more marginal than one lying closer to the axes, it is probably not unreasonable still to assign them as weak members of the group whose factor accounts for more than twice as much variance as any other. Most clearly it seems appropriate to think of Liberia and Madagascar with the "Brazzaville" countries. And for any state which has less than 25 per cent of its variance accounted for by any factor (e.g. Trinidad & Tobago) we have little choice but to term it "unclassifiable." The square in the lower left marks out this area of the diagram.

But for the countries where the percentage of variance explained by the most powerful factor is less than twice that of the next most important factor, it may be misleading to label them as belonging with either of the groups for which the factor is named. This is especially so in the situation illustrated in the above figure, where no less than 18 states occupy the area between the two dashed lines. Here we must speak of yet a sixth voting group, which we can label "Latin America." Twelve of these nations are physically located in the Western Hemisphere. With Honduras and the Dominican Republic excluded from our analysis for excessive absenteeism, only Haiti, Bolivia, Uruguay, Cuba, Trinidad & Tobago (in the lower left box) El Salvador, Argentina, and Nicaragua do not fall into this area. And the latter two are extremely marginal. Those 20 countries (including Argentina and Nicaragua) have been marked with an asterisk in Table 1 and should be considered as comprising a separate group. A number of pro-Western Asian states—Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Philippines and Israel—have quite similar voting patterns.

III. GROUPS AND SUPER-ISSUES

The influences affecting these groupings are not unique or substantially peculiar to the 18th

Session. By and large the issues voted upon in the Assembly during the Session closely resemble those that prevailed earlier. It has been shown through factor analyses with *issues as variables* (R-analysis) that three major issue dimensions or "super-issues" can be identified in each of four different Sessions spread over virtually the entire history of the United Nations.¹³ They have been characterized as "cold war," "colonial self-determination," and "supranationalism" issues, and among them they regularly accounted for more than half the total variance in all roll-call voting. Two other super-issues, concerned with problems of intervention in southern Africa and of Palestine, were found in three of the four Sessions. The four or five factors appearing in any Session always accounted for between 59 and 70 per cent of the total variance in that Session.

A similar analysis of the 18th (1963) Session (using the roll-call data described earlier in this paper) showed these same five factors appearing and accounting for two-thirds of all the roll-call variance. Most prominent was the cold war issue, accounting for 21 per cent of the variance and characterized by votes on such specific matters as the seating of Communist China and the role of the United Nations in Korea—both topics which have long exemplified the cold war issue in the Assembly. A new matter, in form at least, concerned a resolution about extended participation in general multilateral treaties concluded under the League of Nations. Disagreement arose over whether all nations should be eligible, or merely those which were members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Since the latter formula would exclude mainland China and East Germany but include West Germany (which is a member of several specialized agencies), it is not surprising that the issue was perceived and voted upon in much the same way as the more familiar cold war issues. Another set of roll-calls loading highly on this super-issue came from discussing item A/5671, a resolution on "Consideration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States." One section which called for the establishment of an international center of inquiry and fact-finding for the peaceful settlement of disputes was opposed by the Soviet Union and its allies.¹⁴

¹³ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ In all there were nine factors with eigen values greater than one, accounting for 75 per cent of the total variance. I list here only those roll-calls which correlated at least .71 with the underlying factor, and thus more than half of whose

A second super-issue, accounting for 19 per cent of the variance, concerned such familiar problems as Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and "territories under Portuguese administration." These issues formerly turned up on the self-determination factor or on the southern Africa one; here the super-issue can quite clearly be identified as southern Africa. With the dismemberment of the great overseas empires there are hardly any other concrete colonialism questions. A similar though less thorough convergence occurred in 1961.¹⁵ What remains of any separate self-determination issue may perhaps be found in a small factor identified in only two roll-calls and accounting for but four per cent of the variance. A section on granting independence to colonial peoples and countries was inserted in the "Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination." The United Kingdom and some Western Europeans tried to have the section deleted, with the argument that it was irrelevant to the Declaration.

The other major super-issue, accounting for 18 per cent of the variance, is related to what has for previous years been called "supranationalism," composed of votes affecting the retention or expansion of the Organization's powers, especially its peacekeeping forces. As in earlier years votes on the United Nations' role in the Congo and UNEF in the Middle East loaded highly on it, as did a number of roll-calls about the proposed expansion and new composition of ECOSOC and the Security Council. While nations' votes on this dimension surely are not solely the product of their preference for or opposition to a stronger and more effective UN, this question is nevertheless a common thread through all these roll-calls. Finally, there was a factor composed primarily of two votes on the status of Palestine refugees and accounting for four per cent of the variance.

Thus the basic issues and alignments underlying the groupings in the 18th Session are familiar ones. But in the process of identifying them we are reminded of the distinct and uncorrelated nature of these super-issues; knowing a nation's position on one dimension provides no information by which we can predict

variance can be accounted for by the factor. More detailed information on the resolutions can be found in the "Summary of Activities" of the General Assembly in *International Organization*, 18, 2 (1964), 313-467 and of course in the *Official Records* themselves. *International Conciliation*, No. 544 (September 1963) discusses the issues before their consideration by the Assembly.

¹⁵ See Table 2 in Alker, *op. cit.*

its position on another. Because no two of these issue-dimensions or issue-areas¹⁶ together account for more than 40 per cent of all members' voting variance we must reject one- or two-dimensional representations as *general* interpretations of group voting, for which we used the Q-analysis approach instead. Nevertheless we return to the point raised by Lijphart and Rieselbach: for many purposes we want to distinguish behavior on one super-issue from that on another, and to see how voting on a particular issue-dimension is related to other behavioral or environmental influences.

One procedure has been to compute countries' factor scores on each of the major factors or super-issues from the R-analysis, and then to correlate those factor scores with caucusing or other group memberships and with ecological variables such as national per capita income, foreign aid receipts, or racial composition.¹⁷ The factor score summarizes a nation's voting behavior, especially on those roll-calls which load heavily on the factor in question. It is computed according to an equation which weights each roll-call roughly according to its correlation with the factor, so that the roll-calls which are best accounted for by the factor make the greatest contribution to the factor score. Thus a country which voted affirmatively (coded as two) on virtually all successful roll-calls that loaded heavily on, say, the cold war factor would have a high factor score and a state regularly voting negatively (coded zero) would have a very low one. Because the original factors are uncorrelated with each other the consequent factor scores will also be uncorrelated. These factor scores, serving as summary indices of national behavior on the major super-issues before the Assembly, can then be correlated with national factor loadings from the Q-analysis. Thus we can discover the basic issue-dimensions which distinguish our inductively identified "groupings" of countries. Table 2 gives the correlation of nations' factor scores on each of the three important super-issues (cold war, southern Africa, and supranationalism) with their factor loadings on each of the six factors from the Q-analysis.

From this we can quickly obtain a thumbnail sketch to characterize the behavior of each inductively derived "group" of countries. The Afro-Asians, for example, are pro-Soviet on

¹⁶ Cf. James Rosenau, "The Functioning of International Systems," *Background*, 7,3, (1963), 111-117, for an illuminating discussion of issue-areas in national politics.

¹⁷ As was done in Alker, *op. cit.*, and Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*

TABLE 2. CORRELATION OF GROUPING LOADINGS
WITH SUPER-ISSUE FACTOR SCORES

National Groupings	"Cold War"	"Intervention in Africa"	"Supranationalism"
"Western Community"	<u>.79</u>	-.33	.38
"Brazzaville Africans"	<u>.47</u>	<u>.45</u>	.36
"Afro-Asians"	-. <u>.82</u>	<u>.43</u>	.17
"Communists"	-. <u>.56</u>	<u>.45</u>	-. <u>.64</u>
"Conservative Arabs"	.11	.26	.16
"Iberia"	.10	-. <u>.74</u>	-.06

cold war issues, or at least they share with the Soviets an opposition to Western use of the UN for cold-war purposes, and are quite anti-colonial about the problems of southern Africa.¹⁸ But they generally favor initiatives, such as those concerning the role of ONUC in the Congo and expanding the Security Council and ECOSOC, which comprise the "supranationalism" dimension and which the Soviet Union vigorously opposed in 1963. It is on these issues that they oppose the Communists and on which Yugoslavia (rather favorable to strengthening the UN in these contexts) is distinguishable from the other Communist states of Eastern Europe. Similarly, the Brazzaville countries more or less share the Afro-Asians' position on southern Africa and supranationalism but are fairly pro-Western on cold-war questions. The Western Community countries generally vote in favor of those supranationalist initiatives that actually come to a roll call, and while moderately unsympathetic with the Assembly's basic position on intervention in Africa are nowhere nearly as isolated as are the lonely Iberians.

It is tempting to refer to some of our groups by more explicitly political labels. The "Braz-

zaville Africans," for instance, are not well named since they include Latin Americans, Asians, and other Africans as well. Possibly one might want to call them simply "pro-Western underdeveloped states." But we must ascetically refrain from plucking that apple. A word like "pro-Western" demands a unidimensional set of issues which does not exist. Each group's substantive position can be spotted only with reference to all *three* of the major issue dimensions. Imagine a cube defined by three axes—left to right: cold war, with the "West" at the left and the Communists on the right; vertical: intervention in Africa, with the colonial powers at the top and the ex-colonies at the bottom; depth: supranationalism, with those favoring a stronger UN at the front and their opponents behind. These three axes can be thought of as dividing the whole cube into eight subcubes, and each of the major groups falls into a different subcube. The Western Community states belong in the upper left front cube, and the Communists are more or less polar opposites in the lower right rear segment. But the other two groups do *not* fall between the two poles; rather they are off to one side or the other of the shortest-distance-between-two-points lines. The Afro-Asians are lower right but front, and the Brazzaville nations lower front but left. Such a picture implies a multipolar pattern of cross-pressures and shifting coalitions that can mitigate international conflict.

In describing the correlations of the issue factor scores with the "grouping" loadings we of course are only ascertaining the typical voting positions of a group, especially those countries loading heavily on the R-factor. Any individual member may differ from the group pattern, as for example the United States is more "supranationalist" than are most states with equally high loadings on the Western Community factor. Except for establishing very general limits from the group, the behavior of a particular country can be determined only by a check of its own factor scores.

IV. VOTING GROUPS AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY POLITICS

In the Q-analysis we found that an inductive procedure identified six factors, and through them seven voting groups, in the Assembly. The six factors together accounted for 73 per cent of all the countries' variance. Thus the political process is relatively structured and subject to description by a small number of alignments. Yet the groups resembled only to a limited degree those which would be discovered from a list of geographical or caucusing groups alone. While geographical labels have some-

¹⁸ The fact that the Afro-Asians correlate more highly than do the Communists with the "cold war" factor indicates that the latter is a slightly misleading label. There are some roll-call votes, such as those about the role of the UN in reunifying and rehabilitating Korea, or establishing a fact-finding commission for the peaceful settlement of disputes, which have substantial "supranational" loadings and overtones. On these votes the Afro-Asians and Communists often part company, at least to the degree of an abstention. Putting a descriptive label on a factor is always a somewhat tentative exercise, which is why I have here enclosed the labels in quotation marks.

times been used they are very approximate and neither inclusive nor exclusive (e.g., "Brazzaville Africans"). Of our inductively-derived groups only the "Communists" closely resembled a caucusing group in terms both of who was included and who excluded.

In contrast to the mere evidence of caucusing groups the Q-analysis reveals other politically based groupings as follows:

1. The members of the Scandinavian caucusing group do indeed agree almost entirely among themselves in this Session, but Ireland and Austria differ from them in no significant way.

2. Analysis of the Latin American caucusing group would find a moderate element of cohesion, but entirely miss the very high similarity of Israel and several pro-Western Asians to the Latin voting pattern.

3. If the examination were based on caucusing groups extant in 1963 it would also not uncover the great consensus remaining within the officially disbanded Brazzaville and Casablanca groups.

4. The convergence of interest among the North Atlantic countries would not be found by examining any formal caucusing group.

The use of an inductive procedure also permits us to make some more general statements about politics in the Assembly. A simplified East-West-Neutral categorization which has characterized so much journalistic and even scholarly analysis of the world organization is utterly misleading. In terms of the states' behavior, five major groups (on four factors) emerge, in addition to two small groups and a few marginal countries. It should be emphasized that the identification of these groups depends upon their final behavior in the vote, not upon tacit or explicit bargaining among diverse log-rolling coalitions which may exchange promises of support before the vote. It might be supposed, for instance, that one set of countries might offer its support to another set on cold war issues, in response to the other's votes on a self-determination roll-call. While this kind of bargaining undoubtedly does occur, an analysis of voting patterns alone would not find it since

both sets of countries would *vote* identically, whatever their reasons for doing so. But a number of groups in the General Assembly retain their distinctiveness in the actual balloting. Two or more groups must combine to make a majority, and majorities on each of the different super-issues are composed differently. Comparisons with politics within national parliamentary assemblies may provide many fruitful insights and hypotheses, but the multiparty pattern of shifting coalitions that was approximated in the French Third and Fourth Republic may provide a closer analogy than will the aggregation of multiple interests within two stable parties as in Britain or even the United States.

Finally, there is reason to believe that this multi-group phenomenon is not especially new. It existed both before the well-known conflicts within NATO and the communist countries became evident, and largely before the admission of most of the new states. I conducted a similar Q-analysis of voters in the 1952 and 1957 sessions, to be reported upon more fully elsewhere.¹⁹ By the same criteria employed here the 1952 analysis found four groups, and the 1957 analysis uncovered eight, though four were quite small. Therefore the discovery of but five large groups and two small ones in 1963 comes as something of a surprise, especially since the 1952 and 1957 analyses were performed on only 57 and 81 countries respectively. The expansion of Assembly membership (to 107 for purposes of this analysis) has in fact outpaced the differentiation of new voting groups. Nor has their composition altered radically. Except for the emergence of the "Brazzaville" group and a certain greater differentiation between most other Afro-Asians and a somewhat pro-Western minority, the changes over the three sessions have not been great. Recent discoveries of a complex pattern of relationships in the General Assembly not only identify new reality but also show some lag between reality and our perception of it.

¹⁹ Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and International Integration* (Chicago: Rand McNally, forthcoming.).

VIOLENCE IN PRE-MODERN SOCIETIES: RURAL COLOMBIA*

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Violence is a common phenomenon in developing polities which has received little attention.¹ Clearly a Peronist riot in Buenos Aires, a land invasion in Lima, and a massacre in rural Colombia are all different. Yet we have no typology which relates types of violence to stages or patterns of economic or social development. We know little of the causes, incidence or functions of different forms of violence. This article is an effort to understand one type of violence which can occur in societies in transition.

Violence in Colombia has traditionally accompanied transfers of power at the national level. This can account for its outbreak in 1946, when the Conservative Party replaced the Liberals. It cannot account for the intensity or duration of rural violence for two decades. This article focuses primarily on the violence from 1946 to 1953, and explains its intensification and duration as the defense of a traditional sacred order against secular modernizing tendencies undermining that order. We shall discuss violence since 1953 in the concluding section.

I. VIOLENCE IN THE PERIOD 1946-1953

From 1946 to 1953, rural violence ranging from physical assault to brutal inhumanity engulfed most of Colombia, and touched every social institution from the family to the Church. It was so widespread and pervasive that the most appropriate name Colombians found for it was generic: the Violence. Though it varied in intensity among regions, violence was present in all of interior Colombia; only regions near Colombia's borders with the Atlantic, the Pacific, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru were exempt. The destruction and disruption of life caused by the violence is difficult to overstate. Careful estimates indicate 135,000 deaths from the violence between 1949 and 1958.² In a town

in Tolima to which many fled to escape the violence, investigators found that 503 of 509 families had suffered the loss of some close relative, that one-third of immigrant families had been landowners, and that violence in the town itself around 1950 had destroyed its four coffee mills and five iron foundries.³ Doubtless similar conditions prevailed in scores of other towns.

The violence existed for the entire 1946-53 period. It began on a small scale in 1946-7 shortly after a Conservative assumed the presidency after thirty years of Liberal rule. In April, 1947, Liberal leader Gaitán presented a memorandum protesting acts of violence in 56 towns in eleven of fifteen states.⁴ In February, 1948 he made an "Oration for Peace" at a large Bogotá rally asking for public order.⁵ Violence increased following the Bogotazo in April, 1948, and reached a peak 1949-53 during the presidential period of Laureano Gómez. Violence since 1954 has differed from earlier violence and will receive attention later.

Two outstanding characteristics of the violence are that it was rural and that loyalties to multi-class parties defined the lines of conflict. That the violence was rural is undisputable. No major city was affected. Of the 56 towns mentioned above, 30 had fewer than ten thousand residents; eight had between ten and fifteen thousand, nine between fifteen and twenty, and nine over twenty thousand. These figures themselves understate the point, since they are based on census definitions of towns, many of which contain a municipal seat and several hamlets, which together might total twenty-five thousand people, but contain no large concentration of population.⁶

The violence pitted Liberal peasant against Conservative peasant, and does not seem to have had a class basis. Rather than poor looting

* I am indebted to Oscar Delgado, Fernando Guillén Martínez, Nelson Kasfir, Juan Linz, Peter Landstreet, John Plank and Thomas O'Leary for their suggestions on earlier versions of this article.

¹ An excellent discussion of the present state of our ignorance and the most urgent needs for concepts and research is Harry Eckstein's introduction to Harry Eckstein, (ed.), *Internal War* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

² Mons. German Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, *La Violencia en Colombia*, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogotá, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 287-293.

³ In the late 1950's when the questionnaires were distributed, 36% of the sample had resided there less than seven years. See Roberto Pineda Giraldo *El Impacto de la Violencia en el Tolima: El Caso de El Líbano*, Monografía Sociológica No. 6, Departamento de Sociología, Universidad Nacional, Bogotá, 1960, pp. 14, 16-17, 18, 25.

⁴ See Guzmán, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 29.

⁵ The speech is contained in *Las Mejores Oraciones de Jorge Eliécer Gaitán*, Editorial Jorvi, Bogotá, 1958, pp. 434-436.

⁶ Sahagún in 1951, for example, contained 37,000 people. It is composed of 12 hamlets in addition to the town.

rich or rich oppressing poor, Conservatives attacked Liberals in similar social situations. Guzmán, for instance, reports no relation between incidence of violence and either patterns of land tenure or levels of education.⁷ In lacking a social class basis, the violence was similar to Bendix's characterization of political and social protest in premodern Europe.⁸

Considerable documentary evidence supports the suggestion that traditional party loyalties and not class hostilities underlay the violence.⁹ A chief of one band of antagonists in Antioquia wrote in July, 1953, of having seen a man's tongue removed by police who explained to their victim, "We're cutting it out so you won't ever again shout vivas to the Liberal Party, you dirty politician s.o.b." He continues, "They amputated genital organs of others so they wouldn't create any more Liberals."¹⁰ A local organization of Liberals was formed in a town in Boyacá "to begin immediately the tasks and functions which the struggle against the falangist dictatorship implies."¹¹ Guzmán writes of the violence in one region of Tolima, "The Violence there was initiated by official elements. Its promoters were mayors, councilmen and police inspectors."¹²

It is striking, moreover, that no author has suggested that the basis for the violence was class hostility; even Marxist authors concede the primacy of political hostilities as motivations. Colombia's most imaginative socialist, Antonio García, wrote in 1953 of the violence,

We are harvesting the only crop which our "historic parties" have sown: in this spilling of blood, in these odious crimes, in this unpunished cruelty, is summed up the sense of our party-laden history. Those truly responsible for this blood-letting are not the vulgar delinquents, . . . [but] the

⁷ Guzmán, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 139.

⁸ See Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 40-48. This characteristic will receive further attention below.

⁹ It may be noted that there were some cases of class-motivated violence. The Communist Party organized a campaign of "mass self-defence" through which several autonomous "republics" were established. See Partido Comunista de Colombia, *Treinta Años de Lucha del Partido Comunista de Colombia*, Ediciones Paz y Socialismo, Bogotá, 1960, pp. 93 ff. These were very isolated and limited in scale, however, and do not alter the analysis of the modal pattern of violence presented in the text.

¹⁰ Quoted in Guzmán, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 94.

¹¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 84.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

TABLE I. CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL URBAN VOTE, 1946-1949

City	Index of 1949 Vote with 1946 = 100			Liberal % of 1949 Vote
	Lib.	Con.	Total	
Armenia	118	99.5	93	66.8
Barranquilla	96.5	92	93.5	82.5
Bogotá	132	116	127.5	75.6
Bucaramanga	150.5	115	138	73.3
Cali	145.5	118.5	137.5	67.5
Cartagena	122	114	120	77.7
Ibagué	121.5	110.5	120	69.6
Manizales	128	110.5	119.5	54.4
Medellín	138	127	135	56.2
Pereira	136	94	118.5	74.5

political system which takes them as its instruments. . . .¹³

An official history of the Communist Party referred to "the reactionary violence on the one hand and the illusions of Liberals in the effectiveness of assaults on the other. . . ."¹⁴

Because of its precarious political position, the Conservative Party initiated violence against Liberals. Conservative Opsina Perez won the presidency in 1946 when two Liberal candidates split the Liberal vote, but the Liberals retained their electoral majority in congressional and local elections following 1946 and posed a serious threat to regain the presidency in 1950. Moreover, Liberals were increasing their urban vote more rapidly than were Conservatives. Table I shows the comparative growth of the two parties in ten leading cities and the percentage of the vote captured by Liberals in 1949. In every case, the Liberal vote grew significantly more than did the Conservative vote 1946-1949, and the Liberals won majorities in the 1949 elections.

In part to counter increasing Liberal urban majorities, Conservatives resorted to rural political repression. They were assisted in their efforts by political resentments with roots in previous conflicts, which had been reinforced

¹³ Prologue to Daniel Caicedo, *Viento Seco*, Editorial Nuestra América, Buenos Aires, 1954, p. 17. See also his *Gaitán y El Problema de la Revolución Colombiana*, Bogotá, 1955, pp. 294, ff.

¹⁴ Partido Comunista de Colombia, *op. cit.*, p. 93. For a similar view from another leftist author, see Camilo Torres Restrepo, "La Violencia y Los Cambios Socio-Culturales en Las Areas Rurales Colombianas" in *Memoria del Primer Congreso Nacional de Sociología*, Asociación Colombiana de Sociología, Bogotá, 1963, pp. 147-148.

1930-32. Traditionally in Colombia, the transfer of national power from one political party to the other has been shortly followed by local fights over bureaucratic power, inevitably won by the ruling party. Such conflict had broken out when the Liberals assumed power in 1930 after forty-five years of Conservative hegemony. In Boyacá and Santander, two interior states which were scenes of later violence, this led to sporadic fighting between Liberals and Conservatives in small towns. Whether this violence was due to Liberals taking revenge on Conservatives or Conservatives resisting newly-appointed Liberals is unknown; probably both factors were present.

In any case, this violence strengthened political resentments on local levels. In some areas, Conservative peasants were even forced to move to other towns, though the extent of this migration is unknown. In 1946 when Conservatives regained the presidency, hostilities similar to those of 1930 appeared. Boyacá and Santander were among the earliest scenes of violence.¹⁵

The violence of the 1930's was short-lived, however. One reason was a brief war with Peru in 1932 which elevated nationalist over partisan passions and drew attention from local violence.¹⁶ But a more basic reason was the difference between the Conservative opposition in the 1930's and the Liberal opposition in the 1940's.

Conservative Party leadership prior to the Liberal victory was old. Moreover, the young Conservative leadership under Laureano Gómez supported Liberal President Alfonso López until a break between them in 1935, by which time the Liberals were firmly entrenched in power. Consequently, Liberals faced no vigorous opposition on a national level and had no reason to stimulate or encourage local violence. Liberal opposition following 1946, however, was quite vigorous. Led by Gaitán, it presented powerful opposition on a national level and threatened to regain power in the next Presidential elections.

To retain political power, Conservatives were therefore obliged to counter Liberal urban mobilization with rural mobilization. Stimulation of rural violence, assisted by the legacy of the 1930's, accomplished this goal in two ways. First, it aroused Conservatives and intimidated Liberals: in elections in rural areas, more Con-

servatives and fewer Liberals would vote. Further, growing violence in the countryside would justify stronger national measures which would permit repression of Liberals in cities. Though Ospina resisted this move, a state of seige was declared in November, 1949.

Repression, however, is not a startling political weapon. What sets the Colombian violence apart is the resonance which very traditional appeals found in stimulating so much violence for so long. Typical of such appeals is this excerpt from a speech in 1950 by Conservative Laureano Gómez:

When they erased the name of God from the preamble to the Constitution, when they adulterated the wise principles which reigned over the concordance of the spiritual and civil power, when the youth in the University and secondary schools was submitted to unmasked instruction in naturalism and atheism, there emerged a process of disfiguration of our national soul and destruction of our noble Christian and free country, giving us instead a structure which forced the people to pass over red paths of revolution.¹⁷

The heavy reliance on traditional symbols of religion and mystic nationalism, and the powerful resonance it found are puzzling in a modernizing nation, in which manufacturing—apart from artisan industry—accounted for more than 17% of the national product in 1953,¹⁸ and which had seven cities with more than 100,000 population according to the 1951 census.

II. EXPLANATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE

The search for a coherent and convincing explanation of the violence has been nearly as frustrating intellectually as was the violence destructive physically. A detailed two-volume study ends by listing four "remote causes," five "proximate causes," four "immediate causes," and seven "auxiliary causes"; some of the "causes" listed are as general as "precipitant factors" or "social deficiencies."¹⁹ The list of factors frequently cited is formidable: regionalism, lack of national unity, traditionalism, fanaticism, institutional rigidity, poverty, psychopathic tendencies, political and military involvement, erosion of family, inadequate socialization, etc.

To this diverse collection, an American sociologist, Robert C. Williamson, has brought co-

¹⁵ The best account of this is contained in Jorge Enrique Gutiérrez Anzola, *Violencia y Justicia*, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogotá, 1962, pp. 21-25.

¹⁶ See J. A. Osorio Lizarazo, *Gaitán*, Ediciones Lopez Negri, Buenos Aires, 1952, p. 149.

¹⁷ From speech published in *El Siglo* (Bogotá), August 8, 1950.

¹⁸ ECLA, *Analyses and Projections of Economic Growth*, Vol. III, *The Economic Development of Colombia*, United Nations, New York, 1957, p. 17.

¹⁹ See Guzmán, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 381-417, especially 410-417.

herence in a suggestive article.²⁰ He relies primarily on two interrelated hypotheses, deprivation and atomization: "[I]nternecine warfare has been the end-result of social, political and economic frustration as well as of personal *anomie*."²¹ These two factors, he argues, created a potential for aggression, and other features of the Colombian system translated potential aggression to internecine warfare. He suggests specific links between potential aggression and political and military involvement, breakdown of traditional institutions, inadequate socialization, and ready availability of coffee crops for looting during harvesting.

While this is an admirable effort at a synthesis of diverse factors and integration with social theory, two major characteristics of the violence are unexplained by the theory and even tend to controvert it. First, the violence was rural. Second, the lines of division of conflict were determined by party loyalty and pitted peasant against peasant.

Williamson notes "the relative immunity of the city to this kind of warfare,"²² but makes no attempt to relate this to his theory. This is most surprising because both the hypotheses he offers, deprivation and atomization, imply greater urban than rural violence. While objective deprivation is perhaps greater in rural than urban areas, only *perceived* deprivation produces frustration which drives men to violence, and this is probably heightened in cities. Migrants to cities characteristically have higher aspirations than the folk they left behind, and become more acutely aware than they had been of what they lack. Perceived deprivation is thus probably higher in cities and can more readily lead to the social, economic and political frustration of which Williamson speaks.

This is especially true since relative deprivation may not have been acute in coffee-growing areas where violence was particularly heavy. Coffee prices were frozen during the War, but rose sharply afterwards. From an annual average of 15.9 cents per pound in 1945, they rose to 30.1 in 1947, 37.4 in 1949, and reached 58.7 in 1951.²³ While coffee growers did not receive all of this increase, living conditions for thou-

²⁰ "Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural Colombia," *Western Political Quarterly* (March 1965), 35-44. A related view is suggested by Orlando Fals Borda in an unpublished paper presented to the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, 1962, "The Role of Violence in the Break with Traditionalism: The Colombian Case."

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²³ FAO, *The World Coffee Economy*, Commodity

TABLE II. GROWTH OF FIVE LARGEST CITIES, 1938-1951

City	Population		Index 1938 = 100	Index of Rest of Correspond- ing State 1938 = 100
	1938 (hundreds)	1951 (hundreds)		
Bogotá	330.3	648.3	196	115
Medellín	168.3	358.2	213	119
Cali	101.9	284.2	279	161
Barranquilla	152.3	279.6	184	128
Bucaramanga	51.3	112.3	219	113

TABLE III. ECONOMIC GROWTH 1945-1953²⁴

Sector	Rate of Growth 1945-53	Composition of Product	
		1945	1953
Agriculture	2.7%	47.0%	36.9%
Mining	5.7	3.7	3.7
Manufacturing	9.2	13.4	17.2
Artisan Industry	8.4	3.1	3.8
Construction	2.7	6.1	4.8
Transportation	13.7	4.2	7.4
Energy, Utilities, etc.	12.7	.7	1.2
Government	8.9	5.5	6.9
Trade	9.0	10.2	12.9
Rents	3.8	6.1	5.2
Total	5.9%	100.0%	100.0%

sands of small growers were surely not worsened during years of increasing violence.

Likewise, atomization is usually intensified by rapid modernization, in which traditional structures are eroded or left behind and not immediately replaced. Urbanization and industrialization are two of the most powerful motors of such modernization. William Kornhauser has noted that

the very rapid expansion of cities and industries has constituted perhaps the most general source of social atomization in the modern world, insofar as they have inhibited the growth of new forms of group life to replace the village community, extended family and guild which they destroyed.²⁵

As Tables II and III demonstrate, both rapid urbanization and rapid industrialization were

Bulletin Series No. 33, United Nations, Rome, 1961, p. 73.

²⁴ Taken from ECLA, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁵ *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 157. For a full discussion of the effects of urbanization and industrialization, see *ibid.*, pp. 142-158.

taking place at this time; the five largest cities increased rapidly, far outstripping their surrounding areas, and predominantly urban activities like manufacturing and trade increased their share of the total output from 23.6% in 1945 to 30.1% in 1953 while the whole economy was expanding at an annual rate of 5.9%. Thus Kornhauser's remark is acutely pertinent.

Thus Williamson's hypotheses point to urban violence, while Colombia's violence was rural. Further, Williamson's hypotheses suggest a class basis for the violence. If men are driven to violence by frustration and deprivation, then they are motivated in part by social resentments and can be expected to assault the "establishment." Yet, as we have seen, political rivalry and not class hatred was a major root of the conflict.²⁶ Williamson's hypotheses, however, suggest social resentment as a root, and thus once again fail to explain a major characteristic of the violence.²⁷ The search for an alternative explanation should begin with consideration of the party system and political loyalties which produced the violence.

Prior to the rise of the urban sector, the party system was based on traditional legitimacy. Liberal and Conservative strength varied between states and within states, but the identification of a town with one or the other party was probably accidental. It perhaps began with the association of a patron in the 19th century with one party, which implied the association of his peons with that same party. Colombia's 19th century feudalism thus produced political groupings similar to those produced by European feudalism as described by Bendix:

In this [medieval] setting the lower strata of the population are fragmented. Each community of peasants belongs to the jurisdiction of its lord, each group of craftsmen to the jurisdiction of its

guild and town. Thus, peasants participate in medieval politics only indirectly, . . . ; as subjects they are bound up for better or worse with the jurisdictional rights of their lord to whom they are bound in loyalty and service.²⁸

By the early 20th century, the original reasons for the association had died, but the association persisted, stimulated occasionally by strife along party lines and by partial mobilization for elections.

Party legitimacy then was traditional, and loyalty took on quasi-religious overtones. One of Colombia's most perceptive social observers suggests this view in a novel set in the mid-1940's: "in this country there didn't exist political parties properly speaking, but religious sects, closed churches into which one was born and died without real convictions, in the same way as one inherits a religious creed which . . . must be defended ardently unto death."²⁹ If this characterization is correct, one would expect minimal party organization in rural areas, since organization is unnecessary to retain traditional loyalty. Occasional stimulation through party violence—as in 1900–03 and 1930–32 in the twentieth century—and elections would be sufficient to maintain it. Several observers have noted such scant organization of parties.³⁰

Traditional legitimation is characteristically upset when people move to a modern urban context.³¹ Choosing to leave the region and economic activity of one's father often leads one to question traditional identifications.

²⁸ Reinhard Bendix, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–43.

²⁹ Alfonso López Michelsen, *Los Elegidos*, Editorial Guaranía, México, 1953, p. 313. This explication is also based on conversations with the Colombian historian Fernando Guillén Martínez, but it is only a hypothesis. It would require for its verification detailed anthropological work in several communities and an attempt to see whether strong correlations are indeed absent between party identification and sociological variables in rural areas. A cursory glance at regional party strength did not suggest any correlations to the author, but this is clearly a fruitful area for research. The view suggested here is also contained in Eduardo Santa, *Sociología Política de Colombia*, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogotá, pp. 74–76 and *passim*.

³⁰ See Santa, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82; and Martz, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³¹ This has been treated widely in the literature on African states. See for example Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 29–43.

²⁶ For a similar stress, see Fernando Guillén Martínez, *Raíz y Futuro de la Revolución*, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogotá, 1963, pp. 188 and *passim*; Vernon L. Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), pp. 110–211; and John D. Martz, *Colombia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 117–118.

²⁷ Williamson's theory may, however, go quite far in explaining the urban explosion in 1948 known as the Bogotazo. High inflation in the first part of 1948 heightened deprivation, and the violence did have a class basis; objects of attack were typically symbols of social power: public buildings, churches, hotels, businesses, newspapers, etc. See Alfonso López Michelsen, *Cuestiones Colombianas*, Impresiones Modernas, México, 1955, pp. 73–74.

Moreover, demands of new occupational and social relationships of an urban area typically imply new legitimization, often linked to satisfaction of demands based on social position. For this reason, urbanization and industrialization tend to produce pressures for achievement-oriented political appeals and more penetrating political organization.

A reform movement in the 1930's produced the first of these. The Liberal Party sought support of new urban groups by granting economic and social privileges, not by arousing traditional symbols, which say, in effect, "We are both Liberals; therefore follow me."

At the same time, it is obvious that this change was only a partial one, that there were (and are) many areas in which a traditional, not modern, appeal was most effective. This suggests a characteristic of societies in transition noted by other authors: the coexistence of a modern and traditional sector.³² This coexistence of the modern with the traditional applies not only to legitimization of party authority, but also to many features of the economic and social systems.

By the close of World War II, then, Colombia was in the midst of transition. A generally rural traditional sector coexisted with a predominantly urban modern sector. The modern sector, strengthened by industrialization and urbanization, was gradually replacing the traditional sector; political power had swung to an urban-oriented Liberal Party as a result of the reforms of the 1930's.

Hobsbawm, in his study of primitive social movements, suggests what he terms "populist legitimism" as a characteristic reaction of a traditional sector to such a threat. He describes its logic as follows:

First, the ruler (or an institution like the Church) in some sense symbolizes and represents the people and its ways of life, as uninstructed public opinion sees it. . . . But if this stable order, poor though it should be, should be threatened from outside or inside, then, unless the ruler has produced or tolerated more than the expected measure of poverty, injustice and death (to use the Chinese phrase, 'the mandate of heaven has run out'), the people will rally round him, since he is in a symbolic sense, 'themselves,' or at least the personification of the social order.³³

³² It has perhaps been developed most fully by Gino Germani in *Política y Sociedad en Una Época de Transición*, Editorial Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1962, pp. 69-126.

³³ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 118-119.

Post-war Colombia satisfied some conditions for populist legitimism, since a traditional order was being undermined by urbanization and industrialization—in short by modernization. But modernization does not always beget violence on a grand scale. Colombia's political parties, however, differed in two respects from those of most other Latin countries. They dated from the mid-nineteenth century and virtually all peasants identified with them; and they diverged sharply in their commitments to modernization.

The Liberal Party represented an attack on the traditional sacred order. Liberal identification with secular forces of urbanization and industrialization in the 1930's placed the party squarely on the side of modernization. Its latent anti-clericalism reinforced this identification, especially when attacks on churches took place in several sections of the country following Gaitan's assassination in 1948.

The Conservative Party stood for the traditional sacred order in the sense of Hobsbawm's ruler. Since the late 1930's, Conservatives had been stressing the moral superiority of the traditional peasant over urban masses.³⁴ Laureano Gómez in the late 1940's and early 1950's intensified the appeal to such symbols as the Church, family and Hispanic heritage. These became the bases of his proposed constitutional reforms in 1953, and he devoted about half a radio speech discussing those reforms to a historical sketch in which the erosion of values was traced to 1930, the year of the Liberal accession and the beginning of modernization.³⁵

Rhetoric of this sort stimulated traditional identifications and intensified resentments toward the modern sector. Violence motivated by political hostilities on a local level was thus transformed into wider violence directed against perpetrators of moral and spiritual decay. Thus violence became a kind of holy war, defending a traditional order against those who were undermining it.

The key to this process was to identify Lib-

See also Bendix, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-47 for a discussion of populist legitimism and its relation to political life in pre-modern Europe.

³⁴ See, for example, Silvio Villegas, *No Hay Enemigos a la Derecha*, Manizales, 1937; and Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, *Sus Mejores Páginas*, Editorial Renacimiento, Manizales, 1961. The latter is a collection of newspaper articles and speeches from the late 1930's.

³⁵ Gomez later passed to world history, seeing the crisis of Western civilization as emanating from the French Revolution. The speech was printed in *El Siglo* (Bogotá), May 21, 1953.

eral peasants with modernization, which was difficult since they were no more modernized than Conservative peasants and probably shared the latter's resentments. Traditional loyalties to the Liberal Party, however, associated some peasants with Liberal efforts toward modernization. Traditional political hostilities were thus reinforced in rural areas by the conflict over modernization. This explains the unusually strong partisan rhetoric of the period, in which traditional values of Church and family were juxtaposed with Liberal efforts at modernization. Liberal peasants fought back, partly to defend themselves, partly in response to traditional appeals from Liberal leaders.³⁶ In a context of insecurity which stemmed from intense hostility between the parties, rural violence rose to unprecedented and unintended heights.

The existence of national political parties which differed in their commitments to modernization and with which nearly all peasants identified were thus crucial ingredients in the violence. The absence of such institutions in other countries explains why the Colombian violence has few parallels among modernizing nations.³⁷

³⁶ One Liberal Senator is reported to have exhorted Liberals to "break even social and family relations with Conservatives." See *El Siglo* (Bogotá), July 30, 1952.

³⁷ An article by Orlando Fals Borda which came to the author's attention after the completion of the manuscript hints at a view similar to that presented. Fals refers to "the hypothesis that the appearance of violence in the countryside in Colombia since the late 1940's has been an irrational but effective political response to efforts to preserve essential aspects of the same old 'sacred' order. . . ." He does not, however, follow out this suggestion to account for the duration or intensity of the violence; he refers only to the fact that "the use of violence could not be held within reasonable bounds and it got out of the control of the political leaders who had sought to use it and became a monster of malfunctioning based on unanticipated structural faults and cleavages," and leaves that phenomenon unanalyzed. He also asserts that the peasants "were unable to take the next step toward the social revolution that they unconsciously desired," indicating his implicit agreement with the Williamson thesis which he had articulated in "The Role of Violence . . ." *op. cit.* See Orlando Fals Borda, "Violence and the Break-Up of Tradition in Colombia" in Claudio Veliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Quotes are from pp. 189, 197 and 198 respectively.

III. CONCLUSION

We may summarize the argument. Colombian violence was rural and pitted peasant against peasant, and thus cannot be understood as generated by social deprivation or anomie. Rather, it was a feudal or premodern conflict, generated by modernization. Modernization begun in the 1930's presented a threat to a sacred traditional order, and created a potential for populist legitimacy, or violent defense of that order. This potential was realized because of four additional factors: traditional and universal loyalty of peasants to the Liberal or Conservative party; the identification of the Liberal party with modernization; a legacy of political violence accompanying transfers of power at the national level; and the Conservative party's political interest in exploiting violence. Violence against Liberals widened and intensified into a holy war against modernization, with which Liberal peasants were associated through traditional party loyalty.

This view explains why the violence was so intense for so long, and can account for several features of the violence which the Williamson view leaves unexplained. First, it explains why the violence was rural: only that sector could be mobilized against modernization. Second, it explains why there was no class basis to the violence: feudal political affiliations with no class basis associated some peasants with modernization and defined the lines of conflict. Third, it explains the political overtones of the violence: peasants rose to the defense of a traditional order personified by the Conservative party, against Liberal peasants whose party affiliation identified them with modernization. Fourth, it explains the potency of messianic, quasi-religious political rhetoric: only this could mobilize tradition-bound peasants against an enemy whose most visible difference was party loyalty. Fifth, it explains why national leaders incited the violence: political imperatives of the Conservative party complemented loyalties of peasant adherents to traditional values. Sixth, it explains why a figure like Gómez, in essence struggling vainly against the French Revolution, could attain political eminence in an industrializing and urbanizing nation: his attacks on modernization resounded powerfully in the sector being threatened by such changes.

There is a seventh feature of the violence also better explained by our view than by Williamson's. It is generally acknowledged that an evolution in the violence occurred from the late 1940's to the late 1950's. Prominent among the motives of later violence was family ven-

geance.³⁸ Another was that orphans of the violence raised among antagonists knew no other life and continued killing. Economic motives have also been present, from robbing coffee crops to kidnappings.³⁹ No dates may be given for the replacement of "traditional" violence by this latter pattern, but the best empirical study of the violence suggests that such factors were relatively minor in the late 1940's but important in the late 1950's.⁴⁰ Williamson recognizes these factors as part of the violence, but makes no attempt to account for an evolution.

Our view implies that the violence could not maintain its original character for long. Not only was it fighting a losing battle against modernization, but was also destroying its roots, the traditional society. Three features may be noted. First, thousands of peasants fled the violence, some to urban areas, others to new

rural areas. Second, new local institutions arose as peasants banded together for protection from aggression. Third, upward mobility became possible for many peasants who came upon abandoned land.⁴¹ Each of these effects of the violence tended to erode the traditional society out of which it was born and consequently to weaken its roots.

There is some reason to believe that rural violence is now entering a third stage, that of fidelista-inspired guerrilla activity.⁴² The first incident which was clearly fidelista-inspired occurred in January, 1965; such activities may increase in the future. This suggests a dialectic of Colombia's violence, in which feudal conflict undermined the social structure which produced it, leading to a decade of unstructured and diverse violence, which in turn may be followed by modern conflict which could not have prospered in the traditional society.

³⁸ Biographies of four leading outlaws of the late 1950's and 1960's suggest the killing or violation of a close relative as the catalyst which induced them to begin looting and killing. See Brian Moynaham, "La Violencia," *Cromos* (Bogotá), October 18, 1965.

³⁹ One common practice in some areas for instance was to hire bandits to terrorize a finca, whose owners would then be forced to sell at a low price. Theft of coffee crops was also common. See Guzmán, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 130, and Vol. II, p. 276.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 267-279. Colombians generally speak of the evolution as having occurred.

⁴¹ These and related points are brought together by Camilo Torres Restrepo, *op. cit.* Also see Fals Borda, "Violence and the Break-Up of Tradition . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 199-201, Pineda, *op. cit.*, *passim*, Gutierrez, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-50 and Guzmán, *op. cit.*, Vol. I pp. 154-156 and 412.

⁴² See James Nelson Goodsell, "Colombia's 'la violencia'," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 14, 1966, in which the rise of fidelista activity is discussed. A statement to the same effect by Colombia's Minister of War, General Reibeiz Pizarro, may be found in *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), November 6, 1965.

PARTICIPATION, EDUCATION, AND POLITICAL COMPETENCE: EVIDENCE FROM A SAMPLE OF ITALIAN SOCIALISTS*

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Participation is one of the crises of political modernization. Along with the political awakening of masses of people has come the necessity of absorbing them meaningfully into the political system. The almost universally low levels of formal education and political competence contribute to the difficulties of mobilization. The most advanced polities are still seeking ways of making democratic participation effective; modernizing polities find the task even more formidable. This article examines the relationships among participation, education, and political competence in a sample of members of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).

Although Italy is an advanced polity, in average education and industrialization it lags behind the world leaders in Europe and North America; and in some respects patterns of participation likewise reflect a transitional stage. The PSI is probably the only democratic Socialist party of the classic Marxian type left in Western Europe. It is devoted to the democratic mobilization of the industrial and agricultural masses. But it also contains a substantial middle-class element, and thus provides an opportunity to study the relationship between participation and political competence for persons of different levels of formal education.

There can be little doubt that differences in formal education have political consequences. The evidence is compelling that persons of high education participate more, are more knowledgeable, feel more efficacious, and exhibit greater sensitivity to the ideological dimensions of politics. Evidence from a sample of members of the PSI reinforces and refines these findings. Going beyond the simple associations between participation, education, and political competence, it is further evident that participation is more crucial as a means to political competence for the poorly educated than for the better educated. Formal education and participation in politics are both ways of achieving competence. There are undoubtedly many others, but participation is especially important for people of low education. The association between participation and political competence is not as strong for those of high education, as formal schooling and socialization in a sophisticated environment serve to develop competence independently of participation.

Three dimensions of political competence were investigated—factual knowledge about politics, sense of political efficacy, and ideological sensitivity. Measurements are discussed below. Although the data revealed the expected higher association between participation and political competence for those of low education, they also suggested some limitations on participation as a means to competence. At a given level of participation, the better educated always ranked higher on knowledge and efficacy. And high levels of ideological sensitivity were found *only* among members who ranked high on both education and participation. Finally, the relationship between participation and knowledge is stronger than that between participation and efficacy. Before discussing the implications of these findings I will examine some dimensions of the problem and present the data on which my conclusions are based.¹

I. PARTICIPATION, EDUCATION, AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

One of the best documented conclusions

* This research was accomplished while I was a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Florence in 1962–63. I wish to thank the Italian Fulbright Commission authorities, the Horace H. Rackham Graduate School of The University of Michigan, and the Olivetti Foundation for their assistance, as well as the several professors, students, and party officials in Italy who made this research possible.

¹ These data are drawn from a research project on the internal politics of a PSI federation. While the larger study also includes interviews with all the formal leaders of the party in the province, plus extensive documentary research in party archives, the data analyzed here derive from 301 interviews with a dense sample of every third member of the party in the chief commune of the province. (The number of valid responses varies somewhat from table to table.) The interviews were administered in the spring of 1963 by students of the University of Florence. The response rate was 81% after at least two callbacks.

The larger study, which treats organizational democracy and oligarchy as problems in communications, is *Party Democracy: The Internal Politics of an Italian Socialist Federation* (forthcoming).

about participation in voluntary associations in the United States is that high education and high participation are closely related. Studies further demonstrate that participation in voluntary associations is associated with increased political competence even if the associations are themselves non-political. And the evidence is overwhelming that political competence and association membership correlated highly in the United States.² There is considerable evidence that these findings apply elsewhere. In their five-nation study, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba found that participation in voluntary associations is highly associated with political competence.³ Similar conclusions are reported from a Finnish study cited by S. M. Lipset.⁴

Formal education is another method of acquiring both the substantive knowledge and the feeling of personal efficacy that are essential to political participation. That the better educated have higher rates of participation, regardless of how participation is measured, is demonstrated by a number of studies.⁵ It is equally obvious that some individuals of meager formal education are active in politics and that some well-educated people are not: other variables clearly intervene between education and participation. In the PSI, for example, members are induced to join the party regardless of their levels of politicization and commitment. This seems to be a general phenomenon in voluntary associations. James March and Her-

bert Simon concluded, "There is evidence indicating that most union members become participants either more or less involuntarily or for limited special reasons . . ." ⁶ And, more nearly analogous to the PSI situation, Almond found that recruits were attracted to the Communist Party by a wide variety of influences, but that those who stayed in the party became more knowledgeable and committed.⁷

Members join the PSI for many different reasons. Class distinctions are sharply drawn in Italy. The extremes of rich and poor, the social stigma attaching to most non-white collar occupations, and the unequal sharing in economic prosperity give to parties a distinct social significance. In such an environment differences among parties are widely, if vaguely, perceived within the electorate. Social and traditional impulses motivate the voter to favor and join one party rather than another. It is easy to join a party without being highly politicized, without any real knowledge of politics, and without any excessive sense of efficacy. For many, formal party membership represents no level of politicization and commitment higher than that of a sympathizer or supporter. The difference may lie in having a husband, brother, father, close friend, or work colleague who was a member and who recruited those closest to him. The motivations for joining the PSI are thus varied. It is evident that it is not only the highly politicized and competent who are induced to join: yet, it is equally manifest that many poorly educated party members rank high on political competence.⁸

I have thus indicated that I do not believe that self-selection is the principal reason for the increased political competence of the high participants. There is plausible evidence that people join the PSI without prior development of political competence, and that competence results from participation and not the reverse. But cause and effect in social relations are difficult to establish with certitude. My argument is therefore not that participation results in increased political competence but rather that (1) they are closely associated; and (2) on some dimensions the association is stronger for members with low formal education than for those with high. More than this I do not claim.

⁶ *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 72-73.

⁷ *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), esp. pp. 62-126.

⁸ This phenomenon was noted by Almond and Verba, though its implications for working class politics were not developed. *Op. cit.*, pp. 300-322.

² See Howard E. Freeman, Edwin Novak, and Leo G. Reeder, "Correlates of Membership in Voluntary Associations," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (October 1957), 228-233; Herbert Maccoby "The Differential Political Activity of Participants in a Voluntary Association," *ibid*, 23 (October 1958), 524-532; Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," *ibid*, 23 (June 1958), 284-294.

³ *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 320. Their measure of competence differs from that used in the present study.

⁴ *Political Man*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 202.

⁵ For example, Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 304; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 475-481; the evidence cited in Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-189; and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), pp. 122-124.

II. THE MEASUREMENTS EMPLOYED

The modal respondent had completed elementary school and hence had five years of formal education. However, more than one-third of the sample had less than five years, and only one in six had more. Consequently, the three categories of formal education are less than five years of school (low), five years (average), and more than five years (high).

TABLE 1. FORMAL EDUCATION OF SAMPLE

	N	%
Less than five years (Low Education)	116	39
Five years (Average Education)	135	45
More than five years (High Education)	48	16
Total N = 299		100%

Answers to two batteries of questions were utilized to construct indices of knowledge and efficacy. Respondents were asked whether each of eight statements about Italian politics was true or false.⁹ To reduce guessing, respondents were asked whether they knew the answer to each question before replying true or false.¹⁰ The distribution of the responses to the knowledge questions is shown in Table 2.

The four statements concerning political effi-

⁹ The eight statements were: a) Calabria has a special regional status. b) Twenty-five is the minimum age for being elected a deputy. c) There are seven countries in the European Common Market. d) The PSI abstained on the vote of confidence for the center-left government (Fanfani, 1962). e) AGIP is a private industry. f) In the past the PCI has taken part in the government. g) The Constitutional Court has yet to be established. h) Everyone who has reached the age of 21 can vote for the Chamber and the Senate.

¹⁰ The items were machine tested for scalability using the Multiple Scalogram Analysis developed by James C. Lingo, "Multiple Scalogram Analysis: A Set-Theoretic Model for Analyzing Dichotomous Items," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 23 (Autumn 1963), 501-524. They were also tested for scalability by conventional counter-sorter procedures. As the items did not form an acceptable and useful Guttman-type scale, the number of correct answers given by each respondent provided his position on an index of political knowledge.

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF CORRECT ANSWERS GIVEN TO KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS

Correct Answers	%
0	32
1	12
2	15
3	9
4	10
5	7
6	6
7	5
8	4
	100%
Total N = 299	

cacy were treated in a similar fashion.¹¹ Table 3 gives the pattern of responses.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF RESPONSES INDICATIVE OF A SENSE OF EFFICACY

Efficacious Answers	%
0	26
1	31
2	27
3	11
4	5
	100%
Total N = 295	

Ideological sensitivity refers to the capacity to interpret political events in terms of some analytical scheme. Respondents were asked, "In your opinion what are the most important problems of Italian public life today?" And, "If you had to explain Italian political parties to someone who had spent all of his life in another country, in a few words, what would you say about the Italian Communist Party? About

¹¹ The statements were: a) The average member has no influence at all on what the party decides. b) Sometimes politics seems so complicated that it is difficult to understand it. c) I don't think that public officials care very much about what people like me think. d) Voting is the only way for the rank and file member of the party to influence the policies of the party. The questions were taken from SRC American electoral studies. Although none of the items were reversed, there is no internal evidence of distortion due to response set.

the Christian Democratic Party? About the PSI? About the Social Democratic Party?" Answers to these questions were divided into several categories.¹² Eight respondents who used ideological terms seriously and meaningfully were coded high on ideological sensitivity. An additional thirty-four respondents whose answers included references to democracy, totalitarianism, a planned economy, and similar concepts with ideological implications were coded as exhibiting some ideological sensitivity.

The remainder of the respondents were divided into four categories. Those who saw parties in terms of general group or class benefits, such as favoring the working class or capitalists, were separated from those who gave more limited or programmatic answers, referring, for example, to the interests of farmers or industrial workers. Many respondents held a simple good-bad view of the parties, saying merely that "The PCI is evil," or "I don't like Saragat." They were placed in a single category of respondents who viewed politics in terms of personalities or simple likes and dislikes. Finally, many respondents were simply unable or unwilling (and the former seems to be the case more often) to articulate anything about the parties that could be meaningfully coded. This latter category is excluded from the subsequent analysis, as it includes some who could not answer, others who refused, and a few who, for various reasons, were not asked these questions. The pattern of responses is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4. LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY

	%
No Meaningful content	17
Personalities or simple likes and dislikes	33
Limited benefits or programmatic	21
General group or class benefits	15
Some ideological sensitivity	12
High ideological sensitivity	2
	100%
Total N = 301	

The respondents were divided into four levels of participation. The interview schedule contained questions concerning attendance at party-related meetings, activities performed for the party, and formal positions held in the

party. To be classified as a *militant* a respondent must have carried out activities or held formal positions as well as attended meetings. A *participant* differed from a militant in the quality and quantity of his activities. A *marginal* member was one who exhibited at least some interest in the party as evidenced by having attended a meeting, or by having performed some activity on behalf of the party. The *nominal* member was a member in name only: he had done nothing more than take out a party card. The respondents divide as indicated in Table 5.

TABLE 5. LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

	%
Unable to Participate	1
Nominal Members	14
Marginal Members	34
Participant Members	26
Militant Members	25
	100%
Total N = 301	

These categories combine ease of measurement with conventional usage. The militants, for example, are militants in the party's understanding of the term, and the participants are likewise a familiar party category. In evaluating the data that follow, it should be recalled that I am dealing with a sample of the rank and file. Everyone who held a post at the federation level or served as a secretary of section was excluded from the membership sample.

III. PARTICIPATION, KNOWLEDGE, AND EFFICACY

Previous findings of close association between education and knowledge are strikingly confirmed. A somewhat weaker association exists between education and efficacy, and between participation, on the one hand, and knowledge and sense of efficacy, on the other.

However, when these relationships are broken down by educational levels, important distinctions emerge. I hypothesized that the association between participation and competence would be stronger for those members in the low education category than for those in the two higher groups. The better educated generally have better educated parents; apart from their formal education, they are likely to acquire some political competence at home and from their peers. The poorly educated often are caught up in a cycle of ignorance and political incompetence. With poorly educated parents and associates and a long tradition of aliena-

¹² This measure of ideological sensitivity is adapted from Campbell, *et al*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10.

TABLE 6. INTERCORRELATION MATRIX
PARTICIPATION, EDUCATION, KNOWLEDGE,
AND EFFICACY ENTIRE SAMPLE¹³

	Education	Knowledge	Efficacy
Participation	.22	.44	.33
Education	—	.61	.42
Knowledge		—	.42

tion and cynicism, they can escape only through great personal effort or good fortune. Participation in politics is one way for the poorly educated to acquire knowledge and a sense of efficacy; indeed, it may be the only avenue available. It is not nearly as important for the better educated.

Level of participation, for example, is related to the knowledge and efficacy of all groups. However, the regularity and magnitude of the increase are more impressive for the less well educated, and the difference is greater for knowledge than for efficacy.

TABLE 7. PARTICIPATION AND KNOWLEDGE,
BY EDUCATION

Participation	Education		
	Low	Average	High
Nominal Members	.2*	2.0	**
Marginal Members	.8	1.8	4.6
Participant Members	1.4	3.0	5.0
Militant Members	2.1	4.4	6.1
N	116	133	47
Gamma	.52	.40	.35
Total N = 296			

* Figure is mean knowledge (0-8 possible).

** Less than five cases.

The association between participation and knowledge is stronger for the lowly educated (gamma .52) than for the average (.40) or highly educated (.35). Nominal members with low education have a mean of .2 on the index of knowledge (i.e., only one out of five in this category could answer even one of the eight questions correctly); the mean of the militants in the same category was 2.1. The importance of education is shown by the fact that the

¹³ All measures of association herein are gamma rank order coefficients. Gamma was chosen because it does not require N×N tables in order to reach the values of ±1.0. For a discussion of gamma, see William L. Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1963), pp. 655-56.

mean for nominal members with average education is 2.0, rising to 4.4 for militants with the same education. Those with high education scored much higher, from 4.6 for the marginal members to 6.1 for the militants. Marginal members of high education scored higher than militants of the lower two categories. The progression among the militants from 2.1 for the lowest educational category to 6.1 for the highest likewise demonstrates the importance of education for political knowledge even among the most active members. Further, while the association between participation and knowledge is stronger in the low education group, the absolute differences between the mean levels of knowledge in the low and high educational categories are relatively constant within each level of participation. Thus, among marginal members it is 3.8, participants 3.6, and militants 4.0.

TABLE 8. PARTICIPATION AND EFFICACY,
BY EDUCATION

Participation	Education		
	Low	Average	High
Nominal Members	.4*	1.0	**
Marginal Members	.8	1.6	1.9
Participant Members	1.0	1.6	1.5
Militant Members	1.3	1.9	2.6
N	112	133	47
Gamma	.38	.24	.33
Total N = 292			

* Figure is mean efficacy (0-4 possible).

** Less than five cases.

The association between participation and sense of efficacy is roughly similar for all groups. The increase in sense of efficacy by level of participation is monotonic for the lowest educational category; while there is an overall increase for the two other categories, it is irregular. Table 8 shows the mean sense of efficacy for each category, after the fashion of the above discussion of knowledge. It seems from these findings that knowledge about politics is very much a function of exposure to politics, as knowledge consistently increases with participation and education. A sense of efficacy, on the other hand, may have several origins; although in general it exhibits the same patterns as political knowledge, there are irregularities that elude simple interpretation.

IV. IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, EDUCATION, AND PARTICIPATION

There is an expected overall association between education, participation, and ideologi-

cal sensitivity. For the entire sample, gamma correlations are as follows: participation and education, .22; participation and ideological sensitivity, .22; and education and ideological sensitivity, .47. These general patterns are as anticipated. Few people of low education achieved the levels of ideologue or near-ideologue, however; and when the association between participation and ideological sensitivity is examined for each of the educational groups, significant differences emerge. Participation in the party is associated with a dramatic increase in the sensitivity of the best educated members, while the ideological sensitivity of the most poorly educated group hardly changes (see Table 9).

TABLE 9. PARTICIPATION AND IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY

Participation	Education		
	Low	Average	High
Nominal Members	1.6*	2.4	**
Marginal Members	1.6	1.9	3.0
Participant Members	1.8	2.2	2.0
Militant Members	1.7	2.5	4.1
N	89	116	37
Gamma	.09	.17	.43
		Total N = 242	

* Figure is mean level of sensitivity (5 = Ideologue; 1 = Good or Bad).

** Less than five cases.

Party ideologues generally are militants who also have considerable education. Among members of low education, participation is not associated with ideological levels of political understanding. Some ramifications of all these differences can now be examined.

V. PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL COMPETENCE

I began with a review of other findings concerning participation and political competence. The data presented here confirm the generalization that high rates of participation are associated with high levels of political competence. It is now possible to suggest some refinements in the interpretation of this association. Participation is associated more strongly with knowledge, and to a lesser extent efficacy, among those of low than high education. This strongly suggests that participation in politics is a significant way for the poorly educated to break out of the circle of political ignorance and low sense of efficacy.

But the advantages of the better educated are strikingly confirmed also. For they rate high on political competence even when they are relatively uninvolved, and high participation is associated with even higher levels of competence. Low participants with high education excel other low participants in knowledge, sense of efficacy, and ideological sensitivity, and the absolute advantages of the better educated are maintained among the high participants. In other words, the poorly educated do not catch up through participation; they start behind and they stay behind.

This advantage of the better educated has vast ramifications for internal democracy in the PSI. Even through intensive participation in party life the poorly educated majority does not acquire as high a level of political competence as the small portion with more than average education. As differences in competence among the educational levels remain even among militants, the existence of formal opportunities to develop competence and leadership potentialities does not reduce the gap. Although a few persons may largely surmount their poor education, most do not.

This is especially apparent on the ideological dimension of competence. Participation is associated with increased ideological sensitivity only for the best educated; the poorly educated do not become ideologues. Political competence rises with participation and hence meaningful political action is possible for the poorly educated. But insofar as the goals of political action are conditioned by a sensitivity to ideological considerations, individuals with low educational achievement are dependent on others for the analysis and casuistry involved in applying ideological concepts to specific problems.

As many members affiliate and participate for nonideological reasons, the ideologically sophisticated possess an important weapon in internal party politics. They are in a position to interpret events, choose the alternatives presented to the membership, deal in dialectical niceties, and defend their actions in ideological terms. While often competent in practical politics, in fact sometimes more so than the ideologues, the poorly educated member is severely handicapped in dealing with abstractions and problems of general orientation. Ideological sensitivity is almost a monopoly of the educated members. Although participation in politics is undoubtedly a path to increased political competence, it nevertheless has severe limitations as a means to overcome the disadvantages of a poor education.

INTEGRATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT*

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I. THE AIMS AND CONDUCT OF THE STUDY

At the heart of our research was a single basic question: What arms control and disarmament measures might be acceptable to Europeans in 1966, in 1971, and in 1976? And differently put: What would be Europe's attitude in those years either to arms competition or to arms control, and what particular policies would be most popular or least popular in Europe in this respect?

This basic question implied four more detailed questions. The first, What is Europe now, in 1966, and where is it going for the 1971 to 1976 period? Is it going to be a Europe of nation-states with only marginal common functional arrangements on matters not central in

* The findings reported in this paper are based on a study carried out in 1963-1965 at Yale University, and in Western Europe, under the research direction of the author and the administrative direction of Richard L. Merritt. The chief investigators were Karl W. Deutsch, Richard L. Merritt, J. Zvi Namenwirth, and Bruce M. Russett at Yale, together with Lewis J. Edinger of Washington University, St. Louis, and Roy C. Macridis of Brandeis University. Other collaborators included Bernard Brown, Gerald Braunthal, Peter Merkl, Eugene McCreary, Henry C. Galant, Donald Puchala, Ellen Pirro and Carolyn Cooper. Valuable criticism, advice and information was received at various stages from Henry W. Ehrmann, Morton Gorden, Stanley Hoffmann, Daniel Lerner, Erwin Scheuch, Adolf Sturmthal, and others. The responsibility for all weaknesses of the present summary remains, of course, my own.

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Fuller versions of the findings will be published in two books: *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* by Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt (New York, Scribners, pub. sched. 1966) and *Arms Control and Atlantic Unity* by Karl W. Deutsch (New York, Wiley, pub. sched. 1966).

importance to the concerns of its citizens? Or will it be to some extent substantially integrated, with some major policy decisions made by common institutions? Or will it be a common body politic, speaking with a single voice and developing common institutions for a wide range of decisions?

Second, do Europeans in general approve or disapprove of arms control? Do they welcome the relaxation of tensions between America and Russia and between the East and West, or do they fear such relaxation?

Third, what specific arms control measures are likely to be most acceptable to Europeans, and which arms control measures are likely to be least acceptable?

And fourth, what are the strength, location, and time aspects of political support for specific policies, such as the policies of France and its President de Gaulle vis-à-vis the NATO Alliance and the United States? What is the European attitude to the nuclear striking force of France, the *force de frappe*, and the proposals that other European countries should also have national nuclear striking forces? What is the attitude of Europeans, both in Germany and elsewhere, to the idea of nuclear weapons for Germany, either directly, for instance through purchase by the German Government for the German military establishment, or through the abrogation of the Paris Agreements of 1954 and therefore eventually through the German manufacture of nuclear weapons? And what is the attitude of Europeans to a multi-lateral nuclear force, either limited to European countries alone or including the United States?

To attempt to answer such questions requires a combination of evidence and judgment. The diagnosis of a physician, the verdict of a judge, and the judgment of a political scientist or analyst all are made in the light of many considerations, not all of which can be made fully explicit. A doctor who has seen many sick people, a judge who has listened to many plausible but not always trustworthy witnesses, a political scientist who has gained some experience in his professional work as to how deceptive evidence can be—each of these is likely to do better in his appraisal of reality than one who only looks at mere statistics and interview reports.

Nevertheless, though it must be interpreted

with judgment, evidence speaks with its own voice and deserves to be taken seriously in its own right. We tried to develop five lines of mutually independent evidence. The first was evidence from elite interviews of 147 French and 173 West German leaders.

We also surveyed relevant mass opinion polls, going back for about fifteen years. In many cases the same question had been asked every year of samples of voters ranging from between one thousand and two thousand respondents. On many questions it was possible to compare how mass opinion had changed over time, and how it agreed with or differed from elite views in the early 1960s.

Another source of evidence was a survey of arms control and disarmament proposals which were specifically focused on Europe. This permitted us to trace the growth and decline of interest in this particular approach to arms control, in contrast either to the rejection of all arms control, or else—more realistically—to the shift of interest to more nearly worldwide approaches to arms control and disarmament, as in the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty.

We also carried on two content analysis projects. In one, a large number of newspapers and periodicals in four countries (France, West Germany, Great Britain and the United States) were examined for editorial responses to ten major arms control events by coders using their own judgment and "hand-coding" techniques. The other project studied in greater depth the editorials on European integration in four leading newspapers in France, West Germany, Great Britain and the United States by computer or machine content analysis.

Finally, we collected and analyzed a large number of aggregative data about actual behavior. What is happening, not to editorials about trade, but to actual trade? What is happening, not to speeches about universities, but to the numbers of young Germans and young Frenchmen actually crossing the border to study in the other country? What is happening to travel? What is happening to migration? What is happening to the exchange of mail? These data were available from the statistics published by the countries concerned or by various international organizations, and they did tell us whether these transactions had increased or declined, relative to other transactions or to the same transactions in other years or with other countries.

Using all these five streams of evidence, we then tried to make our judgments. A few of the points that came out of the combined use of the five types of evidence can be briefly summarized.

II. THE HALTING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE THE MID-1950's

The first point to emerge was this: European integration has slowed since the mid-1950's, and has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-58. An analysis of trade data, going back as far as 1890, suggests that in the 1957-58 period Europe reached the highest level of structural integration it has ever had. Most of this high level was reached by 1954, but there were slow advances to 1957-58. Europe now is much more highly integrated than it was between the wars or before World War I, but from about 1957-58 on there have been no further gains. The absolute increases after 1958 in trade, travel, postal correspondence and the exchange of students are accountable for from the effects of prosperity and the general increase in the level of these activities. There have been no increases in integration in regard to all these transactions beyond what one would expect from mere random probability and the increase in prosperity in the countries concerned.

The spectacular development of formal European treaties and institutions since the mid-1950's has not been matched by any corresponding deeper integration of actual behavior.

As far as they go, the transaction data do not suggest that any substantial increase in European integration should be expected by 1970 or 1975, even among the Six, if there should be a mere continuation of the practices and methods of the 1950's and the early 1960's. The expectable pattern for the next ten years, as suggested by a study of the trends in European transactions from 1928 to 1963, is toward a Europe of national states, linked by marked but moderate preferences for mutual transactions, with little growth—and possibly some decline—in the intensity of those preferences as expressed in actual behavior of the populations and business communities of the European countries.

The foregoing observations apply with particular strength to France. France alone of the EEC countries has retreated in part from foreign trade. It has now a much lower proportion of foreign trade to gross national product—28 per cent in 1963—than it had in 1928, when the same proportion stood at 46 per cent. France thus has retained a greater amount of national self-preoccupation, and it has accepted in its actions somewhat less of the limited European integration than have Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.

A different line of analysis of economic data suggests, on the basis of provisional computations, that Western Europe now has traversed about one half of the way toward structural

economic integration and that perhaps another 40 years might be needed, at rates of progress from 1913 to 1955, to complete the process.¹ In any case, the pace of actual progress seems much slower than the pace of such legal and theoretical timetables as those in the formal treaties of integration. Difficulties in implementing these timetables in 1966 and thereafter may be in part inherent in this underlying situation.

III. THE DECLINE OF INTEREST IN GENERAL DESIGNS FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

1. *The Evidence of the Elite Press.* The impression of a halt in the growth of integrative sentiment in Europe is confirmed by the evidence of content analysis of "prestige" newspapers. For the years 1953 and 1963, *Le Monde*, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *The Times of London*, and the *New York Times*, were selected as the most representative elite newspapers of France, West Germany, Great Britain and the United States, respectively. In these papers, all editorials dealing with European or Atlantic integration or European politics in general were identified, and a sample of 200 editorials was chosen by appropriate procedures. This sample was then subjected to intensive content analysis by computer. The main changes found in the relevant editorials of each elite paper from 1953 to 1963 were as follows:

Interest in Atlantic Alliance, with military emphasis, and seen against the background of a bipolar world, has declined markedly in all three European papers. This decline is moderate but clear in the *London Times*. It is greater in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; and it is greatest in *Le Monde*. All three European papers have moved toward greater concern for primarily European integration, seen in economic terms, and against the background of an increasingly multi-polar world. Only the *New York Times* has not shared in this trend. Its editorials alone intensified their Atlantic and military emphasis and their view of the world as a continuing bipolar power system.

There has been a general decline in the attention of all four papers to any general political or legal designs for a unified Europe, and a corresponding shift to greater concern with concrete difficulties of European integration or cooperation in regard to such matters as agriculture. In 1963, only the *New York Times* still maintained a reduced but still marked preponderance of

interest in idealized political or legal designs for a unified Europe.

The concern with domestic French and German controversies, as opposed to any attention given to the requirements and costs of supranational alliances, remained unchanged in all four papers over the ten-year period. According to some theories of political integration, such concern with domestic controversies should have been expected to decline, and the interest in the needs of supranational alliances to increase, if there had been major progress toward supranational integration during that decade. No evidence of such a shift was found.

In all four papers, concern increased from 1953 to 1963 in regard to United States pressure for the extension of the powers of supranational organizations, particularly within an Atlantic framework. By 1963, supranational integration had become more closely identified with United States initiatives and pressures. On this issue the *New York Times* alone among the four papers shifted from an attitude of moderate but marked concern for American initiatives and pressures for European unification in 1953 to a so much stronger emphasis in 1963 that in regard to this issue, in the latter year, it seemed to be living in a different world from that of the European papers.

The chief form of United States activism, as discussed in these editorials, referred to American efforts to merge military and economic supranational instrumentalities in Europe or in the Atlantic area. Such a linkage between economic and military policies, however, appeared in 1963 as a theme chiefly created by American speakers and writers, with no substantial support in any of the European papers we studied.

References to arms control and disarmament were so rare in the editorials on European politics and integration, as studied in all four papers, that no statistical analysis could be undertaken in regard to these topics. These problems were not seen, it appears, in the context of European unity and general European politics.

2. *The Evidence of Mass Opinion.* A considerable number of French and German public opinion polls from the years 1952-1962 were analyzed for the purpose of making comparisons between the two countries as well as comparisons of political attitudes among different groups, and comparisons with a smaller number of comparable polls from Italy and Britain. Methods used included the charting of time trends with the help of graphs, and factor analysis with the aid of computers. From these analyses several tentative findings emerged:

There was persistently greater elite and mass

¹ This 40 year period is suggested by unpublished provisional results of research by Robert Schaefer, Yale University, 1965-1966.

attention to national concerns rather than European. Large samples of Germans were asked year after year by German interviewers: "What is the most important task before our country?" In the spring of 1965, 51 per cent said "national reunification," while only 3 per cent said "European union." National interests outpolled European interests fifteen-to-one for the top spot of attention—and had done much the same for more than a decade.

Throughout the period 1954–1962, the difference between French and German mass opinion tended to be larger than those between opinion in either of these countries and that in Italy or Britain, or between British and Italian attitudes.

Friendly feelings in French mass opinion about Germany and in German mass opinion about France increased substantially to roughly one-half of the Germans and Frenchmen polled in 1963–64. Feelings of mutual trust increased much less, to about one fifth of the respondents in each country. Answers in the mid-1950's to specific questions "Which country would you trust as an ally in case of war?" showed markedly greater trust of France and Germany in Britain, and still greater trust in the United States than they showed between those two continental countries.

Questions in the mid-1950's about the Western alliance in peacetime, and about the same alliance in case of war, revealed very marked decreases in its support by French or German mass opinion for the latter and more serious eventuality, but stability or even a slight increase in the British popular commitment.

Nevertheless, factor analysis of many French and German opinion poll results between 1954 and 1962 indicated a marked increase in the similarity of underlying images between the two countries, as expressed by the amount of observed opinion variation that could be accounted for by factors common to opinion in both countries. In particular, there was a marked increase between 1954 and 1962 in the importance of an image of a United Europe in both French and German opinion. Most of this increase occurred between 1957 and 1962. During the same years, there occurred a marked decline in the perception of any military threat and of the danger of nuclear war. Increased relevance of European unity thus appeared quite compatible with a decreased sense of military danger.

The increased similarity of French and German perceptions in 1962, as compared to 1957 and 1954, was not matched, however, by any net increase in the similarity of French and German political values. Although Frenchmen

and Germans had come to agree to an increased extent on what they saw in the world around them, they continued to disagree on what they liked.

The strongest difference between French and German mass opinion in the analysis of these surveys was found in the area of international politics. Germans had a clearly favorable image of the Western alliance and a clearly unfavorable one of the Soviet Union, while the French attitude towards symbols of Western unity was negative in 1962, and their anti-Russian posture was conditional and reserved. French popular opinion became increasingly pessimistic about NATO from 1957 to 1961, and in the confrontations of 1962 it continued to blame the United States for world insecurity, while being divided in blaming the Russians for recklessness. German mass opinion, however, saw United States policy as directed toward world security, and saw the Russians as acting recklessly. Generally, German mass opinion was markedly pro-American, while the French majority was so only with reservations, and a sizeable minority gave outright anti-American responses.

Only in regard to accepting European unity, at least in general terms, Frenchmen and Germans agreed to a greater extent in 1962 than they had done in earlier years. Even here, however, on the specific questions of European political unity and federation, French mass opinion remained significantly less "European" than its German counterpart.

The overall impression from the analysis of the trend of French and German mass opinion data from 1954 to 1962 is that of opinion halting or hesitating at a threshold. There is a consensus that European unity is a good thing, and that some steps should be taken to maintain and strengthen what European unity there is, and to go somewhat further in that direction. There seems to be no clear image in mass opinion as to what these steps should be, or how far they should go, nor is there any sense of urgency about them.

There is thus now in European mass opinion a latent clash between the continuing acceptance of the reality of the nation state, and the newly accepted image of some vague sort of European unity. The ensemble of these present public moods may facilitate general expression of good will, combined with policies of temporizing, caution, national consolidation, and only gradual and sectoral advance toward somewhat greater European integration.

3. *The Evidence of Elite Interviews, 1964.* Since the results of the elite interviews conducted in the summer of 1964 with 147 French

and 173 West German respondents are discussed at considerable length elsewhere, only a few major points will be summarized here.²

Persistent Nationalism with Major Cleavages: The Divided Elites of France. French elite responses show the continuing strength of self-assertive nationalism. Nearly seven-eighths of the respondents see current French policies as increasingly nationalistic, and nearly three-quarters see the world as an increasingly multipolar power system, replacing the earlier bipolar United States-Soviet predominance. Three-fifths definitely approve this new trend, and a majority asserts a "manifest destiny" for France.

There is overwhelming French elite consensus on not trusting Germany beyond a very limited extent. This was expressed in many ways throughout most of the interviews. Only 7 per cent of 136 articulate French leaders are willing to trust the German Federal Republic "a great deal." Of the 109 French leaders who express their views on German reunification, only 7 per cent favor it unconditionally, and of the 77 French leaders who comment on its security aspects, 58 per cent consider it a threat to French security.

On many issues, outright nationalist views command only strong minority support. A plurality of nearly one-half flatly deny that Europe will be unified within the next ten years; and 41 per cent choose national predominance as their preferred form of European integration, as against 43 per cent who want supranational influences to predominate. Only 30 per cent endorse an independent national foreign policy for France, while 70 per cent prefer a policy of alliances.

Efforts toward some further limitations on national sovereignty are favored, at least conditionally, by 83 per cent of French leaders, and definitely so by 45 per cent, with only 14 per cent even conditionally opposed. French elite consensus seems more favorable to at least some limited further steps toward supranational collaboration than have been the recent

policies of President de Gaulle. During the next few years, such limited steps might well be undertaken with elite support by himself or his successors.

The basic pattern of national self-assertion and of French elite preferences and expectations, however, seems likely to persist. Current (i.e., relatively stressful) French policies toward the United States and NATO are most often mentioned (29 per cent) as likely to continue after President de Gaulle.

French domestic cleavages, too, seem certain to persist. Less than one-fifth of our respondents turn out to be clearcut Gaullists. While a majority expect that the Fourth Republic will not be restored, and that some institutions of the Fifth Republic will survive de Gaulle, there is no agreement on just which features will survive. The hopes for a more pragmatic and consensual "new politics" in France have not materialized.

An analysis of elite age groups indicates no major changes over the next ten years. Typically, age accounts for less than 5 per cent of the variance in the answers found. Within these limits, the "middle elites"—those in their fifties and hence the generation of the 1930's and World War II—tend to differ from both their elders and juniors, who in turn often resemble each other. This middle elite group is somewhat more nationalistic and more closely identified with the de Gaulle regime.

The junior elite—those under 50—are more internationalist, more in favor of alliances, and still more opposed to an independent foreign policy for France. A moderate shift toward a somewhat more internationalist foreign policy might be supported by this generation, once its members win full power in the 1970's, but the essential features of French politics are likely to remain.

French elite members themselves do not expect to change their minds. An above-average degree of closure of thinking is reported for 70 per cent of the respondents, and only 1 per cent feel that the policies proposed by them for defending the French national interest might become impractical in the future.

A brief follow-up survey was taken among the same group of respondents in December, 1964, after Khrushchev's fall, President Johnson's re-election, and the Chinese nuclear explosion. It elicited about 60 per cent usable responses and confirmed the stability of French attitudes expressed in mid-1964.

Strengthened National Consensus and Greater Readiness for Supranational Steps: The Integrated Elites of the German Federal Republic. Elite consensus on definite satisfaction with the

² Percentages given in this summary are based on all respondents, including those who said "don't know," as well as those who did not comment on the particular question, if this category amounted to no more than 5 per cent of the total. If a larger proportion did not touch on a particular question, the percentages given refer only to the "articulate" respondents, that is, to those who did make a comment, even if they only professed themselves to be undecided or uninformed. In this latter case, the actual number of articulate respondents on the question is indicated.

present West German regime and basic policies includes nearly three-quarters of West German respondents. Adding those indicating moderate satisfaction brings total elite support for the basic GFR regime to 93 per cent. This support extends solidly across all groupings of age, class, occupation, major party, and past political record.

In contrast to their more detached or alienated French counterparts, large majorities of West German elite members see themselves as influential in the policies of their own country, and appear more likely to identify with them. As recorded by interviewers, 73 per cent of German respondents indicate that they think they have more than average influence in domestic affairs, and 66 per cent do so in regard to foreign policy, in contrast to only 33 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively, among the French.

The foreign policy of the German Federal Republic is definitely supported by 55 per cent of the West German leaders, in contrast to France, whose current foreign policy is clearly supported by only 33 per cent of French elite respondents. West German support for "all features" of current foreign policy, and particularly for the alliance with the United States, is expected to continue beyond Chancellor Erhard's term of office.

West German leaders are in overwhelming agreement on their country's need for allies: 93 per cent see alliances and international instrumentalities as the best means for defending the national interest of their country. Only 7 per cent name national instrumentalities, and only 6 per cent favor an independent national policy. Enduring common interests with the United States are stressed by 72 per cent; and 71 per cent favor policies aiming at further reductions in national sovereignty.

In contrast to France, two-thirds of the West German leaders continue to see the world as a bipolar power system, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, and they believe that it will remain so. Among the French leaders, on the contrary, nearly three-quarters see an increasingly multipolar world around them. Faith in a continuing bipolar world is somewhat weaker among West German politicians (58 per cent), and it is shared only by a minority of German civil servants (44 per cent).

There is less agreement among German leaders as to just how far these internationalist policies will go, or ought to go. A strong plurality—46 per cent—expect European integration to be achieved within the next ten years, while 35 per cent consider this unlikely. A predominantly supranational form of European

union—if it should come to pass—is chosen by a bare majority of the responses, but 45 per cent prefer "confederation" or arrangements implying the clearcut predominance of nation-states. In France, only 19 per cent expect European union within 10 years, while 49 per cent explicitly do not; and 56 per cent of responses prefer confederation or national predominance.

Not unconnected, perhaps, with the increased strength of the West German army, German elite support for the 1954 project of a European Defense Community of conventional forces changed by 1964 to definite opposition by a plurality, 44 per cent, against only 35 per cent in clear support. In France, a much smaller trend seems to have gone in the opposite direction; 23 per cent of the French leaders now definitely favor EDC, and only 18 per cent clearly oppose it.

Contrasting French and West German Views of Future Changes. French response patterns generally indicate that the Fifth Republic is not perceived as deeply rooted, and that many pre-de Gaulle institutions and forces—such as the old political parties—may be expected to reassert themselves after President de Gaulle's departure from political activity. French leaders thus expect short-run changes after de Gaulle, restoring a considerable measure of long-run continuity in society and politics.

German leaders, on the contrary, expect the trends of change, initiated by the Bonn Republic, to continue beyond Chancellor Erhard's tenure of office, and in their large majority they expect no return or revival of any of the pre-Bonn political forces or practices from the Nazi or the Weimar period. As many as 86 per cent of articulate respondents consider Nazism dead; 73 per cent see the possibility of a Social Democratic government within the next 10 years, and 40 per cent consider it likely, but in any case a majority feels sure that it would make very little difference to domestic or foreign policies, except at most in regard to personnel recruitment.

French and German elite expectations differ strongly in regard to German reunification, as well as to European union. Of the 173 German leaders in our sample, only 9 do not comment on this point, while over one-third of the French do not. Among articulate German respondents, 20 per cent definitely expect reunification to take place within the next 25 years, but only 2 per cent among the articulate French do so. Another 38 per cent of the Germans have at least conditional hopes for reunification within the next quarter century, but only 11 per cent of the French agree with them;

and 83 per cent of the Frenchmen commenting consider German reunification as at least unlikely within that period.³

As to European unification, a plurality of 46 per cent among the 158 articulate German elite members see it as likely to succeed within the next ten years, or at least to make substantial progress, but only 19 per cent among the 141 articulate French leaders share this view. By contrast, no success of, nor any substantial progress toward, European union within the next 10 years is expected by 35 per cent of the articulate German leaders but by as many as 49 per cent among the French.

Atlantic Alliance and European Aspirations: French and German Linkages and Clashes. French and German leaders agree—90 per cent in Germany and 72 per cent in France—that the ultimate military security of their countries depends “completely” or “in large measure” upon the deterrent force of the United States. Most German respondents use the stronger, and most Frenchmen the more cautious, wording. Large majorities of elite respondents—79 per cent in Germany and 65 per cent in France—feel sure that the United States is unlikely to abandon its commitments to the defense of Western Europe. Even larger majorities in both countries refer to long-run common interests, linking their nations with the United States.

There is also agreement among 65 per cent of the German and 62 per cent of the French elite respondents that NATO can be relied upon completely or to a considerable extent. The stronger alternative is more popular in Germany, and the weaker one in France. Minorities of 18 per cent of the German and 30 per cent of the French leaders, however, prefer to rely on NATO only “to a limited extent” or not at all.

Large majorities—68 per cent in Germany and 63 per cent in France—agree that Britain ought to be included in an integrated Europe. A majority of 52 per cent in France stress long-term common interests with Britain, but only 28 per cent do so in Germany:

The same elite proportion of 28 per cent in Germany stress common long-term interests with France, and 37 per cent in France feel they share common long-run interests with Germany. In addition, common interests with the other five EEC members, including Germany and France, respectively, are emphasized by 88 per cent of the French and 35 per cent of the German elite members.

³ For French preferences in regard to German reunification, see p. 358 above.

The result is somewhat paradoxical but in line with other evidence. Majorities of French and German leaders see their countries as linked by long-run political and military interests more strongly to the United States—and in the second place to Britain—than they are linked to one another. Any weakening of French ties to the United States thus might weaken the German-French relationship. In distinction from the views of President de Gaulle, the majority of French elite respondents prefer to keep strong these links to the United States, if this could be done on terms nearer to political equality.

French aspirations to a greater measure of equality divide many French and German views on NATO. Among articulate French leaders, 78 per cent favor NATO reforms in this direction, and only 2 per cent say no reforms are needed. Among their German counterparts, only 47 per cent desire such reforms, and 38 per cent consider all NATO reforms unnecessary.

When asked to choose between policies of strengthening mainly European institutions, such as EEC, and strengthening NATO, 40 per cent of the 124 articulate French respondents prefer EEC, against only 4 per cent who favor NATO. The 141 articulate Germans are split more evenly, with 15 per cent picking EEC and 11 per cent choosing NATO, but a 72 per cent majority refuses to choose and insists on supporting both—a middle way favored also by a French plurality of 49 per cent. Major attempts, by President de Gaulle or any successor, to put in a forced choice “Europeanism” against “Atlanticism” are thus likely to run into strong elite opposition in both countries.

Despite this reluctance of French and, even more, of German leaders to choose between Atlantic and European alignments, it seems from many subtle indications that the latter had come to command by 1964 much the larger share of elite imagination and emotional involvement. The vision of a rich, multidimensioned and growing Atlantic Community has faded.

Differentiated French and West German Views of Cold War Problems and International Relaxation. French and German elite members strongly agree in seeing in Communist states and activities the greatest threat to the security of their countries, and in opposing the withdrawals of troops or nuclear weapons from Central Europe. The neutralization of Central Europe is definitely opposed by 69 per cent of the 166 German elite members who express their views, but only by a plurality of 38 per cent of the 71 Frenchmen who did so.

Despite the perception of a Communist threat, European integration is seen as primarily nonmilitary in purpose. Strengthening the West against Communism is seen as the purpose of European integration by only 19 per cent of the French and 10 per cent of the German respondents, while 45 per cent of the French and 67 per cent of the Germans emphasize economic and cultural purposes.

There is a near-record consensus among both French and German leaders that in the next few years relations between their nations and "the countries of Eastern Europe" will become more cordial. No fewer than 99 per cent among the 118 articulate French respondents say so, and so do 83 per cent of the 162 articulate German leaders.

There is much less support, however, for the familiar proposals to relax international tensions by formally recognizing either the division or the current boundaries of Germany. Of the former measure, only 25 per cent of 153 articulate Germans and 18 per cent of 55 articulate French leaders think that it might ease international tensions. Recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland is seen as probably helpful in easing such tensions by a majority of 52 per cent of the 155 articulate Germans, but only by a plurality of 42 per cent among the 52 French leaders who commented on this matter.

Altogether, French and German leaders produce parallel majorities on six out of ten questions relating to the Cold War complex, but in most cases they differ even there in regard to saliency and perhaps in underlying expectations. A majority of German respondents favor a partial continuation of the "hard line" policies of Cold War days, in the hope that these will ultimately lead to success or to desirable changes in the bipolar struggle; the French leaders seem to back the same policies with much greater detachment, in the expectation that they might best preserve the German status quo in a multipolar world.

It is against this background of manifest and latent differences in French and German views that current and prospective French and German responses to arms control and disarmament proposals have to be appraised.

IV. ATTITUDES TOWARD ARMS CONTROL

1. *The Attitudes of the European Press.* The machine content analysis of 1953 and 1963 editorials, reported in a preceding section, was limited to four elite papers and to editorials dealing with European or Atlantic integration. To supplement it, another content analysis

operation was carried out on a larger number of newspapers and periodicals from the same four countries, but focusing this time upon editorial responses to specific proposals or events relevant to disarmament or arms control. For this purpose, a list was compiled of ten such major proposals or events, with the first five items spanning the years from the Baruch Plan of 1946 to the Rapacki Plan of 1957, and the second five items, the years from Khrushchev's speech in 1959 to the nuclear test-ban in 1963. For editorial comments on these ten events, 97 newspapers and periodicals were searched, 35 American, 29 British, 16 French and 17 German. A total of 655 issues were consulted for the relevant periods, and 370 editorials were found and analyzed.

Within the selected periods, following major disarmament-related proposals or events, the general issue of disarmament and arms control was perceived as fairly salient. Over the entire period 1946-1963, editorial responses were found in an average of 58 per cent of the journal issues examined for the four countries. The general attitude toward efforts at disarmament or arms control was overwhelmingly friendly, with 63 per cent of all mentions favorable.

Over time, interest in arms control and disarmament rose substantially in all four countries, from an average of 43 per cent during 1946-57 to 70 per cent for the years 1959-63.

Specific arms control proposals were treated most often as serious and sincere, despite a minority current of comments labeling many of them as unrealistic or as propaganda. The emotional attitudes towards specific proposals, however, were fairly evenly divided; they were almost as likely to be negative as positive or neutral.

Among the four countries, most attention to arms control problems was paid by the press of the German Federal Republic (77 per cent) and of France (61 per cent), followed by that of the United Kingdom (48 per cent) and the United States (45 per cent). To the extent that these differences reflect reader interest rather than the accidents of our very crude sample selection, they may indicate the existence of a significant reservoir of public interest in disarmament and arms control in Germany and France.

As targets of attention, Russia, the United States, and France were the countries whose names and comments received most attention over the period as a whole, accounting for about two-thirds of all national comments reported. They were followed by Britain, Red China (and other Asian Communist countries), and West Germany.

Emotional attitudes toward nations varied. Toward the United States they were about 30 per cent friendly and 60 per cent neutral. Toward the Soviet Union they were most often negative (56 per cent), or else neutral (34 per cent). Toward Great Britain they were almost as often friendly (41 per cent) as neutral (44 per cent). Toward France and Germany they were predominantly neutral.

There was a frequent tendency in the press of the United States, France, and Great Britain, respectively, to pay most attention to the proposals of its own government, and less attention to the proposals or moves of other countries. Although there were some exceptions to this—the German press paid a great deal of worried attention to many moves by other countries—the evidence confirms the familiar picture of the national press of each country conducting often a kind of national monologue rather than genuine cross-national communication within the Western alliance.

2. *The Decline of Specific Proposals for Arms Control in Europe, 1960–1964.* A survey was made of 64 proposals made between 1947 and 1964 from the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, and Poland, for arms control or disarmament in Europe. They included both official proposals and major public suggestions made by political leaders, parties, or respected writers. Its findings are subject to the limitations that only proposals specifically focused on Europe were considered, that repetitions or minor variations of old proposals were excluded, and that some proposals may have been overlooked, but it seems likely that all salient Europe-centered proposals were included. The survey shows:

(1) French interest in arms control has been much lower than that of any other major country. During the 18 years covered, there were only four French proposals, two of which were made in 1959 by political leaders out of office, Pierre Mendès-France and Jules Moch. No official French proposals were found after 1956, and no significant French proposals from any source after 1959.

(2) In rank order of frequency, proposals came most often from the Soviet Union (18), and the United States (14), followed by Britain (11), the German Federal Republic (10), Poland (7), and France (4).

(3) Over three-fifths of the proposals for Europe made by government spokesmen of some kind, and nearly nine-tenths of the proposals from opposition leaders or private persons, came in the five-year period from 1955 to 1959. During this peak period, official Western

and East bloc proposals were equally frequent. From 1960 onward, official proposals from the United States for European arms control diminished; Britain and Western Germany made no such proposals at all, and by the criteria of relevance used for this report they contributed only one unofficial proposal apiece, and France contributed nothing at all. However, the east bloc countries (i.e., the U.S.S.R. and Poland) continued in 1961–64 to make proposals for Europe at nearly the same rate as in 1955–59, with a somewhat larger share of proposals coming from Poland.

This undiminished East bloc activity might have the possible effect of pre-empting some of the role of champions of European disarmament for the East bloc countries, but also of associating to some extent in the minds of West European elite members the entire topic of arms control with East bloc propaganda, so as to reinforce the partial withdrawal of West European elite interest from this topic. If Europe-centered United States proposals should again become salient and frequent, Western European elite interests might again increase.

The shift, however, in United States interest to more nearly worldwide approaches to arms control and disarmament, such as the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty, accords well with the preferences of the French and German elite members, most of whom favor further worldwide arms control arrangements of this kind but many of whom express misgivings about narrowly regional arms control arrangements for Central Europe alone, which they fear might leave the area unprotected in a world of military pressures.

3. *The Common Fear of Nuclear Proliferation and the General Support for Disarmament and Arms Control.* There are clear indications of anti-Communism, and of "tough-mindedness" in regard to disarmament, among majorities of both French and German elite respondents. Inspection arrangements are demanded or desired as part of any East-West arms control agreement by 78 per cent of the articulate German elite members, but only by 38 per cent of the corresponding group in France.

Within this context however, support for arms control and disarmament produces a striking number of strong and parallel majorities among French and German elites. Efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons "to countries that do not now possess them" are supported by articulate majorities of 78 per cent in France and 90 per cent in Germany. Discussions of disarmament are favored by 69

per cent of the articulate French respondents and 76 per cent of their German counterparts; 20 per cent among the French supporters of disarmament discussions say, however, that the idea is utopian but worth discussing anyway. Some plan for arms control is endorsed by 66 per cent of French and 61 per cent of German responses, and only 17 and 30 per cent, respectively, do not favor any plans. The 1963 American-British-Soviet nuclear test-ban treaty—which France has not joined—is endorsed by a French plurality of only 46 per cent, but by a strong German majority of 84 per cent.

Further arms control and disarmament agreements are definitely backed by 52 per cent of the 134 French and by 84 per cent of the 165 German respondents who comment on the matter. Even if their own countries should not be consulted about future arms control agreements, 55 per cent of the 129 articulate French respondents and 65 per cent of the corresponding 152 Germans still are willing to support them. (German mass opinion in mid-1954 took the same view by a majority of 77 per cent of all those envisaging this possibility, or by a plurality of 44 per cent.)

4. *The Lack of Popular Support for National Nuclear Deterrents and MLF Proposals.* The idea of a national nuclear deterrent is unpopular among the elites in France, where it is official government policy, and still more unpopular among the elites of Germany, where it sometimes has been described—by outside observers—as a possible latent aspiration. In fact, it seems to be not even that. A national nuclear deterrent is rejected as unnecessary for national prestige or national independence, and as not credible to the nation's enemies, by majorities ranging between 54 and 63 per cent in France, and 64 and 94 per cent in Germany.

France's current national *force de frappe* is not expected to survive President de Gaulle. Only 22 per cent of all French respondents expect it to be kept and strengthened, while 49 per cent expect it to be turned into a European institution, and another 6 per cent expect it to be abandoned.

Although clear majorities reject the main arguments in favor of a national nuclear deterrent, French respondents are exactly divided between 46 per cent who feel that such a deterrent still is worth its cost, and the same proportion who feel that it is not.

There is no such division in West Germany, where the thrifty rejection of a national nuclear deterrent as not worth its cost is backed by a landslide majority of 95 per cent of the 163

German respondents commenting on this point. This German majority is so large as to swamp all differences among age or interest groups.

These German elite data tend to disconfirm the notion of a supposedly strong German desire for national nuclear weapons—a desire which would have to be bought off or headed off by offering the German Federal Republic some share in a supranational nuclear weapons system. So far as our evidence goes there is no such German desire for national nuclear weapons at this time.

A multilateral nuclear force under NATO is clearly favored only by 18 per cent, and clearly opposed by 27 per cent of the 100 French respondents who comment on this proposal. In Germany, where practically all respondents comment, the same proposal divides the elites exactly, with 34 per cent clearly in favor and 34 per cent definitely opposed. This last division contrasts sharply with the usual propensity for strong elite consensus in the Bonn Republic.

A European multilateral nuclear force, independent of NATO, would be somewhat more popular among elites in France, where a plurality of 40 per cent of 134 respondents clearly favors it, with only 12 per cent clearly opposed, but it would be much less popular in Germany, where no more than 6 per cent of 168 respondents back the project, while a solid 80 per cent express their opposition.

If a multilateral nuclear force within NATO should come into existence, only 16 per cent of the 102 French respondents to this question would definitely wish their country to participate, but another 43 per cent might agree to such a course under certain conditions. Among the 160 German respondents to the same question these proportions are reversed: 58 per cent clearly favor participation in such a NATO development, with another 13 per cent supporting it conditionally; and only 17 per cent definitely oppose it.

The proportions of the various responses to these and related questions confirm an impression from our interviews: there is no substantial German pressure for an MLF, but rather a willingness to go along with such a scheme, if Germany's ally, the United States, should insist on it.

The pattern of responses to this entire complex of questions suggests that neither French nor German elites are pressing strongly at this time for nuclear weapons, either national or collective. Rather, the issues of the national deterrent and the MLF tend to evoke opposition or division. This contrasts with the high

majorities in both countries in favor of arms control.

The evidence of the elite survey, as far as it goes, accords well with the data from mass opinion polls and the other types of evidence examined in this study. All of this evidence is limited and incomplete, and must be appraised with judgment. At the same time it should be borne in mind that none of the evidence we have found, in terms of differences among age groups or of trends over time, points to the likelihood of any drastic changes in the next few years due to any autonomously developing changes in the French or West German political system.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The lines of evidence pursued in our inquiry tend to converge. Although there are minor differences, the weight of evidence points to several major conclusions.

1. *The Strength of Nationalism.* The movement toward structural European unification since 1957 has been largely halted or very much slowed down. The next decade of European politics is likely to be dominated by the politics of nation-states, and not by any supranational European institutions.

Within France, and within Germany, the various elite groups generally are closer in their attitudes to each other, and to the mass opinion of their own country, than they are to the opinion of their counterparts in the other country. Nationality continues to be a far stronger determinant—or indicator—of political attitudes than do class, age, occupation, religion, party affiliation, and even, for most respondents, ideology.

A provisional factor analysis of our elite survey data confirms this finding. Its results suggest that nationality seems to be between two and ten times as powerful as any one cross-national factor, such as religion, occupation, socialist party affiliation, etc., in accounting for the distribution of responses.

To restore now to the movement toward European unification the vigor and the momentum of the years 1947–1955 would require much larger efforts on the part of Europeans and of the United States than seem to be contemplated now in any quarter of authority. In terms of politics, it would require a visible increase in the share of American attention fixed on Europe rather than on Asia.

2. *The Desire for Alliances and Near-Equality.* Alliances, particularly with the United States, and limited steps toward additional supranational arrangements and institu-

tions are popular among elites and acceptable to mass opinion. National isolationism is being rejected, but increasing national equality—or perhaps a share in great power privilege—is being demanded, particularly by the elites of France.

3. *The Desire for Wider Arms Control and Disarmament.* There is striking consensus in France and Germany on the desirability of arms control and disarmament on a more than local or regional scale, and including further direct agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is particularly strong consensus on the desirability of halting the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not now possess them.

4. *The Lack of Any Strong German Demand for Nuclear Weapons.* There is strong opposition in Germany to the acquisition of national nuclear weapons, and there is no strong positive desire for any German share in a nuclear weapons system through some multilateral arrangement, such as the MLF project; and there is overwhelming and deep-rooted French hostility to any idea of a German national nuclear weapon, or to a substantial German share in a multilateral nuclear weapons system.

5. *The Possible European Support for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.* Under these conditions of European politics, the most nearly acceptable approach to arms control and disarmament might be an international agreement limiting the possession of nuclear weapons to those five powers now possessing them: the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Communist China.

These five are the governments in control of the five countries whose special importance is recognized in the United Nations Charter by giving them the status of Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council. The legal status of Communist China is currently blocked in this respect, but her acquisition of a nuclear device has been tacitly tolerated by all other nuclear powers; and an explicit or tacit nuclear *modus vivendi* with Communist China does not seem unacceptable to European leaders.

Even without an agreement with China, an anti-proliferation agreement and extended nuclear test-ban among the "Big Four"—United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union—might prove feasible, and might pave the way to further steps to arms control. Such an approach might meet some of the French desire for a full and genuine share in international leadership; and our data suggest that such an accommodation of French

desires on the part of the United States and Britain would be acceptable to the majority of the West German leaders.

6. *Prospects.* The picture emerging from this study is complex but not without hope. At moments of crisis the main ties of Western unity will be to Washington rather than among the European countries. For the next decade at least, national political issues will predominate over supranational ones in both France and Western Germany. Viable alliances during this period will have to be concluded on specific matters, among sovereign powers, and on a footing of equality, particularly in regard to France. Greater unity of action, as well as deeper emotional ties in Western Europe, are growing very slowly. In terms of European unification, we may expect after 1975 a possible resumption of the advances of the 1950s, but not much earlier. Until then we can expect to hold the present plateau and improve it slightly.

Western Europeans on the whole, if French and German leaders are representative of their

opinions, now favor worldwide measures of arms control. They favor particularly the relaxation of tensions between the great powers, extensions of the ban on nuclear testing, and measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any countries not now possessing them. They favor all these policies, however, only provided that they can keep the American alliance and the American nuclear shield. Within this very wide range of policies acceptable to Europeans, the United States at this time has a remarkably wide range of discretion and perhaps an unparalleled opportunity for leadership.

Opportunities can be used or lost, together with the work of years of preparation. Once lost, they may be gone, or recoverable only at a great sacrifice. The value of the present American opportunities for leadership to European unity and worldwide arms control must be weighed carefully in the balance against the attractions of any policy of predominant or unlimited United States commitments on the continent of Asia.

CHANGING MEMBERSHIP PATTERNS IN HOUSE COMMITTEES

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I. INTRODUCTION

Of the many excellent studies of Congress completed by political scientists in recent years, few, if any, suggest a departure from Woodrow Wilson's apt phrase, "Congressional government is Committee government."¹ Despite numerous efforts to analyze legislative action in terms of roll call votes, constituency characteristics, state delegations, and/or specialized interest blocs, the committee system remains the central focal point of congressional behavior and organization. Thus, if Wilson's nineteenth century insight is still valid, then it would seem that more intensive studies of the congressional committee system—in the manner employed by Huitt and Fenno, for example²—would yield many new relevant facts concerning the complexities of the legislative process.

As a case in point, the manner in which individual members of Congress are assigned to various committees has been well covered by Matthews, Clapp, and Masters.³ The situation in the Senate is such that each member carries at least two, and in many instances three standing committee assignments. In the House, the maximum standing committee work-load is two assignments, although most Representatives have only a single committee responsibility. However, in connection with this latter point, if one examines the standing committee assignments of all House members for the first session of every Congress from the 80th through the 89th, an interesting pattern emerges in which a gradual but steady increase in the number of double committee assignments is clearly evidenced during the past twenty years.

¹ Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Boston, 1885), p. vi.

² Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," this REVIEW, 48 (June, 1954), 340-365; and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this REVIEW, 56 (June, 1962), 310-324.

³ Donald Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (New York, 1960), Ch. 7; Charles Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Washington, 1963), Ch. 5; Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 345-357.

II. SINGLE AND MULTIPLE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

In terms of total, overall House membership, single committee assignments have steadily declined, with one exception, from the 80th through the 89th Congresses (see Table 1). Furthermore, the gradual but steady decrease of single committee assignments has continued despite the almost constant 435 base-membership figure of the House, as well as its widely fluctuating party divisions. The gross figures presented in Table 1 are refined considerably when the percentage of single committee assignments is examined in terms of individual committees (see Table 2). An examination of these figures reveals, in many instances, drastic and dramatic shifts of single committee membership percentages, although a contrasting—but certainly not surprising—pattern is evidenced by the Appropriations Committee. In this instance the data indicate that for an extremely high percentage of its members, the Appropriations Committee constitutes their sole committee assignment. Revealing an equally high consistency in this regard is the Ways and Means Committee. This committee, together with the Appropriations Committee, form the two most consistently "closed" groups in the House committee system. Both are gen-

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGES OF HOUSE MEMBERS WITH SINGLE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN FIRST SESSIONS OF 80TH TO 89TH CONGRESSES

Congress and Date of First Session	Number of House Members with Single Committee Assignments	Percent of All House members
80 (1947)	373	87
81 (1949)	385	89
82 (1951)	367	85
83 (1953)	340	79
84 (1955)	326	75
85 (1957)	315	73
86 (1959)	295	68
87 (1961)	284	66
88 (1963)	276	64
89 (1965)	262	60

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF HOUSE MEMBERS WITH SINGLE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, BY COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSIONS, 80TH-89TH CONGRESSES (1947-1965)*

Committees	Congress									
	80 1947	81 1949	82 1951	83 1953	84 1955	85 1957	86 1959	87 1961	88 1963	89 1965
Appro	98	98	100	100	100	100	98	98	98	98
WM	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	96	100	94
Rules	42	83	92	83	83	83	83	80	67	67
AG	89	82	80	80	88	79	79	80	63	57
AS	88	91	91	86	82	84	78	81	77	73
BC	89	89	85	76	67	77	58	50	61	57
EL	76	84	76	70	60	53	48	52	39	39
FA	92	96	89	69	78	72	72	64	48	50
IFC	93	82	86	68	65	58	48	52	39	33
Jud	100	96	93	76	75	69	63	69	60	66
PO	80	88	67	44	29	40	32	10	12	12
PW	78	74	73	66	65	68	68	45	50	44
SA	—	—	—	—	—	—	36	44	58	45
II	88	88	67	67	40	39	30	32	33	30
MM	88	88	80	64	39	34	29	23	16	13
GO	46	75	44	53	37	27	7	10	19	3
VA	89	85	77	50	43	18	14	8	4	8
HA	44	45	27	13	4	4	4	0	0	0
Un	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* In this and all subsequent tables, committee designations are as follows: Appropriations (Appro), Ways & Means (WM), Rules (Rules), Agriculture (AG), Armed Services (AS), Banking & Currency (BC), Education & Labor (EL), Foreign Affairs (FA), Interstate & Foreign Commerce (IFC), Judiciary (Jud), Post Office & Civil Service (PO), Science & Astronautics (SA), Interior & Insular Affairs (II), Merchant Marine & Fisheries (MM), Government Operations (GO), Veterans Affairs (VA), House Administration (HA), Un-American Activities (Un), and District of Columbia (DC).

erally referred to as exclusive committees,⁴ and certainly the data collected for this study in no way contradict this designation. However, in the case of the Rules Committee—the third of the exclusive House committee triumvirate—a somewhat different pattern emerges.

No disagreement can be found with the current opinion that the Rules Committee, enjoying an extremely strategic position in the House legislative channel, is considered a highly “desirable” committee assignment. In this sense, it must be ranked with Appropriations and Ways and Means as one of the top committees of the House. Nonetheless, the figures of Table 2 do suggest that the isolated or “closed” group concept is not as applicable to Rules as it is in describing the other two top groups. Indeed, in terms of the percentage of members who hold no other committee assignment, Armed Services has almost always ranked

higher than Rules, with Agriculture only slightly lower.

Thus, when one considers the number of House members who hold only one committee assignment, five committees—Appropriations, Ways and Means, Armed Services, Rules, and Agriculture—tend to cluster rather consistently at one extreme of a continuum representing the percentage of committee members who have only a single committee assignment. In constructing this continuum, a six-session (84th through 89th Congresses) average percentage figure of committee members who had a single committee assignment was calculated for each House committee. By basing the average percentage calculations on this selected time period a more accurate indication of each committee's current position was obtained than if the entire time period (80th-89th Congresses) encompassed by this study was used. The committees were then grouped in the following manner: committees in which 68 percent or more of their

⁴ Masters, *op. cit.*

TABLE 3. RANK ORDERS OF HOUSE COMMITTEES BY PERCENTAGES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS WITH SINGLE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS: SIX-SESSION AVERAGE COMPARED WITH FIRST SESSION OF 81ST CONGRESS

Com- mittee	Six-Session* Average Percent of Members with Single Committee Assignments	Com- mittee	Percent of Members with Single Committee Assignments, 1st session, 81st Congress (1949)
Appro	98	WM	100
WM	98	Appro	98
AS	79.5	FA	96
Rules	77	Jud	96
AG	74	AS	91
Jud	67	BC	89
FA	64	II	87
BC	61	MM	87
PW	57	PO	87
IFC	49	VA	85
EL	48.5	EL	84
SA	46**	Rules	83
II	34	AG	82
MM	26	IFC	82
PO	22.5	GO	75
GO	17	PW	74
VA	16	HA	45
HA	2	UN	0
UN	0	DC	0
DC	0		

CATEGORY I

CATEGORY II

CATEGORY III

in which case single committee assignments were held by 33-49 per cent of the members. Thus, on the basis of this classification, the five committees mentioned above would be placed in category I (high).⁵

At the other extreme of this continuum—category III (low)—another cluster of committees is evidenced. The most consistent groups in this set are District of Columbia and Un-American Activities. However, this cluster also includes House Administration, Veterans Affairs, and to a lesser extent Government Operations and Post Office-Civil Service. In addition, the steadily and sharply declining number of single committee members on Merchant Marine and Fisheries suggests this group, too, should be situated within the upper limits of this category.

Two other divisions along the continuum account for the remaining eight House committees. Judiciary warrants a position at the uppermost limit of category IIa, while Foreign Affairs, Banking-Currency, and Public Works are grouped around the mid-point of this category. Within category IIb, Interior-Insular Affairs must be placed at the lowest point, while Interstate-Foreign Commerce, Education-Labor, and the comparatively new Science-Astronautics are clustered near the upper limit of IIb. Thus, the continuum of House committees based on the percentage of committee members who had single committee assignments from the 84th (1955) through the 89th (1965) Congresses reveals the ranked distribution as seen in Table 3.

For the most part, Table 3 reveals an entirely different rank order of House committees than the ranking presented by Goodwin.⁶ The latter scale attempts to present the House committees in order of their desirability. Thus, Un-American Activities and District of Columbia which rank last in Table 3 of this study, rank fourth and ninth, respectively, on the Goodwin preference scale of House committees. Depending on what one wishes to measure,

* Based on First Sessions of 84th through 89th Congresses (1955-1965).

** Based on four-session average, First Sessions of 86th through 89th Congresses (1959-1965)

members held no second committee assignment were placed in category I (high); committees in which 33 percent or less of their members held no second committee assignment were placed in category III (low); all other committees were placed in either category IIa (medium-to-high), in which case 50-67 per cent of the committee's members held no second committee assignment, or category IIb (low-to-medium),

⁵ The classification scheme applied here results in a distribution which is similar, but not identical to the exclusive, semi-exclusive, and non-exclusive scheme as reported by Masters. The use of the latter terms can tend to create confusion when it is recognized that the exclusive committees are not in fact completely exclusive, nor are the semi-exclusive committees actually semi-exclusive as that term is defined by House Democratic and Republican leaders.

⁶ George Goodwin, Jr., "The Seniority System in Congress," this REVIEW, 53 (June, 1959), 412-436.

TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF HOUSE MEMBERS WITH SINGLE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, BY PARTY, FIRST SESSIONS, 80TH-89TH CONGRESSES (1947-1965)

Party	Congress									
	80 1947	81 1949	82 1951	83 1953	84 1955	85 1957	86 1959	87 1961	88 1963	89 1965
All Members	87	89	85	79	75	73	68	66	64	60
Democrats	92	87	79	87	68	67	70	67	62	61
Republicans	82	89	92	71	83	80	64	65	65	59

many other different scales could obviously be devised. However, the real significance of the Table 3 ranking can be seen when it is compared to a similar rank of committees for the 81st Congress in 1949. In this instance, sixteen of the nineteen standing House committees were clustered closely together around the upper limits of category I.

Further refinements can be added to the data contained in Tables 1 and 2 if the percentages of committee members who have no second committee assignment are examined in terms of political party affiliation. The gross figures of single committee assignments by party, without regard to specific committees, are presented in Table 4. For the House Democrats a major change occurred in 1955 (84th Congress). From 1947 to, and including, 1955, single committee assignments for the Democrats decreased by 24 percent, while the net decrease from 1955 to 1965 was only 7 per cent. A different pattern developed in connection with House Republicans. From 1947 to 1957, the decrease in single committee assignments was only 2 per cent, but by 1959, an additional 16 per cent decrease was evidenced. Thus, the total net decrease for the 1947-1959 period for House Republicans was 18 per cent, with an additional 5 per cent decrease occurring during the period 1959-1965. Since 1959 the two parties have paired very closely together in terms of single committee assignments; the widest margin which separated the Democrats and Republicans at any one time during this period was only 6 per cent.

However, this recent tandem pattern fails to disclose some interesting differences between the two parties that are revealed in Tables 5 and 6. The data in Table 5 indicate the six session average percentage of single committee assignments, by party, in terms of the specific House committees. The shift from 1947 to 1965 of committee members of both parties from an almost complete cluster of committee-party groups in category I to a more even distribution throughout the entire scale with a

slightly greater concentration in category III can be seen by examining Table 6. A close reading of the data contained in Table 5 does suggest, however, that the two parties seem to place different emphasis on certain committees, at least in terms of single committee assignments. For instance, Education-Labor ranks much higher on the Democratic scale insofar as single committee assignments are concerned. To a lesser extent, so also do Rules and Science-Astronautics. On the other hand, House Republicans seem to attach greater importance on the value of single committee assignments

TABLE 5. SIX SESSION AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF HOUSE DEMOCRATS & REPUBLICANS WITH SINGLE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, BY COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSIONS, 84TH-89TH CONGRESSES, (1955-1965)

Democrats	Republicans
Appro.....100	Appro.....97.5
WM.....100	WM.....96.5
Rules.....82	AS.....85.5
AS.....74	AG.....78
AG.....72	Jud.....73
FA.....63	Rules.....67.5
Jud.....61	FA.....65
BC.....61	PW.....63
EL.....57	BC.....61
SA.....52.5*	II.....54
PW.....52	IFC.....47
IFC.....50	MM.....45
PO.....24	SA.....34*
II.....19	EL.....34
VA.....13	GO.....31
MM.....12	VA.....19.5
GO.....8	PO.....18.5
HA.....0	HA.....5
Un.....0	Un.....0
DC.....0	DC.....0

* Percentage figure based on four session average, first sessions, 86th-89th Congresses (1959-1965).

TABLE 6. NUMBER OF HOUSE COMMITTEES RANKED ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED CATEGORIES, BY PARTY, FIRST SESSIONS, 80TH-89TH CONGRESSES (1947-1965)

Category Party	Congress									
	80th (1947)	81st (1949)	82nd (1951)	83rd (1953)	84th (1955)	85th (1957)	86th (1959)	87th (1961)	88th (1963)	89th (1965)
I										
Demo	17	15	12	15	6	6	7	6	3	4
Repub	13	16	17	10	14	11	6	6	4	4
IIa										
Demo	0	1	1	1	5	4	5	5	7	6
Repub	1	1	0	1	2	3	2	3	5	4
IIb										
Demo	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	1	2	2
Repub	0	0	0	2	0	1	3	3	3	2
III										
Demo	2	2	4	3	8	7	7	8	8	8
Repub	5	2	2	6	3	4	9	8	8	10

as related to Armed Services, Judiciary, Interior-Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine-Fisheries, Government Operations, and, to a lesser degree, Public Works.

Finally, the House committee assignment patterns for both parties as they have developed since 1955 were examined solely in terms of the double committee assignments which occurred during this period. While the preceding data

clearly indicate an increased incidence of double committee assignments, it was necessary to determine which of the standing House committees were paired most frequently. To simplify the procedure somewhat, pairings were calculated on the basis of the major categories as defined above. For summary purposes, categories IIa and IIb were recorded as a single grouping—Category II. Also, of the six possi-

TABLE 7. PERCENTAGE OF ALL HOUSE MEMBERS SERVING ON TWO COMMITTEES, PAIRED ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED CATEGORIES, FIRST SESSIONS, 84TH-89TH CONGRESSES

Category Pairs	Congress						Six- session Average
	84th (1955)	85th (1957)	86th (1959)	87th (1961)	88th (1963)	89th (1965)	
I/II	0	0	2	2	1	3	1.33
I/III	12	14	10	11	16	15	13
II/II	8	8	14	11	10	8	10
II/III	57	56	52	62	65	65	60
III/III	24	23	22	14	8	8	15
Number*	107	115	135	143	156	169	—

* The number of House members with two committee assignments for each session listed in Table 8 does not combine with the number of members with single committee assignments in the corresponding sessions as listed in Table 1 to equal the total House membership (435, except for the 86th and 87th Congresses when it was 436 and 437, respectively). The discrepancy is due to several factors. First, the *Congressional Directories* list no committee assignments, with occasional exceptions, for the Speaker and the Minority Leader. Second, only Democrats and Republicans were included in the calculations; thus, an American Labor Congressman in the 80th and 81st Congresses, an Independent in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses, and an Undetermined in the 87th Congress were not counted. Finally, in six of the ten sessions examined, from one to four House seats were vacant at the start of the session.

TABLE 8. PERCENTAGE OF ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS SERVING ON TWO COMMITTEES, PAIRED ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED CATEGORIES, FIRST SESSIONS, 84TH-89TH CONGRESSES

Category Pairs	Congress						Six-session Average
	84th (1955)	85th (1957)	86th (1959)	87th (1961)	88th (1963)	89th (1965)	
I/II	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.3
I/III	12	15	11	12	20	17	15
II/II	7	9	11	12	8	9	9
II/III	58	58	53	63	66	67	61
III/III	23	18	24	13	6	7	15
Number	74	76	80	83	96	115	—

ble pairings by categories, no matches were found between the committees classified in category I. Therefore, the pair, I/I, was not included in the calculations (see Tables 7, 8 and 9).

As seen from these tables, the increase in double committee assignments in the House has primarily involved a pairing between category II and category III committees. For the six-session period examined, the II/III pair accounted for a per-session average of 60 per cent of all double committee assignments in the House. As noted above, no matches were found involving two category I committees, and the I/II pair accounted for only a 1.4 per cent average-per-session of the double committee assignments. However, in this case, House Republicans appeared to be much more willing to assume double committee responsibilities in the I/II pair than did House Democrats. Otherwise the percentage of double committee assignments by paired categories has either remained fairly constant or displayed an increase, with the exception of the III/III pair. In this case, double committee assignments sharply declined during the six session period by 16 per cent. Once again, however, House

Republicans displayed a greater willingness to assume double committee assignments involving two category III committees than did House Democrats.

III. CONCLUSION

The preceding data reveal a gradual yet definite change in House committee assignment patterns since the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Admittedly, six of every ten House members still had only one committee assignment in 1965; but when the 1949 pattern of nearly 90% of the entire House membership holding single committee assignments is considered, a decrease of this extent deserves close examination.

The most apparent cause for the increase of double committee assignments can be explained directly in terms of the steadily increasing size of most House committees. Table 10 shows that from 1949 to 1965 an additional 111 committee seats were created which had to be filled from a constant membership base. To be sure, these additional seats were created in response to a wide range of increasing demands, but more empirical investigations are needed to determine the exact nature of these

TABLE 9. PERCENTAGE OF ALL HOUSE REPUBLICANS SERVING ON TWO COMMITTEES, PAIRED ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED CATEGORIES, FIRST SESSIONS, 84TH-89TH CONGRESSES (1955-1965)

Category Pairs	Congress						Six-session Average
	84th (1955)	85th (1957)	86th (1959)	87th (1961)	88th (1963)	89th (1965)	
I/II	0	0	4	5	3	7	3
I/III	12	13	9	10	10	13	11
II/II	9	5	18	8	13	7	10
II/III	55	51	51	62	63	61	57
III/III	24	31	18	15	10	11	18
Number	33	39	55	60	60	54	—

TABLE 10. NUMBER OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, RANKED BY COMMITTEE ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED CATEGORIES, 1ST SESSION, 81ST, 83RD, 85TH, 89TH CONGRESSES

Committee	Congress				Net Gain or Loss
	81st (1949)	83rd (1953)	85th (1957)	89th (1965)	
<i>Category I</i>					
Appro	45	50	50	50	5
WM	25	25	25	25	0
AS	33	36	37	37	4
Rules	12	12	12	15	3
AG	27	30	34	35	8 (20)
<i>Category IIa</i>					
Jud	27	29	32	35	8
FA	25	29	32	36	11
BC	27	29	30	33	6
PW	27	29	34	34	7 (32)
<i>Category IIb</i>					
IFC	28	31	33	33	5
EL	25	26	30	31	5
SA	—	—	—	21	21
II	25	27	31	33	8 (39)
<i>Category III</i>					
MM	25	28	32	31	6
PO	25	25	25	25	0
GO	24	30	30	34	10
VA	27	26	22	25	-2
HA	19	23	25	25	6
Un	9	9	9	9	0
DC	25	25	25	25	0 (20)
Total Increase					111

demands. Moreover, one might wish to consider the relationship between double committee assignments and urban-rural constituencies. As seen in Table 11 the number of Congressmen who represented districts which were 50% or more rural, and who held double committee assignments remained almost constant over a span of three Congresses. The interesting point which does emerge from Table 11 is that, for the limited period examined (87th-89th Congresses), a per-session average of approximately 38% of all double committee assignments in the House were held by Congressmen who represented districts which were 70% or more rural. A definite trend cannot be established on the basis of three Congresses, simply because there is no way to determine if these figures represent rising or declining percentages. In any event, this certainly suggests one area where additional research might prove fruitful.

The implications of the data in terms of possible consequences are even more thought-provoking than the causes. For instance, to what extent, if any, is the role pattern of the individual Congressman altered as his standing

committee assignments are doubled? Do double committee assignments create conflicting or complementary role situations? Does this vary according to the individual concerned or according to the committees concerned, or both? In the event that conflicting role patterns do result, how is the conflict resolved? Furthermore, conflict is not the only factor which may alter individual role patterns. A wide range of interpersonal and group relationships involving such organizational concepts as authority, influence, loyalty, individual autonomy, and control may be altered under the circumstances of double committee assignments. Obviously, much additional work needs to be done to determine if this is, in fact, a valid conclusion; at present it represents merely a presumption.

In this connection, an intriguing comparative study is suggested by examining the multiple committee assignment situation which existed in the House prior to the passage of the 1946 Reorganization Act. Does the current situation simply represent a return to the committee assignment pattern which prevailed in the House during the pre-1946 period, or do the two periods represent significant differences? My tentative feeling is that the present pattern of House committee assignments is not comparable to the earlier pattern, but much more data would have to be collected and evaluated before any such conclusion would be warranted.

One final observation is offered concerning the category III committees. As seen in Table 3, more than two-thirds of all members of the seven category III committees have a second committee assignment. Or, conversely, virtually every one of the thirteen category I and II committees are represented on one of the category III committees. In this connection it is interesting to speculate on the possibility that the category III committees function informally as the primary communications network within the House in a manner designed to expedite the exchange of information be-

TABLE 11. PERCENTAGE OF ALL HOUSE MEMBERS WITH TWO COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS FROM PRE-DOMINATELY RURAL DISTRICTS, 1ST SESSION, 87TH-89TH CONGRESSES

Districts	Congress		
	87th (1961)	88th (1963)	89th (1965)
Districts 50%-69% Rural	14.9	16.0	11.3
Districts 70% or more Rural	37.8	36.5	40.2
Districts 50% or more Rural	52.7	52.5	51.5

tween all other non-category III committees. For instance, consider one formulation which has been advanced by William C. Wheaton who, writing in connection with the degree of integration in urban communities, has stated:

Communications and influence links between constellations are at a lower level than those within constellations and tend to occur through intermediaries. . . . These intermediaries or bridge men preside over flows of communications between networks, giving them the special advantage of being informed about the activities or opinions of other constellations. The members of one constellation may be uninformed or misinformed regarding the activities of another constellation on matters of mutual or competitive

concern, except as they learn of these through such intermediaries . . .⁷

In any system in which information is considered a valued and scarce commodity, and where the formal exchange of information between the major organizational subunits is closely guarded or even curtailed, an informal, or "fugitive" communications network is bound to develop. What is being suggested here is that the category III committees may very well act in this capacity.

⁷ "Integration at the Urban Level: Political Influence and the Decision Process," in Philip Jacob and James Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 126.

VOTING BEHAVIOR ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, 1961-1964*

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Voting behavior of public decision-makers has been of central concern for political scientists. For example, studies of legislatures (notably of Congress) have investigated such research problems as: (1) the extent to which voting on one issue is related to voting on other issues;¹ (2) the potency of party affiliation as an organizer of attitudes and a predictor of voting behavior;² and (3) the relationship of demographic characteristics to voting behavior.³ These and related concerns have more recently occupied the attention of students of the judiciary whose focus has primarily been on the United States Supreme Court.⁴ State

courts of last resort have also provided a testing ground primarily for problems (2) and (3).⁵

* I am indebted to Professors Arthur E. Sutherland and Robert G. McCloskey of Harvard University and to Professor Joseph Tanenhaus of the University of Iowa for their suggestions and advice in the preparation of the larger study from which this paper is drawn. I am also grateful to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation for providing financial support for the research. Full responsibility for what follows, however, is mine.

¹ See, for example, Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1959); Charles H. Gray, "A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson, and Goldwater, 1957-1960," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 615-621.

² Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1951); Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," this REVIEW, 49 (1955), 773-791; Frank J. Sorauf, *Party and Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1965), pp. 677-689.

³ Donald R. Matthews, *United States Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 577-588.

⁴ C. Herman Pritchett, *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948); Pritchett, *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1954); S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in the United States Supreme Court," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 629-653; Ulmer, "Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (1965), 133-153; Joseph Tanenhaus, "Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies, 1947-1956—An Application of Social Science Methods to the Study of the Judicial Process," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 14 (1961), 473-502; Glendon Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959); Schubert, "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis," this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 90-108; Schubert, *The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946-1963* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965); John R. Schmidhauser, "Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (1961), 615-640; Schmidhauser, "Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Backgrounds of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States," *University of Toronto Law Journal*, 14 (1962), 194-212. Glendon Schubert has traced the development of judicial behavior research in two articles: "Behavioral Research in Public Law," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 433-445 and "From Public Law to Judicial Behavior," *Judicial Decision-Making*, Schubert (ed.) (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 1-10. The latter work also contains an extensive bibliography of judicial behavior research on pp. 257-65. Also see Martin Shapiro, *Law and Politics in the Supreme Court* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), chap. 1.

⁵ Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis*, pp. 129-42; S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court," *Journal of Public Law*, 11 (1962), 352-362; Stuart S. Nagel, "Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1961) and the articles derived from that study, especially "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions," this REVIEW, 55 (1961), 843-850 and "Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (1962), 94-110; James F. Herndon, "Relationships Between Partisanship and the Decisions of State Supreme Courts" (unpublished Ph.D.

However, the United States courts of appeals, second only to the Supreme Court in judicial importance, have been largely neglected.⁶ This paper considers the above research problems with reference to the voting behavior on all eleven courts of appeals from July 1, 1961 through June 30, 1964.⁷

I. RESEARCH DESIGN

The voting behavior covered by this paper includes non-unanimous decisions and unanimous appeals court reversals of district court decisions.⁸ Quantification of non-unanimous

dissertation, University of Michigan, 1963).

⁶ Only a handful of studies of the courts of appeals have been conducted by political scientists. Among them are: Robert H. Salisbury, "The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1940-1950: A Study of Judicial Relationships" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1955); Rondal Downing, "The U.S. Courts of Appeals and Employer Unfair Labor Practices Cases, 1936-1958" (mimeo, 1959); Alvin Dozeman, "A Study of Selected Aspects of Behavior of the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1960); Jack W. Peltason, *Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961); Kenneth N. Vines, "The Role of the Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial Process: A Case Study," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1963), 305-320; Louis L. Loeb, "Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Four Selected United States Courts of Appeals, 1957-1960 Terms" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1964); Loeb, "Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Civil Liberties Cases Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia," *American University Law Review*, 14 (1965), 146 ff.; Marvin Schick, "The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: A Study of Judicial Behavior" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1965).

⁷ The time period chosen conforms to the three fiscal years 1962, 1963, and 1964. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts bases its statistics on the cases decided or terminated during the fiscal year.

⁸ The cases utilized are listed in Appendix A, pp. 274-339, of my "Politics, Judges, and the Administration of Justice: The Backgrounds, Recruitment, and Decisional Tendencies of the Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-4" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965; microfilm no. 65-9924,

decisions has been amply justified by students of the judiciary;⁹ however, some explanation should be made of the use of district court reversals.¹⁰

Only those unanimously decided reversals of district court decisions in which the district court judge's interpretation or application of the facts, precedents, principles, or statutes differed from that of an unanimous appellate court were considered. Such cases indicate that there are alternative paths to decision. The assumptions underlying the study of judicial voting behavior are, of course, that certain types of cases present the judges with reasonable judicial alternatives which can produce contrary results, and that a study of the dispositions of a relatively large number of such cases can reveal certain regularities in judicial voting behavior.¹¹

The cases selected for study were assigned to one or more categories depending on the issues involved. Categories with small numbers of cases were either combined with others or discarded. In all, 2,055 cases which yielded 2,260 issues were utilized.¹²

For purposes of uncovering voting tendencies, a scoring system was devised which gave "high" numerical values to designated voting positions on the various issues. The issues and the voting behavior given high scores are presented in Table 1. With the exception of the "dissents" category and possibly "activism," the voting behavior outlined in Table 1 can be considered to be related to a politically "liberal" bent.¹³

University Microfilms, Michigan). A detailed exposition of the methods and statistics used, their justification, and their limitations is presented there.

⁹ See, for example, Pritchett, *Roosevelt Court*, *op. cit.*, p. xii; Pritchett, *Civil Liberties*, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-192; Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis*, *op. cit.*, chap. 1.

¹⁰ Note that Vines, *op. cit.*, utilizes district court reversals.

¹¹ These assumptions are treated as hypotheses and are tested in Goldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-3, 175 n. 16, 192-6. The results lend support to the hypotheses.

¹² There were some non-unanimous decisions and unanimous reversals rendered during the time period studied which did not fit the categories and were not used. These cases, for the most part, involved patent and trademark issues and various commercial law cases (for example, cases involving disputing insurance companies).

¹³ See Goldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-43 for a discussion of this point.

TABLE 1. VOTING POSITIONS ASSIGNED
HIGH SCORES

Issue or Category	Voting Position
Criminal Law	For the claims of criminal defendants or prisoners
Civil Liberties	For malapportionment plaintiffs in reapportionment cases
	For Negro claims in cases involving school desegregation and voting
	For civil libertarian claims of aliens, conscientious objectors, and others
Government Regulation	For the governmental agency in regulation of business cases
Labor Cases	For the labor union and employees in labor-management and NLRB decisions
Private Economic	For the claims of the insured as opposed to the insurance company
	For the claims of the small business or subcontractor when opposed by large business or contractor
	Opposed to alleged anti-trust law violators
	For the tenant in landlord-tenant cases
	For the debtor or bankrupt
	For the buyer of goods as opposed to seller
	For the stockholder in stockholder suits
Fiscal Cases	For the government in tax, eminent domain, and other fiscal cases
Combined Injury	For the claims of injured employees
	For the injured or the fatally injured's estate
	For the injured in federal tort cases
Liberalism	All of the above voting positions for only the non-unanimously decided cases
Activism	For federal court jurisdiction
Dissents	Dissenting in non-unanimously decided cases

Unlike the United States Supreme Court or the highest state appellate courts, all judges on each of the eleven federal courts of appeals do not hear the same cases except on the few occasions when a court will sit *en banc*. Most cases are heard by three judge panels whose member-

ship usually varies from case to case. The quantification-scoring system thus devised was results-oriented (i.e., oriented towards the disposition of the cases) and did not attempt to discern the intensity of the claims presented in the litigation. By examining the voting behavior of judges on a number of decisions involving choices which present the same general issues, it was thought to be possible to legitimately analyze statistically the judges' scores on the various issues even though the individual scores were based on different cases.¹⁴ Although the different cases present different factual situations, the underlying stimuli of the policy alternatives, in terms of competing interests, are similar. By utilizing relatively large numbers of cases for the scores, the differences in the intensity of the claims should balance out.¹⁵

The quantification system assigned a high score, the numerical value of 2.0, to the voting positions indicated in Table 1; the value of 1.0 to a vote which in part adhered to those positions; and 0.0 to a vote which was contrary to them. The individual judge's score on each issue or category was determined by averaging the numerical values given to all of his votes for that issue. For example, if a judge voted on ten cases and his vote on seven of these favored the claims of the criminal defendant, while on the remaining three cases he opposed the criminal defendant's claims, the judge's score would be 1.4 on a continuum ranging from 0.0 to 2.0, thus indicating a relative bent towards favoring the claims of criminal defendants.¹⁶

¹⁴ Note that Vines, *op. cit.*, and in "Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (1964), 337-357 utilizes the disposition of racial relations cases by various judges on different courts deciding different cases which nevertheless contain the same general issue (i.e. Negro civil liberties).

¹⁵ It might be argued that most or all of the Fifth Circuit cases we examined involving, for example, criminal, civil liberties, or labor issues, are inherently different from such cases raised in the Second or Ninth circuits. While this *may* be true for Negro civil liberties cases, the writer is unaware of any compelling evidence to lead one to suppose that it holds true for the other issues. In any event, the hypothesis that the underlying issues of the various cases subsumed within the categories differ on a geographical basis can only be tested by a content analysis of the cases themselves. It is relevant to note that students of the Supreme Court apparently reject this hypothesis and do not classify cases by their geographical origins.

¹⁶ Alternatively, simple percentages could have been used. In the example above, the judge would

II. RATES OF DISSENSION AND REVERSALS

The cases utilized for the study were non-unanimous decisions and unanimous district court reversals. Table 2 presents the rates of dissension and unanimous district court reversals on the eleven courts of appeals for the period covered. It is clear, from Table 2, that outright decisional conflict on the appeals courts is the exception not the rule. It is also apparent that the rates of dissension vary considerably by circuit, with the District of Columbia, Second, and Fifth circuits having the largest percentages and numbers of split decisions.

TABLE 2. RATES OF DISSENSION AND UNANIMOUS
DISTRICT COURT REVERSALS ON THE
ELEVEN COURTS OF APPEALS

Circuit	Number of Split Decisions	Split Decisions as Percent of Total No. of Cases Decided*	Number of Unanimous District Court Reversals	Unanimous Reversals as Percent of Total No. of Cases**
D.C.	168	15.5%	100	13.1%
Second	140	11.5	115	13.4
Fifth	196	11.4	292	23.1
Third	67	9.4	83	17.0
Seventh	63	8.5	88	16.5
Fourth	41	5.9	123	24.8
Ninth	50	4.3	187	22.7
Tenth	23	3.6	70	15.8
Eighth	18	3.3	65	18.1
First	10	3.3	31	16.5
Sixth	20	2.8	105	20.7

* The total numbers of cases are listed in Table B-1 (total cases disposed of after hearing or submission), *Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office), for fiscal years 1962, 1963, and 1964.

** *Ibid.*, for 1963 and 1964.

The rate of district court reversals by unanimous appeals courts involving the cases we utilized, also shown in Table 2, gives some indication of intracircuit conflict. The rates of unanimous reversals with the exception of the District of Columbia Circuit (whose rate of dissension is the highest) are larger than the rates of dissension. Differences among the circuits are apparent. The two southern cir-

cuits, the Fourth and Fifth, have the highest percentages of unanimous district court reversals. The Ninth and Sixth circuits follow with over 20 per cent of their cases consisting of unanimously decided district court reversals.

When the rates of dissension and unanimous reversals are combined, it is apparent that only a minority of each circuit's total number of cases decided are involved. Judicial consensus is apparently more typical than judicial conflict for the lower federal courts.¹⁷ However, there are differences among the circuits. At one end, with the highest combined rates, are the Fifth, Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia circuits. At the other end, with the lowest combined rates, are the First and Tenth circuits. What accounts for these differences cannot be learned from these data. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that judicial strategy, bargaining, persuasion, and the like are at work in the process of fashioning a decision and that these are relevant variables.¹⁸ Personality characteristics, judges' attitudes, as well as other variables (such as opinion-writing assignments) may be relevant.¹⁹

The diversity in the rates of dissension and unanimous district court reversals is considered in another context in Table 3, which shows the relative emphasis on the various issues by circuit. Table 3 presents the rank of each appeals court on each issue for the combined number of non-unanimous and unanimous reversals cases. The Fifth Circuit, for example, had the largest total number of cases utilized for our scores, hence its rank for the total number of cases was one. The District of Columbia Circuit had the second largest total number of cases utilized, hence its rank for the total number of cases was two. The differences between the rank for the total number of cases and each of the preceding categories suggest the relative amount of dissent and intracircuit conflict stimulated by that issue on the appeals courts.

¹⁷ Consensus on the United States Supreme Court (in terms of percentage of unanimous decisions) is markedly less. See Table 1 in Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁸ See Walter F. Murphy, *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), for examples concerning the United States Supreme Court.

¹⁹ See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948), pp. 61-88; Stuart S. Nagel, "Off-the-Bench Judicial Attitudes," ch. 2 in Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making*, *op. cit.*; Robert J. Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals," *this REVIEW*, 59 (1965), 100-104.

be considered to have favored the claims of criminal defendants in 70% of the selected cases he handled. The method used in this study, however, seemed less cumbersome to work with. In addition, the continuum was considered to be an ordinal scale whereas the percentage implies an interval scale.

TABLE 3. RANK ORDER OF NUMBERS OF CASES USED FOR EACH APPEALS COURT TO DETERMINE SCORES FOR EACH ISSUE

Issue	Circuit:	Rank										
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	D.C.
Criminal Cases		11	3	7	5	2	9	6	10	4	8	1
Civil Liberties		11	3	8	2	1	7	6	10	5	9	4
Government Regulation		9	3	4	7	1	11	5.5	10	8	5.5	2
Labor Cases		11	1	7.5	7.5	3	6	4	9.5	5	9.5	2
Private Economic		11	3	4	10	1	8	6	9	2	5	7
Fiscal Cases		11	5	8	9.5	1	3.5	9.5	6	2	7	3.5
Combined Injury		11	2.5	4	5	1	7	6	8.5	8.5	10	2.5
Activism		11	2	3	4.5	1	8.5	6.5	6.5	4.5	10	8.5
Total Number of Cases		11	3	7	5	1	8	6	10	4	9	2

Table 3 tell us, for example, that the Fourth Circuit ranks second on civil liberties cases although it ranks fifth on the total number of cases. This would suggest that the Fourth Circuit, whose jurisdiction encompasses three southern and two border states, heard more civil liberties cases (notably, Negro civil rights cases) than any other circuit with the exception of the Fifth (whose jurisdiction covers only southern states). The table also suggests that during the period studied there was disagreement on civil liberties matters between the appeals court for the Fourth Circuit and its district courts as well as disagreement within the appeals court itself.²⁰ Table 3 further indicates that the Ninth Circuit ranks fourth for the total number of cases utilized yet ranks second on private economic and fiscal cases. The Third Circuit ranks seventh on the total

number of cases yet has a rank of four for the government regulation, private economic, and combined injury categories. There are a number of other suggestive findings that need not be spelled out here. What is strongly suggested is that the *sources* of judicial conflict tend to differ among the circuits—perhaps not only a function of the personality-and-attitudes-of-the-judge variables but also of “constituency” variables manifested by differing numbers of types of cases brought to the various appeals courts.²¹

²¹ It should be stressed that Table 3 is only a very rough approximation (based on the absolute number of cases) of the sources of judicial conflict. A more precise analysis would require the determination, for each issue, by circuit, of the percentage of the total number of cases which comprised non-unanimous and unanimous reversals cases. See Goldman, Table 25, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

²⁰ Cf. Vines, “The Role of Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial Process,” *op. cit.*

TABLE 4. SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS FOR ISSUE-CATEGORIES

	Crimi- nal	Civil Lib.	Gov't. Reg.	Labor	Private Ec.	Fiscal	Injury	Acti- vism	Dis- sents	Liber- alism
Criminal		.61	.38	.44	.34	.16 ^a	.38	.60	.06 ^a	.54
Civil Lib.			.60	.50	.39	.17 ^a	.55	.49	-.37	.72
Gov't. Reg.				.40 ^b	.12 ^a	-.08 ^a	.42	.16 ^a	-.29 ^a	.47
Labor					.49	.12 ^a	.47	.39	-.38	.46
Private Economic						.23 ^a	.43	.49	-.12 ^a	.61
Fiscal Cases							-.02 ^a	.26 ^a	-.04 ^a	.18 ^a
Combined Injury								.38	-.02 ^a	.59
Activism									-.08 ^a	.69
Dissents										-.10 ^a

^a Not statistically significant.

^b Statistically significant between the .02 and .05 levels.

Note that unless otherwise indicated all the correlation coefficients are positive and are significant at least at the .01 level.

The differences among the appeals courts in terms of their rates of dissent and intracircuit conflict as well as the sources of conflict presented some difficulties in gathering case data for all the appeals judges. It was not possible to determine scores on all issues for all of the judges.²² These are obvious difficulties in combining the eleven appeals courts for purposes of analysis. However, these difficulties, indicative of the institutional diversity of the courts, impose limitations but do not preclude analysis. Non-unanimous decisions and unanimous reversals were classified by the issues, and judges were given scores based upon their votes on the disposition of the claims of the litigants.

III. INTERRELATIONS OF ISSUES

The first research problem was the extent to which voting on one issue was related to voting on all other issues or categories. The concern was whether, for example, judges who had relatively high scores for civil liberties cases would have relatively high scores on the private economic cases, combined injury, or labor cases. Spearman rank order correlations were calculated and the correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.²³ All the correlations above +.3 or below -.3 were found to be statistically significant at least at the .05 level.

Table 4 suggests that there is a positive relationship among the following seven categories: criminal cases, civil liberties, labor cases, private economic cases, combined injury cases, activism, and "liberalism." The degree of association varies from .720 for the civil liberties and "liberalism" categories to .335 between criminal cases and private economic cases. The

²² A minimum of five cases and typically ten cases were used to determine each judge's score for each category. It is relevant to note that the number of positions on the appeals courts varies from three on the First Circuit to nine on the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia circuits. These latter circuits also have the most judicial business. The results thus contain some distortion because of the large number of judges from the four largest circuits and the large number of cases which facilitated the collection of case data necessary to determine the scores. The maximum distortion was on the government regulation issue where 25 of the 38 judges with scores were from the four largest circuits.

²³ The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is described in detail by Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 202-213. The formula used to calculate the coefficients presented in Table 4 was one corrected for ties (found in Siegel, p. 207).

judges on the appeals courts, then, show a tendency either to support or oppose the claims of the following: the criminally prosecuted, the individual presenting a civil liberties claim against the actions of a governmental agency, the labor union or employee in controversies with management, the underdog claim in private economic cases, and the physically injured's claims. The judges who tend to support these claims will also tend to favor the application of federal law and standards as well as federal court jurisdiction when they are challenged. The data also tell us that judges with high scores on the "liberalism" category also tend to have high scores on the above categories. It seems reasonable to infer that the cases subsumed within these categories can be thought of in quasi-ideological politically "liberal" or "conservative" terms. However, three categories (government regulation, fiscal, and "dissents") require special mention because they were not found to be associated with all of the above seven categories.

The government regulation category is positively correlated with the "liberalism" category as well as the criminal cases, civil liberties, labor cases, and the combined injury categories. However, there appear to be no significant correlations with the private economic and activism categories (leaving aside, for the moment, the fiscal cases and "dissents" categories). This suggests that the policy alternatives contained within the government regulation category may be too complex and thus not amenable to direct quasi-ideological linkage with the other categories.²⁴

The fiscal cases category is not associated with any of the other categories. The voting behavior of the judges in cases involving tax and other fiscal matters appears unrelated to the voting positions on any of the categories.²⁵

Propensity to dissent was related only to civil liberties and labor cases, for which negative correlations were found. Those who had high scores on civil liberties and labor cases

²⁴ Cf. Harold J. Spaeth, "Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The 'B' Scale," in *Judicial Decision-Making*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-108; Tanenhaus, "Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies," *op. cit.*

²⁵ This finding bears some similarity to Schubert's finding in his article on "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court," *op. cit.*, pp. 101-2, concerning the F scale (fiscal cases). Schubert noted that "the rankings of the justices on F is different from their rankings on either C [the civil liberties scale] or E [economic liberalism]." Also see Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-155, and Table 27, p. 173.

TABLE 5. PARTY AFFILIATION AND MEDIAN SCORES BY ISSUE-CATEGORY

Issue	Democrats		Republicans		Difference in Medians	Significance Level
	Median	(N)	Median	(N)		
Criminal cases	1.67	(43)	1.71	(37)	0.04	n.s.*
Civil liberties	1.60	(23)	1.50	(24)	0.10	n.s.
Government regulation	1.265	(22)	1.125	(16)	0.14	n.s.
Labor cases	1.50	(29)	0.945	(24)	0.555	.0007
Private economic	1.20	(37)	0.93	(37)	0.27	.0009
Fiscal cases	0.91	(40)	0.80	(35)	0.11	.08
Combined injury	1.155	(34)	1.03	(26)	0.125	.05
Activism	1.33	(33)	1.23	(32)	0.10	.05
Liberalism	1.20	(41)	0.83	(37)	0.37	.003
Dissents	0.68	(41)	0.67	(37)	0.01	n.s.

* Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

tended to have low scores on the dissents category. Civil libertarians and those sympathetic to employees and labor unions, it would seem, tended to be in the majority when cases were decided non-unanimously.

In brief, while no perfect intercorrelations were uncovered, seven of the categories were shown to be positively related to each other. This provides some evidence of the existence of organized attitudes and the presence of what can be considered quasi-ideological voting behavior.²⁶

IV. PARTY AFFILIATION AND JUDICIAL VOTING

The next research problem concerned the

²⁶ Note that another analysis reported in Goldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-197, uncovered the existence of voting blocs on all but the First, Sixth, and Eighth circuits. This finding tends to support the interpretation of the rank order correlation analysis in the above text.

relationship of party affiliation to voting behavior. Examination of the scores of all the Democrats and Republicans on all the circuits yielded several statistically significant differences.²⁷ Table 5 reports the results and shows

²⁷ The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in medians and distribution of the scores for each of the categories by the Democrats and Republicans. The U test is described in Siegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-127. Non-parametric inference statistics were used in this study because the cases utilized are only a sample of the decisions the appeals judges have made in the past and will make in the future. On the appropriateness of inferential statistics see Tanenhaus, "Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies," *op. cit.*, and also Tanenhaus and Albert Somit, *American Political Science: Profile of a Discipline* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 144-149.

TABLE 6. MEDIAN SCORES BY ISSUE-CATEGORY FOR APPEALS JUDGES BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

Issue	Catholic		Protestant		Jewish		Significance Level
	Median	(N)	Median	(N)	Median	(N)	
Criminal cases	1.655	(16)	1.69	(56)	1.55	(6)	n.s.
Civil liberties	1.60	(9)	1.48	(33)	1.625	(4)	n.s.
Government regulation	1.40	(9)	1.14	(26)	1.33	(3)	n.s.
Labor cases	1.50	(12)	1.115	(36)	1.365	(4)	n.s.
Private economic	1.18	(15)	1.00	(52)	1.10	(6)	n.s.
Fiscal cases	0.585	(16)	0.96	(53)	0.705	(4)	.04
Combined injury	1.30	(13)	1.11	(40)	1.055	(6)	n.s.
Activism	1.33	(15)	1.295	(42)	1.19	(6)	n.s.
Liberalism	1.00	(15)	1.00	(55)	0.86	(6)	n.s.
Dissents	0.61	(15)	0.68	(55)	0.485	(6)	n.s.

that the Democrats, as a group, had higher scores than the Republicans on the labor, private economic, injury, activism, and "liberalism" categories. There is a possibility that the Democrats, as a group, were more likely than the Republicans to favor the position of the federal government in fiscal matters (tax and eminent domain)—but this finding did not meet our criterion for statistical significance.

It is interesting to note that, in general, the Democrats appear relatively more "liberal" than Republicans in cases which involve what might be called "economic liberalism."²⁸ However, Democrats and Republicans appear equally "liberal" on the criminal and civil liberties categories. Perhaps the economic basis of American party politics is most relevant for our understanding of certain kinds of judicial behavior. As there is no strong relationship between civil-libertarian attitudes and party affiliation in the United States,²⁹ it may be that there are no major differences between Democratic and Republican judges on these matters. However, it must be observed that Democrats had higher scores on the "liberalism" category which included non-unanimously decided criminal and civil liberties cases. This leads us to suspect that on the really "important" cases that force the judges to stand up and be counted, the Democrats may have tended to vote more "liberally" than the Republicans.³⁰ However, it is also possible to argue that the higher scores of the Democrats on the "liberalism" category were the result of their voting on the other categories. On balance, the findings reported here emphasize that party affiliation as a background variable seems to best "ex-

plain" differences in voting behavior on issues primarily involving economic liberalism.³¹

V. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND JUDICIAL VOTING

The possible nexus of demographic variables to judicial voting behavior was investigated. Religious affiliation was found to be unrelated to the voting behavior of the appeals judges on all but one of the categories.³² Table 6 presents the results,³³ which suggest that Catholics were more prone than Protestants and perhaps Jews to oppose the position of the government in fiscal cases.³⁴

When party affiliation was controlled, the median score of the Catholic judges was still significantly lower than the median score of the Protestant judges. If this relationship is not spurious and can be duplicated for other groups of judges, it will be of interest to discover what, if anything, in Catholic-American culture (or perhaps upper-class Catholic-American culture) may contribute to this behavior. Of course, one could assert that such behavior demonstrates the greater "liberality" of Catholic judges and then argue that the fiscal cases really pit Big Government against the underdog citizen or business. But if Catholic judges are more "liberal" than Protestant judges, why should their greater liberality be manifest (in our study) only in the fiscal cases?

No differences in voting behavior were found between lower-status Protestants (such as

²⁸ See Schubert's definition of "economic liberalism" in "The 1960 Term," *op. cit.*, p. 100, and *The Judicial Mind*, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-170.

²⁹ See Robert E. Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," this REVIEW, 49 (1955), 173-190; Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955); Herbert McClosky *et al.*, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 54 (1960), 406-427; Thomas A. Flinn and Frederick M. Wirt, "Local Party Leaders: Groups of Like Minded Men," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (1965), 77-98. Flinn and Wirt as well as McClosky report that differences between Democratic and Republican party leaders on questions of civil liberties are not as prominent as differences on economic issues.

³⁰ Had there been more non-unanimously decided cases involving criminal law and civil liberties, we would have been able to test this hypothesis.

³¹ See Goldman, *op. cit.*, chap. 7, for the findings concerning additional political variables tested for the study. On the relationship of party affiliation to the judicial behavior on other courts see Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-142; Ulmer, "The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court," *op. cit.*; Herndon, *op. cit.*; Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions," *op. cit.*; Don R. Bowen, "The Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Characteristics of Judges" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1965).

³² These findings contradict those of Stuart Nagel's (for state supreme court justices) reported in "Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities," *op. cit.* Also see Bowen, *op. cit.*

³³ The test used to determine the statistical significance of the differences among the medians for each category was the Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks. See Siegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-193 for a description of the test.

³⁴ The number of Jewish judges on the appeals courts is too small for us to draw reliable inferences from the data. The discussion of religious affiliation is therefore confined to a consideration of Catholic and Protestant judges.

Baptists, Lutherans, and Methodists) and higher-status Protestants (including Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Unitarians).³⁵

Other demographic variables were tested and did not reveal any relationship to voting behavior either initially or when party was controlled. These background variables included: (1) place of birth (no differences in voting behavior among those born in communities with populations under 10,000, over 10,000 but under 50,000, and over 50,000); (2) occupations of the fathers of the judges (no differences in behavior between judges whose fathers had low-status occupations and those whose fathers had high-status occupations); (3) undergraduate and law schools attended (no differences among judges who were educated in Ivy League institutions, other private institutions, or public supported schools); (4) public legal (non-judicial) and/or elective office held any time prior to appointment; (5) federal district court experience; (6) bar association leadership; (7) occupation at time of appointment to the appeals court; (8) judges with more than five years of judicial experience; (9) American Bar Association ratings (judges who received the highest A.B.A. rating, "Exceptionally Well Qualified," did not display different voting behavior from those who received the lowest acceptable "Qualified" rating). Only one category, that of labor cases, was related to the age of the judge. Younger judges (under 60) were found to have had higher scores on the labor category than older judges (over 70) when party was held constant.

It would be easy to dismiss demographic variables other than party affiliation as irrelevant for voting behavior, but this would no doubt be incorrect. Such variables as religious affiliation and socio-economic background are known to be associated in the United States with party identification,³⁶ and surely judges are not immune to social and economic forces during the development of their political allegiances.³⁷ Furthermore, the possibility yet

remains that demographic factors have played a part in shaping the hierarchy of values, the outlook, and philosophy of individual judges. Our investigation has only suggested that the demographic variables tested are not *directly* associated with judicial voting behavior.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The eleven United States courts of appeals, as we have seen, differ in their rates of dissension and intracircuit conflict as well as the sources of judicial conflict. Presumably personality and "constituency" variables largely account for this. The institutional diversity of the appeals courts thus imposed limitations on data collection and analysis. Nevertheless, the study of judicial voting on the dispositions of selected cases and issues reported here revealed the following principal findings:

1. There appears to be some evidence of organized voting patterns by the judges on the United States courts of appeals. These voting patterns appear, to some extent, to involve "liberal" and "conservative" voting on issues involving political liberalism and economic liberalism.

2. Party affiliation was found to be associated with voting behavior, notably when the issues involved economic liberalism.

3. Other demographic variables such as religion, socio-economic origins, education, and age were found to be almost entirely unrelated directly to voting behavior.

These findings suggest that, for the cases examined, many of the policy choices of judges affiliated with the Democratic party tended to differ from those made by Republican affiliated judges. The data indicate that for some of the types of cases examined, it tends to make a difference (in terms of the disposition of cases) which political party does the appointing to the United States courts of appeals. Furthermore, it seems clear that just as for legislators, party is the principal characteristic associated with voting behavior. However, the correlation matrix presented in Table 4 suggests that more pervasive attitudinal structures may exist. On balance, the findings underscore the absence of a sharp ideological party cleavage in the United States but also give support to the contention that the center of gravity of the Democratic party is more "liberal" than that of the Republican party.

The findings lend support for the continuation of the political selection process involved in appeals court appointments.³⁸ It can be

³⁵ Cf. Nagel, *op. cit.*, *supra*, n. 32.

³⁶ See Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1960).

³⁷ Democratic administrations have appointed a greater percentage of Catholics to federal courts than have Republican administrations. There are also indications that Democratic appointees tend to have lower socio-economic origins than Republican appointees. See Goldman, *op. cit.*, chap. 3, and my "Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts," *Western Political Quarterly* 18 (1965), 755-763.

³⁸ The selection process concerning appointments to the U.S. courts of appeals is discussed in Goldman, "Politics, Judges, and the Administra-

argued that some degree of policy-making is inherent in the judges' role and that the ideal of party responsibility requires that the large bulk of presidential appointments should be in basic harmony with the values, if not the concrete goals, of the appointing administration. Our

tion of Justice," *op. cit.*, chap. 4. Also see Harold Chase, "Federal Judges: The Appointing Process" (paper read before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1964) and Professor Chase's forthcoming study to be published by the Brookings Institution.

findings indicate that although party is the characteristic most strongly associated with voting, this association (when all of the business of the courts is considered) is too limited and imprecise for party affiliation to be consistently identified with specific judicial results by the appeals courts. The differences between Democrats and Republicans are matters of degree—enough to make party affiliation a significant variable, but not enough to create a judicial system so distorted as to resolve dogmatically and predictably even the slightest of legal doubts in favor of any particular class of litigants.

A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE PARADOX OF VOTING*

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This paper presents estimates of the probability that the occurrence of the Paradox of Voting,¹ commonly known as Arrow's Paradox, will prevent the selection of a majority issue when odd-sized committees of m judges vote upon n issues. The estimates, obtained through computer simulation of the voting process, indicate that the probability of such an intransitive social ordering is lower than the ratio of intransitive outcomes to all outcomes.

Many of the arguments in political theory and welfare economics dealing with the paradox (e.g., Downs, 1957; Black, 1958; Schubert, 1960) seem to have implicitly assumed that since the paradox exists, its likelihood of occurrence is very close to 1. The results in this paper may call for a re-examination of these positions.

THE PARADOX OF VOTING

Consider a panel of three judges—I, II, and III—voting upon three issues— A , B , and C . Each judge ranks the issues in order of preference. Throughout this discussion we will assume that the following conditions hold:

Condition I. For each *individual* judge, the preference relation is *transitive*.² That is, if a judge prefers A to B and B to C , then he prefers A to C .

Condition II. For each *individual* judge, the issues are *strongly ordered*: indifference between issues is not allowed.

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¹ The paradox was discovered in the 18th Century by Condorcet. A history of its rediscovery and analysis is contained in Black (1958). An extensive review and interpretation of recent developments is presented by Riker (1961).

² By requiring the judges to rank order issues we ensure transitivity for individuals. However, there is much evidence (May, 1954; Rose, 1957; Edwards, 1953; Morrison, 1962; Quandt, 1956)

We will call the result of the voting by the judges a *social ordering* of the issues A , B , and C . The social ordering is determined by simple majority voting between pairs of issues; i.e., if X is preferred to Y by a majority of the three judges, then X is preferred to Y in the social ordering.

Figure 1 illustrates a possible voting situation. Each row indicates the ordering of the issues by a judge. Thus, judge II prefers B to A , A to C , and B to C . In this *voting pattern*, as we shall call it, A is preferred to B by a majority of the judges, B is preferred to C by a majority of the judges, and A is preferred to C by a majority of the judges. Consequently, the resulting social ordering of the issues, A , B , and C is transitive.

I	A	B	C
II	B	A	C
III	A	C	B

FIG. 1. A voting pattern yielding a transitive social ordering.

I	A	B	C
II	C	A	B
III	B	C	A

FIG. 2. A voting pattern yielding an intransitive social ordering.

Now consider Figure 2 in this pattern, A is preferred to B , and B is preferred to C by a majority of the judges, but C is preferred to A by a majority. The resulting social ordering is intransitive. As Riker (1961) says, "This is the paradox: that the summation of transitive preferences sometimes produces a circular [intransitive] result." (p. 901)

This paradox may occur with m judges and n issues whenever m and n are both greater than 2. We will add a third condition so that the

that if judges make pairwise choices among issues, individual intransitivity often results. We can account for individual intransitivity in part by constructing a hypothetical "internal voting process" for each individual. Here the "judges" would be various criteria along which issues could be ranked. Even if ordering along a single criterion is transitive, the output that we observe may yield intransitive individual preferences.

strong ordering applies to the social ordering as well as to individual orderings.

Condition III. All issues in the social ordering are strongly ordered.

To ensure this condition, we will consider only voting patterns where the number of judges, m , is odd. This precludes a voting pattern where the social ordering is indifferent between X and Y ; i.e., where X is preferred to Y as often as Y is preferred to X .

If n , the number of issues, is greater than 3, then we can classify the intransitive social orderings that may occur into two categories:

Type 1. In these social orderings there is an intransitivity between at least 3 issues, but there is still an issue that is preferred to all others by a majority of the judges. Figure 3 shows a voting pattern that yields such a social ordering.

I	A	B	C	D
II	A	D	B	C
III	C	A	D	B

FIG. 3. Voting pattern for 3 judges and 4 issues yielding a Type 1 intransitive social ordering.

A is preferred to all other issues by a majority of the judges, although the social ordering among B , C , and D is intransitive.

Type 2. In this type of intransitive social ordering there is no issue that is preferred to all others by a majority of the judges. Figure 4 illustrates a voting pattern that yields a Type 2 intransitive social ordering: B is preferred to C by two judges; C is preferred to A by two judges, but A is preferred to B by two judges; A , B , and C are all preferred to D by two out of three judges. Figure 2 also illustrates a Type 2 intransitivity.³ (The rationale for this particular classification will be developed below. For other purposes one might wish to categorize intransitive patterns differently. For instance,

in Figure 4 all issues are preferred to D by a majority of the judges, thus D is the "majority loser," even though there is no majority winner.)

I	A	B	D	C
II	C	A	D	B
III	B	C	A	D

FIG. 4. Voting pattern for 3 judges and 4 issues yielding a Type 2 intransitive social ordering.

The existence of the paradox has concerned political scientists and economists for many years. There are two general views of the consequences that follow from the fact that the summation of transitive individual preferences may result in intransitive social preferences. Economists, searching for a mechanism whereby a social welfare function can be derived from individual utility functions, are concerned with occurrence of *any* intransitivity in the social ordering. Thus, they are usually interested in the frequency of occurrence of either Type 1 or Type 2 intransitive social orderings.

Political scientists, especially those dealing with the theory of voting, are often concerned with a voting procedure that will yield a single most preferred issue. Riker (1961) says, "but for the theory of voting one wishes to know not the amount of possible inconsistency, but the frequency with which inconsistency prevents majority decision," i.e., the frequency of Type 2 intransitive social ordering.

This research is directed toward the discovery of a function $P(m, n)$ that expresses the probability of obtaining a Type 2 intransitivity, when m judges vote upon n issues under conditions I through III. We will analyze voting patterns in which we assume that all of the $n!$ possible individual orderings are equally likely to occur. This assumption has two equivalent interpretations: 1) All judges are equally likely to have any one of the $n!$ possible individual preference orderings among n issues; 2) We obtain the m judges by sampling randomly with replacement from a population of judges uniformly distributed among the $n!$ possible individual orderings of n issues.

The first interpretation implies that judges are in fact indifferent among the n alternatives and that when condition II requires a ranking, all judges are equally likely to arrive at any of the $n!$ individual orderings. The second interpretation does not require any individual to be indifferent among the alternatives but requires only that there be a uniform distribution of potential judges over all possible preference orderings. The latter interpretation, while

³ In set-theoretic terms:

U = universe of all social orderings

A = set of all transitive social orderings

B = set of all intransitive social orderings

b_1 = set of all Type 1 intransitive social orderings

b_2 = set of all Type 2 intransitive social orderings

The following relations hold:

$$A \cup B = U$$

$$A \cap B = \phi$$

$$b_1 \cup b_2 = B$$

$$b_1 \cap b_2 = \phi$$

for $n=3$: $b_1 = \phi$, $b_2 = B$

ϕ = empty set.

somewhat more realistic, does not escape the criticism that the equally likely conditions rarely obtain in actual voting situations. Furthermore, as recently demonstrated by Riker (1965), when the paradox is consciously generated by the judges, then *a priori* calculations based upon any kind of assumed probability distribution are inappropriate.⁴ However, the equally likely assumption provides a great analytic simplification and so will be used throughout this paper.

It is important to note that this is an assumption that all possible *individual* orderings are equally likely. This is not equivalent to, nor does it imply that, all *social* orderings (as defined above) are equally likely. One of the main points of this paper is the demonstration that equally likely individual orderings do not aggregate to equally likely social orderings.

Several investigators have proposed expressions that give the proportion of intransitive social orderings to all possible social orderings. We will call this proportion $P(n)$, since it is a function of the number of issues under consideration.

Duncan Black (1958) reviews Condorcet's investigation of the proportion of all intransitivities (Type 1 or Type 2). For $n=3$ there are only Type 2 intransitivities and Condorcet's results are directly relevant to our discussion. The argument runs as follows:

There are

$$K = \binom{n}{2}$$

possible pairwise relations of n issues, i.e., for $n=3$, the

$$K = \binom{3}{2} = \frac{3!}{2!1!} = 3$$

relations are $A \succ B$ (A has some relationship to B), $A \succ C$, and $B \succ C$. Each relationship is two-valued; i.e., $A \succ B$ could mean either " A is preferred to B " or " B is preferred to A ." A social ordering consists of a selection of one value from each of the K two-valued relationships. Thus, there are s possible social orderings, where

$$s = 2^K = 2^{\binom{n}{2}} = \frac{n!}{2^{(n-2)!}} = \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$$

The number of social orderings that are transitive for all n issues is $s - n!$. The number of intransitive social orderings is $s - n!$, and the proportion of intransitive orderings is

$$P(n) = \frac{s - n!}{s} = \frac{2^{(n^2-n)/2} - n!}{2^{(n^2-n)/2}}$$

For

$$n=3, P(3) = (8-6)/8 = \frac{1}{4}.$$

Riker (1961), in discussing the frequency with which intransitive social orderings prevent majority decisions (i.e., Type 2 intransitivities), suggests a series for $P(n)$ based upon Condorcet's argument. Some of Riker's results for $P(n)$ are presented with ours in Figure 6. Referring to his table, Riker says:

The main inference to be drawn from this table . . . is that the *a priori* expectation of the existence of a majority decision, if it could be calculated, would be quite small, at least for $n \geq 5$ (p. 908.)

$P(n)$ is the *ratio* of intransitive social orderings to all social orderings. However, it is equivalent to the relative frequency or a *priori* expectation of intransitivities only if we assume that all social orderings are equally likely. But this is a severe constraint to place upon the outcome of the very process that is under investigation. The significance of the paradox rests upon the relationship between the distribution of individual orderings and the distribution of the social orderings that result from their aggregation. We can demonstrate that if individual orderings are equally likely, then the social orderings generated by the pairwise majority voting process are not equally likely. In particular, the intransitive social orderings are less likely than the transitive orderings; hence the probability of an intransitive social ordering, $P(m, n)$, is less than the ratio of intransitive orderings to all orderings, $P(n)$, for all n .

Riker and Condorcet have shown that for $n=3$, $P(n) = \frac{1}{4}$. We will analyze the voting patterns for 3 judges and 3 issues and show that $P(m, n) = P(3, 3) = 1/18$. Black discovered this in his unsuccessful attempt to find an expression for $P(m, n)$, but does not indicate his method. He assumes that $P(m, n)$ will increase rapidly with n :

It would be of interest to know in what fraction of all the possible cases one motion [issue] is able to get a simple majority against each of the others as m and n vary. . . . If the general series could be discovered it would almost certainly show that for a committee with a given number of members [judges], the proportion of cases in which there is no majority decision increases rapidly with an increase in the number of motions [issues] (p. 51.)

⁴ I am indebted to Professor Riker for calling my attention to his recent paper and for indicating its implication for these assumptions.

A judge may order the n issues in $n!$ different ways. A vote consists of each of m judges selecting one of the $n!$ orderings. Thus there are $(n!)^m$ different voting patterns. For $n=m=3$ there are 216 equally likely patterns. From these patterns we obtain, through the simple majority voting process, the $s=2^K=2^3=8$ distinct social orderings. Although 2 of these 8 orderings yield intransitivities, the different social orderings are not equiprobable. Out of 216 patterns, only 12 give rise to the two intransitive social orderings. We can demonstrate this as follows:

The only two general forms of 3 by 3 voting patterns that yield an intransitivity are shown in Figure 5.

$P\ Q\ R$	$P\ Q\ R$
$R\ P\ Q$	$Q\ R\ P$
$Q\ R\ P$	$R\ P\ Q$

FIG. 5. General form of the two voting patterns yielding intransitivity for 3 judges and 3 issues.

In each general pattern, the issues A , B , and C can be assigned to the positions P , Q , R in 3! different ways. Thus there are $2 \times 3! = 12$ patterns that yield an intransitive social ordering. $P(3, 3)$ is $12/216 = 1/18 = .0555 \dots$. A table of the eight social orderings and their relative frequencies for the 3 by 3 case is presented in Appendix II.

COMPUTER SIMULATION

The problems encountered in seeking an analytic expression for $P(m, n)$ are formidable. Such an expression has as yet not been found.⁵ However, we can investigate some of the properties of $P(m, n)$ by using a digital computer to simulate the voting process. The computer can provide us with empirical estimates of the frequency of occurrence of various types of voting patterns. A program has been written that generates voting patterns and determines whether or not they yield a majority issue in the social ordering. (Appendix III contains a description of the program.) The most straightforward approach is simply to generate and evaluate each of the $(n!)^m$ distinct patterns for various values of m and n . However, the number of patterns increases rapidly with m and n : for $m=n=3$ there are 216 patterns; for $m=5$, $n=4$ there are over 7 million patterns. If the computer could generate and evaluate a thou-

sand patterns per second, it would still take over two hours for the 5 by 4 case.

Rather than enumerate all cases, we have written a program that generates and evaluates a random sample from the complete population of $(n!)^m$ patterns. With a sufficiently large sample size, we can obtain good estimates of the actual values of $P(m, n)$. From a simple statistical analysis (see Appendix I) we have chosen to generate 10,000 patterns for each estimate of $P(m, n)$ for $3 \leq n \leq 6$ and odd m , $3 \leq m \leq 7$. In its present form, the program generates an $n!$ by n table of permutations and then samples randomly from this table to obtain votes for each judge in every pattern. Sampling from a table of permutations takes less time than generating the permutations at random for each individual vote. Because a table of $7!$ by 7 elements would exceed the memory capacity of the computer, for $n > 6$ we would be forced to trade time for size and generate the permutations at random. For larger values of m , the running time exceeds 15 minutes per 10,000 votes, and we have chosen to discontinue the runs, since it has become evident that this program is very costly for large values of m .⁶

The enumerative program was run for $P(3, 3)$ and $P(3, 4)$. For the remaining cases in Figure 6, the sampling program was run, generating 10,000 patterns for each pair of values for m and n .

RESULTS

Figure 6 shows estimates of $P(m, n)$: the probability of occurrence of an intransitive social ordering that prevents majority decision when each of the $n!$ individual preference orderings is equally likely to be chosen by each of the m judges. Riker's results for $P(n)$, the ratio of Type 2 outcome to all outcomes, are shown in the last row for purposes of comparison. The first two entries in the first row ($m=3$, $n=3$, 4) are exact, having been computed by the enumerative program.⁷ The remaining entries are

⁶ A somewhat different trade-off between time and space has been taken, at the cost of accuracy, by Campbell and Tullock (1965). In an approach quite similar to ours, they have written a program that gives estimates of $P(m, n)$ for m up to 29 and n up to 17. Because they sample only 1,000 patterns for most of their points, their estimates are somewhat less accurate than ours; however, their results indicate the general shape of $P(m, n)$ for a wider range of m and n than we have considered.

⁷ For $P(3, 3)$, 12 out of 216 cases are Type 2 intransitivities; for $P(3, 4)$, 1,536 out of 13,824

⁵ For an interesting analysis of some features of $P(m, n)$ see Nicholson (1965). He presents necessary and sufficient conditions for intransitive social orderings in the case of m judges and 3 issues.

		Number of Issues (n)				
		3	4	5	6	
Number of Judges (m)	3	.0555 . . .	.111 . . .	.16	.20	$P(m, n)$
	5	.07	.14	.20	.25	
	7	.08	.15	.22	.27	
.		.25	.50	.69	.81	$P(n)$

FIG. 6. $P(m, n)$: probability of obtaining an intransitive social ordering that prevents majority issue from appearing, for m judges and n issues. $P(n)$: ratio of intransitive social orderings that prevent majority issue from appearing. (From Riker, 1961, Column 4, Table I, p. 909.)

estimates; there is at least a .95 probability that they are within .01 of the true value of $P(m, n)$. (See Appendix I.)

DISCUSSION

The primary motivation for this study was the attempt (still unsuccessful) to find an analytic expression for $P(m, n)$. The results presented here provide a first step in exhibiting the behavior of the function for small values of m and n . In principle, the enumerative program could find the exact number of occurrences of intransitivities for all m and n , or the sampling program could compute estimates of $P(m, n)$ to any desired degree of accuracy. The only limitations are computer time and space. Perhaps the most useful theoretical result comes from the observation that for any n , the s different intransitive social orderings are not equiprobable, and depend upon m . The correct analytic expression for $P(m, n)$ will have to reflect this fact.

From a more pragmatic point of view, the results demonstrate that under those circumstances where the equiprobable assumption is tenable, attempts at meaningful summations of individual preferences are not doomed to almost certain failure, but instead may often (e.g., at least four times out of five, for 3 judges and 6 issues) be successful. For example, we can apply these results to the problem of determining committee sizes and agenda. A committee of 3 judges is three times as likely to reach an impasse when they consider 5 issues as when they consider 3 issues. However, increasing a committee size from 3 members to 5 members has a relatively small effect on the probability of an intransitive social ordering.

cases are Type 2 intransitivities. The sampling program produced $P(3, 3) = .056$, $P(3, 4) = .116$. These results are within the estimated sampling error.

For those cases where some other distribution of individual orderings is more appropriate, the simulation program can be modified to use the assumed distribution to generate voting patterns. In this manner, we can obtain estimates of the distribution of social orderings for any given distribution of individual orderings.

APPENDIX I

DETERMINATION OF SAMPLE SIZE FOR SAMPLING PROGRAM

The random generation of voting patterns is, in effect, sampling with replacement from a binomially-distributed population. Each item in the population is a voting pattern. For each pair of values for m and n we estimate P , the fraction of items in the population that yield Type 2 intransitivities.

In a random sample of N patterns from a population that has an actual proportion P of Type 2 intransitive social orderings, the estimate of P , P^* , is approximately normally distributed with mean P and variance $\sigma^2 = P(1 - P)/N$. We desire a .05 confidence level that P^* is within .01 of P . That is, we want $\text{Prob}(|P^* - P| \leq .01) \geq .95$. Thus we require that $2\sigma = .01$

or

$$\sigma = .005$$

Then

$$\sigma^2 = 25 \cdot 10^{-6} = P(1 - P)/N.$$

Solving for N ,

$$N = P(1 - P) \cdot 4 \cdot 10^4.$$

Since P is unknown, we consider the worst case, when $P(1 - P)$ is a maximum, $0 \leq P \leq 1$. This occurs at $P = .5$; thus, the maximum value of N required to obtain the desired confidence level is

$$N = (1/4) \cdot 4 \cdot 10^4 = 10,000.$$

This is the sample size used throughout the runs for the sampling program.

APPENDIX II

EVALUATION OF 3 BY 3 VOTING PATTERNS

From an enumeration of all 216 patterns with 3 judges and 3 issues, we get the following results:

Social Ordering*			Intransitive?	Number of Occurrences
<i>ApB</i>	<i>ApC</i>	<i>BpC</i>	no	34
<i>ApB</i>	<i>ApC</i>	<i>CpB</i>	no	34
<i>ApB</i>	<i>CpA</i>	<i>BpC</i>	yes	6
<i>ApB</i>	<i>CpA</i>	<i>CpB</i>	no	34
<i>BpA</i>	<i>ApC</i>	<i>BpC</i>	no	34
<i>BpA</i>	<i>ApC</i>	<i>CpB</i>	yes	6
<i>BpA</i>	<i>CpA</i>	<i>BpC</i>	no	34
<i>BpA</i>	<i>CpA</i>	<i>CpB</i>	no	34
				216

Probability of Intransitive Social Ordering
 $= 12/216 = .055555 \dots$

* $YpX = Y$ is preferred to X by two or more judges.

APPENDIX III

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The program was written in ALGOL-20, a dialect of ALGOL-60 (Naur, 1963), and run on the CDC-21 computer at the Carnegie Institute of Technology Computation Center. This is a description of the sampling program. The enumerative program is quite similar, and the evaluation mechanism is identical. Both programs are available upon request.

For a given pair of values for m and n , ($m, n \geq 3$; m odd) the program generates and evaluates 10,000 voting patterns. A count is maintained of the number of transitive and intransitive social orderings; the final output is the relative frequency of intransitive social orderings (Type 2). Additional output, in the form of typical voting patterns and their evaluation is provided at every 500th pattern.

For each pair of values m, n the program executes three main phases: initialization, generation and evaluation. During the initialization phase, a permutation array, H , is filled with all permutations of the first n integers. The H array represents all the possible orderings that a judge might put upon the n issues. H has $n!$ rows and n columns. For $n=3$, the permutation array looks as follows:

Column	1	2	3
1	1	2	3
2	1	3	2
Row 3	2	1	3
4	2	3	1
5	3	1	2
6	3	2	1

Once the initialization phase is complete, the program generates and evaluates 10,000 voting patterns.

A vote is represented by H and by V , the vote vector. V contains m elements. Each element has an integer value between 1 and $n!$. A vote is generated by assigning a random integer, $1 \leq J \leq n!$, to each of the m elements in V . When $V_i = J$, the vote of judge i can be obtained from row J in H .

For example, let $m=5$, $n=3$. If, after the generation of a vote, $V_1=2$, $V_2=6$, $V_3=3$, $V_4=2$, $V_5=1$, then the voting pattern is:

I	1	3	2
II	3	2	1
III	2	1	3
IV	2	3	1
V	1	2	3

Patterns are evaluated by a scan that searches for an issue that is not preceded by any other issue in more than half of the rows. If there is such an issue, then it is the majority issue and the voting pattern does not yield a Type 2 intransitivity. If there is no such issue, then the pattern yields a Type 2 intransitivity.

In the voting pattern above, issue 1 is tested first. It is preceded by issue 2 in rows II, III, and IV; thus, it is not the majority issue. Next issue 2 is tested. It is preceded by 1 in only two rows (I, V), and by 3 in only two rows (I, II), hence it precedes all other issues in more than half of the rows. Issue 2 is the majority issue and the pattern yields a transitive social ordering.

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COMMUNICATIONS

A REPLY TO "FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON 'THE ELITIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY'"

TO THE EDITOR:

Attempts to identify the dominant themes implicit in the work of any political theorist is a difficult and risky enterprise and, as Professor Dahl himself admits, efforts to show that common tendencies are present in several writers are even more hazardous. After reading Professor Dahl's rejoinder, I am convinced that it was a mistake to use the label "The Elitist Theory of Democracy" (even though it came directly from Lipset) to describe the doctrines with which I tried to deal. The word "theory" gives a false precision to what would be more properly identified as a prevailing attitude toward the American political process. The word "elitist" apparently carries, at least in Dahl's view, some objectionable anti-democratic connotations. My intent was not to question Dahl's, or anyone else's democratic *bona fides*. My article was intended as a critique of the prescriptive implications of a set of ideas concerning democratic political systems which can be found, in varying degrees of prominence, in the writings of many contemporary students of politics—Dahl among them.

The doctrines with which I was concerned were: (1) the belief that the political inactivity of the average citizen is a more or less permanent aspect of his behavior, not an artifact of the social and political systems; (2) the related belief that political inactivity is a sign of satisfaction with the operation of the political system, a form of passive consent; (3) the belief that political apathy is not seriously dysfunctional in a democratic system and, on the part of some writers, the belief that widespread apathy may be a prerequisite for the successful functioning of the system; (4) the belief that agreement on democratic norms among political leaders is more important than consensus among the common citizens for achieving political stability; and (5) an overriding concern with maintaining the stability of democratic systems. I meant to analyze this set of ideas and its consequences; I did not set out to write a comprehensive appraisal of the political theory of Professor Dahl, or any other single writer.

Since my principal concern was with the prescriptive implications which I believe have been drawn from these five beliefs, Professor

Dahl misses the point when he complains that I have not dealt with his own normative model, "polyarchal democracy." I never intended to deal with his normative theory; instead, my intention was to analyze the normative consequences of the descriptive and explanatory efforts of Professor Dahl, and several other contemporary political scientists. Ideas and beliefs have manifold consequences, some intended and others wholly unexpected; writings meant by their author to be purely descriptive may still lead their readers to draw normative conclusions, and it is quite possible to study these conclusions without violating the logical distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements. It would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for any single writer to describe every aspect of the American political system. Each writer must choose among innumerable phenomena which could conceivably be studied. Regardless of the writer's intention, I would argue that the facts he presents and the explanations he proposes may prompt his readers to make certain normative inferences. In the case of the beliefs I considered in my article, the normative impact has been to reduce the urgency of the need to extend the limits of the active political community; and as I argued further, this has tended to divert the attention of political scientists from such phenomena as social movements which appear on the periphery of the organized political system.

Since I was primarily concerned with the normative consequences of contemporary political theory, I had no need to discover the personal values of each writer I studied. But when Americans write about their own political system they frequently reveal the normative implications of their own work. Professor Dahl, in *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, concludes his chapter, "The American Hybrid" with these words:

... the normal American political system ... appears to be a relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified, and incredibly complex society. This is no negligible contribution, then, that Americans have made to the arts of government—and to that

branch, which of all the arts of politics is the most difficult, the art of democratic government.¹

I do not believe I would be alone in asserting that there are normative criteria implicit in these sentences (criteria not analyzed or discussed in Dahl's chapter on "Polyarchal Democracy") which might guide us in evaluating the performance of the political system he has so brilliantly described.

Perhaps the most significant point upon which Professor Dahl and I differ is this final question of the criteria to be used in evaluating the performance of a democratic political system. Professor Dahl places great value on the capacities of a system "for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace." The examples of political disaster that spring readily to his mind are the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Kerensky regime, the awful bloodshed and senseless chaos of the Spanish civil war, and the grotesque displays of mass obedience and total political involvement in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. He is part of a generation which has experienced a series of savage attacks on political democracy and his concern with political stability, in light of all that has happened, is certainly understandable. Political stability is indeed a precious commodity; I do not wish to create the impression that I reject its obvious importance. But I do think that both the discipline of political science and American society have suffered from our excessive concern with the protection and maintenance of our political system. I believe that the time has come to direct our attention to the infinitely more difficult task of involving larger and larger numbers of people in the process of government. The theory of democracy beckons us toward an ancient ideal: the liberation of the energies of all our citizens in the common pursuit of the good society.

JACK L. WALKER

University of Michigan

TO THE EDITOR:

Although it must cost me precious time away from research, I am obliged to protest against Professor John H. Millett's travesty of my book, *Dulles over Suez*. I suppose a rejection so completely contemptuous as his might be taken as a compliment, since its totality would seem to demonstrate that as a reviewer he wants the capacity for discrimination between the good and the bad in it. Yet, I prefer the discriminat-

ing and responsible judgment as well as expertise to such putative flattery. I hope I may indicate where he has been unjust, untruthful and inexperienced. I may be able to sweep away his misrepresentations which can create an insulating wall between this work and the possible needs of my colleagues and students in their study of international politics in practice.

1. He declares that "Finer toys with some of Dulles' basic attitudes . . . but does not explain them fully." What is "fully"? Anyone can say this about anything. I should have thought that some 250 pages on this topic was "fully" enough. He concludes his assault with the assertion that, "The fascinating questions posed by this situation are illustrated not answered." But they are answered, thoroughly, in 500 pages. Professor Millett suffers from some blind spots about some extremely important questions in foreign politics. He has omitted to tell the reader that I treat of such important themes as the nature of alliances; the violation of treaties; the uses made of the United Nations by the U.S.A. and other powers, great and small; the inter-relationship between President, Secretary of State and the U. S. Ambassador to the U. N.; the cooperation between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union to avert World War III; the effects of U. S. policy on NATO and upon France in particular, and so on.

2. Professor Millett declares that the book could have been cut "one-third," had I left out "constant Finer interruptions" which, "argue with the actions taken . . ." But I am a teacher as well as a discoverer. The book is (a) a narrative of events in diplomatic behavior and (b) a teacher's current reflections on the ecological and personal factors significant in the crucible of the diplomat's mind, the pondering of alternatives, the decisions actually made, and the possibilities and consequences if others had been made instead. I think this is how to teach political science in world politics. It is regrettable that it makes no impression on Professor Millett. Indeed, an additional third might be even more helpful, to judge from the seminars I have led.

3. Professor Millett objects to what he calls "pejorative adjectives," and hence by implication to laudatory ones. It happens, however, that each of my adjectives is a deliberately selected synoptic, one-word description of a number of proven attributes of the actors in the midst of world "forces" (other people!) which I fully describe with abundant evidence (two-thirds of 500 pages). Of course, "pejorative" is only so by Professor Millett's undisclosed standards of value. He offers no counter-evidence.

¹ Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), p. 151.

Four examples may be adduced to demonstrate, slightly, the reviewer's incomprehension and unfairness. (a) He cites a sentence that runs: "Dulles had before him a Nasser who not only embraced the Soviet Union, but had recognised *Red China*." His charge is that my italics indicate something derogatory in my attitude towards underdeveloped countries. The inconvenient little ugly fact that spoils this beautiful theory is that I use the italics as a typographical way of describing Dulles' feeling that Nasser had committed a horrible sin. That's all. It is Dulles' state of mind, not mine. (b) He complains that I describe Nasser as a "juvenile." True! But in what regard? I was explaining Nasser's attitude towards one of the most important subjects that have intrigued sophisticated political scientists and diplomats ever since the League of Nations first set up a Secretariat: how can international institutions provide technical and financial assistance through their officials, loyal to the international agency and its purposes, without prejudicing the political independence of the recipient nations? (My two years experience with the I.L.O. emphasises the significance of the question.) In his attitude towards it, Nasser in 1956 demonstrated obstructive, even destructive, unsophistication. Is this a better description than "juvenile"? I cut out two-thirds of the description. But if Professor Millett wants it, he can have it. Or, ought I have used an adjective much more condemnatory? Or, are we, who create, to ignore contexts? (c) Millett reproves me for repeating that India seized Goa by force, that is, (pejorative) war. This unfortunate dereliction from Menon's U. N. speech that nothing could ever justify war, is a truth. Both are truths. Their juxtaposition is necessary for the comprehension of world politics. The repetition is sound teaching, in order that the double standards of nationalist-biased diplomats may be made clear to the jejune. So, also in regard to Kashmir. (d) Professor Millett has somehow omitted or missed my observations that Nasser had practised assassination and later encouraged and financed it. I include a brief essay on this theme. The facts are true. Would it be pejorative to use the word "murder" or "barbarous"? And in Yemen—leadership in Arabs killing other Arabs?

3. Finally, Professor Millett makes only a perfunctory acknowledgment of the scholarship that has gone to the making of this book. His skimpy, even grudging reference, gives not the slightest glimmer of the truth about its substance. That truth is this: my facts and interpretation of the theory and practice of Dulles' diplomacy (the gravamen of the work) are

supported by no less than 400 notes concerning documentary sources, some of them highly complex, providing multiple chapter and verse for the narrative and analysis. Moreover, my personal interrogations of the chief actors were conducted at considerable length, sometimes repeated, by various well-known methods of interview, sometimes with the actors' diaries and files before us, and always in depth. It is possible, if the evidence is read seriously, for a student who prefers to sum up differently from my judgment, to find his evidence in the book. That evidence fully entitled me to graphic adjectives and even nouns and verbs. Professor Millett is far, indeed, from making all this clear, or that I am trying to take the reader along with me into the inner councils of the top statesmen. There, by the way, they use earthy words, few diplomatic suavities, and almost no stone dead textbook gobbledygook. This, I think, is the true behavioralism. (See, for example, Mulford Q. Sibley in *The Limits of Behavioralism*, Symposium, American Academy of Political and Social Science, October, 1962.)

One pejorative used by Professor Millett cannot, surely, have been designed to open my book to those who might need it, say, in a seminar on world politics: "polemical." This word strikes me as an escape-hatch from hard intellectual effort and a fear of the vitality that shows how much Nature in politics among nations is still "red in tooth and claw."

HERMAN FINER

The University of Chicago

TO THE EDITOR:

The thrust of my review of Professor Finer's most recent work was that it was part of the events themselves, rather than an analysis of them. I believe his reply has borne out my contention.

JOHN H. MILLETT

TO THE EDITOR:

The recent article by Professors Robinson, Anderson, Hermann, and Snyder dealing with empirical research on the values of the case study and simulation techniques was most welcome. I am impressed with the meticulous and systematic way in which the study was conducted. I note that, other than a brief mention of the McKeachie article (p. 56), the work of educational psychologists in this area goes unmentioned. Perhaps this is because the McKeachie essay is one of the few that deals with case study and simulation techniques with which the political scientist is familiar.

However, research conducted by psychologists on the general problem of learning theory is also applicable and would, I think, help the political scientist to perfect each technique—the case study and simulation—to the point of becoming an increasingly valuable and integral part of classroom instruction. To most instructors, student learning of principles is more valuable than fact mastery, and the authors show that simulation fares slightly better in this respect. The interdependence of facts and concept formation is readily evident and, it can be argued that the latter represents the logical and successful utilization of the former.

In this connection, I think the use by psychologists of stimulus-response analysis is valuable. This analysis has shown that the student has formulated a concept when he can respond to a common property shared by a number of events. Irrelevant factors, unrelated to the principle being taught, often creep into case studies. This may help explain why the authors found that fact mastery tended to predominate in case study situations as against principle predominance with simulation. Further research could well be spent on determining the extent to which commonly used case studies contain irrelevant events which distract

from student assimilation of the principle. There is, of course, a fine line to be drawn here because a certain amount of distraction is necessary in order to teach the student to distinguish between the relevant and irrelevant.

It would also be profitable to extend research to include analysis of the role of "feedback" as it applies to case study and simulation use. Relevant here is the use of programmed instruction, which is procedurally designed to utilize "feedback" to check on the pertinence and accuracy of situations presented to students. Many other disciplines, including psychology, have found programmed instruction quite valuable in this respect. I would not hesitate to say that case studies and simulation are readily adaptable to the programmed instruction concept.

The purpose of a theory of learning is to construct analytic tools which will make it possible to develop models which will, in turn, exhibit the principles which govern the modification of student behavior through training. The authors have made a significant contribution to an area which has heretofore been nearly completely neglected by serious researchers.

WILLIAM L. MORROW

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Politics of Modernization. BY DAVID E. APTER (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 481. \$7.50.)

In this wide-ranging and ambitious book David Apter takes leave of Africa, establishes himself securely as a general student of political development, and stakes out his claims as a political theorist. This is an important book which will receive wide attention, and be especially provocative to graduate students with the time and enthusiasm for mulling over complex formulations.

In several key chapters Apter elaborates, with some repetitions if not contradictions, the basic theory for which this book will be known. In other chapters he leaves the framework of his theory to discuss with great sympathy and knowledge various aspects of modernization. Throughout the approach adheres closely to the social theory school of sociology and is little influenced by considerations from economics and psychology, as is so often the case in discussion of political development. Time and again the result is an imaginative and even lively form of political sociology as, for example, when Apter brings vividly to life such abstractions as innovation, social mobility and value change, by linking them to the spread of "the concept of career."

The real test of this book, however, lies with its basic theory about the relative capabilities of different types of political systems to modernize. Very briefly, the theory "centers on models of government, described in terms of two main criteria; degree of hierarchy and type of values." (P. 22.) According to the first criterion systems have authority structures that are either "hierarchical," *i.e.*, a chain of command, or "pyramidal," *i.e.*, pluralistic and competitive. Secondly, their values are either "consummatory," *i.e.*, sacred and related to ultimate ends, or "instrumental," *i.e.*, secular and related to intermediate ends. The possible combinations of these two main variables yield four pure types of political systems, the two most important being the consummatory—hierarchical, which Apter calls the "sacred-collectivity," and the instrumental-pyramidal, which he calls the "secular-libertarian."

Much of the rest of Apter's analysis is an elaboration and comparison of these two models, which in essence means that he is contrasting the authoritarian-mobilist-communist systems with the liberal-conciliatory-democratic

ones. Crudely put, his argument is that in at least the short run authoritarian systems are better adapted for modernizing, but given the open character of science all societies must eventually move toward the democratic model. In fact the analysis is much more complex and subtle than such a summary would suggest, and it should be added that in a later chapter Apter does point out that mobilization systems are not as efficient as they pretend to be and they tend to go from high enthusiasm to widespread cynicism and opportunism.

Unquestionably there is a great deal that can be illuminated by employing these variables, as Apter so masterfully demonstrates in his fascinating chapter on the analysis of different traditional African systems. There is also much to commend the idea of continuing the debate about the relative advantages of authoritarianism and democracy with a new vocabulary that is far removed from the polemics of the cold war. There is, however, no escaping the fact that Apter is dealing with ideological matters—he himself insists that analysis must begin with normative considerations—and for some readers there may be a feeling that his approach is retrogressive in that while using the back door to the totalitarianism-democracy confrontation he revives some old issues which should be laid to rest. For example, he says that "planning, rationality and progress became associated with the sacred-collectivity model," while he populates the secular-libertarian model with myopic citizens interested only in private gain and prone to alienation. Isn't it time that we recognized that planning, whether wise or foolish, can be done by either totalitarian or democratic societies, and that alienation and apathy can occur in all kinds of societies?

But let us not be diverted by polemical issues, and instead concentrate on the basic elements of Apter's theory. This reader must report that he greatly enjoyed the intellectual exercise of following the analysis and he was repeatedly impressed with Apter's erudition, but he was left with some annoying questions which he cannot put out of his mind.

First there is the question of why Apter so readily assumes that certain characteristics of political systems tend to belong together. The combination of hierarchy and consummatory values, for example, suddenly becomes a "collectivity" oriented model which is heavy on coercion and which extols the goals of efficiency and the potentialities of community. On the

other hand, the linking up of pyramidal power and instrumental values produces equalitarianism, a slighting of the collective interest, and little ability for vigorous social mobilization. These associations may be true, but if so they deserve the fullest exposition because the solid establishment of such relationships would constitute a major breakthrough in social science. Unfortunately we are left wondering, and we begin to speculate as to whether there have not been totalitarian systems dedicated to at least the mystique of equality and which were contemptuous of efficiency. And have there not been democracies that have believed in the sacred importance of building a more perfect union and of being able to take on all comers? How often one is left wanting to stop Apter and ask him to please elucidate a bit further, as for example when he makes the extraordinary statement that "These two normative models are in perpetual conflict, and are constantly in danger of being transformed into each other." Is it really likely that petty dictatorships which exploit the symbols of modernity are in danger of becoming democracies?

A second major problem with the theory is its lack of clarity on the grantedly old and frustrating topic of what is "modernization," what contributes to it or inhibits it, and how does political modernization differ from other forms of modernization. At one point Apter relates modernity to choice and hence to rationality, but this is done at such a general level as to make modernity nearly indistinguishable from politics, which presumably is always concerned with decision-making. Elsewhere Apter distinguishes the three concepts of development, modernization and industrialization as being in a descending order of generality. Development relates to the "proliferation and integration of functional roles" while modernization "implies three conditions—a social system that can constantly innovate . . . ; differentiated, flexible social structures; and a social framework to provide the skills and knowledge necessary for living in a technologically advanced world." This may be a useful start but without further specifications it becomes difficult to judge the relationship between different types of political systems and any inherent facility for achieving modernization. Yet presumably the whole purpose of the exercise is to determine the relative prospects for modernization of different kinds of system.

A third and related problem of the theory is that it is pitched at such a high level of generalization that it provides little guidance for policy or basis for evaluating the performance of leaders and regimes. For example, although

Apter has much to say about the problem of balancing authority and liberty, his theories could in fact be used by any petty dictator to justify his self-seeking ways. Apter's analysis sets the stage for discussing the dangers of "premature" attempts at democracy, but on a basis that is no more operational than that with which people used to argue about whether particular colonies were "ready" for independence.

These may seem like rather harsh judgments of what we have already identified as an important work. They all point to the fact that David Apter has attempted an exceedingly difficult but important task: he has sought to bring dynamic dimensions to the essentially static constructs which have been the mainstays of theories based on the concept of roles. He has not been satisfied with merely designating typologies, for he is basically concerned with how systems may change and the direction in which they are likely to move. In trying to do all of this he makes it manifestly clear why the effort to build theories of political development must be ranked among the most ambitious enterprises in political science. Apter further complicates his assignment because he also seeks to help in "understanding" the leaders of the developing countries. Rigor and emotion do get confused at times in these two worthy enterprises.

LUCIAN W. PYE

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Politics of Democracy: American Parties in Action. BY PENDLETON HERRING, with a preface to the new edition by the author. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965. Pp. xxvii, 468. \$2.25.)

After twenty-five years, this reappearance of one of the classic analyses of the American party system is welcome for many reasons, but perhaps the most pertinent is the opportunity provided to assess its contribution and challenge to systematic political science. If we except the standard chapter on "The Nature and Functions of Party" in the textbooks on political parties, Herring's essay was practically the first effort to apply systematically a functional theory of American politics. It was followed in 1941 by Schattschneider's *Party Government*, and ten years later by Truman's *Governmental Process*, the three of which constitute the core of contemporary analytical theory concerning the interplay of formal constitutional structure with interest group and party politics in the United States. The methodological alternative, ably demonstrated by Austin Ranney and

Willmoore Kendall in *Democracy and the American Party System* (1956), is the "classical" procedure of constructing a normative model of democracy with which to contrast, and usually to bewail or condemn, the facts of political life. Herring deftly points out in his 1965 preface that perhaps the discrepancy between American political theory and practice didn't matter too much as long as no one took seriously the inability of American intellectuals to explain how their system actually worked. But once foreign students and observers began to look to America for a pattern of successful democracy-in-action, only to find American publicists using an ideal standard against which to portray their system as a phony, defective caricature; and once Americans began to advise other countries on how to reform or rebuild their societies and economies, then it made a great deal of difference whether they did or did not have an adequate working model of how their own political system functions. The point of course is not whether the American brand of democracy could or should be exported, but whether political and social scientists possess an analytical equipment which qualifies them as competent investigators, advisers and consultants on how to plan, develop, install and maintain modernized political systems.

Herring is well aware of the shortcomings of functionalism as a scientific theory, not the least of which is the ambiguity of "equilibrium" and "stability" as criteria by which ideas, interests, institutions and behavior within any given system of political order can be judged as eufunctional or dysfunctional to it. No one has worked more unremittingly than he for a revitalized statement of the requirements of democracy appropriate to deal with political realities in the twentieth century (see Rockefeller Brothers Report No. VI, *The Power of the Democratic Idea*, Doubleday, 1960). He maintains a sharp distinction between this sort of enterprise, however, and the critical, realistic analysis of "factors or forces that appear to hold the system together, that serve to integrate or (*sic*) disintegrate" (pp. xiv-xv). As a political scientist, he sees his theoretical problem as one of specifying the conditions, costs and consequences of nation-building through the instrumentalities of self-government. This is a different sort of intellectual activity from that of establishing a priority schedule of preferred social structures and value systems, to be peddled either as a "scientific" or a quasi-religious patent medicine for universal application to everybody's troubles, and applied ideologically as a loyalty oath, according to the demands of the occasion.

The complex, literary, discursive style of *The Politics of Democracy* vividly recalls the challenge made to political scientists several years ago by two economists, Anthony Downs (*An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Wiley, 1957), and C. E. Lindblom ("In Praise of Political Science," *World Politics*, January, 1957, pp. 240-53), which has never been picked up. They proposed to cast the rich body of analytical insights, assumptions and hypotheses in Herring, Schattschneider, Truman and Ranney-Kendall into the rigorous mold of a formal, deductive model, based upon the assumption that political parties in a two-party system exist to maximize voter support so as to attract and enable candidates for public office to govern with the widest possible basis of popular support, rather than primarily to articulate distinctive ideological positions and enact into law programs consistent with those views. Presumably everyone, including Herring, would agree that a theoretical model would be more powerful, and scientifically attractive, the larger the number of relationships between the variables composing the model that could be deductively derived (theorems) and integrated with the smallest possible number of relations that would have to be assumed (axioms). Downs' critical hypothesis that parties are motivated to maximize votes for their candidates, corresponding to the rationality assumption of economics, fitted remarkably well with many definitional statements and empirical findings of Herring and Ranney-Kendall, if not so closely with Schattschneider's and Truman's more differentiated concept of party organizations as bureaucratic interests within voluntary, openly-inclusive membership-associations. What then explains the continuing distrust and apathy among political scientists toward formal, explicit theory-building, and why do they cling so compulsively to their multiplicity of approaches, concepts, and logically-unreconciled, empirical propositions? Is Lindblom's taunt justified that political scientists as a profession deliberately: (1) undervalue and refuse to recognize the formal concepts implicit in their empirical work, and (2) dissipate destructively their theoretical assets by refusing to employ them when they are engaged in professional analysis and evaluation?

The first answer is that even in the few years since 1955 the factual basis of the indictment has noticeably changed. Even if it had not, important obstacles still remain. One is the difficulty of securing agreement on the central categories to be incorporated in the model, corresponding to concepts of length, time and mass

in classical physics, or the productive factors and market elements in classical economics. Another is the problem in politics of determining which are the axioms, which are the derived theorems or hypotheses, which should be treated as constants, which are the independent and dependent variables. Thirdly, even if the assumption of rationality were extended from individual to group and system behavior, it is still necessary to know under what conditions one set of derived hypotheses loses relevance or significance and has to be replaced by another. Fourthly, with respect to the purposive action-perspective of politics, there is the perennial problem of adjusting the tensions generated by conflicts between technical or scientific specialists; whose competence is restricted to one segment of "reality," whether it be that of a crusading social movement or a particular interest, group, class, or official bureaucracy, and the role of the "politician-generalist," who has to calculate the effects of specific proposals both upon his personal constituency and the desire of the differing elements in the political system to maintain its identity and continuity as an effective unit of political energy. Without intending to appear merely negative and defeatist to enthusiastic advocates of rationalist idealism and formal, logical theory-building, it is perhaps a sign of intellectual health to admit with Herring that we still lack a systematic, well-articulated body of theoretical propositions and a methodology appropriate to unify our empirical knowledge of the several component parts of the political system and process. This in no way implies relaxation of the effort to be as scientific as possible, to increase our self-comprehension as much as possible, to carry on trying to delineate and clarify the basic patterns of "how things really are" in political relations among people. By so doing, when the opportunity comes for political scientists to influence the course of human events, it is more likely that they will maximize their effectiveness in "adjusting the sails to the wind, not the wind to the sails!"

AVERY LEISERSON

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The Cities and The Federal System. By ROSCOE C. MARTIN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1965. Pp. 208. \$6.95.)

Although the literature on metropolitan problems is now at high tide, little of weight or originality is being written on the role of the Federal Government. The first useful contemporary book treating this subject comprehensively was Connery and Leach's *The Federal*

Government and Metropolitan Areas, published in 1960. By helping others view Federal practices through urban-colored glasses, the book contributed to the reorientation and coordination of Federal programs to a point where, to cite one example, the Federal Aid Highway Program, originally justified on the grounds of interstate commerce and national defense, now expends at least 50 per cent of its three billion dollars a year within urban areas, and metropolitan highway decisions are made on the basis of a planning process established by agreement among the local governments affected. Penetrating appraisal, of course, is no guarantee of proper conclusions or prognostications, and Connery and Leach ended their book by recommending against creation of a Cabinet Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Roscoe Martin's book, *The Cities and The Federal System*, carries forward from Connery and Leach's volume and provides the most thorough analysis to date of an important aspect of our new urban federalism—the direct Federal-city relationships that have been established in the administration of programs designed to meet metropolitan ills, programs where the State governments do little more than enact enabling legislation. And, having examined this new federalism, he finds it good. The major contribution of *The Cities and The Federal System* is its documentation of the capacity of the federal system to adapt to changing conditions in the face of new problems. Here, as in the Connery and Leach book, one can accept the major findings—the cities are now major partners in the federal system, and increased cooperation between the Federal Government and the cities is desirable and invigorating to both—while rejecting its harsh appraisal of the role of the States now and in the future: "... the decision [by the states] not to become too heavily involved in urban matters is a natural one. And given the predictions of the state, it may also be a wise one." (P. 135.)

The book begins with a summary of urban demographic trends and major domestic problems that must be dealt with primarily in the public sector. Reasons for the cities now acting openly as members of the Federal family are identified—the use of cash grants-in-aid, the Depression, and the incapacity of the States. Just how the cities (and some urban counties) and the National Government actually work together at the operational level is described through an examination of three programs—Federal Aid to Airports, Urban Renewal, and Low-Rent Public Housing.

A final chapter, an appraisal of the expanded partnership, identifies problems resulting from this intergovernmental romance (in which apparently three is a crowd). They are: (a) the widespread spawning of special districts by Federal programs, adding to the already almost lethal urban "fallout"; (b) the "metropolitan problem" created by the fact that Federal urban aid programs are usually designed to cope with areawide problems while few local governments pay much attention to metropolitan considerations; and (c) the effects of this partnership on the States.

There is much the Federal Government can do. Preference in Federal-aid eligibility can be granted to general local government over special districts. Comprehensive planning requirements can be, and increasingly are being, employed to help assure that federally supported projects are part of a functional system and are reasonably coordinated with other development decisions. These Federal solutions are cited, but insufficient attention is given in *The Cities and The Federal System* to the crucial State role increasingly being played to reduce fragmentation and achieve economies of scale through legislation to supervise special district activities; provide for rigorous standards before new districts and municipalities can be created; authorize interlocal contracting, extra-territorial planning, zoning, and subdivision regulation; and authorize and support metropolitan area planning agencies.

Evidence in *The Cities and The Federal System* suggests that the States are, in fact, increasing (as measured in dollars and employees) in influence and service to their citizens at a faster rate than the Federal Government, local government, or the private economy. Most new federal grant programs (eight major new grant programs enacted in 1963, nine in 1964, and seventeen in 1965) strengthen rather than weaken the State's role in urban development. That Federal bureaucrats create their State as well as their local counterparts has been documented in the work of Morton Grodzins, William Anderson, and others. Today, in the fields of education, health, and highways, State (even excluding local) expenditures far exceed the Federal. Indeed, a weakness of the direct Federal-local grant relationship in housing, urban renewal, and air transportation is the short-circuiting or, at best, discouraging of State financial contributions to the local government's matching share.

The book concludes that the record demonstrates "the present inability of the States to function in accordance with the standards of democratic government. . . . The cities are [on

the other hand] dedicated to both the principle and practice of democratic government." (P. 191.) One would question whether either State House or City Hall is in a monopoly situation with respect to democracy. The fact is that over half of the States have now taken action to put representation of both houses of the legislature on the basis of population. Recent court decisions indicate that city and county councils will similarly soon be forced to adopt this most fundamental of democratic concepts. Predictably, the governors elected statewide in the 39 States that are more than 50 per cent urban are now the urban residents' friends. Weak mayor and county commission forms, increased racial voting in local elections, snob suburbs designed to keep out the low-income resident, low voting participation in local and bond elections, and Congress's finding that there must be maximum representation of the poor in the local administration of the Economic Opportunity Program indicate that there is little to be gained by the pot calling the kettle black.

The Cities and The Federal System appraises and gives its blessing to the new Federal-local relationship. Inevitably, this involves to some extent a rationalization of the existing situation. Still needed are new proposals and machinery for maximizing the contribution of all three levels of government to the tasks of an urban society.

NORMAN BECKMAN

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

British Politics in the Collectivist Age. By SAMUEL H. BEER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965. Pp. xii, 390, xiii.)

Lecturing at Professor Beer's university in the year 1898, A.V. Dicey dated the beginnings of collectivism in British political life in the late 1860's. Its "influence on legislation did not become perceptible . . . say till 1868 or 1870, or dominant till say 1880." Professor Beer does not directly take issue with Dicey, but he dissents fundamentally from his analysis. Exceptional acts of state intervention to provide a service, or correct an undesirable consequence of the free enterprise system fall, for Beer, under the heading of 'Radical' politics. "Collectivism," on the other hand, "characterises government intervention with the economic and social system as a whole." (Pp. 67, 80.) This may be found, at its earliest, in the Liberal administrations of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, 1906-15.

There is another and even more important difference between the two authors' approaches. Dicey is concerned almost entirely with the

effect of opinion on legislation. Beer considers not merely legislation, but also representation. The permanent influence of organized producers on government, different in kind from earlier, *ad hoc* lobbying and petitioning, is a feature only of twentieth-century politics. The Employers' Parliamentary Council was founded in 1898, the Trades Union Congress was certainly not an effective political force before the turn of the century, the National Farmers' Union until just before the First World War.

The integration of producers' lobbies is a later development still. As long as the Liberal theory of the independent parliamentarian, following only reason and his conscience before voting on an issue, prevailed, such a method of government was out of the question. Indeed, one of the strongest arguments in favour of *laissez-faire* and free trade was that they provided safeguards against log-rolling and pork-barrel politics. Under the British system effective group representation requires disciplined parties and, as Beer shows (pp. 257–263) these did not emerge until the mid-eighties.

The ideological aversion which even many Radicals had to systematic state intervention meant that only war and depression could bring about the changes. The First World War made widespread "consultation" between government and producers' groups inescapable, but the machinery was largely dismantled after 1918, and in 1923 the electorate explicitly disavowed protective tariffs. It was only after the Great Depression, specifically between 1931 and 1935, that the National Government embarked on a policy of import duties, industrial rationalisation and the regulation of prices and marketing. "Group consultation had been on the rise for many years. But it is not too much to say that the scale and nature of state intervention under the National Government founded a system of quasi-corporatism in which industry and government were brought into regular and continuous contact" (p. 298).

The government's relations with capital were a good deal closer than those with labour. Only the Second World War gave labour equal privileges, a situation which the Labour Government found easy to perpetuate, so that by 1948–9 the T.U.C. was represented on 60 government committees, compared with 12 in 1939. It is in the last twenty years, in the combination of "managed economy" and "welfare state" that the "new group politics" has attained full growth—a system which unites the functional representation of producers with the electoral pressure of consumers.

While Professor Beer traces this slow revolution in convincing detail, he also places it in

historical perspective. Beginning his study with the 'Old Tory' and 'Old Whig' views of the constitution, he reminds us that before the parliamentary reforms of the nineteenth century, Parliament was seen as the representative of communities and legitimate interests, not, as in 'Liberal' theory, merely of individuals. Moreover, classical Toryism has always looked to the state as the symbol of national dignity and unity: it emphasises—according to L. S. Amery—"the strength and stability of government." It is fascinating to see how many Tories, from Keith Feiling to Harold Macmillan, welcomed the protectionist policies of the 1930's as a return from Liberal heresies to traditional orthodoxies. The Liberal period of the mid-nineteenth century, far from being the norm of British parliamentary practice, is thus seen as a deviation from it, and even during this interlude individualism never held unqualified sway.

Professor Beer's other major point is that for all the continuities in British political history, and for all the diminution of class and policy conflict in present-day Britain, the two major parties have differed, and continue to differ from each other, in both aims and structure. It is this aspect of his book which has aroused the most attention in Britain, since it contradicts the conclusions of the only other modern authority, Robert McKenzie. Even here, many of Beer's assertions are not controversial: that the Labour Party's concern with intraparty democracy arises directly out of the 'Radical,' pre-Socialist tradition, with its distrust of the club atmosphere of the House of Commons; or that an independent Labour Party without a commitment to Socialism could never have out-distanced an existing Liberal Party already committed to social reform. The real trouble with some of his major conclusions, however, is not that they are demonstrably wrong, but that their truth cannot be finally proved or disproved. Two examples will do.

Firstly it is part of Beer's case that the belief in Socialism was based on consensus within the party and that this Socialism was intended to be a guide to action, not just a common moral denominator. It would be unfair to cite the records of the first two Labour governments (1923–4, 1929–31) as evidence of how timid the party would be when actually in office. These governments lacked clear majorities. But it is surely more revealing than Professor Beer thinks that the party's leaders should have been ready to embark on the 1945 election without a "shopping list" of industries to be nationalised, and that they were obliged to include one only after the 1944 party conference had insisted on this. Of the industries specified in the Mikardo

amendment, two—banking and construction—did not get as far as the manifesto; two others, iron and steel and road haulage were nationalised late, quickly denationalised by the Conservatives after 1951 and have remained denationalised. Only three—the old hard core of coal, power and rail—are securely in the public sector.

This raises the second question, that of elitism in the party. Professor Beer insists that the "story of the 1950's is certainly not one of an elite imposing its views on the mass" (p. 229) any more than between the wars. And it is certainly true that in response to conference pressures the leadership repeatedly made important concessions. Yet the performance of the Wilson government so far, in both domestic and foreign policy, is far closer to the original "revisionist" views of the 1950's than to the officially agreed compromises. To say this is not to pronounce on the merits of those intraparty disputes. But it is surely no accident that the period of 'Socialist consensus' between the wars, and that of the uneasy revisionist-fundamentalist truce more recently, saw Labour in opposition. In trying to explain the major differences between the parties it might be worth pursuing another thesis: that for most of this century the Conservatives have been in power and the Labour Party has not.

It is inevitable that a British political scientist, actively involved in party affairs, should want to argue with Professor Beer about this or that. Equally, however, he must be grateful for this erudite, elegant, stimulating, sympathetic—and sometimes flattering—volume, one which will be essential for many years to come for understanding British politics.

PETER G. J. PULZER

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International Relations: A General Theory. By J. W. BURTON. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 288. \$7.50.)

Despite Professor Burton's opening remarks concerning the necessity of making a "distinction between analysis and policy" (p. 5) in order to build a "science of international relations," this book thoroughly mixes analysis with prescriptive statements. The avowed aim of the book is a "general theory of international relations"; the result is a presentation of the author's view of the path to world peace. Burton, a Senior Lecturer at University College, London, maintains that international relations as a science "has been slow to develop and to achieve results, largely because of . . . scientific excursions into policy, and the advocacy of

single solutions" (p. 5), but he has written a book presenting many policy suggestions and to a large extent focused on a single solution—nonalignment.

In the following remarks, the Reviewer will not deal with the question of whether it is proper to call a work on how to bring about world peace a "general theory" even though if one were to apply the criteria suggested by the author, he would have to answer in the negative. Rather, the Reviewer will discuss Burton's treatment of contemporary international relations theory and his argument concerning the way to world peace in terms of their value to those interested in theories of international relations.

After an initial discussion of the proper approach to the study of international relations, Burton surveys the contemporary (primarily, but not entirely, American) theories of international relations (pp. 14-94). With the aim of his survey to provide a rationale for his own position, Burton treats the theorists in a polemical and selective manner. Although the survey is extensive in that it cites most of the prominent theory-oriented scholars (particularly, the more traditional ones), it lacks an in-depth analysis of particular theorists.

Much of his survey is a discussion of the writers who emphasize "power politics." Classifying these theorists under the pejorative rubric "orthodoxy," Burton lists the fallacies of their positions and the inadequacies of their framework as a guide to foreign policy-making. Asserting that the "orthodoxy" fails to distinguish between power as a means and power as an end (p. 53), Burton maintains that it cannot provide a meaningful theoretical framework and relevant policy alternatives in the nuclear age.

Burton finds cybernetics to be a more useful model for analyzing contemporary international relations. His remarks on cybernetics are confined primarily to Karl W. Deutsch's *Nerves of Government* and consist of the polemical use of a number of concepts drawn from cybernetics rather than an intensive analysis of Deutsch's position. For example, he writes: "In terms of communication needs, power is unimportant. When a system is fully integrated, receiving information, classifying it, and reacting, and is subject to feed-back controls, and when through this process it can change its goals and adapt itself to changing situations, power is seen as of incidental importance, no matter how important it might happen to appear at any point in history" (p. 147). Typical of the author's style, this statement also exemplifies his technique of employing cybernetic concepts

to substantiate his general predilections against power.

Burton uses the decision-making model in a similar manner. In his attempt to discredit power, he juxtaposes decision-making to power by arguing that "accompanying the decrease in the role of force and of power, there is an increase in the role of decision-making, which implies an increased interest in each State in the responses of other States to its policies, in processes of change, in goal-changing, and in national adjustment to change elsewhere" (p. 274). In this statement as in others, Burton's use of what he calls the decision-making model is ambiguous. If he is asserting that a state which enjoys a large amount of power is less adaptive to certain political conditions, he is using the decision-making model to describe a set of phenomena which has been adequately handled in the past by the distinction between "revisionist" and "status quo" foreign policies. Conversely, if he is saying that powerful states make fewer decisions than less powerful states or that the process for making decisions is qualitatively different, he shows neither anecdotal nor empirical evidence sufficient to warrant such a position.

Burton's general arguments prescribing the path to world peace can be summed up in one word—nonalignment. With nuclear deterrence providing a necessary but not a sufficient basis for international order, according to Burton, nonalignment will create an international system "in which all sovereign States regardless of size can live together in a competitive, but not an aggressive, relationship" (p. 231). Rejecting the concepts of the balance of power, the world state, and even collective security, Burton maintains that the evolving international system will be or should be (the distinction is not clearly made throughout the book) characterized by nonalignment. Although the picture Burton paints of the impartial, passive and anti-power nonaligned state (pp. 218–240) pursuing policies designed "to avoid the involvement in the affairs of others" (p. 274) is contradicted by such activities as the Indian invasion of Goa, the Egyptian involvement in the Middle East and Africa, and the Indonesian involvement in Malaya, to mention the more obvious, he maintains that the nonaligned states contribute to world peace by their impartial stance in Great Power conflicts and their dedication to goals of internal development.

The Reviewer can find little reason to recommend this book to those interested in international relations theory, except that it introduces the American reader to some of the theoretical work being done in Australia and Great Brit-

ain. Although there are a number of sections in the book which would interest the student of international relations in general (e.g., Chapter Sixteen, which discusses the forces which have contributed to the development of nonalignment), the lack of a rigorous approach to the theoretical literature coupled with the failure to conceptualize systematically about the contemporary international environment limits its utility to the would-be theorist and student of theory. The discrete occurrence of interesting analyses and policy prescriptions, even if embellished by modern theoretical concepts, does not represent a significant contribution to a systematic or theoretical study of international relations, and the assumption that the international system is evolving in such a way that the involvement of states in the affairs of other states will diminish is curious in the contemporary period where transnational ties and influences are proliferating.

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L'Europe dans le Monde. By ALEXANDRE MARC. (Paris: Payot, 1965. Pp. 238. F18.)

Federalism—Origin, Operation, Significance. By WILLIAM H. RIKER. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1964. Pp. 169. \$1.95.)

Both these books deal with federalism; yet it would be hard to find two books representing a greater contrast. The first philosophical, literary, hortative and specific, the second scientific, didactic and general. Yet both are agreed on the importance of federalism in the contemporary world.

For Alexandre Marc, the well-known director of the *Centre International de Formation Européenne*, federalism is a philosophy of life, personalist, realist, revolutionary, dialectic and yet anti-ideological, in short a new conception of man and society. This new conception rests upon three principles: (a) autonomy, (b) co-operation, (c) subsidiarity (if one may thus render the French *subsidiarité* by which is meant the proposition that the groupings at the base of human society may not be deprived of their functions as long as they fulfill their tasks properly, something in short that resembles the American grass roots philosophy). Marc has been a close student of Proudhon and is sympathetic to the non-Marxist tradition of French socialism; he believes in planning, but a planning which preserves competition and private initiative. For him, as for Proudhon and many others in this tradition, *étatisme* is not progressive, it is "reactionary to the end." Marc likes to quote Nietzsche's well-known description of the state as "the coldest of cold monsters" (but

without Nietzsche's enthusiasm for coldness!), since he looks upon the modern nation state as the great adversary whom federalism is meant to supersede. And it is this *étatisme* which is behind the much touted formula of the *Europe des Patries* which is often attributed to de Gaulle. Indeed, M. Marc's study is in a sense an impassioned argument against de Gaulle, of whom he sarcastically says at a central point that he is right "*il a raison*," namely in the sense that the present governmentally determined Community of the Six is far from what is needed, namely a federally integrated Europe.

One might wish that Marc had a better knowledge of comparative federalism, of the way federalism actually works in various countries, and of its complexities and shortcomings. His argument is strong in general reflections, but lacks empirical support from the operation even of nearby federal regimes, such as Germany and Switzerland. The same is, unfortunately, equally true of Riker's book. Though it is presented as if it were a wholly new treatment of a subject hitherto monopolized by "institutional" approaches, it actually addresses itself to a restatement of the old contractual theory of federalism in terms of a "federal bargain." In the presumably central chapter on the origin and purposes of federalism, i.e., on the genetic and teleological theory of federal regimes, Riker states that "a constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere." (P. 11.) This statement fails to differentiate federal from decentralized regimes (all three conditions are, e.g., fulfilled for local government in Land Baden-Württemberg) and is highly conventional in the bargain.

As for the "federal bargain," the disposition to make it is then explained in terms of two predispositions, one "the desire (on the part of leaders) to expand their territorial control" and two "some external military-diplomatic threat." While these are undoubtedly recurrent conditions of federalism, as often pointed out before, they are by no means the only ones. The argument completely overlooks, e.g., those federal systems which are the result of differential developments, e.g., British Dominions, Prussia under Weimar, the British Commonwealth in its earlier phases, etc. Yet, Riker claims that these conditions are "*always* present in the federal bargain." In light of this erroneous starting point, Riker then discusses what he considers an "ideological fallacy," namely

"that federal forms are adopted as a device to guarantee freedom." (P. 13.) Leaving aside the difficult empirical question whether federal regimes do in fact guarantee freedom, the cited proposition is logically not a fallacy, but either true or false. And since it is beyond the peradventure of a doubt that many federal regimes have been instituted by men who *inter alia* believed that it would help guarantee freedom, federal forms have undoubtedly been "adopted to guarantee freedom." This the author himself admits on the next page, but at the same time asserts "that there is almost no evidence that they have so believed." From this one is forced to conclude that Riker does not know very well the constitutional debates or the literature on federalism in many countries.

There follows a discussion of the "reductionist fallacy" which is again no fallacy (R. seems to think that an erroneous factual statement is a fallacy). According to Riker, the argument here is that "federalism is a response to certain social conditions that create some sense of a common interest" (p. 15) and K. Deutsch is cited as a representative of this view. By casually criticizing Deutsch's nine essential conditions, Riker "disposes" of a view the crucial tenets of which he has not even touched upon.

Riker makes much of his distinction between what he calls centralized and peripheralized federalism (p. 5). This distinction is the old and now happily buried Bundesstaat-Staatenbund dichotomy and as such a discarded form of the morphological theory of federalism. It is worthwhile only when clearly related to patterning problems in federal systems.

There are chapters on the "spirit" of American federalism, and sketchy reviews on federalism outside the United States, such as the former British colonies, European federalism, and so forth. The information is to some extent at variance with the reviewer's own theoretical views. It also largely neglects the significant work of others. Of K. C. Wheare's magistral study on federal government, Riker says that "it is highly legalistic in tone and displays very little understanding of political realities." (P. 157.) I should venture in spite of my disagreements with Wheare to say that his work displayed a considerably better "understanding of political realities" than Riker, especially as far as the Commonwealth countries are concerned; to these Riker's basic theory does of course not at all apply. This reviewer could find no trace of the significant insights presented by a group of careful students of these matters in *Area and Power* (ed., A. Maass), nor of the interesting theory of "unitary federalism" (Hesse), nor of the problems of Soviet federalism, not to speak

of the extended recent discussion about federalism as a process. Association is another feature of recent federal development the author completely ignores.

Altogether, this book is a very disappointing one, especially when one remembers that it comes from the pen of the author of some fine studies in other fields. While claiming to be empirical and introducing some quantitative data, it is based upon an erroneous and outmoded theory, and its empirical basis is entirely inadequate, because the author is so largely unfamiliar with the recent research done in the field. He presents some rather inadequate quantitative data which involve such misstatements as that the main "beneficiaries" of federalism in Germany are the "capitalists" when it is known to all that the party of the capitalists, if there be such, namely the FDP, is vigorously opposed to federalism. Riker is inclined to see federalism largely in terms of an exploitative minority—admittedly one of the serious dangers of any federal scheme. But he is quite unaware of the countervailing dangers of an unqualified majoritarianism, though the experience with Hitler and some other one-party states would seem to be fairly obvious. In this respect, Riker thinks in terms familiar from New Deal days, and characteristic of those ardent "liberals" who thought *then* that the majority is always right, because it was *then* on their side. McCarthy taught many of them a lesson.

In short, it is lamentable that this general study on the broad problem of federalism should be so inadequate, so prejudiced and so lacking in contact with the original work in the field, even in the United States. Perhaps a reading of Denis de Rougemont's *La Suisse—Histoire d'un peuple heureux* (1965) and the other works referred or alluded to would help Riker to produce work in the field of federalism, as fascinating as it is complex, which would be worthy of the author of *The Theory of Political Coalitions*.

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Vietnam and the United States. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. 112. \$3.25.)

This collection of Professor Morgenthau's provocative opinions on Vietnam is an important addition to the growing literature on the most tangled and controversial foreign affairs issue since Korea. The book is composed of previously published writings plus a fresh introductory essay. The whole is given cohesion by the boldness and verve of the arguments

presented. Although almost all aspects of the issue are touched upon, Vietnam is treated primarily as a problem of American foreign policy in terms of the author's own highly developed conceptions of *Realpolitik*.

Particularly impressive are the pointed criticisms of tactical blunders by the United States. The faults dwelt upon are not new—the myopic commitment to and disposal of the Diem regime; the initial abortive, military-dominated counterinsurgency operations; the "public relations" approach of the American government to the conduct of foreign policy; etc.—but they are given added credence by Professor Morgenthau's forceful arguments and polished rhetoric. Apart from occasional polemic lapses (American policy toward Vietnam cannot, despite Morgenthau's assertion [p. 18], be treated essentially as an issue of "psychopathology."), it is persuasively established that specific United States actions have been conducted in a stumbling and amateurish fashion.

Considerably less persuasive is his broad appraisal of the "intellectual bases" of our Vietnam policies and the impact of these policies on Asia and the world. However, before turning to the substance of this critique, the special nature of the evidence used and the theoretical bases of his interpretation require consideration.

A peculiar feature of the debate on Vietnam has been dispute over what the "facts" are. In this regard, Professor Morgenthau swims in the mainstream of criticism. He disputes the veracity of official reports (pp. 18, 59, 72) and offers countersources (e.g., *L'Express*, *The Economist*, his impressions as a "casual observer") that *prima facie* seem scarcely more authoritative. Inevitably, a dialogue in which the facts themselves are in question is extremely muddy.

In contrast, the generalizations made by the author concerning Vietnam are distinguished by their clarity and simplicity. In part this is attributable to two assumptions concerning international relations, basic to all of his extensive writings in this field, which are particularly crucial to his arguments here. First, the "national interest" of any nation is considered to be readily calculable from broad strategic and geopolitical factors and the country's past international behavior. Second, there are for every nation "priorities in foreign policy which are derived from a hierarchy of interests and the availability of power to support them," so that effective policies must be aimed at limited non-Utopian ends. Application of these premises to the complex Vietnam situation produces clear but not always convincing conclusions.

One useful result of Professor Morgenthau's

analysis is demonstration of the folly of a commitment to the military defense of South Vietnam as part of a global anti-Communist crusade—with emphasis on the infeasibility of such a plan in view of the limited capabilities of the United States. This warning against “moralism” in the conduct of foreign policy is apt, but is it presently applicable? To believe that it is requires determining the intentions of American policy makers. Neither the government’s varied and ambiguous pronouncements nor its equally complicated military and diplomatic maneuvers offer incontrovertible proof that the *raison d’être* of our policy is “moral.” Such an inference is plausible, but others are as well. Rather than twentieth century Metternichs (p. 89), our policymakers might better be termed well-meaning but inept strategists who conceivably may profit from their mistakes.

Professor Morgenthau sees the policy of the military containment of China as a basic fallacy in America’s Vietnam position. To him containment is not “rational” because the threat of Chinese expansion is “political not military” and what is required is not encirclement but the hopelessly impractical goal of conquest of seven hundred million Chinese. In Vietnam and throughout Asia, the real choice for the United States, he argues, is a full-scale land war or withdrawal. In developing his argument he implies that all countries of Southeast Asia are equally susceptible to military and political subversion by “China or its proxies” (pp. 64–65). Such a line of thought falls into the error of believing that insurgency is a technique everywhere applicable and always successful—almost a mirror image of Morgenthau’s own charge against America’s approach to counterinsurgency (pp. 70, 73). Moreover, it ignores the obvious and many political differences among the nations in this region.

However, his recommendation for our withdrawal essentially is not based on concrete considerations of power and politics in Southeast Asia. Professor Morgenthau’s conclusions concerning Peking’s capacities and intentions toward this area are dubiously derived from extremely broad generalizations concerning China’s “national interests . . . confirmed by 2,000 years of history.” Indeed, China already has “political and cultural predominance” on the mainland of Asia “by virtue of the quality and quantity of her population, her geographic position, her civilization, her past power remembered, her future power anticipated” (p. 63). Nowhere are the specific Chinese capabilities for international domination of the region elaborated. Whatever the meaning of such vague, Toynbee-esque generalizations, they are

at best peripherally relevant to Chinese or American policy in Vietnam. The “national interest” of both countries concerning Vietnam will ultimately be determined by their present rulers in terms of the current contingencies of the international situation. The practicability of containment, the relevance of a neutralist *détente*, and the ability of China to dominate Asia all remain open questions, to be answered in a concrete fashion, not in terms of grand speculation. Professor Morgenthau does seem to admit as much in suggesting a possible negotiated settlement from “impregnable enclaves” (p. 80), although this point is never fully explained or juxtaposed to his other conclusions.

DONALD C. HELLMANN

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The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis. EDITED BY MARCUS G. RASKIN AND BERNARD B. FALL (New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. 415. \$5.95, cloth; \$2.45, paper.)

Bernard Fall and Marcus Raskin have been among the most clear-headed of American critics of this country’s Vietnam policies. The book of selected readings they have put together is, to my knowledge, the best place now available for non-experts to begin their acquaintance with the last ten years or so of the Vietnam situation. This means that the book will be of particular use to those academics who, though interested in Vietnam, have not had time to pay much attention to it—outside, perhaps, of the May 15, 1965, national teach-in. It also is probably the right book to recommend to a student who wants to find out more than what the newspapers have told him about the Vietnam conflict.

The book is organized into four large sections: The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, The Rise of the Viet-Nam Problem, The Second Indochina War, and The Negotiating Positions. Within each of these sections, conflicting selections are included, ranging, for example, in the section on American Foreign Policy, from Thomas Dodd and Dean Acheson to Hans Morgenthau and Richard Barnet. As well as representing Administration spokesmen, their defenders and their critics, the authors also have substantial selections showing how the war looks from the other side. These include the Program of the National Liberation Front, an interview with Mao Tse-Tung, and a North Vietnamese policy statement issued in the spring of 1965. A few particularly hard to obtain selections are here: I. F. Stone’s valuable

critique of the State Department's 1965 White Paper, the 1960 "Manifesto of the Eighteen" calling for reform of the Diem regime, and excerpts from Robert Scalapino's stand-in for McGeorge Bundy speech which still remains the best defense of a portion of Administration policy. There is also a very useful chronology of events, 1945-1965, and a thorough index.

Fall and Raskin have their opinions, of course, and these opinions do help to shape the book they have assembled. They show up in the authors' comments on various other readings mentioned in their selected bibliography. And their section on public assessment of the war includes more critics than defenders. But the authors are not in any way trying to disguise their positions—several articles of their own appear—and the book concludes with a "Diplomatic Alternative to U. S. Policy," written by the editors, which is still pertinent despite the events of December and January, 1965-66. Overall, at this writing, the book is far from dated, though new developments make it more incomplete. Were the Vietnam conflict settled tomorrow, this book would still be of use. Reading it, one is struck by the fact that intransigence, suspicion, and fanaticism are among the most equitably distributed factors in the international world—something Americans easily see abroad. Finally, the presence in this book of so much intelligent criticism of government policy, criticism that attempts to come to grips with the political complexities and moral subtleties of power, creates the realization once again that governing is merely a human deed subject to the same limitations and tragedies as other human acts. There are no special properties which attach to leaders. In the alphabetical list which identifies contributors at the book's close, after a line about Warren Hinckle, but before one about George McT. Kahin, it says matter-of-factly: "Lyndon B. Johnson is President of the United States."

LEWIS LIPSITZ

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The Penkovskiy Papers. BY OLEG PENKOVSKIY. Introduction and Commentary by Frank Gibney. Translated by Peter Deriabin. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965. Pp. xv, 411. \$5.95.)

The remarkable espionage feat of Colonel Oleg V. Penkovskiy of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff, conducted over a period of sixteen months from April 1961 to August 1962, is said to have made available to the West at least 5,000 classified items from Soviet government files. He also provided London and Washington with the

perceptive observations and timely warnings of a highly trained and responsible Soviet official who had many friends and contacts in the upper ranks of the Soviet political and military hierarchy.

The "papers" included in this volume obviously contain but a very small part of the data obtained through this intelligence windfall. The "papers" presented here are, for the most part, the pages of a "journal" which Penkovskiy apparently kept in spare moments and in which he recorded his innermost thoughts about the Soviet regime and its policies; he also attempted to explain his motives and to justify his audacious and dangerous undertaking. These "jottings of a lonely man," as the editor terms them, are said to have been smuggled out of the Soviet Union at the time of the Colonel's arrest in October 1962. The journal is in many ways a moving personal document and one that is particularly valuable because the public portions of Penkovskiy's trial, held in May 1963, did not provide a full or accurate record of his activities since the prosecution wished to minimize the extent of this Western espionage coup while demanding the death penalty for the accused.

Slightly more than half (223 pages) of this volume is devoted to Penkovskiy's journal and to the autobiography which he prepared when offering his services. Fifty-nine pages are given over to the text of Colonel Prikhodko's training manual for the recruiting and handling of agents in the United States. There is also an account and evaluation of the trial of Penkovskiy and Greville Wynne, the British businessman whom the Colonel chose as his principal contact with the West. Wynne also provided a brief "personal comment" on Penkovskiy for this volume. The introductions by Frank Gibney cover eighty-five pages and place Penkovskiy's observations in their context.

Given the circumstances under which Penkovskiy recorded his journal, it is understandable that at times the entries are disjointed and fragmentary. Presumably the editor grouped various entries under appropriate topical headings. The volume contains no photographs of the Russian text of the journal, although it does include photographs of Penkovskiy's identity documents, passes, diplomas, official orders, his Communist Party membership card and dues book as well as family and group photographs. The sole photograph of what is clearly an intelligence item is that of the title page of copy number five of the "top secret" Soviet spy manual prepared by Prikhodko. Yet the effort to find alleged discrepancies and signs of forgery in the "papers" has not provided any im-

pressive proof. A good measure of authentication of the "papers" was provided by the demotion and disgrace of such figures as Marshal Varentsov, chief of the Tactical Missile Forces, and General Ivan Serov, head of the GRU and former KGB chief, whom Penkovskiy frequently quotes. Further evidence was provided by the shake-up of the entire Soviet espionage apparatus and by the fact that Moscow hath protested too much the publication of this volume.

Penkovskiy wrote with sardonic irony, and he was also something of a *bon vivant*. A Party member since 1940, a war hero and a colonel at the age of thirty-one, he was a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy and of the Military Diplomatic Academy. He had served more than a year as assistant military attaché in Ankara. This member of the Soviet elite was motivated by a number of factors including his disapproval of Khrushchev's treatment of the military and the suspicion cast upon him when the KGB finally discovered that his father, whom he had never known, had served in the White Army. However, his principal motive appears to have been a genuine concern that Khrushchev's "adventurism" (especially in Berlin) and the instability of the Soviet leadership could lead to a nuclear war for which the Soviet military was not prepared. He asserts: "Khrushchev's is a government of adventurers. They are demagogues and liars, covering themselves with the banner of the struggle for peace." (P. 56.) The Colonel was apparently disturbed by Soviet advocates of the first strike doctrine. He regarded it as his duty to enlighten the British and Americans whom he thought to be naive in their view of the Soviet Union. He advised that Khrushchev's bluster not be heeded and he noted: "The best way to handle Khrushchev is to throw him off balance—here, there, everywhere, by propaganda, and by actual deeds" (p. 219).

The "papers" offer many revealing insights into Soviet politics and the elite's way of life. One is impressed with the descriptions of bureaucratic backbiting and the chronic rivalry between the KGB and the GRU. Penkovskiy devotes much attention to the work of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research to which he was assigned by the GRU; he claims that this "civilian" agency provided a cover for intelligence operations. He discusses the Committee's use of "scientific" delegations, and he contends that scientific exchanges are one-sided and to the Soviet Union's advantage. He asserts that usually forty per cent of the personnel in Soviet embassies abroad work for the KGB and twenty

per cent for the GRU. Yet he erred in predicting that Khrushchev would sign a peace treaty with East Germany late in 1961 (p. 244), and he underestimated the rapidity with which Moscow would sign the test ban treaty (p. 332).

If Penkovskiy's bold action constitutes an important chapter in the lengthy annals of espionage, this volume is likely to figure prominently in that chapter. His informative observations on the Soviet system provide very sobering reading and serve as a corrective to some of the palliatives which have gained currency of late.

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Power Transformed. BY ROBERT M. MACIVER.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964.
Pp. 244. \$5.00.)

"In this book Professor MacIver reflects upon the role power has played in the first half of this century and which it is likely to play in the future. The first part, "The Miscalculations of the Mighty," contains reflections on the historic forces and government mistakes which caused the First World War, the instability and disintegration of the interwar period, the Second World War, and the disorders following it. This part is not so much in the nature of history or theory as of the personal reflections of a morally committed man who deplores the intellectual and moral limitations of the men of power and the sufferings these men have brought to mankind. Professor MacIver remembers with nostalgia the golden age that ended in 1914, and he beholds with horror "the manner in which power and folly often go hand in hand." The chapter headings of this part express the author's mood: "The Ending of an Age of Peace" deals with the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; "The World at War and an Evil Peace," with the First World War and its immediate aftermath; "The Spineless Years," with the interwar period; "Armageddon," with the Second World War; and "The Climactic Stultification of Power," with the period since the end of the Second World War.

In Part Two, "The Great Historical Trends," Professor MacIver juxtaposes "irresponsible power, cloaked in authority and safeguarded by the indoctrinations, the rituals, and the usages sustained by the powerful" to "social power, with its numerous and very diverse manifestations." The latter performs useful social functions through the manifestations of the creative mind, knowledge, personality, and organization. It is the burden of Professor MacIver's argument that our period of history

witnesses a radical shift in "the residence, the distribution, the character, and the structure of the prevailing forms of power. In the process the role of functional power has been greatly enhanced and that of arbitrary power diminished, with consequences of great significance to social man. The process of transformation has now reached a crucial stage." We have now reached a stage of the development of mankind which witnesses the opening up of new sources of power—knowledge, technology, and wealth—enabling it to solve its outstanding problems, especially war and poverty.

The correctness of Professor MacIver's historical analysis is not open to doubt. All of history testifies to the stupidity, arbitrariness, and selfishness of the holders of power. It is also true that the historic process has transformed power, limiting, restraining, controlling its use, even though one can hardly speak of "progress" in a linear sense. Finally the unprecedented magnitude of the new sources of power which the modern age puts at man's disposal are clear for all to see.

It is, however, a moot question whether we can draw from these obvious facts the author's optimistic conclusions. Professor MacIver equates rational possibilities with empirical trends. This is the classic position of nineteenth-century liberalism as well as of Marxism. Political power is evil, the rational means of getting rid of political power are at hand, and thus it is inevitable that we will get rid of political power. While the liberals thought that this result would be achieved gradually and organically through the ascendancy of reason, espe-

cially by way of social reform, the Marxists expected from the cataclysm of world revolution the destruction of political power and the establishment of the reign of reason.

The basic fallacy of this position lies in the qualitative equation of man's power over man and man's power over nature. The two are not interchangeable; rather the latter serves as a means to the ends of the former. The future is determined not by technological developments but by the decisions made in the political sphere. The powers-that-be have at their disposal the technical means to abolish, if they so decide, war, poverty, and many of the other evils which have been the result of the scarcity of natural resources. Yet the very ability of the powers-that-be to achieve these benefits for mankind has also enormously strengthened their power over their subjects. Thus it is not by accident that the age which in the span of a few decades has increased man's power over nature so as to leave all previous increases far behind, is also the age of totalitarian governments. The enormously increased power over nature has also enormously increased the ability to exert power over men.

Thus technological change is in essence politically ambivalent. The political purpose for which it will be used is not inherent in technology; it is a function of political decision. What is rationally possible is not for that reason also empirically probable. One might wish that it were, but historic experience does not support so optimistic an equation.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, METHODOLOGY

Georg Lukacs' Marxism. Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution: A Study in Utopia and Ideology.
By VICTOR ZITTA. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xv, 305. \$8.05.)

Georg Lukacs has been characterized as one of the few Marxists of Communist affiliation still worth studying for his own sake.* This evaluation chiefly rests upon his *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, a collection of essays published in 1923 and subsequently repudiated by the author after Communist leaders condemned it for idealistic relapses into Hegelianism and made "Lukacsism" a term of abuse.

His long career has been marked by paradox. The principal essay in the collection, "Reification and Proletarian Consciousness," was written in Vienna's Steinhof lunatic asylum, where Lukacs, who had been Commissar of Culture in Bela Kun's shortlived Communist regime of 1919, was confined with other revolutionary leaders after the regime's fall. The deviationist philosopher-commissar then proceeded to survive Stalin's purges while living and working in Russia in the 1930's, returned to postwar Hungary to become a professor under Rakosi's dictatorship, joined with Nagy in another shortlived Hungarian revolution in 1956, and now, improbably, is living and working in Budapest at the age of eighty.

What mainly explains the recent growth of interest in Lukacs' Marxism is its Hegelian orientation and its emphasis upon the theme of alienation, which is now increasingly seen to have been a central one in the Marxism of Marx. Lukacs came to Marxism by young Marx's own route—via German philosophy, Hegel in particular. He reached an interpretation according to which alienation and the dialectic are the basic conceptions in Marxism. In the essay just mentioned, he undertook to show that even Marx's *Capital*, seemingly a work of economics, rests on fundamentally Hegelian notions.

This reading of Marxism was very original for its time. Marx, it is true, had invited such an interpretation by various Delphic utterances to the effect that he had come to his "materialist conception of history" through an *inversion* of Hegel's idealist conception. But this was not taken very seriously by a later generation of Marxists who saw the Hegelian derivation of

Marxism as a tenuous affair and the Marxist conception of history as a sort of inductive generalization from historical facts.

Marx's unpublished papers contained, however, a time-bomb destined to explode those assumptions. Not suspecting that such a thing was possible, the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow put out in the 1930's the previously unknown manuscripts of 1844 which record the genesis of Marxism in Marx's mind. Marx, it transpired, had indeed reached Marxism via an inversion of Hegelianism: He saw Hegel's phenomenology, in which Spirit experiences self-alienation and ultimate self-realization in the person of man, as an upside-down rendition of actual history as a dialectic of *man's* alienation in the life of material production ("alienated labor") and his ultimate self-recovery in "communism." In this special sense he built Marxism on the premise that Hegelianism was true.

Thus Lukacs' "Hegelianization of Marxism" (the phrase is Professor Zitta's) can now be seen to have had a real basis in Marx's own formulation of Marxism as an inverted Hegelianism. But how valid was Marx's system-building procedure? Was Hegel's phenomenology really an idealistic misrepresentation of real history seen as an economic dialectical process? Appropriately, it was Lukacs, much later, who set out to answer these important questions affirmatively. In *Der Junge Hegel* (1948) he found a key to the rise and meaning of Hegelianism in the influence of Adam Smith and the labor theory of value on young Hegel. And to cap the paradoxes of Lukacs' life in Communism, this valiant if misguided effort to validate Marx's peculiar Hegelianism by relating Hegel himself to economics has been anathematized by Soviet Marxists. It would take a Hegel to appreciate fully the irony of these misadventures of the dialectic in the minds of his Marxian intellectual descendants.

Professor Zitta has made a timely contribution with this first book-length study of Lukacs in English. A voluminous bibliography of Lukacs' writings and literature on him enhances its value. The book is at once a biography of Lukacs in his earlier years and a study of the evolution of his Marxism to the work of 1923, after which point it breaks off. The two aspects of the study are brought together in what appears to this reader an unconvincing psychological interpretation of Lukacs as a thinker and historical actor. Unfor-

* Morris Watnick, "Relativism and Class Consciousness: Georg Lukacs," in L. Labedz, ed., *Revisionism*. (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 153.

tunately, moreover, the book's merits are counterweighted with serious defects: a style that is oracular and obscure in places, a tendency of the argument to bog down in a welter of erudite detail and footnotes, and insufficient exposition of Lukacs' argumentation in its own terms. The work is recommended for specialists only.—ROBERT C. TUCKER, *Princeton University*.

America: Purpose and Power. EDITED BY GENE LYONS. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Pp. 384. \$7.95.)

To evaluate this collection of essays is difficult. The fact that they exist within the covers of a single volume calls for focal criticism. Yet the most salient feature of the book is its unevenness. The best of the essays are perceptive, candid, and—at times—exciting. Both Kalman Silvert and Vincent Starzinger have written such pieces. The remaining selections are correct, but often tedious. The worst essays are very bad indeed. Roger Brown's solemn description of America's world mission "to improve the lot of man" is hard to take seriously.

Unevenness of quality, however, is the least burden this volume has to bear. The crucial question is whether or not the book achieves in any measure what the authors present as its goal. What seems to be central to the work is squarely placed in the title: the relationship of purpose and power. Editor Gene Lyons asserts that intentions divorced from reality have too often distorted United States policy. Power as Lyons sees it is not the corruption of high purpose, but the necessary reality of relating means to ends. On the other hand, power without good intent is equally vulgar. Hence, purpose must be welded to the realities of power. To this relationship the authors are to address themselves using as raw material the facts of American life.

Who would deny Lyons' assertions? Good intentions left unrealized remain as worthless in politics as in religion. To escape triviality the argument must be beefed up empirically or conceptually. Unfortunately, both dimensions remain anemic in the essays. After Brown's pious observations on American history, we are treated to some better interpretations of United States problems ranging from military policy to the civil rights struggle. Yet, in spite of an impressive range of subjects, none of the contributors draws general inferences about power and purpose beyond his immediate area. Only Starzinger incorporates the two concepts directly into his essay. At no point in the entire book is either power or purpose defined.

These omissions are hardly accidental, since we are told in the opening pages that no two authors would agree on the meaning of these concepts. If

anything, this dramatically illuminates the problem. The fundamental malaise of American policy is purported to be the ill fit of purpose with power. What explains the malaise better than this: that a year of discussion on this problem by thoughtful men yields only random viewpoints. To examine root problems entails clarifying our thoughts before turning to fragmented issues. If the authors had constructed an authentic framework to hold the volume together, general conclusions embracing all of the areas might have been realized. As it is, the book falls considerably short of its stated purpose. We are left with a collection of essays, some penetrating, some oblique, but each of which must be evaluated independently of the others.—FRED M. FROHOCK, *Syracuse University*.

The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict. BY SIDNEY F. GIFFIN (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965. Pp. 191. \$4.95.)

This book, a brief, highly readable, and often humorous introduction to crisis gaming, consists of two distinct parts. In the first four chapters General Giffin examines the antecedents of gaming, from an ancient Indian version of chess, through "free" and "rigid" *Kriegsspiele* to contemporary "cousins" such as business games, simulations of various types, and construction of alternative futures.

The technique of crisis gaming, the purpose of which is "to achieve plausible simulations of possible international conflicts which the players ought then to resolve without either a compromise of vital interests or resort to warfare" (p. 71), is described in Chapter 5. But this is not a "how to do it" manual. Despite some detailed advice ("For ready identification, communications are best produced on paper colored to identify the source. Ordinary white paper is useful for administrative purposes, light blue for the Blue team," etc.) the reader hoping to try his hand at gaming in research or in the classroom will need to consult other sources in the simulation literature.

Decision-making in a game is illustrated in more detail by two chapter-length scenarios. The first is a blow-by-blow account of the Cuban missile crisis as it might have developed in a simulation. General Giffin points out that the starting scenario is "too fantastic for serious consideration," but both the Washington and Moscow decision-makers are given high marks in crisis management. Almost a third of the book is then devoted to describing a game developed around a crisis in Kashmir (vintage 1966), in which a Soviet-American coalition emerges to check a Sino-Pakistani drive against Kashmir and India.

In answering the question "Is the game worth

the candle," the author's optimism is tempered by caution. He concludes that the utility of gaming exercises is limited to the education of those taking part; the hope (or fear) that simulation might serve as a source of either prediction or policy is firmly dismissed.

One serious flaw mars an otherwise interesting introduction to gaming. General Giffin's enthusiasm for simulation as an educational experience is matched by his doubts of its value in research. A short, and wholly gratuitous, discussion in Chapter 5 of the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) developed at Northwestern University begins with the familiar saw about students not behaving like nations any more than rats behave like people. But after acknowledging that in some respects rats *do* behave like people, the author levels the more damning charge that INS results are largely "gimmicked" by the experimenter: "As someone said, if you introduce rabbits into a hat you should not be surprised at what comes out." (P. 54.) As evidence he presents a parody of an INS study which misrepresents even its purpose. General Giffin's healthy skepticism toward the entire gaming technique suggests that he might have contributed a valuable critique on simulation as a source of data on international behavior; instead he has chosen to aim his barbs at a caricature.—OLE R. HOLSTI, *Stanford University*.

Mathematics and Politics. BY HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965. Pp. v, 152. \$1.50.)

How much can one say about mathematics and politics in one hundred and fifty pages? As Hayward Alker shows in *Mathematics and Politics*, one can say a great deal. This is at the same time both the virtue and the problem of this pioneering book.

The virtue of *Mathematics and Politics* lies in Alker's skillful and highly imaginative demonstration of mathematics' relevance to various kinds of political inquiry. His first chapter sketches out the importance of mathematical thinking in classical Greek political theory. Chapter Two states the concerns of modern political inquiry in terms of the allocation of values and relates these concerns to qualitative and quantitative measurement of political phenomena. Philosophical concepts of equality and matching operational measures are the subjects of Chapter Three. Imaginary data inspired by Aristotle's collection of 150 city-state constitutions are used to investigate two-variable relationships in Chapter Four, employing Aristotle's proposition that unprovoked aggression will invite attack upon the aggressor. Chapter Five takes up relationships between more than two variables by examining the effect of economic development on the association

between government spending and political participation. Chapter Six on correlation and causation makes its point by testing three competing theories on the causes and effects of Negro voting in the South. The concluding chapter on game theory advances the familiar but instructive paradox which occurs when voters are confronted with more than two alternatives for which preferences are not transitive. Alker's choice of examples and manner of presentation clearly indicate his concern for political analysis.

The title *Mathematics and Politics* may mislead some into thinking that the book deals with such things as functions of variables, matrix algebra, and stochastic models. Because Chapters Four, Five, and Six—which together make up more than half of the book—treat topics that are commonly included in statistics books, perhaps *Statistics and Politics* may have been a more accurate title. But by any name, the book applies quantitative analysis to a variety of patently political research questions.

The problem of the book lies in its very meaty nature. Little books are often taken for introductory books. By its size and survey-type chapter headings, *Mathematics and Politics* may be especially deceptive this way. The audience or market for which the book was written is not clear, but it does not seem suitable for students who lack prior training in statistics. To be sure, Alker at times handles the reader as if he were a rank beginner. Example: "For two dichotomous (two-part) attributes, such displays are called '2×2 contingency tables.' The 'dependent' attribute (which is to be explained) is presented vertically on the left side of the tables, while the 'independent' (explanatory) attribute is labeled horizontally." (P. 57.) Alker also points out that only basic algebra is needed to follow his formula derivations and proofs. Granted—but the lengthy derivations and proofs *per se* seem out of place in a book designed to introduce statistical applications to mathematically uninclined students.

But the most important obstacle to the beginner is the very concise nature of the book. Although Alker's writing is admirably clear, he just does not devote enough background information on his topics for the uninitiated reader. Many examples can be chosen to illustrate the point but two should suffice: Guttman scaling is covered from the beginning through the calculation of the Coefficient of Reproducibility in a scant two pages; game theory goes from zero-sum games through minimax strategy, saddle points, non-zero-sum games, Pareto optima, and Nash's Theorem in a breathless ten pages. The coverage is smooth enough, but it is far too fast for the student who has to be told what a contingency table is.

What then is the proper place for the book in

the curriculum? As Alker himself states, "The book is most emphatically not a 'how-to-do-it' cookbook of statistics for political scientists." (P. iii.) Although it is not a suitable introduction to statistics, the book may well be used as a supplementary text for statistics courses—especially those taught in other departments. But *Mathematics and Politics* seems to have its greatest value as a refresher, stimulant, and organizer of knowledge for political scientists who have already had statistics. Alker's book will forcefully remind them of mathematics' contribution to precision in political research. Features of the book that will prove especially instructive in this regard are his presentation of various measures of inequality, the interpretation of qualitative associations in terms of *form* as well as strength of relationships, the utilization of "dummy" variables in applying quantitative analysis to qualitative data, his discussion of the explanatory power of multivariate equations of relationships, and his concern with elaboration and identification of casual relationships.

To me, the most disappointing part of the book is the treatment of "Political Judgment and Statistical Significance" in the Appendix. I had hoped that Alker would grapple directly with the problem of determining the statistical significance of relationships found among data on *whole* populations, which often interest political scientists, instead of relationships found within *sample* data, which form the mainstay of psychologists and sociologists. But we cannot expect Alker to treat all aspects of quantitative political analysis in one book. We need more books and articles on mathematics and politics. In short, we need to develop a *literature* of mathematical analysis for political scientists. Alker has made a fine start on this task. Let us hope others follow, and soon.—KENNETH JANDA, *Northwestern University*.

Mathematical Applications in Political Science.

EDITED BY JOHN M. CLAUNCH. (Dallas: The Arnold Foundation, Southern Methodist University, 1965. Pp. vi, 85. \$1.00, paperbound.)

Four essays circulated to a National Science Foundation two-week conference on uses of mathematics in political analysis have been made available to a larger audience. The kinds of mathematics, the strategies for using mathematics, and the substantive applications demonstrate that mathematical analysis takes many forms indeed. S. Sidney Ulmer uses stochastic process models to fit Supreme Court decisions, Senate roll calls, and state electoral returns. Harold Guetzkow recalls how he and his colleagues, in inventing Inter-Nation Simulation, converted their assumptions about processes of international politics to arithmetical statements. (This paper, incidentally, is valuable for its description of choices and com-

promises that scholars inevitably must make in the early stages of their research but that are rarely reported in their completed work.) William H. Riker, in the mathematically most elegant of these chapters, shows the deductive prowess of set theory applied to "the paradox of voting," or decision making, in legislatures or committees and finds data consistent with the deductions. (Like an earlier essay of his, this chapter should be consulted by anyone interested in ways in which voting mechanisms affect voting outcomes.) Donald E. Stokes reports a statistical rather than a mathematical model adopted to fit data about the relationship of publics to representation in Congress.

Guetzkow's essay is much the most elementary; it can be appreciated by nonmathematical readers interested in international relations. It illustrates initial steps in building descriptive models for either formal theory or simulation.

Ulmer's contribution is primarily illustrative of Markov chain processes applied to judicial, legislative, and election statistics. The beginner will not be able to "do anything" after reading this essay, but he may be led to inquire further about the appropriateness of Markov chains in analyzing certain processes: that is, changes in one "state" depending on its state in a previous period.

Stokes's chapter, more technical than Ulmer's, exemplifies the strategy of looking for a statistical model with which certain political data correspond. Avowedly, it is not predictive or explanatory. It briefly notes an alternative model that was cast aside because it did not fit the data as well as the researchers desired. It describes the development of a "variance components" model.

Riker's use of mathematics contrasts sharply with that of Ulmer and Stokes. His is deductive; theirs, inductive. Riker's predicts the inevitability of "cyclical majorities," given certain requirements in voting. Data are sought to illustrate or confirm the prediction. Ulmer and Stokes, in contrast, do not predict, but rather search for mathematical or statistical models to which their data conform. The contributions to political theory differ also. Riker's deductive strategy leads more directly to basic political theory-building and hypothesis-testing. Ulmer's and Stokes's inductive strategy is a step less close to political theory, but it holds promise that abstract mathematical models such as Markov chains and the variance component model may fit political data as well as other kinds of data. As classical mathematics was discovered to fit such varied phenomena as gravity, diffusion rates, and arms races, so newer mathematics have a relevance quite apart from the data for which they were originally invented.

What this collection of excellent papers lacks is a head-on confrontation of the contrasting and complementary values of deductive and induc-

tive strategies. As it stands, the pamphlet reminds one of Conant's cases in the history of science. Now that political scientists have ventured into mathematics, they need materials on the strategy and tactics of mathematical applications. Such an exercise in "science of science" would lend perspective to and would clarify issues about alternative uses of different mathematics beyond what is possible in individual illustrations.—JAMES A. ROBINSON, *The Ohio State University*.

The ABS Guide to Recent Publications in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. (New York: The American Behavioral Scientist, 1965. Pp. xxi, 781. \$19.95.)

Listing, with brief annotations, of over 6,600 books and articles published from 1957 through 1964. Essentially a compilation of items which appeared in the "New Studies" section of *American Behavioral Scientist* during these years.—C. B.

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3. University of Iowa
4. University of Chicago
5. University of North Carolina

6. University of California at Santa Barbara
7. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
8. American University
9. Washington State University
10. Acadia University, Canada
11. Institute for Social Research, Oslo
12. Washington University
13. San Jose State College
14. Michigan State University
15. University of California at Davis
16. University of Michigan
17. Purdue University
18. University of Massachusetts
19. University of Pennsylvania
20. University of Alberta
21. University of Minnesota
22. University of Kentucky
23. Rutgers University
24. University of Waterloo, Canada
25. University of Arizona
26. University of California at Berkeley
27. Wayne State University
28. University of Kansas
29. Technion-Israel Institute of Technology
30. University of Texas
31. Ohio State University
32. University of Denver
33. The Johns Hopkins University
34. University of Illinois
35. Stanford University
36. Naval Medical Research Institute
37. California State College at Long Beach
38. Wesleyan University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization. EDITED BY MORRIS JANOWITZ. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964. Pp. 369. \$6.50.)

This fascinating book begins with a brief, stimulating introduction by the editor and ends with a useful bibliographical note by Moshe Lissak on revolutions and coups d'etat in developing nations. In between there are eight research studies grouped about four major themes: managerial forms and succession; professional socialization in the military; cohesion in small military groups under prolonged stress; and career commitments and patterns in the military services. All the research studies focus on the American military establishment, and their unifying concern is with the structural and behavioral changes in that establishment.

As a whole, this collection vividly demonstrates the opportunities for fruitful sociological research in the military field. Sample survey data

are used by Albert Biderman in his study of military retirement problems, by John P. Lovell in his analysis of the professional socialization of the West Point cadet, by Mayer Zald and William Simon in their discussion of career commitments and opportunities among officers, and by Oscar Grusky in his fascinating comparison of turnover on a military installation and in a business organization. Participant observation techniques are employed by Roger Little in a study of interpersonal relations in a Korean War combat platoon. Maury Feld uses content analysis to trace the changing military self-image as reflected in service journals. Biderman, Zald and Simon, and Kurt Lang in his analysis of the military career structure employ aggregate statistics. Finally, Richard Seaton reports the results of a controlled experiment in which several small military groups were subjected to extreme deprivation in a variety of circumstances on the Greenland ice cap. In this case such use of human

guinea pigs probably could only occur in a military environment.

If these essays illustrate the applicability of the standard sociological methods to military subjects, they also in one instance demonstrate that such techniques can be equally well misused when applied to such subjects. Roger Little's study is a perfect demonstration of how a social scientist can force a category—"the buddy concept"—on to data where it has little or no relevance. Little's own description of his interviews suggests that the whole concept of "buddies" was one which was only latent and primitively developed in his platoon until he brought the concept into the platoon's cognitive universe by insisting that his interviewees name their buddies. His most fascinating finding, indeed, is that in a majority of cases if "A" named "B" as his buddy "B" did not name "A" as his buddy. In his own words: "The men were reluctant to designate one or more specific persons as a buddy. Once they had made a choice, however, they talked extensively about him, although the man designated rarely reciprocated the choice." (P. 198.) In the absence of mutual awareness of a buddy relationship, it is hard to see that the relationship was very meaningful. The Little evidence offers little support for the Little conclusion that "Buddy relationships were the basic element of infantry social organization in the Korean Conflict." (P. 221.) In a volume which is otherwise so methodologically sophisticated and precise, it is unfortunate that Little was allowed to indulge in a primitive interviewing error and to pronounce conclusions so divorced from his data.

Several of the essays draw interesting comparisons among the four American military services, and Biderman includes a brief comparison of the American military's retirement problems with those of the British military. The most fascinating comparisons, however, are those between American military and civilian life in the Grusky, Lang, and Lovell studies. These are particularly relevant because a major theme of the volume, which the editor has explicitly formulated and developed at length in his book on *The Professional Soldier*, concerns the narrowing of the gap between the military and civilian worlds. The evidence in the present volume, however, turns in a mixed verdict on this proposition. Grusky stresses the effects which the differences between the rapid succession on a military base and the more leisurely turnover in a business organization have on executive homogeneity, organizational identification, and community involvement. Lang's figures on the distribution of occupations among enlisted men and in the civilian economy show that one quarter of the soldiers are in jobs with no civilian equivalent and

one-fifth of civilians in jobs with no military equivalent. More significantly, even where the same general types of occupations exist in both worlds, the distribution of jobs is strikingly different. In general, the proportion of higher-skilled positions is much greater in the military than in civilian life. Conversely, almost 27% of the civilian male labor force but only 5.4% of enlisted men consisted of "operatives and laborers." Finally, Lovell's comparison of the strategic perspectives of West Point cadets and Dartmouth students cannot help but be somewhat disturbing. The evidence suggests that freshmen at both institutions arrive with what Janowitz has termed "absolutist" strategic perspectives. West Point seniors apparently do not differ much from West Point freshmen. Dartmouth seniors, however, have a much more "pragmatic" approach than do Dartmouth freshmen. Clearly, as other studies have also shown, four years in a liberal arts college tend to produce more moderate and liberal views on foreign policy, which are not produced by four years at West Point. Taken together, these three studies indicate that important differences still exist between the military and civilian worlds in terms of bureaucratic structure and behavior, occupational profiles, and policy viewpoints.

The essays in this volume open windows on many crucial problems in military sociology and civil-military relations. Having furnished us with these tantalizing glimpses, it is to be hoped that the editor and his associates, as well as others, will continue their work and produce more studies on the subjects which are necessarily treated in such brief compass in this tightly organized collection.—SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, *Harvard University*.

Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel Edward L. Bernays. BY EDWARD L. BERNAYS. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. Pp. 849. \$12.95.)

This is an interesting, entertaining book. For some it is a bit disturbing. It has the reading appeal of a doctor's diary or the case histories of a lawyer's client relationships. In clear, simple prose Bernays reviews his promotional activities for the last fifty years. The book reveals him to be a warm, friendly person, socially minded, independent, individualistic, gifted to an extraordinary degree with imagination, insight, shrewdness, vigor; a family man devoted to wife, children, and relatives, and one who has spent a major part of his life trying to raise the level and status of his profession.

His list of clients over the years reads like a Who's Who in America. Among them were at least sixteen in music, drama, ballet, art; eleven

in the building and construction industry; fifty-nine in other businesses; twenty-five in communications; three in education; seven concerned with expositions of one kind or another; eleven in finance; nine in government; five proprietors of hotels; twenty-two "public interest" groups; ten retailers; twenty trade associations; five engaged in transportation; three labor unions; and twenty-three individuals. The book is, indeed, a moving panorama of social, political, and economic life in the United States during the last half century. The vantage point of a public relations man provides a focus which is unusual and revealing.

Mr. Bernays does more than describe the strategies and tactics he used to promote clients such as Dinghileff's Ballet Russe, the American Tobacco Company, Light's Golden Jubilee, Clare Booth Luce, or William O'Dwyer. He gives intimate, candid portraits, sketches, and characterizations of twentieth century business leaders, bankers, government officials, and would-be opinion managers as he saw them behind stage, at home and at play, when others were not looking and these publicity seekers were really themselves. TV's candid camera is usually amusing. ELB's shots are not always so.

As the story of client promotions unfolds, certain basic methods or techniques are used repeatedly. First, there is the indirect and partially hidden approach. The client's real objective is concealed by waving a wand in the direction of a somewhat related public interest such as health, safety, cleanliness, or peace. Then this public interest is further dramatized by setting up a committee, institute, foundation, or "front" of some kind headed by as many prominent and respected people as possible. Finally, every effort is made to use media and opinion leaders to disseminate the message as effectively as possible. Mr. Bernays' skill in enlisting outstanding people to serve the cause of private as well as public interests, from promoting plays and the ballet to selling soap and cigars, is at times almost incredible.

Here and there Bernays gives pithy expression to lessons learned. "When a non-paying client asks for advice I have found that since it has not been paid for it is not usually acted on." (P. 704.) "The notion that business decisions are the result of more and better deliberations than those in government has no basis in fact." (P. 750.) "I have refused to advise several men who asked me to aid them to become President of the United States because I believed they were unfit for the office." (P. 694.) "Any memoir reflects a selective process, omission is a better index of the character of the writer than content." (P. 678.)

Why does the book disturb? Because it reveals so poignantly certain activities which have be-

come more and more imbedded in our social and economic life. Mr. Bernays did not invent them, of course. He has merely embellished them. The biography of an idea turns out to be, not so much the story of the development of public relations in the better sense of that term—that is: a real two-way street, a real effort to adjust and reconcile conflicts of interests. It is rather the biography of promotion in the twentieth century, essentially one-sided propaganda. Much of the promotional work described relies to a degree on deception. Some of the deception is as harmless as the card tricks of a magician. Much is not. Referring to some of Harry Reichenbach's tricks to sell Obesitea, Bernays says, "And Harry, whose analytical, imaginative mind might have been harnessed to more constructive purposes, continued to hoax the press and the public until his death in 1931." (P. 203.) However, on the very next page Bernays writes, "But any plea made by LeBoutillier's importer's association would be suspect because of its obvious self-interest. I decided a nonpartisan committee of women speaking on behalf of the consumer would best enlist nation-wide opinion against the detrimental clause." He referred to a clause in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Bill.

In one case Reichenbach used actresses to create a false impression of the demand for Obesitea. In the other a panel of women was used to give what may have been a false impression of public demand for changes in a tariff bill. Is deception, however elaborate, refined, or expensive really in the public interest?—HARWOOD L. CHILDS, *Princeton University*.

Censorship: Government and Obscenity. BY TERRANCE J. MURPHY. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1963. Pp. 294. \$5.50.)

Censorship: The Search for the Obscene. BY MORRIS L. ERNST AND ALAN V. SCHWARTZ. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964. Pp. 288. \$6.00.)

The first prosecution for obscenity occurred in 1663 when an Englishman was penalized "for shewing himself naked in a balkony, and throwing down bottles (pist in) . . . among the people in Covent Garden, *contra pacem* . . ." (Harvard Law Review, Dec., 1957, 348.)

Obscenity is still *contra pacem* but the meaning is less clear today. These two books before us echo the American search for meaning pursued by Congress, the courts, and community from the Puritan concern through the Comstockian crusade to the reformulation of judicial standards from Hicklin to Woolsey to Warren. Yet these books are not duplicates, for each represents different sides in the social conflict about what is obscene.

Protection of the young against corruption has been the primary motivation of those seeking to proscribe the obscene. Such protection is deemed equivalent to that against impure foods and polluted water, a danger sufficiently obvious to require state regulation. Sometimes such regulation has taken the form of prior restraint (as in film censorship), and at other times it has involved extensive post-restraint (as in widespread state obscenity laws). But always these state efforts have been implemented—if not stimulated—by private groups who worry about the moral lessons which media teach (vide Comstockery and the Legion of Decency).

Only in the last several decades have these guardians of the young come on hard times, and that by action of the Supreme Court. Censorship has been all but gutted (*Burstyn v. Wilson*, 1952, et seq.), and private group efforts to assume state powers have been expressly forbidden (*Bantam Books v. Sullivan*, 1963), although still continuing more covertly. Post-restraint prosecution remains, although confused by the Court's statements on what obscenity means.

On one side the Court is urged to—and local prosecutors accept—the view that the tidal wave of literary expression which technology and increased education make possible constitutes a great danger. Terrence Murphy's work, far removed from Comstockery in its restrained analysis, is a reasoned statement of this view. The normative conclusions he offers would, while critical of censorship, see a vital community need in some effective controls over the spate of "hard core pornography," with standards set by "the great bulk of the people." His empirical analysis demonstrates that Congress has consistently acted in these terms but that the Court has opposed them in recent years. He recommends new laws protecting youth without limiting adults' access to expression and urges prosecution of existing laws against pornography.

On the other side, the Court is urged to—and has largely accepted—the view that while obscenity is not protected constitutionally, restraints on expression must be clearly justified and operate from explicit standards. Ernst and Schwartz, while more restrained in this dialogue than Mencken ("bluenosed smut sniffers," he called exponents of Comstockery), differ sharply from those who see increased danger in the present communication surge. For them, the dangers of restriction outweigh those of expression. It follows that they applaud the Court's loosening of restraints, as do publishers, artists, film-makers, etc.

Caught in this confluence of ideologies, the Court has moved toward the Ernst-Schwartz view. But it is presently deeply uncertain of the

meaning of obscenity and far from clarifying it. The nadir of confusion may have been reached in 1964 when Justice Stewart Potter wrote that maybe he could never define intelligibly hard core pornography, "But I know it when I see it . . ." (*Jacobellis v. Ohio*).

Essentially the problem is one of trying to define a single standard for a nation of pluralist standards. If one applies the standard of the national community, as the Court seems now to suggest to the delight of libertarians, whose definition of "national" do we accept and who judges violation? Can a jury in Huntsville, Alabama, apply national standards of art? Or does it mean that the Court itself ends up as the judges? With the Court determining fact and not law by reviewing personally each book or film challenged, do we thereby substitute censors in robes for those in business suits—a condition which the Potter doctrine produces? Further, if one applies local standards, as some would have it, who protects the individual against a local majority whose ideas of art have not risen above the *Reader's Digest* or Norman Rockwell?

And how clear is the danger to youth in unrestrained expression? I know of no libertarian who would permit a dope pusher to hawk his wares in a high school yard at recess time. Murphy treats the question directly, developing clinical evidence which supports his thesis that some media can have anti-social effects; the other authors ignore it. However, the Gluecks' immense study of juvenile delinquency finds pornography or violent comic books not to be causative factors; the recent Kinsey study of the sex offender reaches similar findings. This question of social effect is a serious question which needs fuller analysis, for it is the premise which both sides accept.*

Thus the study of obscenity conflict provides rich material for more than the legalist. It is at once of interest to the specialist in normative theory, the policy process, and causation analysis. These two volumes provide an illuminating survey of the material, written with clarity, style, and forcefulness. They attest how far in complexity, as well as time, we are from the Covent Garden episode.

The Future of Old Neighborhoods: Rebuilding for a Changing Population. By BERNARD J. FRIEDEN.

* The complexity of the causation analyses involved may be seen from the annotated bibliography, *The Influence of the Cinema on Children and Adolescents*, Mass Communication Techniques Division of UNESCO, Report 31, 1961. A similar report on TV, *loc. cit.*, Report 43, 1964.—FREDERICK M. WIRT, *Denison University*.

(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964. Pp. vii, 209. \$7.50.)

It is encouraging to see city planners begin to deal with the urbanism in multifactor dimensions of economics, sociology, and politics. At a recent conference, for example, planners were advised to develop programs and take action to deal with the problem of broken homes and unstable families as the most effective way to combat community disintegration. This is a long way from the palliatives of the 1930s, when slum clearance and public housing were vigorously proposed as the single most important cure-all of the ills of modern city life.

Bernard Frieden, editor of the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, presents a careful examination of the gray-area hypothesis, which holds that the market for new housing will decisively reject locations in declining neighborhoods in favor of vacant lands in fringe areas or suburban locations. The author rejects the hypothesis upon thorough comparative analysis of three cities: New York, Los Angeles, and Hartford. He finds instead that the fundamental problems are not economic alone but environmental and social as well. In fact, he believes that the economics of rebuilding our cities are much more amenable to the influence of public policy than are the social factors which determine the rebuilding of old neighborhoods, even if the real estate and banking interests could be enticed to invest in such declining areas.

Frieden examines three public policy alternatives and the constraints generally placed upon these policies. The first alternative is to await the natural abandonment of declining areas and defer building until only a few people remain and site acquisition costs have fallen. The second is to rebuild declining areas gradually so that new housing develops in response to demand. The third, which was in practice during the 1950s, is the large-scale clearance of areas where minorities reside in an effort to rebuild them for new middle-upper income markets. The author prefers the second alternative, the more gradual approach, and cites New York City's west side urban renewal project as a good example. But it hardly fulfills his criterion of declining use. The planners were reluctant to include much, if any, public housing for low-income minority groups in the total plan. However, public housing represented a gradual approach from another point of view in that planning and gaining acceptance required more than a decade.

Herein lies the major criticism of this study—that is, Frieden's conception of public policy-making. While the author is fully abreast of the latest legislative proposals and the tools provided hous-

ing officials and planners, he is far too optimistic about his gradual approach and the ability of public policy-makers to arrive at the tough decisions necessary to regulate the economic and social worlds. His study provides little information on how political decisions are made or their economic and social conditions. This is all the more interesting because there are many political scientists connected with the Joint Center for Urban Studies at M.I.T.-Harvard. Perhaps they have not yet joined the various disciplines, but I would highly recommend that they spend more time communicating with each other.—BERT E. SWANSON, *Sarah Lawrence College*.

Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs. BY ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965. Pp. 253. \$1.25.)

Political scientists teaching and supervising research in the areas of state and local government, metropolitan politics, and legislative reapportionment would be well advised to alert their students to this government document.

The report demonstrates, with an impressive array of statistical data, that American cities and suburbs do not differ substantially in their social and economic characteristics. Thus in the cities 57 per cent of those over 25 years of age have not finished high school, whereas the figure for the same group in the suburbs is only one percentage point lower. So far as income is concerned, virtually the same proportions of city and suburban families are found in the Under \$4000, the \$4000-\$8000, the \$8000-\$15,000, and the Over \$15,000 groups. It is even concluded that "unsound housing . . . is much more conspicuous in the suburbs than in the central cities."

If all this is so then a lot of myths are due to be shattered. For we are going to have to discard our commonsense observation that, generally speaking, suburbs are materially better-off than the cities they surround. Indeed according to this report suburbanites emerge as just about as poorly educated, paid, and are even worse housed than their urban brothers. We know that there are pockets of poverty in most suburbs and that not all such areas are well-manicured developments filled with white-collared commuters. But on the strength of the Commission's findings we are going to have to go a lot further in rejecting or revising our stereotypes about suburban life.

The only problem is that despite the fact that all of the tables in this report contain parallel columns labelled "central city" and "suburbs," the figures they present do not at all add up to a contrast of those familiar entities. What are

juxtaposed, rather, are indices of social and economic conditions in the central cities of the 212 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the United States with conditions in the *non-city* territory of the *counties* containing those central cities. Thus, in aggregate, the report contrasts the 58 million people in the 200 or so central cities with the almost 55 million people remaining in the counties after the central city population has been subtracted. Indeed, there is the curious assumption that the nation now contains almost as many suburbanites as it does city-dwellers.

The so-called "metropolitan areas" of the Census Bureau's SMSA's are, for the most part, misnamed. An SMSA always includes an *entire county*, or occasionally more than one county. Such a whole county may properly be called a "suburb" if it happens to be Westchester. But in going down the list of the 200 SMSA's, one soon encounters such "metropolitan" counties as Black Hawk (central city: Waterloo, Iowa), Blair (Altoona, Pennsylvania), Lane (Eugene, Oregon), and Yellowstone (Billings, Montana).

Most significant, the non-city parts of most of the Census' SMSA's are primarily rural and small town. Take Asheville, North Carolina, which is one of the SMSA's used in this report. The central city has a population of 60,192. The rest of Buncombe County, which the report classes as *entirely* suburban, has no less than 69,882 people. It should be clear that whatever suburban fringe there is to Asheville must be a fairly small ring: yet the SMSA—and the Commission Report—marches on out to the end of the county line, taking in thousands of farmhouses and several dozen villages and small towns.

No wonder, then, that the non-city population of the SMSA's shows up so poorly in social and economic terms. This population is a melange of high-status suburbanites mixed indiscriminately with low-status rural people. They average out so as to appear comparable to the middle-status city-dwellers. The authors of the report, in a one-page aside, admit that "the effect of including these non-urban residents may be to lower the suburban averages which include both wealthy

and poor suburban jurisdictions. . . ." However even here they persist in calling rural and small town people "suburban" and they go right on using the SMSA base despite the availability of a much more sensible alternative.

For the Census Bureau has another population grouping it calls the "urban fringe" of a central city, and this is a far better approximation of the true suburbs. Thus for Buncombe County, North Carolina, only 8,400 of the 69,882 non-Asheville residents of the county are classed as "urban fringe" population. It stands to reason that a city of about 60,000 will have suburbs of about 8,000 rather than of 70,000. Moreover the Census' report on *General Social and Economic Characteristics* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962)—an easy document to obtain—shows that "urban fringe" people are usually appreciably higher in income, education, and housing than those in the central cities. Thus the median family income for all central cities is \$5945, whereas that for their "fringe" areas is \$7114. Families with incomes over \$10,000 constitute 16.6 per cent of city families, but 24.1 per cent of "fringe" families. And so on. In other words, common sense about the suburbs was and continues to be right.

The far-fetched policy recommendations of this report, based as they are on suspect use of data, cannot be considered here. It remains only to say that the conditions, and hence the political problems, of non-city territory in SMSA's differ in character depending on whether one is dealing with the close-in suburbs or with the outlying rural portions of a county.—ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University*.

National Party Platforms: 1840-1964. COMPILED BY KIRK H. PORTER AND DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON. (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 698. \$10.75.)

This compilation contains 173 national party platforms, beginning with the Democratic platform of 1840 and ending with Democratic, Prohibition, Republican, Socialist Labor, and Socialist Workers' platforms in 1964.—J.W.P.

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FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Constituency Politics: A Study of Newcastle-under-Lyme. BY FRANK BEALEY, J. BLONDEL, AND W. P. McCANN. (London: Faber and Faber, 1965. Pp. 440. 63 shillings.)

This important study from the University of Keele is a detailed analysis of politics within a parliamentary constituency, the first of its kind to be undertaken in Britain. The constituency, embracing Newcastle Borough and the adjacent countryside, is a mixture of proletarian districts, middle-class residential wards, mining villages, and farming areas. Despite the division's heterogeneous makeup, its predominantly working-class features are reflected in the size and educational level of the non-manual classes, although there is considerable home-ownership.

In erecting the framework for their analysis, the authors present an historical treatment of local politics and a socio-economic description of the contemporary setting. They then proceed to examine the political preferences of the electorate, the composition and opinions of party memberships, and the social linkages of political leaders. In addition to census reports, the study relies upon survey data gleaned from 1,516 interviews.

The historical sections deal with the changing class nature of local leadership and trace the development of the three parties, indicating the influence of "Lib-Lab" sentiments and Josiah Wedgwood's personal "machine" upon the growth of mass party organizations. Local and national

politics were not separated until the 1940's, and the lingering influence of personalized politics and parochial rivalries has impeded efforts to impose party discipline locally. Newcastle is illustrative of areas where socially prominent groups continue to dominate local politics even though the social bases of their strength have been eroded. In a constituency of this type, the nature and style of political leadership—though difficult to measure precisely—become, in the authors' view, more influential than the sociology of the electorate. The historical dimension of the study emphasizes traditional patterns, which are linked in good part with the current scene.

The research focuses upon socio-political patterns that emerge among designated echelons of the political population. The authors have sharpened the analysis of social class by restructuring census breakdowns of occupation, and they continually relate their general findings to research done elsewhere. Reinforcing other studies, the project indicates that social class is a crucial determinant of voting behavior. While the authors found some differential voting patterns on the basis of sex, age, education, religion, and home-ownership, they prudently state that the sample size made it difficult to isolate some variables from the class factor. The self-assignment of social class by voters and the influence of homogeneous and mixed-class environments upon the voting behavior of industrial workers are interesting facets of the study.

The research also explores the degree of political interest among voters, the extent of political participation among components of the social structure, the popular "images" of the major parties, and the strength of voter attachment to the parties. Although a marked degree of consensus appeared between Conservative and Labour voters, the latter tended to be more ideologically committed than the former. Exposure to mass media had little influence upon the voters' perceptions of the two parties.

An engrossing part of the study is the comparison of membership in the three parties and the members' political outlook. These socio-economic profiles include length of residence in the district and newspaper-reading habits. Labour has the largest corps of "actives," though the Conservatives enroll a bigger group of formal members. In both parties the actives come from the higher age-brackets. Compared with Conservative voters nationally, Newcastle's Conservatives were found to hold moderate views, especially on questions of corporal punishment, conscription, and colored immigration; only a fragment of the group could be regarded as a "right-wing bloc." On the Labour side, support for left-wing positions fluctuated according to the issues, but the "left-wing core" was small, even though the MP is a "leftist." Gaitskell attracted considerable support—even from the left—but his strength resulted more from personal qualities than from his policy stands. The authors did not gauge Labour opinion on the immigration issue.

The discussion of political leadership concentrates upon the social composition and career patterns of local councillors. The authors found the political leadership in Newcastle to be diffused, with little connection between political leaders and the leaders of economic and socio-cultural groups. In some respects, this is the least satisfying part of the study. The reader becomes aware of complex patterns, but he is left with the feeling that the treatment has been somewhat sketchy.

At appropriate places in the volume, there is a well-painted portrait of the Liberal Party operating at the local level. Recent recruitment drives have had an impact upon the political awareness and views of Liberal members. Interestingly enough, they are more dissatisfied with Labour than with the Tories; they are relatively moderate on immigration, although they exhibit greater concern about competition for jobs than for housing; and they display conspicuous support for unilateralism.

The authors might have improved upon their excellent study if they had chosen their survey sample differently. By a random sampling of 100 interviewees from each administrative subdivision

(when these units varied considerably in population size and social type), the number of respondents in particular social categories was too small for the results to be conclusive. Perhaps a random selection within stratified socio-economic clusters—feasible in a heterogeneous constituency—would have permitted more effective control of certain variables and would have facilitated greater refinement of some of the data. The basic findings of the research, however, give us a splendid picture of the political and social factors at work in local areas. This study—the product of careful, imaginative scholarship—will be invaluable to students of British politics and will hopefully serve as a guide to researchers who seek to fill the need for additional studies in other parts of Britain.—JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*.

The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada. BY PETER REGENSTRIEF. (Toronto: Longmans Canada Ltd., 1965. Pp. xii, 194. \$2.95.)

The book, by a young Canadian political scientist trained and presently employed in this country, is an attempt to explain Canadian voting behavior from 1957–1963, the so-called "Diefenbaker era." The bulk of the data on which this study is based were obtained from interviews conducted by the author on behalf of several large Canadian newspapers prior to the national elections of 1958, 1962, and 1963. In addition to the usual demographic information, respondents were asked to recall their parents' party preferences, their own previous voting behavior, and to state their voting intention in the following election. As well, an effort was made to delineate their perceptions of the political parties, candidates and issues. The findings are contained in a four part analysis. The first provides the background leading to the overwhelming Conservative victory of 1958 and deals with the general context of Canadian electoral behavior during the period 1958–1963. Section two is concerned with national and section three with regional voting patterns. The last part of the book is an attempt to make some predictions about future voting behavior in Canada.

Both the most interesting and informative section is that on "National Patterns." That the author owes an intellectual debt to both Berelson and his associates and Canadian sociologist John Porter is attested to by the importance he ascribes to "elite opinion-leaders." "Opinions are formed and given impetus by upper-status groups or elites—and for Canada as a whole, this means the corporate and bureaucratic managers and the top-level politicians—and then filter down through the social system" (p. 45). His data also

lead him to suggest that Canadians do not identify as strongly or on as sustained a basis with their parties as do Americans. Like Robert Alford, he believes there is relatively little class voting in Canada: "For Canada as a whole, there is little in the way of long-term status-party linkage" (p. 98). Also, in contrast to the United States, ethnicity appears to be the most important independent variable affecting Canadian voting behavior (p. 90).

There are other equally interesting findings, some of which support the work of other scholars and a few of which are original. Unfortunately, there is also a tendency to make rather flat statements which rest lightly or in some instances are unsupported by his data (i.e., "Education is an especially useful indicator of 'leadership' in Canada compared to the United States, for example, because the Canadian educational style is still strongly elitist and ascriptive."). This is not to suggest, however, that there is a paucity of data. In fact, the endurance of even the staunchest supporter of quantitative analysis is likely to be severely taxed by the size of many of the tables. It is not uncommon to find tables with 70 or more cells, while those on pages 37 and 38, each containing 210 cells, surely must constitute some sort of record. The size of the tables in part may explain why the author nowhere tries to test the statistical significance of his findings. Measures of association are similarly lacking and the fact that he has relied on "judgment sampling" to select his respondents raises serious questions about the validity of his data. In defense of his esoteric sampling method, however, it must be said that the author was remarkably successful in predicting the outcome of the three Canadian elections in question.

Virtually no systematic empirical research on voting behavior has been carried out in Canada. Regenstreif's work is one of the first attempts to fill that void. Despite its methodological shortcomings, it deserves the attention of students of Canadian and comparative politics.—ALLAN KORNBERG, *Duke University*.

Interstate Relations in Australia. By RICHARD H. LEACH. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965. Pp. 183. \$6.00.)

Students of Australian politics and of federalism will find this short volume by Professor Leach useful. For the students of Australian politics it is another piece of descriptive and analytical research which will aid in building basic knowledge about the government of that island continent. For the student of federalism it provides further material on the ways in which states in a system of division of powers order their relationships with one another.

The book is not an in depth study, but an attempt to categorize and to describe briefly the kinds of interstate relations the Australian states maintain. Professor Leach, like other students of Australian government, found that one of the foremost problems was to collect basic data. He points out: "There were no published studies of interstate relations to draw upon." At a very minimum, the author furnishes future students with fundamental knowledge which should aid in exploring one facet of the formal and informal workings of the Australian federal system.

Professor Leach points out that interstate relations are not very highly developed in Australia and are quite different from interstate and interprovincial relations in the United States and Canada. There are only six states in Australia, and they are separated by great distances. Moreover, the two principal states, New South Wales and Victoria, which dominate Australian political, economic, social, and cultural life seem to have been more interested in combating one another than in developing relations with their four "weak sisters." Not even political parties or commerce have served as common denominators or spurs in developing close relations among the states. Professor Leach concludes "that an atmosphere of conscious state differentiation must be taken into account in any study involving Australian state government."

Despite drawbacks to a highly developed system of interstate relations, there is a fairly long history of limited interstate cooperation in Australia which pre-dates the federal union of 1901. However, it has only been in recent years that the Australian states have provided a contractual or statutory basis for their relations with one another. As Professor Leach observes: "Interstate arrangements are still new, still developing. Moreover, too little attention has been paid to the whole matter for any firm conclusions to be drawn."

While admitting the difficulty of ascribing interstate relations to a particular source, the author does use five sources for discussion purposes. Interstate relations: (1) develop out of Commonwealth inspired conferences and activities; (2) result from conferences and contacts among state officials; (3) grow out of meetings of governmental advisory groups and lay organizations; (4) come about as a result of correspondence, visits, and exchanges of information between officials of various states; and (5) develop out of formal arrangements between two or more states. Each of these topics receives attention. Examples for each topic are provided in a very brief form. Unfortunately, most of the examples are very superficial and are only of value in establishing the fact that a particular activity does in fact exist. But

as Professor Leach points out, there need to be case studies before the student can do any substantial analytical work.

The interstate arrangements which grow out of Commonwealth activities are in many ways the most important. It is doubtful if the states would have recognized the advantages of collaboration without boosts from the national government. The author indicates that without Commonwealth urging "many state officials might well have never left their offices and so been introduced to the possibilities of cooperation." For one who has worked in an American governor's office, as has the reviewer, this observation about Australia bears little relation to the peripatetic breed of state officials who inhabit American state capitals.

One of the most significant portions of Professor Leach's study is the one dealing with uniform law. Here he introduces some general items of comparability with the United States and Canada. (With the exception of this section, comparisons to practices in other federal states are present in only a few instances and are of a very general nature.) The general point which the author makes is that a greater degree of uniformity is present in both the United States and Canada, and there are powerful forces in both these countries which constantly push in this direction. On the other hand, uniform laws have only recently—and in a very limited way—become a factor in the relations among Australian states.

The absence of large scale conscious efforts to foster uniform state laws results in part from the Australians' pride in the individuality of their states and the lack of pressing need in many areas for greater uniformity. These same two factors—differences between the states and pressing need—are also drawbacks to developments in other areas of interstate relations. Throughout the study Professor Leach emphasizes the fact that the development of interstate arrangements has been slow, informal, and voluntary. This reflects state differences, but more important it indicates that Australia is still a long way from economic, political, and social integration.—CONRAD JOYNER, *University of Arizona*.

Forces Religieuses et Attitudes Politiques dans la France Contemporaine. EDITED BY RENÉ RÉMOND. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1965. Pp. ix, 408. F 25.00.)

This carefully edited volume publishes the reports submitted to a colloquium held in 1963 and summarizes the discussions which took place at that time. The participants were historians and political scientists, many of them belonging to the younger generation and almost all committed in various ways and beyond their academic pursuits to the political and religious movements

which they discuss. The documentary parts are excellent: the bibliographies of Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism and especially the annotated and commented lists of periodical publications will prove invaluable for all future research in the field.

The book makes its most important contribution to the political history of post-war France where it investigates the remarkable mutations that have occurred since 1945 in the relationship between religious and political attitudes, in the correlation of church membership and activities in certain parties and interest groups. Earlier generalizations do not hold. It is obviously no longer true that Protestants and Jews are oriented towards the left, while the Catholic *croyant* can be expected to find his political home on the right of the political spectrum. The brilliant report by Professor Rémond discusses the possible reasons why the political orientations of Catholics become increasingly more diverse at a time when inside the Catholic church a stronger centralization takes place. Also many of the other contributions and discussions seek answers to the controversial question: Should the move of representative Catholic elements into novel directions be explained by the fact that sociological affinities are more decisive than religious preferences, or is such an evolution of political attitudes due to a deepened appreciation of the meaning and the consequences of religious faith? The evidence collected here, tentative as it must be, seems to make the second hypothesis more plausible. A Catholic elite for which the values of order, authority and tradition have been replaced by concerns for justice, charity and liberty seeks an altered political commitment.

Quite naturally an analysis of the MRP, an explanation of its initial successes and subsequent decline, occupies the foreground of that part of the study which is concerned with Catholic influence on the political scene proper. Though necessarily incomplete, it suggests that comparative studies, placing the MRP alongside other, and often quite different, Christian Democratic movements in Europe and perhaps Latin America are called for, since earlier monographs on that subject are now outdated. The various accounts which picture the churches themselves, their representative organizations and the innumerable *mouvements* inspired by them as political interest groups, are highly sophisticated. They too give evidence of the important transformation which the "input side" of the French political process has undergone. There is no more Catholic ghetto, memories of both clericalism and anticlericalism are rapidly fading. (The fight around the so-called Debré-Law, granting new status and increased subsidies to parochial schools, apparently belies such an appraisal. But the authors might well be

correct when they see the significance of the new legislation and the reaction it provoked momentarily as conditioned in large part by the demographic explosion, hence by general developments rather than by sectarian attitudes.)

At the time of the colloquium the Catholic trade unions had not yet symbolized the transformation which they have undergone since the war, by dropping the "Christian" from their label. Hence the reports which describe their activities, their purposes and their evolving ideology are somewhat suspended in mid-air and will need to be completed.

There prevails a far from accidental indecisiveness whenever any of the authors is led to evaluate the attitude of religiously motivated personalities and movements towards the UNR, the Gaullist party, and towards the present political regime itself. A coolness if not outright hostility is noted, even though it seems an aversion to the style and spirit of the Fifth Republic rather than to its institutions. Such an impression, it is true, is derived mostly from observing the attitudes of the Catholic (and to a lesser degree of the Protestant and Jewish) elites rather than those of the membership of churches and religious mass organizations. Here and elsewhere the limitations of a study devoted to the "*forces religieuses*" are quite obvious. In an age of declining ideologies and in the consumer society that France too has become, such a study must be concerned almost exclusively with elite orientation and can afford few generalizations on public opinion. This however does in no way detract from the interest, especially of those papers which attempt to trace the religious background of political actors inside and outside the government.

The concluding essay (by Professor Merle of Bordeaux) on religious factors in French foreign policy is by its scope and methods somewhat different from the other contributions. On the basis of what he calls somewhat ambitiously "case studies," the author tries to determine attitude and role of the Catholic church (and of its political instrumentalities in France) in the international struggle against communism, in the laborious edification of a united Europe and in the process of decolonization, especially in Indochina and Algeria. The interesting and at times highly suggestive attempt suffers from the author's acknowledged inability to isolate the factors which influence decision-making. At the colloquium this paper evoked rather sharp controversies contesting not only the evidence but pointing also to weaknesses in methodology.

Altogether the book raises far more questions (and elucidates them in the process) than it is able to answer. Would a more rigorous methodology have produced more verifiable and com-

parable data and hence less tentative answers? The authors seem to have good reasons to doubt it. Their rich and rewarding empirical research, the insight which guided their ordering analysis, their historically oriented understanding for the country's intellectual and political life have furnished a first-rate contribution which continues and refines the earlier inquiries of André Siegfried and Gabriel LeBras.—HENRY W. EHRMANN, *Dartmouth College*.

Public Administration in France. By F. RIDLEY AND J. BLONDEL. (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1965. Pp. xvii, 336. \$6.50.)

Much in this book is useful, especially since there exists no general study of the French administrative system and of its working in any language. The authors wisely avoid passing global judgment on the complex machinery of French public administration. Their familiarity with the history of administrative institutions gives depth to their analysis. It becomes quite clear that each major part of the administrative system owes something significant to almost every regime that France has known since before the revolution of 1789.

The information provided is extremely complete, indeed at times exasperatingly minute. It is also rewardingly up-to-date. At a time when it is yet impossible to assess which lasting contribution de Gaulle's Republic might make, the study records the rather substantial changes which the present regime has brought to administrative structure and practice. The non-French reader will be grateful for the pragmatic resoluteness with which the authors cut through intricate concepts of public law, as developed by the professors thereof and by the Council of State. (For French students this way of proceeding might at times result in superficial over-simplifications.) Some aspects of administrative life and some traits of its practitioners are described vividly and realistically. The recruitment for the training at both the *École Nationale d'Administration* and at the *École Polytechnique*; the articulation between local and central government, i.e., the degree of autonomy and of centralization; the flexible planning practiced since the war by the Planning Commissariat—these are some of the processes that are discussed ably and on the basis of the best monographic studies available.

Where the authors set out to bring clarity into the never ending dispute as to whether the Fifth Republic is a "technocracy" (which in France means government by experts) they are not merely inconclusive, a failing that could be explained by the fluidity of the system itself. They also fail to clarify their terms and to examine the evidence from a broader sociological perspective.

Had they done so, they would probably have concluded that present-day administrative life has by no means lost political density. However, the ambivalence of this discussion is quite typical of the shortcomings that mark the otherwise considerable achievement of the authors.

Because they aim at completeness, they have furnished something like an encyclopedic handbook. Their text, to be true, is interlaced with more general comments; but these are so summary that they appear at times trite if they are not outright misleading. The authors themselves are obviously convinced that a purely institutional and legal approach does not do justice to the realities of administrative life. But since so much space is taken by a description of the structure, there is not always satisfactory discussion of its functioning. To discuss (in 1964!) the amendment provisions of the constitution and the general role of the Constitutional Council without indicating how much the situation has been altered by the events surrounding the referendum of 1962 is hardly admissible. The office of the President is described on the basis of constitutional texts and official pronouncements but there is no acknowledgment let alone appraisal of the permanent tension that exists between the services of the *Élysée*, and between those of the Prime Minister and government departments. Yet that very tension colors almost every phase of public administration. The book deals rather lengthily with a highly interesting French phenomenon: the ministerial (and now also Presidential) *cabinets*, the group of personal collaborators with whom every minister surrounds himself. But it does not describe the particular mentality of these collaborators (whether they be civil servants or not) and the ensuing meshing of their activities and those of the permanent services. No attempt is made at explaining why the institution of the *cabinets*, which was considered to be a product of ministerial instability, has waxed even stronger under the more stable conditions of the Fifth Republic.

The labyrinth of economic and social administration is traced with great attention to detail. Some of the long-standing proposals for reform are mentioned. But what seems to be lacking is an insight into the crux of the matter: the absence of valid arbitration between conflicting claims. The discussion of "administrative pluralism," namely the institutionalized participation of a wide array of interest groups in administrative decision-making, is particularly unsatisfactory. In my opinion the accumulated and published evidence does not sustain the authors' claim that the civil service is generally unimpregnable to such influences. Once again a far too formalistic treatment prevents a truly perceptive and graded de-

scription of administrative realities. As an example: the phenomenon of *pantouflage*, the passing of numerous high civil servants into private employment, is mentioned; but its possible impact on the relationship between bureaucracy and the private sector is nowhere appraised.

The book gains in perspective by frequent and often illuminating comparisons between the French and the British administrative process. It is true that occasionally such comparison and the contrasts which it reveals between French and Anglo-American views lets appear as typically French what in fact is continental. This is especially evident in the discussion of the judiciary, of its methods and its personnel.—HENRY W. EHLMANN, *Dartmouth College*.

Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, 1925-1945. BY ERNEST K. BRAMSTED. (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1965. Pp. xxxvii, 488. \$12.50.)

With the apparent increase in emphasis over recent months on propaganda campaigns in the Vietnamese conflict, there should be rekindled interest in similar campaigns in past wars. Accordingly, this book has come at a most propitious moment, since it deals with the man who is, perhaps more than any other individual, virtually synonymous with propaganda.

Because of fragmentary documentation and because of the degree of emotional involvement on the part of those who have written about him, our picture of Joseph Goebbels is sketchy and often contradictory. Professor Bramsted (University of Sydney, Australia) takes this material, adds a few hitherto unpublished works and a number of interviews conducted by himself, and comes out with an account of Goebbels' basic methodology and psychology which is both informative and free of strong emotional bias. If in the early chapters (and particularly in dealing with the machinery of propaganda under the Nazis) this approach leads to a sometimes dry, pedantic style, the latter part of the book (especially the section concerned with propaganda campaigns toward the end of the war) is lively, and even, on occasion, humorous.

Professor Bramsted frankly states in the Foreward that he does not intend to offer a biographical study of Goebbels. His intent, he claims, is to depict "the development of the themes and the machinery of National Socialist propaganda, to analyze characteristic attitudes and methods employed by Goebbels and his subordinates in the changing circumstances of two decades and to examine the objectives and targets of their propaganda."

This he succeeds in doing, with two notable ex-

ceptions. If by machinery he means the functional apparatus through which propaganda is transmitted (the press, radio, film), this receives scant attention. The reader seeking more information on the mass media in Nazi Germany will find little here; he would do better to consult Hale's *The Captive Press in the Third Reich*, Pohle's *Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik*, and Kris and Speier's *German Radio Propaganda*. This omission is unfortunate, I feel, since material on this subject is not plentiful and since Goebbels' attitude toward and relations with the mass media were an essential part of his successes and failures as a propagandist.

The second omission may well be a product of the author's national background. His coverage of wartime propaganda in Germany says much about how Goebbels handled German-English and German-Soviet confrontations, but very little about how he dealt with the United States. There is almost nothing, for example, on how he reacted to the American entry into the war—how he personally felt about it, how he presented the fact to the German people.

But these are minor criticisms of a praiseworthy effort. The contrast between Goebbels' personal feelings, as revealed in his diary and in the reminiscences of those who knew him, and his propaganda themes and campaigns, reveals an ability to divorce what he himself knew and felt from what he thought he must or should do, which is one mark of a master propagandist. And it is the master propagandist that emerges in Bramsted's book—despicable, to the sure, but at times awe-inspiring in his understanding of the essence of propaganda.—DON R. BROWNE, *Purdue University*.

Zur Soziologie der Wahl. EDITED BY ERWIN K. SCHEUCH AND RUDOLF WILDENMANN. (Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965. Pp. 360. DM 24,—. Sonderheft 9 der *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*.)

West Germans witnessed in the early summer of 1961 what was doubtless the most lackluster electoral campaign ever waged in a modern industrialized democracy. Under the guidance of professionals, well versed in market research, and with fresh memories of what they perceived to be the implications of the American presidential race of the previous year, the major political parties sounded and behaved less like ideologically-oriented antagonists striving for political power than like competing entrepreneurs trying to market almost identical products.

Not until 13 August, when Ulbricht built his wall of concrete and barbed wire through the heart of Berlin, did the campaign become lively. The Social Democratic candidate for chancellor,

Willy Brandt, immediately cancelled his stumping tour of West Germany to return to the city of which he was Lord Mayor. And when Adenauer continued politics as usual, even going out of his way to make snide references to Brandt's illegitimate birth, large portions of the West German public and press were incensed. In fact, it was only after President Kennedy bypassed Adenauer in his demonstrative show of support for West Berlin that the leadership of the Christian Democratic Union took steps to quell the furor set off by their apparent refusal to take the Berlin crisis seriously. Heated argument and speculation about outcomes had by then replaced the disinterest and lethargy of earlier weeks.

During this election year, Erwin K. Scheuch of the University of Cologne, Rudolf Wildenmann of the Wirtschaftshochschule Mannheim (formerly of Cologne), and the late Gerhard Baumert of DIVO (one of the "big four" in West German public opinion polling) undertook what is probably the most massive electoral study to date, comprising three waves of national and sub-national sample surveys; panel surveys in four districts; interviews with politicians and interest group representatives; content analysis of newspapers and television programs; observational studies in particular cities and regions; and computer simulation. In short, the whole works. Preliminary findings suggest that this project will not only contribute immensely to our understanding of German politics, but will also serve to give us the needed data to revise some of our more parochial observations about political behavior.

It is not altogether fortunate that the first publication to stem from the 1961 voting study is a collection of rather disparate essays. *Zur Soziologie der Wahl* contains, in addition to an introduction discussing the aims and methodology of the entire study, eight chapters of (dare one use the cliché?) uneven quality, some of them of only marginal importance, set in an inadequate integrative framework. Three discuss the election itself as it developed at different levels and, aside from some truly perceptive remarks by Scheuch and Wildenmann in their chapter on the national scene, contain little of relevance to the *sociology* of voting. Indeed, chapters on Heilbronn by Peter Pulzer and Marburg by David Schönbaum, although interesting, appear as obsolete journalistic accounts next to some of the other contributions to this volume. Another chapter, by Uwe Schleth, considers at great length the fascinating story of how the CDU financed its 1961 campaign. Essays on differences in American and West German patterns of party identification by Werner Zohnhöfer and on "floating voters" by Max Kaase are of more relevance to the sociology

of voting. The latter, however, is marred generally by unimaginative interpretations and specifically by the fact that at least one major conclusion—that floating voters (in this case, those who voted for a different party in 1961 than in 1957) as a group do not differ in their demographic characteristics essentially from the average of all respondents—is contradicted if we apply simple chi-square tests to the tabular data presented by the author.

The real strength of the volume lies in two important and very exciting chapters—chapters which alone are worth the price of the book. One of these is an essay by Wildenmann and others on the impact of electoral systems upon political outcomes. In their computer simulation they varied a total of 45 assumptions about percentage shifts in voting preferences (particularly among those who in 1961 opted for the Free Democratic Party) to determine what the distribution of Bundestag seats would have been under nine different electoral systems, including proportional representation, majority rule in single-member constituencies, and the current mixed system of the German Federal Republic. Among other things they discover that, given the present electoral system, the SPD would have to gain at least 12 per cent more of the votes (that is, a net swing of 24 per cent) to attain an absolute majority in the Bundestag, whereas under a majority-rule system an SPD gain of only 6 per cent would guarantee this result. Clearly such findings are of significance not only to students of comparative politics. They are fraught with policy implications for West German and other governments, particularly if they want to create electoral systems that will maximize the chances for certain types of outcomes (e.g., single-party majorities, as in the United States).

If I had to single out one chapter as the “best” in the volume, without doubt it would be Scheuch’s discussion of freedom and restraints in everyday political behavior. He focuses upon the willingness of people to discuss their political views with family members and others, and to take visible political actions. His analysis of data from the 1961 voting study leads him to take issue with those, such as Almond and Verba, who stress the importance of norms of participation for maintenance of a “civic culture.” So long as the existence of the political community is not threatened, there is no controversy about what the nature of the political system should be, the distribution of power remains fairly stable, and the purpose of politics is seen to be improvement of rather than struggle against the current structure of government, then, says Scheuch, the voters will view government as a form of administration of the community in which active participation

can be reduced to a minimum. The tasks of practical politics will be left to the professional politicians, much as those of guarding religious sentiments and institutions are left in the hands of the clergy. Most voters are unwilling to endanger the stability of their family and other primary relationships that are continuing and diffuse merely because of political differences. But this is far from apathy. If the conditions listed above were to change, then, according to Scheuch, we can expect an immediate change in the style of political behavior among the voters. To those who do not take an active and overt part in the everyday politics of a political community should not be attributed an attitude of unconcern toward political institutions and themes.

Although not all the pieces in this volume measure up to the sophisticated methodology and imaginative analysis displayed by Wildenmann *et al.* and Scheuch, taken as a whole the volume is a significant contribution to political sociology. And, as a foretaste of the more comprehensive studies to emerge from the 1961 West German voting study, it is particularly tantalizing.—
RICHARD L. MERRITT, *Yale University*.

Power and the Soviet Elite. By BORIS I. NICOLAEVSKY. (New York: Frederick A. Preager, 1965. Pp. xxi, 275. \$6.95.)

This book consists of several articles which have appeared primarily in Russian journals during the past thirty years. While the material is not new, this is the first time many of the articles have become available to the English reading public. Unlike other books of this type, *Power and the Soviet Elite* does have a common and unifying theme. Boris Nicolaevsky attempts to penetrate the secrecy which surrounds political activity at the apex of the Soviet power structure. By carefully analyzing Communist communications the author broadens our understanding of many crucial periods in Soviet political history. The great purge of the thirties, the “Leningrad affair” in the postwar period, the doctors’ plot just prior to Stalin’s death, the struggle for succession and the dynamics of de-stalinization—these constitute the foci of Nicolaevsky’s attention.

The interpretations offered by the author are, of necessity, speculative and conjectural. The limited and unsatisfactory nature of Soviet data does not permit unqualified judgments. The most we can expect is that the scholar carefully consider whatever evidence is available. Certainly Nicolaevsky has done this and more. He has evaluated the most obscure of Soviet statements and has drawn from his rich knowledge of Bolshevik personalities and history to illuminate the complex events that he describes.

From these efforts emerges a picture of Soviet

political life which contradicts some long-standing assumptions about Communist political systems. The image of the monolithic disciplined party cannot be sustained once the reader has finished *Power and the Soviet Elite*. Conflict rather than unity appears to be the prevalent norm of intra-party life. Furthermore, such conflicts are not generated solely by individuals aspiring to supreme power. Behind the exterior clash of personalities lies the reality of multiple and conflicting group interests. Time and again the author relies upon a group theory of politics to explain Kremlin power struggles. Yet the use of this theoretical construct is never explicitly acknowledged in the book. Indeed the reader is left with the impression that Nicolaevsky has unconsciously and unwittingly stumbled upon group theory as an explanation of the phenomena he investigates. As a result many important questions are left unanswered. The author asserts, for example, that group formation and influence has been of differential significance during the Stalin and post-Stalin periods. He does not discuss, however, the relevant variables which might account for this difference.

Despite this weakness, the book represents a valuable contribution to the field and serves a useful purpose. For it leads the student of Soviet affairs to the inevitable conclusion that the resolution of competing demands put forth by societal groups is as fundamental to the Soviet political system as it is to other political systems. To be sure group conflict and resolution assume varying forms and manifestations in different societies. But these dissimilarities are meaningless for comparative political analysis unless we relate them to a common behavioral phenomenon. By emphasizing the group basis of Soviet politics Nicolaevsky places the question of conflict in a larger frame of reference. The political scientist then has the task of identifying those contextual factors which explain the peculiar nature of group interaction in the Soviet Union.

George Kennan, in his introduction to the book, undertakes just such a task. He suggests that the violence and bloodshed which have characterized conflict resolution in Russia owe much to the ethical code engendered by Bolshevism. That code had been designed for conspiratorial struggle against "a well installed enemy disposing over all the instruments of the power of the state." Such guide rules, Kennan maintains, proved wholly inappropriate when applied to relationships between political elites now themselves possessed of power and confronted primarily with the peaceful tasks of socialist construction. The result was an absence of effective behavioral or procedural norms which could impose restraint when disagreements arose among groups of the ruling elite.

Whatever merit Kennan's argument may possess, his explanation certainly does not exhaust all of the factors which determine the form of group interaction in Soviet politics. The task of identifying those factors still lies ahead of us.—JOEL SCHWARTZ, *University of North Carolina*.

Russia and History's Turning Point. BY ALEXANDER KERENSKY. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965. Pp. xvi, 558. \$8.95.)

The thorough, exciting, exalted and touching success story of a young man "blest because he was given a chance to plumb the very depths of human history, to witness the destruction of an old world and the creation of a new one" (p. 217), this is a warm human account of perhaps the greatest drama of modern history. Concentrating on his five years in Russian politics which culminated in his seven months in the Cabinet of the Provisional Government, Kerensky vividly describes his early youth, the preparation for his law career, his first political involvements, his election in 1912 (he was then 31 years old) to the Duma, and finally the brief zenith of his political life—membership in the Cabinet of the revolutionary Provisional Government, as Minister of Justice, Minister of War, and, by the beginning of July, 1917, Prime-Minister (he was then 37 years old).

An imaginative and exciting natural leader eminently capable of channeling the mass hysteria, hatred and passion of the times into an incipient political system, Kerensky was also a forceful, impatient and impassionate doer. Time was short, the tasks gigantic. Committed to fighting both obstinate extremes, the crumbling but cunning autocracy and the treacherous but determined Bolsheviks, Kerensky also stepped on the wrong toes. Nervous at signs of counter-revolution—justifiably so, as events soon proved—he confused and divided his own supporters. But it was his ultimate inability to reconcile the staunch and unyielding opposites which cost him his political life. (The question of who, at the crucial "history's turning point," could have done better, however, is a moot one.)

After his escape from Russia in 1918, Kerensky has never stopped fighting. A prominent emigré, he travelled widely, lectured, wrote books and articles and published a newspaper ("The Will of Russia" in Prague); engaged to this day, he dictated this book (in Russian) not only to offer his own interpretation of the historical events but also to provide new information and data—on his underground life before his escape, his escape, his conversations with major Western leaders, and his views on the Versailles Peace Treaty, for the benefit of posterity.

To Kerensky, the events of March, 1917, stood for the beginning of a new era of human liberty in

Russia. Tolstoyan in his beliefs (though not always in his actions), Kerensky hoped that the Revolution would be the catalyst which would make it possible to transform men and endow them with the human dignity and human rights commensurate with their autonomy as human beings, in a universe where morality, love and mercy would rule. The successful Bolshevik Revolution put a stop to this hope: Alexander Kerensky has had to live with his defeat ever since. His personal tragedy became the tragedy of his nation.

Almost fifty years after his great personal triumph and defeat, years which he spent in the deep and cold shadow of 1917, Kerensky writes now with detachment, wisdom, compassion and wistfulness: "At the end of my long life, which has been entirely passed in the critical years of our present historical turning point, I can clearly see that no one gets away with anything and that one has to pay for everything. . . . Man must learn to live not by hatred and revenge, but by love and forgiveness. [Otherwise], the destructive forces which have accumulated in the depths of the soulless mechanical civilization of the contemporary world will burst out."—JAN F. TRISKA, *Stanford University*.

Obstacles to Change in Latin America. EDITED BY CLAUDIO VELIZ. (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University, 1965. Pp. viii, 263. \$6.00.)

Collections of essays are often difficult to evaluate because they frequently vary in the quality of their contributions. Moreover, the essays may not be integrated by a central theme to clarify their relationship to one another. Fortunately, the essays in this book are of such generally good quality that it is possible to assess the volume as a whole and to recommend it.

The obstacles to change referred to in the title are the institutions and attitudes which typify what we may call traditional society in Latin America: a steeply hierarchical social system, headed by old landed families, which acts as a barrier to greater equality in the distribution of material goods and the promotion of democratic institutions. To be sure, Latin America has undergone rapid economic development in some areas, but industrialization has not been accompanied by any dramatic increase in social mobility, as in the European case. Instead of competing elites emerging, the traditional class has learned to adapt to economic change and maintain its leadership by coopting leading figures among the new rich. Although reformist parties won political power in many of the republics during the 1920's and 1930's, the usual result of this has been only that the upper middle class has achieved for itself a higher standard of living by commanding a

greater share of consumers' goods and through the extension of governmental services. Having attained this much, these parties generally have ended by abandoning their former working class supporters and becoming apologists for the status quo.

Among these essays, perhaps the most interesting for political scientists is the one by Professor Torcuato Di Tella on populism. The term populist refers to multi-class political parties which combine mobilized urban labor and/or peasant masses with dissident middle class leadership. These elements are united by a vague but powerful anti-status quo ideology which emphasizes state-planned economic development combined with emotional nationalism. Di Tella offers a typology of populist parties in underdeveloped countries based on the possible characteristics of their middle class leadership. Two criteria are used: (1) whether this leadership includes elements from the upper middle class, military or clergy, or is based only on the lower middle class or intellectuals; (2) whether these leadership elements are generally accepted or rejected by the dominant social circles of the class from which they are drawn. Four basic types of populism result from this approach: *the multi-class integrative party*, based on socially accepted upper middle class leadership with a tendency toward conservatism (e.g., the Mexican P.R.I.); *militaristic reform parties*, led by socially rejected military and, at times, upper middle class elements—for example, Nasserism, or Peronism in the context of somewhat more developed countries; *aprista parties*, based on the lower middle class or intelligentsia which are generally accepted by their peers; and *social revolutionary parties*, whose lower middle class-intellectual leaders, alienated from their class, favor the most radical programs.

While the criteria used to construct this scheme may need considerable testing as to accuracy and reliability, the approach offers at least two advantages. In the first place, it is dynamic, in that Di Tella provides hypotheses as to the probable evolution of populist parties from one form to another under changing social conditions. Secondly, the approach avoids such labels as Left, Right, Center, Democratic and Totalitarian, which are often value-laden and may emphasize superficial differences at the expense of clarifying important similarities among anti-status quo parties.

Di Tella's general discussion of populism is followed by more specific treatments of the theme by Osvaldo Sunkel on Chile, Helio Jaguaribe on Brazil, Orlando Fals Borda on Colombia, Moises Gonzalez Navarro on Mexico, and an especially superb essay by Celso Furtado on "Political Obstacles to Economic Growth in Brazil."

To sum up, then, it is the reviewer's opinion that this book contains the most valuable collec-

tion of essays on Latin America since Richard N. Adams, *et al.*, *Social Change in Latin America Today*.—PAUL LEWIS, *Louisiana State University*.

Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society. By MAX GLUCKMAN. (Chicago: Aldine, 1965. Pp. 339. \$7.50.)

This book is "a statement of how one social anthropologist, working in the full tradition of the subject, sees the general problem of rule and disorder in social life." (P. xxix.) Professor Gluckman uses the material from forty-one non-western societies, twenty-seven of them African, to describe the political, legal, economic, and ritual life of such groups. An introductory essay on the history of social anthropology and its relation to other branches of the subject indicates in detail what he means by "the full tradition of the subject" which in effect is a limitation of data (not interpretation) to those phenomena which can be labelled 'social relations.' The sampling is based on Gluckman's assessment of how well the social relations are described for each society, combined with an attempt to represent all the basic levels of complexity to be found among the non-western polities.

In the body of the book the economic life is described first, the implication being that this sector places limits on the nature of social groupings and therefore on the formal organization of political life. Then polities are broken down into two overall levels of complexity, state and non-state, and the variations within these two forms are treated in detail. After this the author analyzes the nature of law and ritual in promoting the stability of political systems, and finally he discusses equilibrium and change as these concepts apply to such societies.

Political anthropology is a rapidly expanding field, but there are as yet very few general works on the subject. Previous efforts such as *African Political Systems* (1940), Schapera's *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (1956), or Mair's *Primitive Government* (1962), all deal with a more limited sample of data both typologically and geographically. And although this reviewer knows of two more general works in preparation, one a reader, the other a book of edited papers, this present effort by Gluckman is by far the most ambitious and comprehensive treatment of the subject to date.

From the point of view of contemporary social science the book has a number of limitations which Gluckman has quite self-consciously chosen because of his own approach to social anthropology. Thus he eschews any evolutionary position concerning non-western political systems which might synthesize the data into some over-

all theory because his purpose is "to show the kind of functional interdependencies which social anthropologists have sought to establish *within* political systems." (P. 84. Italics are mine.) Such functional interdependencies have to be in the form of what Gluckman here and elsewhere has called 'invariant relations.' In effect, these are propositions about the operation of primitive social systems, such as "the government organization which we find in states at these levels of economic development [intensive village agriculture] has an inherent instability which continually leads to its breakdown . . ." (p. 85). On the other hand, variable relations are given short shrift so that the possible relationship between population density and/or population size is not considered in any detail because it does not manifest an invariant relationship to political complexity, *i.e.*, a one-to-one correlation. I would suggest alternatively that the correlation is interesting and important and that it is high at both the higher and lower levels of political complexity; it seems to be much less important at the middle ranges of tribal polities, somewhere between simple hunting and gathering bands on the one hand and centralized states on the other. Why this should be so is an interesting theoretical question, but one Gluckman's approach cannot elucidate since he passes over such relations in his search for 'invariant' propositions.

A final criticism is one that Gluckman makes himself; this results from the fact that there is less known about the actual operation of non-western political systems than there is about the structural features of these systems that give them their basic constitutional format. As Gluckman notes, this stems from the fact that it is a long and arduous task of research to obtain a working knowledge of the basic outline of these non-western polities and major efforts have been devoted to such ends. Here we need more detailed field studies in political socialization, decision-making, interest group formation, and attitudes to authority within such societies at all the various levels of complexity. Only then will we begin to obtain a full gamut of data about the actual operation of non-western political life. Custom is one thing and social action is another. Anthropology has provided much detail on custom, and has done less well on social action, *i.e.*, using a theory that custom is only one, albeit a powerful one, among many factors influencing the actual behavior of non-western peoples.

It is to Professor Gluckman's great credit that he has assembled a vast amount of information on primitive political systems and attempted to provide us with a description of the way in which these systems are constituted and how they main-

tain themselves through time. The book will eventually have to be superseded, for as the author says anthropology as a discipline is cumulative. We still need a more comprehensive theory about non-western polities that will explain variations both within and between the various types available for study, and we need more and better data on the actual workings of such systems. However, until that happens, this is the best treatment of the subject available in the literature.—RONALD COHEN, *Northwestern University*.

Foreign Enterprise in Nigeria: Law and Policies.

By PAUL O. PROEHL. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 250. \$7.50.)

Unfortunately, the recent *coup d'état* and the chain of lawless events leading up to it have cast a dark shadow on Nigeria's commitment to "the rule of law" and therefore on the author's (and others') appreciation of the scope and nature of that commitment. Unfortunately too, as Professor Proehl apprehends might happen in the preface of his book, the federal constitution, rather than the underlying "regional suspicions, jealousies, and antagonisms," is in danger of being made the scapegoat for the political instability the recent coup has demonstrated. Nonetheless, Professor Proehl's book, which relates to the constitutional and legal practices antedating the January 1966 coup, particularly the chapters concerned with Nigerian law, provides illuminating background and observations for potential investors and, for that matter, for anybody else concerned with understanding more about Nigerian laws and policies affecting foreign enterprise, and beyond that, Nigerian constitutional and juridical practices and attitudes generally.

The book is not, nor is it intended to be, an investor's handbook or guide. Similarly it is not, nor is it intended to be, an historical or social account of the role of foreign enterprise in Nigeria. It sets out to be and is rather an interesting if somewhat loosely tied together collection of essays on the investment "environment," touching as one might expect on relevant legal factors, such as taxation, "pioneer status" incentives, land tenure, credit transactions, patents, and company law, and also extending to "non-legal" factors such as Nigeria's six-year development plan, "African socialism," Nigerization, and the 1962-1963 political crisis in the Western Region. The treatment of the latter, the "non-legal factors," would have been strengthened if it were somewhat less eclectic and more directly related to foreign investment in its coverage. If non-legal factors are to be treated, then

one could have done with more focussed attention on such central factors as the interaction of public and private sectors, particularly with respect to salary scales, fringe benefits, and productivity, on political considerations affecting economic priorities, choices and decisions, on corruption as a deterrent to foreign investment, on bureaucratic practices as an obstacle to foreign investment, on the differing attitudes and policies of the various regional governments toward overseas investment, and on fiscal and monetary problems and policies affecting foreign investment.

The book is a good one, clearly written, well-documented, and usefully indexed; it is refreshingly free of jargon. The author brings to bear the skills and tools of a law professor in analyzing situations and trends in the political arena with particularly good effect. The comparable approach to the Nigerian six-year plan, although effective, is somewhat less satisfying. It would have been more valuable to the overseas investor, *inter alia*, if the discrepancy between the formal plan and its implementation during its first two or three years were analyzed. The experience of these years tends to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Nigerian economy, and the interrelationship of an "open economy," a political system based on federal and democratic concepts, and a legal system reflecting the country's economic and political systems.

The American Society of International Law is to be complimented on its series of books on foreign enterprise in underdeveloped countries, of which the present volume is the third to appear. It seems a most useful enterprise, and the present volume a most useful contribution to the enterprise. This reviewer would hope that in future volumes the most valuable and special contribution of Professor Proehl's book—those parts dealing with the country's legal concepts, decisions, practices and institutions—would be enlarged and used as the point of departure for the analysis of non-legal factors, so that these latter factors are considered from a vantage point different from one an economist or political scientist might employ in approaching the same factors.—ARNOLD RIVKIN, *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*.

Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government. By CLEMENT HENRY MOORE. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. 230. \$6.00.)

Professor Moore has given us a superb study of the intricacies and dilemmas of Tunisian politics. As the title suggests, the book goes much deeper into the dynamics of the one-party regime than

did the earlier essay Moore contributed to *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* with Charles A. Micaud and Leon Carl Brown. Most important, Moore's intimate knowledge of how decisions are made in Tunisia also sheds light on the capacity of one-party states to build durable institutions that has been lacking in many comparable studies of African one-party states.

The book is well written and carefully documented. Chapters deal with the background to independent Tunisia, the role of President Bourguiba, the Neo-Destour, local politics, auxiliary organizations of the party, and the emergence of representative institutions. A typology for the analysis of one-party regimes is suggested, but Moore does not impose it rigidly on his data nor does he make more than tentative suggestions about the future of Tunisia once its energetic President is gone.

The basic distinction Moore makes in the introduction is between a "neo-Leninist" or militant one-party state and a more "permissive" mass party regime, centering on the cult of personality. He concludes that the Neo-Destour shares the qualities of both models.

The thoroughness of the study suggests to this reviewer that the critical problems in the analysis of political development remain how to put data together rather than how to get them. Moore spent two years in Tunisia working on the book, based on his dissertation, and was on close terms with nearly all the leading figures of government. He also spent a good deal of time in the countryside and made extended visits to many provincial towns and villages. As R  ger Le Tourneau suggests in the Foreword, this kind of exposure is essential to derive insight and balance in such a study, but the competence with which Moore has executed this aspect of his task also underscores the remaining problem of how to draw more general conclusions.

Moore clearly has more in mind than a descriptive typology of one-party states. The second chapter on Bourguiba, probably the best account available on the widely publicized tactics now known as "Bourguibism," suggests the intricacy and the prevailing strategy for the use of power in a one-party state. The introduction to this chapter, by the way, applies some fundamental distinctions about charismatic figures that are often neglected. The evidence in this and the penetrating chapter following on "Presidential Monarchy" clearly establish that "Bourguibism" is not purely moderation and compromise, something that Western observers frequently fail to observe so long as extremism works in their favor. President Bourguiba has always had the capacity to coerce and has acted rashly on many occasions before the ill-fated Bizerte incident, which is

carefully described. Uncertainty within the party elite is obviously one of the ways Bourguiba has kept power so largely to himself, but it is also one of the qualities of Tunisian political life that has handicapped the development of viable institutions. Perhaps the fact that Bourguiba has most often acted arbitrarily and unexpectedly in domestic matters makes the Tunisian political system less well rooted institutionally than it would be if he engaged in the more common exploitation of international extremism found in other developing nations.

This problem underlies the following analyses of the party and its supporting institutions. The interplay of administrative official and party militant, perhaps the confusion of each, reflected in the several reorganizations of the Neo-Destour (now Socialist Destour) indicates the problem of using power for constructive ends in Tunisia. This reviewer would attach more significance to frustration felt by technicians, which Moore briefly notes on page 130, and the discontent of the students, which is more carefully treated. Local elections lose their meaning not because there is no discussion or influence at the local level, but because the Neo-Destour performs the task of coordinating "too well" (p. 147). Moore does not make explicit the perplexing issue of whether or not power relationships may be so tidy that change is smothered and institutional development retarded. The evidence is clearly there and the question tactfully raised by Le Tourneau in the Foreword.

Given the mosaic by which all lines of power lead to the President, it is surprising that more attention was not paid to the attempt on Bourguiba's life, not mentioned until p. 207. In terms of the party's power and the genuine popularity of the President it does not deserve more comment, but considering the fragile quality of power outside the President, so well documented, it raises the fundamental issue of how well Bourguiba's accomplishments will endure. Moore would give the regime a good deal of credit for the measure of associational activity and local politics that does indeed take place in Tunisia, even though he admits that the channels for the articulation of power at higher levels are closely circumscribed. He concludes that Tunisia is not likely to take the neo-Leninist alternative (trade union and youth policies since the book was printed would cast doubt on this conclusion), and implies that the party may simply wither as a new generation comes to the helm. Perhaps so, but the new generation must also have a power structure if Tunisia is to continue to thrive. Without deprecating the formidable accomplishments of the present generation, it can (and should) be asked if existing patterns of power are adequate for the

complex society now emerging in Tunisia.—DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD, *Cornell University*.

Political Development in Pakistan. By KARL VON VORYS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 341. \$6.50.)

Students of political development are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of balance between the volume of demands created by popular sovereignty and the capability of political institutions to convert such demands into acceptable action. Undue emphasis on the "participation explosion" has unfortunately eclipsed the need for strong institutions. Yet despite such inattention in the realm of scholarship, many developing states have responded to the imbalance thus created by sedating politicization by various contrivances under such rubrics as indirect elections, guided democracy, and a controlled legislative process. The process by which such controls are loosened and some semblance of balance between demands and capability is achieved in the context of progressively expanding sharing of power is perhaps the most important phenomenon in political development.

Pakistan is a contemporary instance of a rational effort to adjust the pace of politicization to the viability of institutions while expanding the dimensions of participation. For this reason, all written analysis which sheds light on this process is *ipso facto* of value. The present work, based largely on the author's tenure as a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Dacca in 1961-62, helps in understanding how Pakistan has evolved its political program. The analysis is somewhat richer for East Pakistan than for the other province, thus unavoidably reflecting the author's stay in Dacca. But this imbalance can justifiably be viewed as an advantage, since most other political and economic analysis of Pakistan is based on West Pakistan experience.

In von Vorys' volume the quality of analysis is best in three of the various subjects covered. First, the difficulties in achieving national integration because of Bengali-West Pakistani cultural and political differences is competently treated. The illustrations of strikes and student disturbances in East Pakistan are especially valuable since they have nowhere outside of that province been systematically recorded. A second strength of the book is the description of the work of the Constitution Commission headed by former Chief Justice Md. Shahabuddin. Here for the first time we find an account of the issues on which the administrators and cabinet committees and President Ayub himself disagreed with the Shahabuddin Commission. This analysis is enhanced somewhat by a comparative table which is not, however, as clear as it might be. A third

feature of noteworthy merit is an analysis of the presidential election of January, 1965, based on newspaper accounts surveyed in the United States after the author's stay in Dacca. Here the author includes an analysis of issues mentioned by President Ayub and his opponent, Miss Fatima Jinnah. This analysis is accompanied by tables showing both frequency and substance of issues discussed in the public "projection meetings."

The author has attempted to fit the Pakistan case into a conceptual apparatus which is neither clearly set forth nor systematically developed. The use of categories of political actions which appear to be put in vulgate style and which appear to bear little relation to somewhat standardized modes of systems analysis detracts from the book's value. The several chapters on environmental factors might have been replaced by development of a theory of the balance between participation and institutional capability and the Pakistan case might have been related to that theory.

The value of the book is enhanced by two short statements of President Ayub and extracts from the 1962 Constitution and by eighteen tables, mostly on economic data. The tables, however, are not as clear as they might be, in part because of design and in part because they are not sufficiently separated from the text. Notes and documentation applicable to the tables are arranged to support related observations in the text instead of substantiating the tables.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the volume is of value to students of Pakistan and of political development.—RALPH BRAIBANTI, *Duke University*.

The Anguish of India. By RONALD SEGAL. (New York: Stein and Day, 1965. Pp. 319. \$6.50.)

Most books on contemporary India by specialists on the subject conclude on a note of optimism: economic development may be moving slowly, but the future will be better; if national unity currently shows signs of disintegration, the revitalized subregional parts will join later at a higher level of national commitment; caste is not necessarily a barrier to social change, it may be a channel for such change. Ronald Segal, an African expert, after a three months' tour of India on assignment from Penguin Books redresses the balance with his conclusions: India is hopeless; its cultural values and world-view make it so; China will defeat India; all efforts to alter India's self-induced, misery-seeking trend will fail.

How seriously should one take Segal's thesis? On one level—and briefly—very seriously. It is true that recent academic and journalistic studies of modern India have probed deeply, and the data

collected plus the sympathies of the observers have combined to obscure the complexity of finding solutions for the social, political, and economic problems that are obvious even to casual visitors. Everything that Segal says has been said many times by students of India, but never before quite so bluntly or with such finality. Segal at least causes us to reexamine earlier benevolent conclusions and to reassess cozier views that India may not be all that hopeless.

Regrettably, that is about all that one can say in favor of *The Anguish of India*. It is at root a superficial book—about the equivalent of a long seminar paper written by an excellent note-taker who had access to his professor's reading list. Indeed, as one who has read the works from which Segal has extracted, I can vouch for the fact that

Segal writes better than his sources. He does not know as much, however. Segal was bent on a thesis; he found one; he then had little difficulty in selecting the evidence.

Mr. Segal gets caught by the usual problems. He insists that Hinduism is India (p. 15), which it is not; he has views on Indian national character (p. 119 ff.) that will not hold up; he is amused by the marriage advertisements (p. 166). Then there is a tortured attempt to condense Indian history, to lay out the economy, and to explain the workings of the polity. He does not fail, he only bores us with detail more expertly analyzed elsewhere.

Beyond this, Segal's book does not warrant academic notice.—RICHARD L. PARK, *University of Pittsburgh*.

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RICHARD L. MERRITT

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Politics of International Cooperation. By T. V. SATHYAMURTHY. (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964. Pp. 313.)

Twenty years after it was created, the member states of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization still have difficulty in defining precisely the role of the organization within the United Nations system. They have found no difficulty in requesting the organization to undertake a growing range of activities, though they found no adequate formula for reconciling the varied program with the limitations in funds appropriated. As Sathyamurthy's analysis makes abundantly clear, the interpretation of the UNESCO constitution by the General Conference, the Executive Board, by successive Directors General and by commentators reveals a variety of conceptions of the organization that lead to quite different conclusions concerning programs and operational needs. Some are hardly consistent with the basic legal foundation of UNESCO as an agency of completely sovereign national states who protected themselves by a standard domestic jurisdiction clause in the constitution. Interpretations seem to reflect conceptions of UNESCO as an ideology of world community, or a world movement to seek peace through mutual understanding or as an inter-governmental agency for performing agreed upon technical services for member states.

In practice, of course, UNESCO has been considered one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations community, committed by agreement to make its contribution to the achievement of peace. In practice it is deeply enmeshed with the other specialized agencies in those programs in which obviously educational, scientific and cultural development cannot be easily isolated from development of health, nutrition, food supply, the exploration of outer space, and ocean basins, the application of atomic energy for peaceful uses and the social and scientific aspects of the industrialization progress. As the liberal arts college or university cannot isolate itself within the total educational process from the technical and professional institutions, so UNESCO cannot in fact separate itself from agencies such as the World Health Organization, International Labor Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, Atomic Energy International Organization, the technical services of the United Nations. Through the Special Fund, EPTA and the World Bank, these relationships have been affected at least in respect to programs focused upon the needs of underdeveloped countries. Among the more developed countries, UNESCO has some-

what more independently helped to provide linkages among professional persons and institutions of education, science and culture.

The most difficult area to clarify in UNESCO's mission relates to the vague area of international understanding, for this can be considered a necessary by-product of the growth of many kinds of cooperative exercises that bring people into closer relationships. It can also be considered an objective of activities undertaken for this specific purpose, but plans for such activities have usually been frowned upon by the General Conference of member states who stand in defense of their exclusive right to manipulate their own public opinions.

Sathyamurthy has attempted to provide some historical threads which help explain the evolution of UNESCO during the last twenty years and the continuing argument over its task. The best parts of his analysis are those concerning the views of Huxley, Niebuhr, Torres Bodet and others, and the response they elicited from some member states. His attempted application of the diverse interpretations of UNESCO's functions to the program operation is less successful because the evidence is not readily available to prove that the voting preferences of member states coincided with any particular preferred interpretations, the chance whim of a delegate, or a quid pro quo during the total program-making process in the Secretariat, Executive Board and General Conference. The fact is that given the inherent breadth of UNESCO's constitutional language, no nation can be denied that there is justification for almost anything it wants to suggest or request. The fact is, also, that the inclusion or exclusion of a desired program item has rarely, if ever, been based upon constitutional interpretations. Decisions have reflected the distribution of votes and the application of time-honored ways of winning friends and influencing people.

Complicating as the issue of purposes has been in the fashioning of an organization and program satisfactory to member states, I believe the time long past when it can be dealt with head on. Events and diverse pressures have fashioned a niche for the organization in the larger context of the U.N. agencies. But a problem that is worthy of very serious attention is the muddled relationships existing among the General Conference, the Executive Board, and the Director General. The international civil service created so that it can bring a small measure of system into the efforts of member states to achieve the goals of UNESCO's constitution is today compelled to waste precious time, resources and creative ability in an unend-

ing struggle to free itself from the bickerings of the Executive Board, whose role between the Director General and the General Conference has never been defined in terms of increasing UNESCO's operational effectiveness. The member states, so long as they are completely sovereign will give their own interpretation, in the broad context of international politics, to what UNESCO's role should be. Once they have resolved their political differences in the General Conference, the Secretariat should be relatively free to move ahead within the broad lines of that authorization.—WALTER H. C. LAVES, *Indiana University*.

The International Civil Service. By LANGROD, GEORGES. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963. Pp. 358. Translated by F. G. Berthoud.)

The position of the international civil service of the United Nations agencies in terms of its relationship to member states is matched only by judges and staff of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The members of the international civil service are separated from the control of their national government by the terms of their employment, and it is improper for member states of the United Nations to attempt to exert influence over them on the basis of national citizenship. They properly receive direction only from the Secretary General, or from the Director General in the case of the specialized agencies. In a world political system in which jurisdiction derives from territorial sovereignty the jurisdiction of the United Nations organization is personal and calls for a loyalty that is in some respects akin to that expected within the Catholic church or other international ideological movements.

The nature of the international civil servant's position, his responsibility, privileges and immunities are presented in this volume by Langrod, together with a history of how the system evolved under the early international administrative unions, the League of Nations, and more recently, within the United Nations system. The importance of the unique legal status of the international civil service to the proper functioning of an international organization is vigorously argued. The dangers by which it is threatened under influence of national policies inconsistent with the charter language are clearly presented.

As an extended essay on the importance of the international civil service to the orderly conduct of the business of the United Nations, this volume touches on the familiar issues of geographical distribution, career prospects and international vs. local recruitment. The author emphasizes the importance of international civil service to the im-

plementation of the concept of international administration as a de-politicized segment of international relations; the relation between the success of the international civil service and recognition by nations of the nature of the role of the Secretary General or Director General; and the failure of public opinion generally to recognize the essentiality of the protection due the international civil service if the underlying objectives of the United Nations system are to be attained.

Extended attention is given to the approaches and style of Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld and the crises they both faced in fashioning the role and nature of the international civil service in the course of growing international tensions and under pressure of new responsibilities which the United Nations was asked to undertake. Here the author is also concerned with the clearly dual roles of the Secretary General as political and as administrative officer of the United Nations.

The volume is replete with quotations from official United Nations documentation and secondary literature and certain especially apt quotations from declarations of member states about the international civil service. It is an interesting companion volume to that of Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat*. Whereas Wertheimer's was essentially a history intended to help fashion the coming international civil service of the United Nations, Langrod's focuses largely upon the United Nations experience.

The dangers to the international civil service and to any nationally neutral but ideologically positive international force are obvious as the world's climate for cooperative and world community approaches has deteriorated. But obvious also are the needs for a stronger international civil service as the world tasks that lend themselves to administrative and denationalized treatment increase and as the need increases for international administrative leadership in discovering means of reconciling conflicting national views. Langrod is a vigorous protagonist on behalf of strengthening the international civil service to meet all these needs.—WALTER H. C. LAVES, *Indiana University*.

Peace-Keeping By U.N. Forces From Suez to the Congo. By ARTHUR LEE BURNS AND NINA HEATHCOTE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger [Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University], 1963, Pp. ix, 256. \$6.00.)

Concentrating primarily on the experience of the United Nations Operation in the Congo from July 1960 through December 1962, this study is concerned with attempting to indicate the precedents in the U.N. use of military forces that may

apply in the future. An initial, and very brief, chapter examines the previous U.N. peace-keeping experiences in Suez, Lebanon and Jordan, and culminates in an evaluation of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's "summary study" of these efforts in which he attempted to ascertain guidelines for future operations. In essence this volume analyzes the first eighteen months of the Congo experience to see if it is possible to further refine these principles of Hammarskjöld, particularly as this operation was intranational in character. At the end (and presumably in a chapter tacked on after the completion of the rest of the manuscript) is a chapter covering the U.N. Congo operation from December 1962 through February 1963, and this chapter included a revision of some of the precedent conclusions made in the penultimate concluding chapter.

Considerable attention is given to the dilemma posed by the initial guidelines suggested by Hammarskjöld for the Congo operation: that the U.N. force was not to be a party in the internal factional struggles in the Congo. An underlying theme in the study is the evolution of the U.N. role in the Congo, and the fact that while the ONUC was not sent to achieve political ends, in the end its actions had "political effects". The analysis is directed to trying to answer three questions. First, did the Congo experience establish a precedent for using military forces for political ends? Here the authors conclude that Hammarskjöld would not allow the U.N. "to be merely an instrument of power politics for any group of nations, nor to contravene the Charter's provisions or the principles of the precedents he had worked to establish." They argue that in July to September 1960, the Secretary-General "attempted a consistent extension of those precedents to intranational situations, but the logic of events in the Congo rendered the extension inconsistent" with the principles he had laid down in his "summary study" on the experiences in Suez, Lebanon and Jordan. Secondly, could the United Nations use force in the future to ease the transition from colonial status to full independence? The authors conclude that: "It may appear to be an ideal instrument for transforming postcolonial situations to the shape desired by the Afro-Asian powers—and therefore an invaluable tool from the U.S. viewpoint for weaning the Afro-Asians away from their habit of looking to Moscow in such cases." Thirdly, they ask: are military forces used by the United Nations effective instruments in preserving international peace? Burns and Heathcote tell us:

A doctrinaire realist might here interpolate that the Congo experience has exposed the myth of transcendent justice among states and has shown up the U.N. as merely the machinery of a

collective security alliance. We would rejoin that, so far as in the Congo operation UNOC departed from strict impartiality, it did so through contingent frailty and not from logical necessity. And we would add, on the other hand, that on numerous and difficult occasions the U.N. and its Secretariat acted with scrupulous objectivity. The future effectiveness of the Organization and of its forces as instruments for the preservation of peace is likely to depend upon which policy is remembered.

In addition to answering these three questions, the authors evaluate a number of lessons from the U.N. experience in the Congo and suggest many elements that might be considered in establishing future peace-keeping forces.

The study is based primarily on an examination of the official documents and press releases of the U.N. Few questions are raised as to whether these sources really tell the complete story of the Congo operation, or whether this limitation of sources would have implications for the conclusions. In Chapter VI, attention is given to the attacks of the ANC on the Sudanese forces in Banana and Matadi in March 1961 (which incidents were covered in the official documents) but no mention is made to the massacre of a considerable number of Ghanaian troops at Port Francqui (which information was suppressed from the official documents). As another example of omission, little attention is given to the role of diplomatic agents of the major powers and of the African states in the Congo, who, particularly in the first few months of the operation, complicated the role of the Secretary-General and his agents, and had an effect on delaying the Security Council from extending a wider mandate to the Secretary-General. The usefulness of the study as a guide to the official story of the U.N. role in the Congo is further hampered by the lack of an index.—T. HOVET JR., *New York University*.

The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations, By JAMES BARROS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xxi, 339. \$7.50.)

Professor Barros has written a first-rate case study of diplomacy in the early interwar period. The Corfu Crisis of 1923 confronted the League of Nations with one of its first major problems, and the judgment is inescapable that the League failed to function effectively—or, rather, that it was not permitted by some of its important members to do so. Thus was set an example which was to have tragic consequences in the 1930's.

The basic facts of the matter can be quickly established. The President of an international commission sent by the "Conference of Ambassadors" (an organ established to interpret and execute the Peace Treaties) and members of his staff—all Italian citizens—were assassinated on Greek territory, near the Albanian border. The

assassin was not caught, and the motives of the act remain in doubt to this day. Italian reaction was strong and immediate. Mussolini dispatched an ultimatum to Greece, requiring specified actions, including reparations, within a short time limit. Pending the execution of these terms, Italian naval forces seized the island of Corfu as a warranty for Greek performance. Greece appealed to both the League of Nations and the Conference of Ambassadors. The Italians, who would have preferred to settle the matter bilaterally with Greece, strenuously opposed the proposition that the League was competent to handle the issue. In this stand, they were supported by the French, who had reasons of their own to apprehend that disturbing parallels might be drawn to their occupation of the Ruhr only a short time before. The British supported the competence of the League to handle the issue, but gave in on this point and agreed to have the conflict handled by the conference of Ambassadors. The issue was resolved by that body. Greece was not represented in the important discussions, whereas Italy, as a regular member, took a leading part. Needless to say, the outcome was an almost complete victory for Italy.

So much for the outlines of the case. While the book would be valuable and interesting in its own right as a case study of an important diplomatic encounter, its real significance lies in the larger issues which this case opens up. First among these is the new style of diplomacy demonstrated by Mussolini—with its impatience with the traditional, slow and restrained process of accommodation, and its substitution of the deliberate use of force, the clear implication that those who stood in its way could not count on restraint or reasonableness, its threat to leave the League if that body were to address itself to the issue at hand. Diplomats of all countries, including regular officials of the Italian Foreign Office, tried to tone down this new diplomatic approach, but in the end Mussolini carried the day simply by being unreasonable, willing to take chances while others were not.

Secondly, it is interesting to note the repeated, overt emphasis on arguments of national pride, prestige, honor, glory, and dignity. One cannot help speculating that such concepts may be stressed most by those who are least sure of their own or their country's position. Mussolini was a newcomer who badly needed an international triumph. Italy, whose status as a major power has always been clouded, also felt frustrated by the peace settlement.

A third clear contribution of this study lies in the demonstration that differences in approach between France and Britain, the two major

guarantors of the peace settlement, did much to make the interwar period as tense and unstable as it was. Arnold Wolfers, in his *Britain and France Between Two Wars* (1940), outlined the general divergencies in approach; in this case study, they are focused on the issue at hand.

Finally, although the conflict was peacefully resolved, the price paid for it was extremely high in terms of uncertainties about the willingness of the great powers to utilize the League of Nations as the instrument to resolve problems between states. The judgment of Sir Eric Drummond, then Secretary-General of the League, is in point when he said "it is generally held that the authority of the League has been challenged in a sphere which is precisely that for which it was created, and that this challenge has brought in question the fundamental principles which lie at the root of the public law of the new world order established by the League."

We are indebted to Professor Barros for a painstaking, thorough, scholarly and well-written effort to remind us not only of the first weakening of the League of Nations, but more importantly of the precarious nature of international institutions when they are not supported by their more powerful members.—FRED A. SONDERMANN, *The Colorado College*.

International Law of Fisheries. By DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. xxiv., 554. \$12.50.)

The most direct confrontation between nations (other than in war) occurs in the competition for the open fisheries of the high seas. On some fishing grounds, the vessels of a dozen or more nations may be jostling each other in pursuit of an invisible, fugitive, and scarce resource—a resource that is the common property of the world community. There are three significant and deleterious consequences of the international struggle for fisheries. *Conflict* arises as foreign fleets "intrude" on the waters near the coasts of other nation states, and as the coastal states respond by attempting to extend their limits of exclusive rights. *Depletion* occurs because no individual can willingly and unilaterally restrain his own efforts in the interest of future returns, since anything he leaves in the sea for tomorrow will be taken by others today. *Economic waste* is the result of open access to the resource, which attracts far greater investments in labor and capital than is rational for an industry.

These consequences are attracting increasing, but still inadequate, attention. Biologists have been long concerned, but their management objective of a maximum sustainable yield has become tarnished with the recognition that bio-

logical goals can have very damaging economic results. The economists are but recent venturers into the problems of the sea, bringing a clear-cut theory of waste, but no answers that can be readily adopted by the world community. Political scientists have given scarcely a glance to the administrative and management difficulties of internationally shared resources. International lawyers have participated in many of the decisions of the past but, until recently, have based their decisions on the past.

Johnston's book is an encouraging attempt to break away from the traditions of international law. It is a thorough and scholarly presentation, based on a detailed knowledge of the history and development of international fishery agreements and conventions. It explores in great depth the processes of use, claim, and decision and the patterns of authority that are emerging. Professor Johnston is to be applauded for his efforts to introduce "socio-economic" criteria into the discussions of the formulation of an international regime for fisheries. He concludes, and quite rightly, that a fisheries regime should no longer be tied to the concept of the territorial seas. And he concludes that this regime should consider the needs and values of coastal states, and that this should permit greater development of "modified authorities", i.e., neither fully shared (inclusive) nor fully unshared (exclusive).

The precision with which Professor Johnston discusses the juridical aspects of fisheries management does not carry over to his discussions of the conservation and socioeconomic criteria and objectives. As a result, he does not realistically address the extent of a fisheries regime that may be necessary in the future.

For example, his recommendations on socioeconomic criteria and, indeed, on conservation regulations, imply the necessity for restrictions on the number of producers. This form of exclusion, *without recompense*, is unlikely to be acceptable to the emerging nations and to those nations presently without extensive fishery industries. It would be very desirable if Professor Johnston could extend his analysis to the development of a regime that could accommodate both the maximization of net economic revenue and its equitable and acceptable distribution among the nations of the world community.—FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, JR., *Resources for the Future, Inc.*

The Security of Southern Asia. BY D. E. KENNEDY. (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 308. \$7.50.)

The spate of studies produced by American journalists, diplomats, political scientists, policy strategists, and area specialists on the defense of

non-Communist and, in particular, United States interests in Asia have addressed their own audiences, professional and national. It augurs favorably for the development of international relations, as discipline and as policy, that a specialist educated in Great Britain and lecturing in Melbourne, Australia, should contribute an analysis of Asian security problems in an Asian context.

The author's intention is not a monograph—although he has not entirely avoided one—but rather an analysis of environments. He espouses the now traditional view that Southeast Asia is not a region, according to either geography or issue, and that for military-political reference, 'Southern Asia,' is valid. This arena serves as an intensive and generalized focus for the study of all defense alliances as basic patterns of communication and distancing between the interests of Communism and non-Communism. Mr. Kennedy established analogies, though imprecise, among NATO, the Warsaw Pact, SEATO and CENTO. The first two alliances describe a field against which to define the Asian heartland system of alliances including SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS and bilateral defense pacts with the United States. Kennedy's analogies, summarized in the phrases, "balance of prudence," and, "political equilibrium," and indeed his functional relating of Communist and non-Communist commitments are, unfortunately as expected, European in perspective. The concurrent holding patterns which he describes in terms of alliances are therefore subject to correction through the lenses of Russian and CPR perspectives.

Kennedy cites an Asian origin for the confrontation between the United States and China, thus confining or telescoping in space and time the nature of the phenomena under consideration. The present Asian system of defense alliances found its germ in the bilateral treaty of 1951 between the United States and the Philippines, and its evolution, in the view of the author, was essentially complete in the institution of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization three years later in 1954. One is disappointed in the narrow and formalistic definition of Asian commitments to China, or to the United States, especially when the problem of the volume is cast as a study of the interaction among political goals, military and diplomatic resources, administration and the formulation of values. As he states at the outset, "The existence of the system of alliances in Southern Asia has provided a framework for discussions about the security problems of the area, as well as establishing some procedures for dealing with the problems themselves. In particular, the alliances provide values for judgements about diplomatic

and strategic problems, and the assumptions of the alliances have tended to become part of those values." (Pp. 18-19.)

Such a research proposal suggests the recent and ramifying insights of theorists on systems, communications, and inter-group and inter-state conflict. However, once the influence of the CPR on the constellation of South Asian commitments is established, the analysis proceeds on a geographical rather than a conceptual plane: its foci move from the outermost parameter, Communist Powers, SEATO Powers, and 'Other European Countries,' to Southern Asia itself, country-by-country, Sub-continent-by-Zone, to domestic arenas in which the relationships between political goals and subversive instruments are most intense. It is with the last combination of categories that Kennedy is ultimately concerned since, as he maintains, the integrity of the nation-state as a unit constitutes the most effective available resistance to Communist subversion in Southern Asia.

Intra-regional collective security will develop with the capacity of any given country for resistance to subversion, externally controlled, and local, small scale wars. However, an exclusive South Asian arrangement could not cope with nuclear aggression, which by definition is a supra-regional commitment. On the basis of these conclusions, Kennedy shifts from an analysis of the relations among Asian defense problems to the specific recommendation that, in addition to military capabilities against subversion and local aggression, some form of credible deterrence be established with the United States and the United Kingdom as guarantors and not as immediate defenders.

In the absence of such a system, the individual initiative of India, Japan, or Indonesia is required to catalyze the very conditions in Asia which could allow military alliances with smaller nations, anathema to traditional international politics. India and Japan would find little that was attractive in Asian leadership were they to assume the roles of the United States in military defense. Here, the author assumes that the positions of leadership among Asian nations themselves would be comparable to United States- or United Kingdom-Asian relations. Without, of course, the military resources, which Kennedy poses as the second major handicap for an Asian system of deterrence, India and Japan are patently incapable of such an initiative and reluctant to assume the place of the U. S. in any potential military confrontation against China. Their interests would persist in nonalliance or in bilateral arrangements as demonstrated by SEATO's failure to galvanize regional, multilateral participation in Asian defense.

The equation made of military capabilities and types of alliance systems, bilateral or multilateral, is extended to concluding questions of several conceptual orders: would any collective security system not create greater conflict in Asia, on the one hand, by revealing the means to be employed against an aggressor, and, on the other hand, by involving hostilities of such a limited scope that a Great Power could not feasibly intervene? What, then, is deterrent power in Southern Asia? Kennedy cites as imminent the obsolescence of multilateral or even bilateral arrangements in that area. Instead, it is the general threat of nuclear retaliation in a blanket Great Power guarantee that would both obviate the need for perpetually ineffective, country-by-country military commitments and free Asian states from what they fear to be dangerously anti-Chinese militaristic policies. If one defines regionalism on geographic and military bases, one may conclude with Kennedy that the defense of Southern Asia as a region is outmoded.

It is possible to agree that Southern Asia is indeed not a region but from different premises. If Kennedy assumed, which he did not, that alliances were processes in which the fact of a commitment, as well as the ability to execute it and the goal which it is perceived to effect, is an interest, he might perhaps have integrated his analysis of the West's, and the East's defense of Asia with their respective involvements in Africa and Latin America. He might, further, have referred to the questions, "Is nonalignment now a scarce diplomatic and political resource? If not, what is the significance of alignment?"

Kennedy's volume is an outstanding treatment of one aspect of non-Communist defense of Asia for an analyst of current South Asian military problems. But, established, as it has been initially, in a context of global alliances, the study fails to coordinate national and supra-national interests on that scale over time. It does not, in its present form, serve as a model for research on the relationships between national interests and international alliance systems.

Probably, Mr. Kennedy's research should have been published five years ago. Communications on Asian military and political conditions at all levels, official and public, over space and time, are now so encompassing that they have created a various and kaleidoscopic audience whom he is no longer able to reach.—ANNE RENOUF HEADLEY, *Yale University*.

Pan Africanism and East African Integration.
By JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 307. \$7.50.)

Perhaps the most important episode in recent East African history has been the attempt and the

failure to achieve federation. Widely forecast by numerous observers, federal unification of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) seemed to be the natural product of an array of forces contributing towards regional integration. These included economic factors such as a common market and common currency, an inter-territorial infrastructure, and incipient federal political structures such as a supra-national bureaucracy, an inter-territorial legislative assembly and a shared political movement (PAFMECSA). Most important, Pan-Africanism seemed to furnish the necessary emotional and ideological impetus to federation. All these forces, especially the exact role and impact of Pan-Africanism, have been carefully analyzed by Joseph Nye in an effort to determine why federation failed to occur.

Nye's study, which is based on intensive field research in East Africa during 1962 and 1963, indicates that none of the assumed factors of integration operated unambiguously as a force for East African unity. The East African common market is an important example of this. While it may have benefitted all three territories it tended to do so unevenly and in recent years Kenya profited disproportionately from an ability to export freely to its neighbors: as new industries established in East Africa, they seemed to find Nairobi far preferable to other areas. For this reason, the common market generated considerable strain between the countries, and disagreement over the location of future industry became a bitter and divisive factor in East African politics.

Ultimately, Nye shows, the decisive obstacles to federation were not economic but political. Nationalism had been accompanied by increasing territorial consciousness, and the achievement of independence meant the creation of individual state power structures. Political leaders who had fought a long struggle to gain control over their societies were not eager to surrender this power, almost at once, to an uncertain federal regime. The thorniest political problem concerned the nature of the constitution. The draft constitution, worked out during a brief period of mutual co-operation envisioned a strong federal system with a powerful president, directly elected lower house, and a schedule of powers which included the most important areas of public policy. This posed special problems for Uganda (which had the smallest population of the three territories and a relatively weak multi-party system). At this critical juncture, Pan-Africanism seemed to play a negligible role in keeping the federation movement alive. Of the three countries, only Tanganyika could be said to have been motivated by Pan-African ideals and, even then, these did not conflict with con-

siderations of national interest. Kenya was moved almost entirely by economic interest. Uganda, the most unwilling of the three countries, was able to find in the Ghanaian version of Pan-Africanism a convenient rationale for its negative attitude towards regional integration.

Pan-Africanism and East African Integration has an importance which transcends its treatment of the East African experience. In testing established theories of federalism and economic integration against the special conditions which exist in newly independent societies, Nye's book represents a valuable theoretical contribution to the literature on regional unification in the developing areas.—MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE, *University of California (Los Angeles)*.

The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. BY GHITA IONESCU. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965. Pp. 168. \$.95.)

This is a complex little volume. On the surface it tries to grapple with a great deal, yet offers seemingly much less. It is ambitious in its scope and not without merits in its accomplishments. The initial impulse of the reader is that here is another political chronicle as tangled as Congolese politics. But then reading the entire book reveals an excellent insight and analytical mind at work—all the time in somewhat a tongue-in-cheek fashion. This work suggests more than it tells, but what it tells is said with clarity and insight.

Ionescu traces the development of the 'empire' from the mid-war years, through the era of Stalin, the great ferment of 1956, up to the present—an era of increased disintegration, proliferation and latent neutralism. The presentation and approach on the surface appears as heavily historical, but this tendency (or approach) only underlines the analytical discussion of ideological currents and political dynamics operative in the bloc.

The author is at his best when analyzing the dynamics of interaction within a bloc setting in which the previously essential coercive functions of the "center" have eroded to a degree often not perceived by the average observer. Quite correctly the author implies that there are newly found "pragmatic" stimuli which suggest at times the acceptance of the policy line of the USSR. In this sense we might witness the acceptance of certain behavioral patterns solely upon the basis of identifying these with the self-interest of the bloc countries. Provided that the case of Rumania (and more peripherally that of Hungary and Czechoslovakia) will not be an exception but rather the norm as far as the future is concerned, the analyst might do well to compare the dynamics of internal decision-making within the

countries of the East European bloc with that of some of the newly independent countries of the *Tiers Monde*. Even more relevant might be a comparison of the responses of these, on the surface rather distinct, entities to the solution of external issues of collaboration and conflict management. The behavior of Rumania analyzed within the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the parallel ensuing secondary "position fighting" within the bloc could very well offer some interesting lessons as far as the issue of non-commitment and non-alignment is concerned among the Afro-Asian nations. Forgetting about the symbols of Communist parlance, the statements of the Rumanians regarding economic and political interrelations might well come from the oratories of the Nkrumahs, Toures or Nassers.

As Ionescu quite correctly states, the assertion of political independence by the Rumanians proceeded through the channel which offered the maximum rewards with the probability of minimum risks: the insistence upon economic independence. The Rumanians successfully started to talk about the role of the rhythm of economic development—and soon after the Czechs and Hungarians got the clue too. The issue of the rate and nature of industrialization and the proper allocation of resources naturally led to the considering of economic nationalism as a manipulative symbol of both independent thinking and creative self-assurance in decision making. Alas, we are back again with the example of the developing countries and their arguments about balanced or unbalanced growth, the issues of politically manipulated economic nationalism in Latin America, or the old problem of industrialization versus agrarian development. Someone in Bucharest must have been listening to the theses of Raul Prebisch!

Thus, in the end result, with what are we left? Is the bloc in a state of decay, dispersal or disintegration? The answer, maybe, lies in the suggestion that the system is undergoing a continual process of change (change contrasted to notions of development) best characterized by what this reviewer considers to be dynamic stagnation. The internal manipulation of social forces and ideological conflicts has become an everyday concern as the political systems of the East European bloc countries seek to induce identification and support from the populace. The Kadars, Gomulkas, and Ceausescus know that there is no return to the times of Stalin. The men in Moscow must feel increasingly that the same is true as far as intra-bloc relations are concerned.—*ARPAD VON LAZAR, Vanderbilt University.*

Winning Without War. By AMITAI ETZIONI, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964, Pp. XIII, 271. \$4.95.)

This is a decent and humane book, written in a spirit of hope and reason that does not seem warranted by the world in which we live. The author begins by describing the change that has taken place in the bipolar system that dominated the first decade of the Cold War. By making Soviet-American relations the focus of his analysis Etzioni may have biased his analysis somewhat.

He then extrapolates from this that possibilities exist for stabilizing East-West relations on the basis of presumed rules of the game. The author writes (p. 107):

"I do not suggest shifting from a system that relies on power to one that relies on morality or from the force of armies to the force of public opinion; given the present state of international relations, such a shift could be extremely hazardous. I do suggest making explicit and effective the rules that have evolved implicitly and are today imperfectly enforced. . . ."

Now the term 'rule' implies something far more compelling and authoritative than the uneasy détente that presently exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore it is precisely over the unresolved problem of Germany that the rules do not seem to apply, and there Russia is busily contributing to one of America's most bitter and galling diplomatic experiences.

Etzioni's central thesis is that the Cold War that began in the forties has been fed by an extension of opposed security interests into the African, Asian, and Latin-American continents and that the reasonable thing for Russia and America to do now is to admit that neither of them can hope to win a decisive breakthrough without the risk of war and that both, therefore, ought to practice "remote deterrence." Non-armed competition—in ideology, trade, aid—would continue between the two systems, but each would refrain from direct or indirect military interference or subversion. Each would instead rely upon a capacity to intervene swiftly and decisively should the other side commit aggression to deter such aggression from happening. Etzioni describes this as "holding from the outside" and insists that it is not the same as disengagement. Because the Soviet bloc would be deterred from intervening and consolidating its control, left-wing, even Communist, revolutions in third world countries would pose no threat to the United States. United States could accept revolutionary change with equanimity and there would be no need for sickening recourse to intervention as in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic.

In the second half of his study, Professor Etzioni extends the same species of hopeful reasoning to such matters as peaceful competition in the underdeveloped countries, to the arms race and arms control, and to international relations in the nuclear age.

While addressing himself to concrete problems

of the Cold War, Etzioni is really presenting a model of what might be the conditions of a stable international order if its leading members could see the light of their best long-run interest. But is it not precisely the character of the real world that no such light shines evenly for all of them at one time? Some states such as China are violently opposed to the existing status quo; neither Peiping nor Washington appear in the least interested in upholding rules that might favor the other's interests. Each is obsessed with immediate advantages, not with long-run consequences. Is it not precisely the unequal interest nations have in the status quo and the concomitant security psychosis that, in the absence of an independent authority, accounts for the ubiquity of power in international relations?

Elsewhere Etzioni speaks of a 'major new insight' that gives him reason to believe that much more can be achieved in the matter of disarmament through interbloc agreements and *adversary* inspection (p. 207) and therefore the former obstacle of impartial international inspection can be bypassed. But was international inspection *per se* ever the real obstacle (and not Soviet fear of U. S. dominated U. N. inspection) and why does the author think the Soviets would be willing to accept *adversary* inspection given the degree to which secrecy is a condition of their system's existence?

Then too Etzioni underplays the intensity and ubiquity of power politics. Common sense keeps the Soviet Union and the United States from attempting to nuclearize one another and encourages them to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but beyond that the very existence of the other is still a threat and a challenge. Because the attitude of China and the importance of the Sino-American conflict are somewhat slighted, Etzioni underestimates the obstacles to reason. Etzioni starts with the assumption that all states have an equal interest in stabilizing the status quo, although how anyone with his firsthand experience with the Israeli-Arab situation can make such an assumption is hard to understand. Secondly Etzioni's analysis discounts or seriously underestimates the degree to which governments are under the control of unreasoning forces of a domestic, psychological, political, and bureaucratic nature that greatly limit their maneuverability. It takes a combination of circumstances and gifted national leaders like Kennedy to wrest minor gains.

Despite the weakness of his assumptions much of Etzioni's analysis remains valid because it is directed against an excessive American preoccupation with power and control. We are intent upon a ten year war in Viet Nam to induce Communist China to respect *our* rules of the international

comity, but we refuse to employ the political and diplomatic means that over a similar period might alter Peiping's behavior. *Winning Without War* is a solid antidote to a one-sided approach to international relations.—DAVID S. McLELLAN, *University of California (Riverside)*.

Policy and Power: Two Centuries of American Foreign Policy. BY RUHL BARTLETT. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965, paper. Pp. xiv, 303. \$1.95.)

Frequently in preparing a course on contemporary United States foreign policy-making a teacher looks for some relatively brief survey of American history which his students can use to put current problems into long-term perspective. Most of the materials available thus far have been too long for inclusion in the usual political science course, being designed instead as texts for full history courses. The volume under review, however, is fairly short, a paperback, is clearly written, and becomes a prime candidate to fill the gap.

Professor Bartlett covers most of the major problems of past American foreign policy in what seems, to this non-historian, to be a competent manner. The book is of course not intended to be a reference source for the professional, yet for a brief text it is quite comprehensive and can be recommended to the political science teacher. But in terms of the concepts and theories of our profession he will have to supplement, clarify, and correct some aspects in a careful fashion.

As a provider of factual information for our hypothetical course it is a quite adequate history of American foreign policy in the narrow sense, but not of American foreign-policy *making*. It gives very little interpretation of why a given decision was made or how it was molded by the political process. Too often one sees the United States as essentially responding to external stimuli, without having any sense of what alternative responses might have been available. (There is, however, frequent concern with the *formal* aspects of policy—like whether the President acted constitutionally in the destroyers-for-bases deal, or in sending troops to Korea.) Perhaps some references to works such as those on isolationism in the late 1930's, or the Georges' on Woodrow Wilson, might help give another perspective.

This whole problem is especially evident when the author discusses the policies of other states. Most obvious is an excessive personalization. References such as for 1937: "The Chinese people were growing restless under the inactivity of the government against the Japanese invaders" hardly give the student a very accurate view of decision making in a vast underdeveloped coun-

try. It is more serious elsewhere. Professor Bartlett's summary of the events of 1941, "The way to peace was always open to Japan," quite neglects the dynamics of Japanese policy and the interplay of various interest groups. More consequential still is a case which remains directly relevant to current world politics. Because Premier Khrushchev knew about the U-2 flights for years before the 1960 Paris Conference the author concludes that the actual downing of an aircraft could have had nothing to do with the Russian decision to wreck the conference. But certainly a recollection of the internal rivalries within the Soviet Union shows why the Russian leader might have felt obliged to torpedo a meeting immediately after the flights had become *public knowledge*. This whole difficulty stems from a bad case of what has been called the "level of analysis" problem, and can actually be turned by a skillful teacher into a useful pedagogical instrument.

Some less serious problems include an excessive focus of concentration upon particular events seen as trees without reference to any forest. One consequence is an extreme caution in evaluating causality. Typically, as in discussing the causes of British neutrality in the Civil War, we find an explicit disavowal of any search for "primary" causes followed by a long list of contributing factors. Without in any sense denying the complexity of such situations, a more discernible theoretical framework plus a modest bent for comparative analysis might at least help to narrow down the list. Partly too just a little less caution is called for generally—the careful listing of pros and cons on current controversial issues (e.g., foreign aid) is a bit painful.

I also missed the development of many common threads through the period covered, with the chief exception of a continuing interest in neutral rights and naval warfare. To the political scientist maybe one of the most illuminating sections of the book comes at the beginning, in dealing with the American revolution, where Professor Bartlett makes very clear the degree to which the colonists were dependent upon foreign (French) help in liberating themselves. A comparison of this situation with the colonial wars of the mid-Twentieth Century might prove fascinating. And an explicit contrast might usefully have been made between America's problem, around 1800, of trying to extricate itself from European quarrels and the situation following 1940 when the great thrust of our policy has been actively to resolve European and world-wide problems in a direction favorable to us.

In dwelling on some of what a political scientist might consider the flaws of the book I do not mean to imply that it is not well done, or not useful to

us. On the contrary, it does fill an important teaching need. It is precisely in trying to adapt what a man in another discipline has done that we often have our most stimulating thoughts in the classroom.—BRUCE M. RUSSETT, *Yale University*.

The Democratic Revolution. BY BRYAN MAGEE. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1964. Pp. 128. \$2.95.)

The New Concert of Nations. BY CHRISTOPHER MONTAGU WOODHOUSE. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1964. Pp. 103. \$2.95.)

Both of these little volumes have been published as part of a list of "Background Books" to inform the general reader, but they are aimed primarily at a British audience. They seek to expose the world as it really is, and to offer meaningful predictions concerning its future. However, both authors have been forced by the goal of brevity into dangerous omissions and oversimplifications and, further, they have not feared to venture predictions based on somewhat scanty evidence.

By far the best of the two books is *The Democratic Revolution* by Bryan Magee, world traveller, author, and British television reporter. His basic thesis is that the capitalist West and the communist states are now moving inevitably down the desirable path of democratic socialism, and that the newly emerged states should hurry to do so too if they know what is good for them. Accordingly, the old theories of the cold war with their ideological premises must be abandoned in order to understand what is really happening.

While there can be no doubt that capitalism has undergone profound transformations as a consequence of modern technology and political democracy, Magee goes rather far when he speaks of the "abandonment of capitalism." Socialized capitalism, if one may risk this term, has retained some of the vital characteristics of the older system, and it flourishes in a revived Western Europe and Japan, as well as in the United States. Indeed, some of capitalism's concepts about the market as a regulator seem now to be attracting attention in strange places!

In his exploration of communism, Magee is devastating. He notes in some detail that the evils which Marx ascribed to capitalism are today most characteristic of the communist societies, a factor creating profound disillusion even among their own elites. Magee believes that today realism supersedes Marxism as a guide to communist policy. This, along with persistent pressures for better living standards and nationalism, accounts for the growing diversity in the communist camp. Thus Western governments should avoid policies which lump all communist states together, and

should "cooperate with liberal Communist rulers." However, while Magee notes the continuation of the ideological struggle against the West by the communist leaders, he believes they are now dedicated to peace and that "the Communist world has turned from being outward-looking and expansionist to being inward-looking and on the defensive." Is not the wish here pushing a bit ahead of the facts? Unfortunately, Magee makes no reference at all to NATO and other anti-communist policies as deterrents to communist expansion, even in Europe.

The best section of the book concerns the "developing world." After justifying the recent rush toward self-government and independence, and the rejection by the new states of communism as another form of subservience, Magee explores and counters the arguments commonly used, especially in Africa, in support of new authoritarian regimes. He notes that the leaders of these states were rightly angered when told by the imperialist powers that their people were not ready for self-government, but too often after independence some leaders advanced exactly the same view in rejecting democratic institutions. He supports Churchill's dictum that democracy is the worst form of government except for all others. More to the point, he chides opponents of democracy for assuming that what to do is obvious, and that the difficulties arise in getting it done. On the contrary, "the most serious problems relate to what to do." Free discussion lessens the danger in politics of making the wrong decision, and if the wrong decision is made, it allows readier correction. Consequently, democracy is not a luxury for the new states, but essential to their welfare. Sooner or later they will understand this point and also move toward democratic socialism. The older liberal regimes which may be considered as already in or near the social democratic camp should help the new states to find the path and to set a specific timetable for traveling it.

Magee is not concerned here with economic analysis and consequently asks his reader to accept a vague socialism on faith. His focal point is democracy, and, while he says little new, he is on the whole clear and persuasive. A more thorough discussion would also have touched on the relation between the democratic state and capitalism and socialism. To the virtues of freedom and equality which he explored, Magee might also have added hard work and initiative, which he ignored.

The volume on *The New Concert of Nations* by C. M. Woodhouse, Conservative Member of Parliament for Oxford and formerly Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, sets forth the simple point that today states are in different phases in relation to their experience with nationalism. As the new states "become mature," they will recognize the essential character of interdependence. Eventually a new and broader concert of nations will be established as the basis for true peace when national interests and boundaries are subordinated to the needs of all humanity. This will occur as people become aware that the nation-state does not provide an adequate framework for fulfilling their aspirations. The book is rather discursive, superficial, and contains a surprising number of factual errors, considering the experience of the author.

Magee and Woodhouse both assumed the absence of war in the days ahead, and they both radiated a glowing optimism about future trends. Likewise, they paid very little attention to the regime in Peking. Indeed, Woodhouse said almost nothing at all about the communist states. Perhaps this is the way to achieve at least brevity in analysis.—ALFRED FERNBACH, *University of Virginia*.

International Affairs. PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ALFRED DE GRAZIA. (New York: Universal Reference System, 1965. Pp. xxxii, 1205. \$29.95.)

A computer-produced bibliography of 3,030 books and articles on international affairs. Unique feature is the "Topical and Methodological Index" developed by De Grazia, which provides far more intensive indexing than library catalogs or traditional bibliographies. The first of ten projected bibliographical volumes in a series on "Political Science, Government, and Public Policy."—C.B.

Inter-American Conferences 1826-1954: History and Problems. BY SAMUEL GUY INMAN. (Washington, D. C.: The University Press of Washington, D. C. and the Community College Press, 1965, pp. 282.)

An authoritative account of the Inter-American Conferences from 1826 to 1954, which is also partly autobiographical. The author's personal recollections give the work special interest and value.—F.G.G.

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NEWS AND NOTES

1966 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1966-67

The 1966 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 6-10 at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City. Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, to be held at 4:30 p.m. Wednesday, Sept. 7, in the Georgian Room, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City, the Nominating Committee (comprised of Bernard C. Cohen, University of Wisconsin, Chairman; Gwendolen M. Carter, Northwestern University; Alfred Diamant, Haverford College; Robert Horn, Stanford University; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; and Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina) will propose the following officers for 1966-67:

President Elect: Merle Fainsod, Harvard University
Vice Presidents: Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University
Richard C. Snyder, University of California, Irvine
Harold Stein, Princeton University
Secretary: Kenneth Waltz, Swarthmore College
Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D.C.

Members of the Council for two years:

M. Margaret Ball, Duke University
H. Paul Castleberry, Washington State University
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Ohio State University
Herbert Kaufman, Yale University
Charles A. McClelland, University of Southern California
Alfred G. Meyer, Michigan State University
Clara Penniman, University of Wisconsin
Clinton Rossiter, Cornell University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1967 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1967 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Chicago at the Pick-Congress Hotel, September 5-9. Early appointment of the Program Committee for the meeting makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as convenient, and prior to October, 1966, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Members of the Committee are:

Chairman, Harry Eckstein, Princeton University
American Politics: National and Local—Allan P. Sindler, Cornell University
History of Political Thought—Melvin Richter, Hunter College
International Politics and Organization—Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University
Authoritarian Political Systems—Robert C. Tucker, Princeton University
Political Development—Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University
Comparative Political Behavior—Sidney Verba, Stanford University
Parties and Pressure Groups—Henry W. Ehrmann, Dartmouth College
Political Stratification (Power, Influence, Elites, Leadership)—Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University
Political Violence—James C. Davies, University of Oregon
The Political Science Curriculum—Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa
The Political and Social Sciences—Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvard University

The Program Committee invites younger members of the Association to submit papers for consideration to the appropriate section chairman listed above. This procedure replaces separately organized selected-paper or volunteer-paper panels but is designed to offer the same opportunity. To be considered, papers should be submitted no later than November 1, 1966.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

Ford Foundation Announces Nearly \$3,000,000 in Grants for 4 American Political Science Association Programs. The Ford Foundation on April 26 announced nearly \$3,000,000 in grants to the Association for operation of public service programs over the next five years. The individual grants and activities which they will support are:

- \$690,000 for orientation of newly elected state legislators under a State Legislative Service Program.
- \$750,000 for a Public Affairs Reporting Awards Program, including seminars and fellowships for political journalists.
- \$775,000 for continuation of the Congressional Fellowship Program, which brings political scientists and journalists to Washington, D. C., for study of and work with Congress.
- \$770,000 for state and local internship programs organized and conducted by university departments of political science.

Legislative Service Programs will be developed in about five states each year. Designed to introduce incoming members to the workings of their legislature, each program will include a series of seminars and the preparation of a handbook on legislative practices, organization and traditions. The Association co-sponsored similar programs for newly elected members of the U. S. House of Representatives in 1963 and 1965.

The grant for reporting awards provides for continuation and expansion of a program which has been operated by the Association since 1956. Its purpose is to encourage and reward excellence in public affairs reporting at the state and local level. About 60 such awards will be made each year. Winners will be selected on the basis of regional competitions and will attend one-week seminars on state and local government. Additionally, the grant provides for establishment of a new fellowship program for newsmen. On the basis of a national competition, the Association each year will award 12 fellowships for six months to one year of study in colleges and universities of the successful candidates' choice. Generally, these awards will be made to reporters of public affairs who wish to develop new techniques for gathering and reporting the news or who wish to improve their knowledge in a particular field.

Sponsored by the Association since 1953, the Congressional Fellowship Program brings about 16 journalists and political scientists to Washington each year for nine-months of first-hand observation of Congress. Congressional Fellows are chosen in a national competition and serve as aides to Senators and Representatives or work

on the staffs of Congressional committees. The purpose of this fellowship experience is to improve teaching, research, and reporting on Congress and the legislative process. Participants attend educational seminars conducted by the Association throughout the period they are serving in Congressional offices.

The State and Local Internship Program is designed to establish internship as a permanent feature of graduate-level instruction in political science. Individual university departments of political science will submit proposals for operation of internship programs to the Association, which will provide funds and technical assistance to support them. Under this program, the internships may be in state legislatures, with administrators at the state, city and county levels, or in state and local party organizations.

Congressional Fellowship Awards. In March, the Association announced 16 winners in the national competition for the 1966-67 Congressional Fellowship awards. The winners—seven journalists, eight political scientists, and one psychologist—will be brought to the Nation's Capital for a year of full-time work in the offices of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.

The Congressional Fellows will arrive in Washington in mid-November for a six-week orientation period and will begin working in Congressional offices of their choice about January 1, 1967. The program ends August 15, 1967.

The 16 winners were selected on the basis of superior academic training and experience. Final selections were made by an Advisory Committee made up of government officials, Washington newsmen, and political scientists.

Journalist winners are:

- Loren F. Ghiglione, 25, former reporter for Claremont (Calif.) *Courier* and Washington (D. C.) *Post*, presently at Yale University
- Stephen B. Goddard, 24, city hall reporter, Hartford (Conn.) *Times*
- Harry A. Lenhart, Jr., 27, on leave from Cleveland (Ohio) *Plain Dealer*, presently at University of Wisconsin
- Wesley G. Pippert, 32, reporter, United Press International, Chicago
- William E. Shands, 32, assistant news editor, Redwood City (Calif.) *Tribune*
- Roger Summers, 31, courthouse and political reporter, Fort Worth (Texas) *Star-Telegram*
- Harrison J. Ullmann, 31, science and medical writer, Indianapolis (Indiana) *Star*

Political science winners are:

- Ernest A. Chaples, Jr., 26, Ph.D. candidate in political science, University of Kentucky

R. Roger Majak, 25, Ph.D. candidate, Ohio State University
 James T. Murphy, 28, Ph.D. candidate, University of Rochester
 Conrad P. Rutkowski, 27, Ph.D. candidate, Fordham University
 Morley Segal, 32, assistant professor of political science, California State College at Hayward
 Clarence N. Stone, 31, assistant professor of political science, Emory University
 James E. Underwood, 28, Ph.D. candidate, Syracuse University
 Gilbert Ware, 32, senior program analyst, Civil Rights Commission

Psychologist winner is:

Monroe Friedman, 31, associate professor of psychology, Eastern Michigan University

Summer NDEA Civics Institutes. Five NDEA Civics Institutes for advanced study by elementary and secondary studies teachers are scheduled for this summer. Provision for the Institute program resulted from the amendment of Title XI of the NDEA Act of 1958. The first five Institutes, their titles and Directors are:

Columbia University, "American Liberties," Alan F. Westin
 The University of Florida, "American Government and Politics," Manning J. Dauer
 Southern University, "American Government and Politics," Jewel L. Prestage
 Wayne State, "International Relations: Problems of War and Peace," Russell H. Broadhead
 University of California at Los Angeles, "Problems of Democracy: Conflict and Consensus," Herbert Morris

Seminars in Legislative Operations. Legislative Operations Roundtables, jointly sponsored by the Association and the Office of Career Development of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, were held January 24-25 and April 18-22 for Federal Executives. The program is part of a continuing series of Roundtables designed to improve the federal career executive's knowledge and understanding of executive-legislative relations through an examination in depth of Congressional functions and processes. Discussion leaders and their topics were as follows:

Max M. Kampelman, American Political Science Association Treasurer and Counsel; "Congress and the American Political System."
 Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University; Randall Ripley, Brookings Institution; and George Meader, Associate Counsel, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress;

"Congressional Organization and Reorganization."

Mike Gorman, Executive Director, National Committee Against Mental Health; "Lobbying and Congressional Reaction."

Wayne Granquist, Administrative Assistant, Senator Abraham Ribicoff; John P. Carlson, Minority Counsel, House Governmental Operations Committee; George Stafford, Administrative Assistant, Senator Frank Carlson; and Frank Matchett, Deputy Director, House Sub-Committee on Manpower; "The Role of Congressional Staff."
 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System."

Warren Miller, Survey Research Center; "The Congressman and his Constituency."

Rep. Thomas S. Foley (D-Washington), and Rep. William S. Mailliard (R-California); "Perspectives of the Congressmen."

Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina; "U. S. Senators and their World: A Behavioral Analysis."

Sen. Thruston B. Morton (R-Kentucky), and D. B. Hardeman, Trinity College; "Congressional Leadership and the Legislative Process."

Samuel Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare; J. Leiper Freeman, Vanderbilt University; and Ben L. Steele, Congressional Liaison Office, Department of Agriculture; "Congressional Relations with Agencies—The Liaison Office and the Subsystem."

Phillip Sam Hughes, Bureau of the Budget; "Executive Planning, Budgeting and Legislative Clearance."

David S. Broder, *The New York Times*; "Congress, the Press and Public Opinion."

Carl B. Swisher, Johns Hopkins University; "The Courts and Congress."

Ralph K. Huitt, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare; and Bryce Harlow, Director of Governmental Relations, Proctor and Gamble Co.; "Presidential Leadership and Executive-Legislative Relations."

A.P.S.A. Social Studies Projects. The Association has co-sponsored three programs in recent months in the area of secondary social studies. In January, the Association was a co-sponsor with the Social Science Department of Jersey City State College of a "Conference on the Improvement of Social Studies Instruction." Participants in the panel on "Political Science and the Social Studies" included: Norman W. Beck, Jersey City State College, Chairman, Robert E. Cleary,

American University, paper, Walter E. Beach, American Political Science Association, and Stanley Worton, Jersey City State College, discussants.

Participants in a spring series of seminars, "Political Science and the Social Studies," co-sponsored with the Montgomery County, Maryland Public Schools included:

Robert E. Cleary, American University; "Political Science and the Social Studies."

Brad Patterson, Treasury Department; "Congress and the Presidency."

Louis S. Loeb, American University; "The Judicial Process."

H. Field Haviland, Brookings Institution; "Foreign Policy and International Relations."

The Association co-sponsored a seminar series with the Arlington County, Virginia Public Schools, on "Congress and the American Political System." Participants and their topics included:

D. B. Hardeman, Trinity College; "The Legislative Process."

Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University; "Congressional Organization and Reorganization."

John F. Manley, Brookings Institution; "The Congressional Committee: The House Ways and Means Committee as a Case Study."

Rep. Robert T. Secrest (D-Ohio); "Representing and Informing the People: The House of Representatives."

Stanley J. McFarland, National Education Association; "External Pressures on Congress."

Albert L. Alford, Office of Education; "Legislative-Executive Branch Relations."

William Selover, *The Christian Science Monitor*; "The Press and Congress."

Warren Butler, Legislative Assistant; Rep. William Widnall (R-N. J.); "The Congressional Staff System."

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AT ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 6, 1966, in the Cornell Room, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

At its ninth annual meeting in November, the Missouri Political Science Association elected the following new officers: president, Robert Jacob, Central Methodist College, Fayette; vice president, Robert Karsch, University of Missouri, Columbia; secretary-treasurer, David A. Leuthold, University of Missouri, Columbia; executive council member, Al C. Sullivan, Jr., Assistant State Budget Director.

Retiring officers included Robert Salisbury, Washington University, president, and Lloyd Wells, University of Missouri, Columbia, executive council member.

Papers were presented by Philip Maher, Administrative Assistant to the Governor for Urban Affairs; Victor T. Le Vine, Washington University; Congressman Thomas B. Curtis; Lyman Sargent, University of Missouri at St. Louis; H. Carl Camp, Southeast Missouri State College;

David Wurfel, University of Missouri, Columbia; and Robert Salisbury.

The next annual meeting will be held October 8-9, 1966 at Mai-Tai Resort, Lake of the Ozarks, Missouri.

The second conference of The Cross National Program of Political and Social Change was held at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, from August 16 to September 10, 1965. Participants included: Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, Stanford University; Robert Somer, Berkeley; Samuel Eldersveld, Michigan; Ulf Himmelstrand and Albert Imohiosen, University of Ibadan; Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Ciudad Universitaria; Rajni Kothari and Bashir Ahmed, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi; and Hajime Ikeuchi and Joji Watanuki, University of Tokyo.

The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History will hold its fifty-first annual meeting in Baltimore, Maryland, at the Sheraton-Belvedere Hotel, October 21, 22 and 23, 1966. Persons interested in attendance or participation

are invited to contact Roland C. McConnell, Chairman of Arrangements or Walter Fisher, Program Chairman; Morgan State College, Cold-spring Lane and Hillen Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21212.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Institute on American Freedoms announces its sponsorship of a prize essay contest for graduate students in political science. An award of \$1,000 will be made for the best original research project on "frontier problems in the field of criminal law or the administration of criminal justice." Similar awards will be made to graduate students in law and sociology.

Judges of the contest will be selected by the Executive Board of the Institute. Their decision will be announced before January 1, 1967. Essays, either individually or jointly written, must be submitted by September 1, 1966. Published articles will be considered if they appeared after January 1, 1965.

Members of the Executive Board of the Institute are: Daniel M. Berman, The American University (Executive Director); Vern Countryman, Harvard Law School; David Fellman, University of Wisconsin; Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago Law School; and Herbert L. Packer, Stanford University Law School.

In order to assist scholars to acquire survey materials from the developing countries, the Survey Research Center of the University of California, Berkeley, under a grant from the National Science Foundation, created the International Data Library and Reference Service two years ago. The Library now has approximately 120 studies, including 70 from Asia and 37 from Latin America. Except for the few studies which are still being analyzed by the original data-suppliers, all of these materials can be freely rediffused. Most of the studies have been cleaned, but most of the clean versions are on octal tape. In the future, the Library will maintain the cleaned studies on BCD tape. Of course, the cards also can be obtained.

The user of this unique service need pay only the duplicating and mailing costs.

In addition to acquiring materials from other countries, the Library has collected information about foreign research agencies and organizations capable of collecting materials for American scholars. (Information on other specialized archives and social science information services may be obtained from the Executive Director, Council of Social Science Data Archives, Bureau

of Applied Social Research, 605 West 115th, New York, New York 10025.)

To help the Library perform these important services, scholars are requested to inform it of studies and information which it might consider acquiring.

Please address your inquiries to the International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720.

American political scientists presently among the specialists at work in the Senior Specialists program of the East-West Center, University of Hawaii are Henry Hart, University of Wisconsin; Richard S. Wheeler, University of Michigan, and Martin Landau, Brooklyn College.

A group of anonymous donors, friends of Harold H. Fisher, Chairman Emeritus of the Hoover Institute and Library at Stanford University, have pledged \$100,000 to Mills College for the establishment of a scholarship honoring him. Professor Fisher was associated with Mills College from 1961 to 1964 as visiting professor of history and government. Since his retirement from Stanford in 1955, he has served on the faculties of the University of California at Berkeley, San Francisco State College, Columbia University and Tokyo University.

This summer four seminars will be held at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor under the auspices of the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, a cooperating group of sixty American and Canadian universities. Eight-week courses in research design, data analysis, and mathematical political analysis will extend from June 29 to August 18. In addition, a specialized seminar in comparative research in state politics will be held from August 1 through August 12. The seminar in mathematical political analysis is jointly sponsored by the Mathematical Social Science Board and will be led by Hayward Alker of Yale University. The state politics seminar will be led by Herbert Jacob of the University of Wisconsin, John Grumm of the University of Kansas, Samuel Patterson of the University of Iowa, H. Douglas Price of Harvard University,

and Kenneth Vines of Tulane University. The course in research design will be led by Warren Miller and the course in data analysis by Donald Stokes, both of the Consortium staff. Expenses of participants in the research design, data analysis, and state politics seminars can be partially met out of funds made available by the National Science Foundation. Financial assistance can be made available to participants in the mathematical political analysis seminar out of funds provided by the Mathematical Social Science Board. Inquiries about the seminars should be directed to the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

A seminar in Development was held at the Claremont Colleges from December 26, 1965, to January 1, 1966. The seminar was sponsored by the Institute of International Education and the Agency for International Development. Participants included 55 Development Fellows from 20 African and Asian countries. Administrative director of the seminar was Dean Arthur Feraru of Pitzer College; academic director was Merrill R. Goodall of the Claremont Graduate School.

The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, in collaboration with the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, will hold its regular sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in Washington, D. C., December 26-31, 1966.

Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions are invited to forward titles and abstracts of some 300 words not later than September 1st to Donald P. Ray, Director, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D. C. 20044.

Papers should be based upon the current research of the author. Subjects may relate to any aspect of political science. Topics of special interest might concern social change in the U.S.S.R., the political science of national security, socio-political problems of divided nations, international law and relations, and general subjects in American government and politics. Multidisciplinary studies are also of interest.

Selected materials of the sessions of the National Institute will be published in the *Symposia Studies Series*.

The American Political Science Association regularly holds symposia sessions at A.A.A.S. meetings as an affiliate member of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, University of Pennsylvania, participated in an interdisciplinary collo-

quium on "The Emerging Constitution," led by Rexford Guy Tugwell, at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, from January 29-February 10.

HUGH A. BONE, University of Washington, has been elected secretary of the Constitutional Advisory Council for the State of Washington, which was created by law to recommend changes in the constitution. Paul R. Castleberry, Washington State University, also serves on the committee as an ex-officio member.

LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN, Denison University, will serve during the summer of 1966 as the Director of the Regional Council Center for International Students in Pittsburgh.

JOHN H. BUNZEL, San Francisco State College, has received a research grant from the Committee in Constitutional Democracy of the Rockefeller Foundation, and is on leave during the 1965-66 academic year.

ARDATH W. BURKS, Rutgers University, has returned from Japan after a semester's field work.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL, University of Southern California, will conduct a second special summer program in 1966 on "World Law and World Order." The program is financed by a grant from the World Law Fund of New York City. He also served as a consultant to the United States Naval War College in 1965.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, The Ohio State University, participated in a two-week conference in September on political and economic problems of Western European integration sponsored by the British Foreign Office at Wilton Park, Sussex.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., The University of Michigan, lectured at the Law Faculty of the *Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico* in October, in a program organized to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations.

DAVID R. DERGE, Indiana University, spent April and May in India and Afghanistan studying the impact of U. S. foreign aid to education and research in various universities.

GILBERT H. FLANZ is on a spring term sabbatical leave from New York University. He visited Korea as an advisor to the Korean government.

GUY FOX, Michigan State University, is spending the 1965 and 1966 academic years in Baghdad, Iraq, as Chief Advisor to the Institute of Public Administration, University of Baghdad. The project is financed by the Ford Foundation.

DONALD M. HANCOCK, University of Texas, has been awarded a research grant from the University's Research Institute. He will spend the summer in Sweden.

ILIYA HARIK, Indiana University, will be on leave during 1966-67 doing research in Egypt on a grant from the American Research Center in Egypt.

BERNARD HENNESSY, Director of the National Center for Education in Politics, was a member of an international Research Conference on Learning and the Educational Process, sponsored by the SSRC, at Stanford University, June 21 to July 30, 1965.

JOHN C. HONEY, Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University, is serving during 1966 as a consultant to the Ford Foundation's programs on Latin America and Public Affairs. He is also a consultant to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the preparation of a report on university programs for mid-career executive development of officials in public service. He is assisting AID and the University of Puerto Rico in evaluating the special program of the University's School of Public Administration.

BASIL KARP, Columbia University, participated in the First World Conference on University Adult Education, held at Humlebaek, Denmark, and in a British-North American conference on university adult education at Oxford, England, last summer.

KEMAL H. KARPAT, New York University, is engaged in organizing an international conference on the social foundations of democracy in the Middle East, to be held in the summer of 1966. The purpose of the conference is to appraise political modernization from the point of view of non-western nations.

JOEL LARUS, Brandeis University, is on leave during 1965-66 as a research fellow of the Mershon National Security Center at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

WERNER LEVI, University of Hawaii, spent December and January 1965-66 in Australia and French Polynesia. He gave some lectures and did some research.

ERWIN L. LEVINE, Skidmore College, is on research leave, second term 1966.

DOUGLAS MENDEL, JR., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, will lecture at Sophia University, Tokyo, during the summer of 1966 and will continue his field work for the Roper Opinion Research Center at Williams College.

CHARLES NEFF has returned to the University of Hawaii after two years as Associate Director of the Peace Corps in Colombia.

NORMAN D. PALMER, University of Pennsylvania, was recently appointed a member of the Pakistan Council of the Asia Society in New York. He participated in a conference on "Design for Political Science, Objective Methods," held in December in Philadelphia under the auspices of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

PHILIP M. PHIBBS, Wellesley College, will be on leave in 1966-67 for research in India on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

GERALD POMPER, Rutgers University, has been awarded a University Research Council grant for a year's leave, beginning July, 1966.

EMMETTE S. REDFORD, The University of Texas, has been appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the newly created National Council on Humanities, which will advise the government on programs to strengthen education and scholarship in the liberal arts.

JAMES R. ROACH, The University of Texas, has been appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to the Board of Foreign Scholarships. The Board supervises the educational exchange programs administered by the Department of State under the Fulbright-Hays Act and certain exchange functions administered by the U. S. Office of Education.

ROBERT R. ROBBINS, Tufts University, served as Legislative Counsel and Consultant to the Congress of Micronesia and as Advisor on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands during a 1965-66 sabbatical leave.

JOHN H. ROMANI, University of Michigan, has been named Staff Director of the Committee on the Organization of Health Activities of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

GORDON J. SCHOCHET, Rutgers University, will spend six weeks at the University of California at Los Angeles as a Clark Library Fellow in British History.

DAVID C. SCHWARTZ presented a paper at the 1965 Meetings of The American Association for the Advancement of Science.

ROGER M. SMITH, University of Washington, will study in Southeast Asia during 1966-67 under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. James E. Todd, University of Iowa, will replace him during his leave of absence.

JAMES A. STEINTRAGER, The University of Texas, has received a research grant from the Reim Foundation for the academic year 1966-67. He will be conducting research under the grant in London, England.

ROBERT W. STERN has received a faculty research fellowship for study in India for the year 1966-67 from the American Institute of Indian Studies.

JOHN E. STONER, Indiana University, has received a grant from the U. S. Bureau of Public Roads and the Indiana Highway Commission to establish a system for coding the location of highway traffic accidents by electronic data processing procedures.

RICHARD N. SWIFT, New York University, has been elected president of the Mid-Atlantic Region of the International Studies Association.

CHARLES L. TAYLOR, College of William and Mary, will be on leave during 1966-67 and will be Technical Director of the Yale Data Program.

HENRY J. TEUNE, University of Pennsylvania,

was on a leave of absence this fall in connection with the International Studies of Values in Politics project, spending his time in Yugoslavia.

JOHN E. TURNER, ROBERT T. HOLT, WALTER KLEIN and THOMAS SCOTT are jointly directing the University of Minnesota's new Center for Comparative Political Analysis.

DANIEL W. TUTTLE has resigned from his post in the department of political science, effective June 1966, and has accepted a position as secretary of the Hawaii Education Association, effective July 1966.

HENRY WELLS, University of Pennsylvania, was a member of the technical assistance mission sent by the Organization of American States to Costa Rica to observe the general election held in that country on February 6, 1966. He has previously served on OAS electoral missions in the Dominican Republic and Honduras.

ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, University of Chicago, is the Director for the University's new Center for Comparative Study of Political Development.

NEW APPOINTMENTS

VICTOR BASIUK, associate professor, Case Institute of Technology; formerly of Columbia University.

JAMES J. BEST, assistant professor, University of Washington.

RICHARD N. BLUE, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

MINKYU CHO, instructor, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.

JAMES COBBLEDICK, assistant professor, Skidmore College, 1965-66.

JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, instructor, University of Nevada, spring term, 1966.

MURRAY EDELMAN, professor, University of Wisconsin; formerly of the University of Illinois; September, 1966.

EUGENE EIDENBERG, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

JOAN FISS, instructor, University College, New York University.

THOMAS HOVET, JR., professor, University of Oregon; formerly of New York University.

KENNETH F. JOHNSON, associate professor, University of Southern California; formerly of Colorado State University.

HERBERT M. KAGI, assistant professor, University of Washington.

DAVID A. KAY, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

KENT A. KIRWAN, instructor, Lawrence University.

L. LARRY LEONARD, associate professor, Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh.

MICHAEL LIPSKY, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

JOHN F. MANLEY, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

TIMOTHY MEAD, instructor, Moravian College.

CLIFTON McCLESKY, associate professor, University of Texas; formerly of the University of Houston. September, 1966.

J. PETER MEEKISON, assistant professor, University of Washington; formerly of Duke University. September, 1966.

STANLEY MICHALAK, assistant professor, Franklin and Marshall College; formerly of the Ohio State University.

JACK NORAGON, Denison University, 1966-67.

JAMES E. PANTON, instructor, Skidmore College.

NEALE J. PEARSON, instructor, Miami University (Ohio).

BURTON M. SAPIN, associate professor, University of Minnesota.

DAVID C. SCHWARTZ, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, assistant professor,

University of Wisconsin; formerly of University of California, Davis.

JEROME N. SLATER, assistant professor, State University of New York at Buffalo; formerly of the Ohio State University.

RICHARD G. STEVENS, assistant professor, University of Washington; formerly of the University of Santa Clara. September, 1966.

RODNEY P. STIEFBOLD, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

JOHN C. WAHLKE, professor, University of Iowa; formerly of the State University of New York, Buffalo; September, 1966.

DONALD ZAGORIA, associate professor, Columbia University.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS

JAMES E. ANDERSON, Wake Forest College: visiting associate professor, University of Houston, spring term, 1966.

ARDATH W. BURKS, Rutgers—the State University: visiting professor, Columbia University, spring term, 1966.

HAROLD CHASE, University of Minnesota: visiting professor, National War College, 1965-66.

LANE DAVIS, University of Iowa: visiting professor, University of Wisconsin, 1966-67.

HERBERT GARFINKEL, Michigan State University: NATO visiting professor, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, 1965-66.

WILLIAM J. KEEFE, Chatham College: visiting professor, University of Wisconsin, summer, 1966.

H. KOEPPLER, Warden of Wilton Park, England: Mershon distinguished visiting professor, the Ohio State University, spring term, 1966.

ROSCOE C. MARTIN, Syracuse University: visiting professor, University of California at Berkeley, 1966-67.

ROY MOREY, Denison University: visiting assistant professor, University of Arizona, summer, 1966.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College: visiting professor, Claremont Graduate School, spring term, 1966.

WALTER SHARP, Yale University: visiting professor, Columbia University, 1965-66.

JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, Rutgers—the State University: visiting professor, University of Pennsylvania, spring term, 1966.

FREDERICK A. SONDERMANN, Colorado College: visiting professor, Claremont Graduate School, spring term, 1966.

JOHN E. TURNER, University of Minnesota: visiting professor, University of Hawaii, summer, 1965.

J. G. G. WOOTTON, Oxford University: visiting professor, Tufts University, 1965-66.

BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, University of Texas: visiting professor, Harvard, 1966-67.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

NORBERT BROCKMAN, S.M., chairman of the department, University of Dayton.

WILLIAM BUCHANAN, chairman of the department and professor, Washington and Lee University; formerly of the University of Tennessee.

BYRUM E. CARTER, chairman of the department, Indiana University.

JOHN DONOVAN, chairman and De Alva Stanwood Alexander professor, Bowdoin College.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH, chairman of the department, Vanderbilt University.

LELAND M. GOODRICH, acting chairman of the department, Columbia University, 1965-66.

EUGENE W. JONES, acting dean, Wayland Baptist College.

NED V. JOY, chairman of the department, San Diego State College.

BASIL KARP, associate dean, School of General Studies, Columbia University; formerly of the Department of State.

GERARD J. MANGONE, acting dean, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

RAYMOND L. MCILVENNA, chairman of the department, University of the Pacific.

W. WARNER MOSS, director, Marshall-Wythe Institute of Public Affairs, College of William and Mary.

ROBERT E. RIGGS, assistant director, International Relations and Area Studies Center, University of Minnesota.

JAMES M. ROHERTY, head of the department, College of William and Mary.

EVANGELOS ROUSOS, chairman of the department, Fenger College.

BURTON M. SAPIN, coordinator of International Programs and director, International Relations and Area Studies Center, University of Minnesota.

JAMES R. WATSON, special assistant to the President, Rutgers.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

NORMAN A. BAILEY, Queens College (CUNY): associate professor.

RAYMOND D. BODNAR, Bureau of Government Research, Rutgers—the State University: associate extension specialist.

PHILIP H. BURCH, JR., Bureau of Government Research, Rutgers—the State University: associate research specialist.

HARRIS I. EFFROSS, Bureau of Government Research, Rutgers—the State University: associate research specialist.

RICHARD C. GRIPP, San Diego State College: professor.

HAROLD H. HAAK, San Diego State College: associate professor.

D. JOY HÜMES, Wells College: professor.

BARBARA WOLFE JANCAR, Skidmore College: assistant professor.

HENRY W. MORTON, Queens College (CUNY): associate professor.

JOHN RENSENBRINK, Bowdoin College: associate professor.

WALTER L. RILEY, University of Washington: associate professor.

JOHN H. ROMANI, School of Public Health, University of Michigan: professor.

KARL SCHMITT, University of Texas: professor.

FRANK SORAUF, University of Minnesota: professor.

HENRY J. TEUNE, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

JAMES P. YOUNG, State University of New York at Buffalo: associate professor.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

WALTER H. C. LAVES has resigned from the chairmanship of the department of Indiana University, effective June, 1966, a position which he has held since September, 1954.

ALBERT H. ROSE, S.M. has returned to teaching and research after twenty years as chairman of the department at the University of Dayton.

IN MEMORIAM

LOWRY ALFRED DORAN, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Oklahoma, died from a heart attack, at the age of eighty, January 8, 1966, in Springfield, Missouri.

Professor Doran enjoyed two careers. Following graduation from Drury College, 1910, he pursued one career in public education leading to service as the principal of Central High School, Springfield, Missouri. After receiving his doctoral degree from the University of Chicago in 1930, he followed a teaching career in political science with a short tour at the University of Maine, and from 1931 to his retirement, at the University of Oklahoma. He is remembered with affection by hundreds of pre-law students at the University of Oklahoma for his course in elements of law, and by others for his regular courses in political parties and comparative government. His students and colleagues revere him for his broad human sympathies and his amiable skepticism of those who impose on the credulity of the human race.—JOSEPH C. PRAY

FREDERICK C. IRION, member of the Department of Government and Director of the Division of Government Research at the University of New Mexico, died December 11, 1965 after an extended illness. A native of Missouri, he took his undergraduate training in journalism, his M.A. in history, and his Ph.D. in political science.

The diversity of interests that characterized his college education was reflected in his scholarship. He wedded journalism and political science in his public opinion research. In 1950, his *Public Opinion and Propaganda* was published. He maintained ongoing studies of public opinion in New Mexico until shortly before his death. In addition to monographs, Fred contributed articles to many professional periodicals, including the REVIEW.

Although he held short term appointments at other universities, nearly all of his professional service was with the University of New Mexico. For almost twenty years, Fred and his colleagues, Charles Judah and Dorothy Cline, produced the bulk of scholarship on New Mexico politics. In the 1960's, Fred's earlier studies of the New Mexico legislature were augmented by research on reapportionment.

His professional dedication was never better exemplified than in his final year. He continued to meet classes until his last hospitalization. At the time of his death, he was working on a book manuscript. The last of more than forty publications of the Division of Government Research,

that were prepared under his direction, was issued the weekend he died. His qualities as a man, a colleague, and a scholar will not readily be forgotten by his numerous acquaintances throughout the profession.—T. PHILLIP WOLF

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, professor of Political Science at Columbia University, died of a heart attack on November 26, 1965, at the age of 60. Born in Heilbronn, Germany, he studied law and social science at the Universities of Münster, Cologne, Berlin, and Bonn, and received the degree of Doctor of Law in 1928. Active as lecturer at German trade union schools and as a member of the Berlin Bar, he published a number of outstanding essays on the legal and political structure of the Weimar Republic. After Hitler's ascent to power, Kirchheimer emigrated first to Paris, and, in 1937, to the United States, where he joined the staff of the Institute of Social Research at Columbia University. He worked as research analyst in the Office of Strategic Services and in the Department of State from 1944 to 1951, and subsequently lectured at Harvard University, American University, and the New School of Social Research in New York. In 1960, he was appointed Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. His books on *Punishment and Social Structure* (1939) (co-author Georg Rusche) and *Political Justice* (1961) represent Kirchheimer's achievement as a scholar: a masterful combination of legal and political, critical and normative analysis.

Kirchheimer's faith was in democratic socialism. He knew that in the world which began with Hitler's rise to power, the fight for this goal was lost. His answer was the uncompromising analysis of the forces and tendencies which were responsible for the defeat. He worked without illusions; he was contemptuous of easy accommodation to prevailing trends. In his cynical sharpness were the charm and warmth of a man for whom the pursuit of the truth was inseparable from the end, namely, the "creation of humane and meaningful social conditions."—HERBERT MARCUSE

MARSHALL M. KNAPPEN, retired H. Fletcher Brown Professor of History and Political Science at the University of Delaware, died on January 17, 1966 at the age of 65 in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He was born in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. His higher education was garnered at the College of Wooster, at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and at Cornell University where he was awarded the Ph.D. degree in history. Between the

Oxford and Cornell experiences he received a Master's in Theology from the Princeton Theological Seminary. He served two churches, but demitted his Ministerial status in 1929. His education, like his subsequent career, reflects the idealism, the rationalism and the pragmatism that combined in his nature.

Marshall Knappen's academic career began as an instructor and then assistant professor of history at the University of Chicago. Appointments followed as chairman of history and political science at Michigan State University, and as a professor of political science at the University of Michigan, with special assignment in adult extension teaching. Prior to coming to the University of Delaware he was executive secretary to the Commission on Foreign Policy Legislation in Washington, D.C., an organization he promoted as a voice of the people in foreign policy. His transition from history to political science reminds one of the Woodrow Wilson adage, "history without political science has no fruit; political science without history has no roots." Marshall Knappen was increasingly concerned that his writings and teaching bear fruit.

Serving in World War II he advanced from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Corps. From 1942-46 he was Chief of the Religious Affairs Section and Deputy Chief of the Educational Section in the Office of Military Government in Germany.

He was the author of four books; the first two mark him as a historian and the last two as a political scientist. His *Tudor Puritanism* will stand as a significant scholarly contribution.

Over and above his classroom teaching, his major devotion was to students as individuals and as groups, especially those with intellectual and reformist interests allied to his own. Marshall Knappen never married. These students and other academic associates for whom he was always most solicitous made up for a lack of family.—
JOHN A. PERKINS

The Rev. ARTHUR A. NORTH, S.J., associate professor of political science and former Dean of the Fordham University Graduate School died on Saturday, January 29, 1966. After serving as an army chaplain during the second World War, he obtained his Doctorate in Political Science at Fordham University in 1951. He held administrative posts at Loyola College in Baltimore and the University of Scranton before becoming Dean of the Graduate School at Fordham University in 1953. During his years as Dean he offered a seminar each year in constitutional law in the Department of Political Science and when he ceased being Dean in 1965, he became a full time member of the Political Science Department.

Father North was a dynamic administrator and lecturer. He published articles on constitutional law in various law journals. He also contributed articles to various encyclopedias. Just before his death he had prepared for publication a volume entitled *Supreme Court Judicial Process and Judicial Politics* which will be published by Appleton Century later this spring.

RENZO SERENO, American political scientist, born August 9th, 1909 in Ancona, Italy, died November 28th, 1965 in Washington, D.C. His degrees were from the University of Rome where he had been assistant to Gaetano Mosca. He worked at the University of Chicago with H. D. Lasswell, G. S. Borgese, and C. E. Merriam. During World War II he served first with the Office of War Information and later with the Department of State. He taught for a year at the University of Puerto Rico; then he spent two years with the Rand Corporation. From 1958 to 1962 he was Professor of Political Theory and International Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He was visiting Fulbright Professor at the University of Siena from 1962 to 1964. His latest position was that of consultant to the President's Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico.

Renzo Sereno first came to the United States in 1933 as a visiting Ph.D. Once here, he stayed. He did go back to his native land in 1951, after an absence of nearly twenty years. On the day of his return, as the train sped over the border into Italy, he stood looking out the window of the Wagon-Lit at the grey, rain-streaked morning, tears running down his face. Yet, in the following decade or more, when he was to be in Europe often, he would always correct the many Frenchmen and Italians who took him to be one of them, saying firmly: "No, I am an American." Sereno always worried about America, not as an adopted son might, but as a man who has adopted a son, and has had to watch him grow up in the times of the Depression, the Spanish Civil War, World War II, and the many crises since.

He died but is not dead. We shall see him one of these days returning from Mexico or Antigua, Portugal, Spain, Syria or Morocco. And, like Herodotus, he will regale us with tales of the customs, climes and cuisines of these countries, of their political institutions and, of course, their interesting turns of phrase—for he was fascinated above all by language. From tales perhaps the talk will shift to books, old and new—the wit and humor sparkling—to the beauty of cities, wines and loves, old and new, and then as it always happened, to the "g. o. U. S."

Renzo Sereno was often a gay man; his sense of

humor was superb. Yet he was not a serene man, nor was his life forever bright with fair weather. He was tormented by demons and petty minds. Often he was fighting them two at a time. Although he came from Italy, life for him there would have been impossible. Politically, Sereno was a Whig. In an Italy without Fascism, he might have gone on to ministerial or ambassadorial rank. He would have smoked with a connoisseur's relish the old choice blend of diplomat and scholar. In America he seldom had the post he was best fitted for, and when he sensed a job was not the one for him, he had the courage to quit. His happiest workdays were spent as professor at Johns Hopkins. His students will never forget him. Diplomat-scholar may have been his metier; teaching was his calling.

Original minds are rare. Renzo Sereno's mind lives on in his students, friends, and children. In his book *The Rulers* (1962), those who never had the luck to meet him will feel the power or originality. "In the realm of politics, beliefs, no matter how absurd, are the common patrimony of rulers and the ruled alike." These are words of one of this century's few great students of politics. His new work, *Take Care of the Night*, a study of magic, science, and religion, just completed in first draft, should be in print before long to console us for this his latest absence.—SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA

WILLIS G. SWARTZ, Chairman of the Department of Government, 1930-1950, and Dean of the Graduate School, 1950-1963, of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, died suddenly of a heart attack on November 6, 1965, at the age of 63. He had returned earlier in the year from an 18-months' leave in Washington, D.C., to conduct a study with Dr. John R. Mayor for the National Commission on Accreditation. This

resulted in the publication in 1965 of *Accreditation in Teacher Education: Its Influence on Higher Education*. He was also the author of a textbook on *American Governmental Problems* (1957, Rev. Ed. 1959).

Dean Swartz directed SIU's rapidly growing foreign student program after World War II, serving as Foreign Student Adviser and later as Dean of International Students. Foreign students around the world sing his praises. Prominent in the area of Southern Illinois, he served as District Governor of Rotary International in 1957-58, and supervised the Rotary Foundation Fellowship program for study abroad and the Rotary district scholarships for foreign students at SIU. Dean Swartz served on the national council for the American Association of University Professors, and held offices in the Illinois Council for Social Studies. At SIU, he served on many important administrative committees, and was instrumental in starting and guiding the ecumenical Student Christian Foundation on the campus. He was an elder and leader in the United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.

A native of Iowa, Dean Swartz received his A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Iowa, and took further graduate work at Clark University, as a Carnegie Fellow in International Law, 1927-28. He taught at Sterling College, Kansas, 1925-27 and at Oregon State College, 1929-30, before coming to Southern Illinois University to inaugurate a new Department of Government in 1930. He is survived by his wife, Helen, and two daughters. His colleagues and a generation of graduate students and foreign students mourn his passing. Dean Swartz was especially noted for his deep personal concern for students and their progress.—DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY.

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
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
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
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


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
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
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